XXXX v Dr. Myelone Tharmaseelan (MA-23NCvC-3-06/2026)

MUHAMMAD RIDZWAN DAMIRI BIN NAJLI (NRIC No.:090510-04-0187) (a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition and a minor suing through his father and litigation representative, NAJLI BIN YAKOB (NRIC No.: 810222-11-5335))

NAJLI BIN YAKOB (NRIC No.: 810222-11-5335) (father suing as the administrator of the estate of MUHAMMAD HAZIQ DAMIRIBIN NAJLI (NRIC No.: 140216-09-0055), deceased, for himself and as the litigation representative of MUHAMMAD RIDZWAN DAMIRIBIN NAJLI)

ARBAE'YAH BINTI ZAKARIYA (NRIC No.: 841003-04-5180) (mother suing as the administrator of the estate of MUHAMMAD HAZIQ DAMIRIBIN NAJLI (NRIC No.: 140216-09-0055), deceased, and for herself) ... PLAINTIFFS

DR. MYELONE THARMASEELAN (MMC Registration No.: 70850)

GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT A. INTRODUCTION [1] This is the Plaintiffs' appeal to the Judge in Chambers under Order 56 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("the ROC 2012") against the decision of the learned Senior Assistant Registrar given on 22 June 2026, at the first case management of this action, registered as Civil Suit No. MA-23NCvC-3-06/2026, by which the Plaintiffs' action was struck out on the ground that it had been registered under a wrong case code ("dibatalkan atas alasan pendaftaran kod salah"). The appeal is brought by the Notice of Appeal to the Judge in Chambers filed on 24 June 2026 (Enclosure 6), and the relief sought is the reinstatement of the action ("dihidupkan semula"). [2] The action was commenced by a Writ of Summons issued under the seal of this Court on 18 June 2026 (Enclosure 1), together with a Statement of Claim filed on the same day (Enclosure 2). It is a claim in medical negligence arising out of the assessment and management of the First Plaintiff, a minor and a person of unsound mind not so found by inquisition, at Hospital Melaka in June 2023, and out of the death, on 5 July 2023, of his younger brother, Muhammad Haziq Damiri bin Najli ("the deceased"). [3] The appeal does not concern the merits of that claim. The Defendants have not yet pleaded to it, and nothing in these grounds is to be read as expressing any view on the allegations of negligence, which remain to be tested in the ordinary way. [4] The controversy raised by the appeal is narrow, but it is of some importance to registry practice under the electronic filing system. It is whether an error in the administrative code under which an action is registered is a defect capable of nullifying the proceedings or of justifying the striking out of the action; and, connected to it, whether such an order may be made at the first case management of the Court's own motion, without any application by a defendant and before any defendant has entered appearance. [5] An appeal from the Registrar to the Judge in Chambers under Order 56 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 operates as an actual rehearing. The Judge is not confined to asking whether the Registrar erred in the exercise of a discretion; the matter is considered afresh on the materials on the court file. These grounds proceed on that footing. B. MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY [6] The facts material to the appeal are procedural and lie within a short compass. The facts underlying the claim are, at this stage, pleaded allegations only; they are summarised solely to explain the nature of the action and the setting in which the impugned order was made. [7] As pleaded in the Statement of Claim (Enclosure 2), the First Plaintiff was in 2023 a fourteen-year-old Form 2 student. Following escalating episodes of behavioural disturbance, described in the pleading as including hysteria, trance-like states, unprovoked aggression and attempts to strangle family members, his parents the Second and Third Plaintiffs brought him on 20 June 2023 to the Emergency Department of Hospital Melaka, where he was referred to the Psychiatric Department under the care and management of the First Defendant, a medical officer. The Statement of Claim alleges that the First Defendant did not admit the First Plaintiff for inpatient psychiatric observation or arrange an urgent specialist assessment, and instead arranged outpatient referrals. [8] It is further pleaded that on 5 July 2023, while at home with the deceased, the First Plaintiff strangled the deceased, and that the cause of death was concluded as neck compression due to manual strangulation. The First Plaintiff is pleaded to have been thereafter admitted for psychiatric evaluation pursuant to court orders and to have been diagnosed with schizophrenia. [9] The Second and Third Plaintiffs sue for themselves and as administrators of the estate of the deceased, and their claims are expressly brought pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of the Civil Law Act 1956. The Second Plaintiff sues in addition as the litigation representative of the First Plaintiff. The claim is brought against the First Defendant, against Hospital Melaka as the Second Defendant, and against the Government of Malaysia as the Third Defendant, in negligence and breach of duty; vicarious liability and a non-delegable duty of care are pleaded against the Second and Third Defendants. [10] Upon registration through the e-Filing system on 18 June 2026, the action was assigned Civil Suit No. MA-23NCvC-306/2026, and the Writ was issued under the seal of this Court on the same day. The number so assigned is composite in structure: the prefix "MA" identifies the Melaka High Court registry; "23NCvC" is the case-type code under which the action was classified upon registration; "3" is the running (serial) number of the action within that code; and "06/2026" records the month and year of filing. It is the middle element the case-type code "23NCvC" with which this appeal is concerned. [11] On 19 June 2026 the Plaintiffs filed, pursuant to Order 76 rule 3 of the ROC 2012, the Certificate by Solicitor in respect of a person under disability (Enclosure 4) and the Consent of the Litigation Representative (Enclosure 5), both dated 16 June 2026. [12] The first case management of the action was conducted by way of eReview before the learned Senior Assistant Registrar on 22 June 2026 four days after the issue of the Writ, and before any Defendant had entered appearance. On that date the learned Senior Assistant Registrar ordered that the action be struck out ("dibatalkan") on the ground that it had been registered under a wrong code ("atas alasan pendaftaran kod salah"), as the decision is recorded in the Notice of Appeal (Enclosure 6). The order was directed at the action itself that is, at Civil Suit No. MA-23NCvC-306/2026 as registered and not at any pleading or step within it. The record does not disclose which code the learned Senior Assistant Registrar considered to be the correct one: no grounds appear on the record, no minute identifying the correct code appears on the court file, and no classification practice direction is referred to anywhere in the record. No summons or application by any Defendant was before the Court; no memorandum of appearance appears on the court file; and there is nothing to show that the Plaintiffs were first directed to rectify the code and failed to do so. [13] On 24 June 2026 the Plaintiffs filed the Notice of Appeal to the Judge in Chambers (Enclosure 6), within the fourteen days prescribed by Order 56 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. No Defendant took part in the proceedings before the learned Senior Assistant Registrar, and none appeared on the appeal. C. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION [14] Three issues arise for determination:

whether the registration of an action under an incorrect case code is a defect which renders the proceedings a nullity, or is at most an irregularity within the meaning of Order 2 rule 1 of the ROC 2012;

whether it was open to the Registrar, at the first case management and of the Court's own motion, to strike out a duly issued writ on that ground; and

if the order cannot stand, what orders ought to follow on a rehearing. [15] The first issue is dispositive of the appeal. The second concerns the manner in which the power was exercised; the third, the consequential relief. D. GOVERNING LAW AND FRAMEWORK [16] Order 1A of the ROC 2012 directs that in administering the Rules, the Court or a Judge shall have regard to the overriding interest of justice and not only to the technical non-compliance with the Rules. It states the lens through which every procedural question arising under the Rules is to be approached. [17] Order 2 rule 1(1) provides that where there has been a failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules, the failure shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not nullify the proceedings, any step taken in the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order therein. Order 2 rule 1(2) declares the Rules to be a procedural code, subject to the overriding objective of enabling the Court to deal with cases justly. Order 2 rule 1(3) empowers the Court, where such a failure has occurred, to cure the irregularity by allowing amendments and by making such order dealing with the proceedings generally as it deems fit. Order 2 rule 3 completes the scheme: an objection founded only on noncompliance with the Rules is not to be upheld unless the noncompliance has occasioned a substantial miscarriage of justice, or prejudice which cannot be cured by amendment or by an appropriate order as to costs. The principle underlying that scheme has been stated at the highest level; but so have its limits, and both must be kept in view. In Megat Najmuddin bin Dato' Seri (Dr) Megat Khas v Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd [2002] 1 MLJ 385 (FC), the appellant had been shut out from a hearing of his appeal on the merits on account of a defect in the record of appeal. The Federal Court held that the duty of the court to ensure that justice is done outweighs procedural technicalities; and it further held that practice directions, although they must be complied with once properly and legally issued, cannot supersede or deviate substantially from statutory rules of court, and are, to the extent of any such conflict, of no legal effect. In Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj v Datuk Captain Hamzah bin Mohd Noor and Another Appeal [2009] 4 MLJ 149; [2009] 4 CLJ 329 (FC), the Federal Court marked the boundary of the indulgence: technical non-compliance with the Rules may be remedied where it is the product of accidental omission or oversight, but a general provision such as Order 1A cannot supersede a mandatory requirement of the Rules, and cannot be invoked to cure non-compliance by a party who intentionally disregards them. Two notes of caution attend the use of these authorities. First, the holding in Megat Najmuddin on practice directions was pronounced in the context of a conflict between a practice direction and statutory rules of court. No such conflict arises in this appeal: as appears at [21] below, Arahan Amalan Bil. 6 Tahun 2013 attaches no consequence to a miscoding and contains nothing capable of colliding with the ROC 2012. The case is accordingly relied upon for its primary holding that the duty of the court to ensure that justice is done outweighs procedural technicality and for the subordinate, administrative status it assigns to practice directions; it is not relied upon to resolve a conflict, for there is none to resolve. Secondly, the distinction drawn in Tunku Ibrahim Ismail between inadvertent error, which the courts will cure, and intentional disregard, which they will not, was drawn in relation to compliance with the Rules themselves; it is applied in these grounds, by parity of reasoning, to a departure from an administrative direction which stands below the Rules. So confined, that distinction remains central both to the disposal of this appeal and to the safeguards addressed at [41] to [44] below. [19] The power to terminate an action summarily is draconian. Whether it is invoked under Order 18 rule 19 of the ROC 2012 or under the inherent powers of the Court preserved by Order 92 rule 4, it is exercised sparingly and only in plain and obvious cases: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (SC). That threshold — that summary termination is reserved for claims which are obviously unsustainable — is the ratio of the decision and remains the governing standard. Although neither Order 18 rule 19 nor the inherent jurisdiction was invoked before the Registrar, no lesser standard could govern an order which produces the same terminal result. [20] The powers of the Registrar at case management stand within the same discipline. Order 32 rule 9 of the ROC 2012 confers upon the Registrar power to transact all such business and exercise all such authority and jurisdiction as may under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 or the Rules be transacted and exercised by a Judge in Chambers, except such business, authority and jurisdiction as the Chief Judge may from time to time direct, or as the Rules may expressly direct, to be transacted or exercised by a Judge in person. The grant is wide, but it is not at large, and its limits were examined in Carsem (M) Sdn Bhd v Fatimah bt Noordin [2022] 7 MLJ 905, in which it was contended that a Senior Assistant Registrar had, at a case management conducted by way of e-Review, struck out with finality an appeal from the sessions court to the High Court while an application to strike out that appeal remained pending and unheard. The High Court set the order aside, holding that the Registrar has no power to make an order which has the effect of disposing with finality of an appeal from the subordinate court, that being business which Order 55 rule 5(1) reserves to a Judge in person; that under sections 3, 10(3) and 18(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 the office of the Registrar is separate from that of a Judge, so that while "Judge" under Order 1 rule 4 includes, where he is empowered to act, a Registrar, the converse does not hold true; that, even if the power had existed, no striking-out order could have been made at the e-Review because no earlier direction had been given the non-compliance with which could attract that sanction; and that an order which the Registrar has no power to make is a nullity and of no legal effect. Three propositions drawn from that decision bear directly upon this appeal: the jurisdiction which Order 32 rule 9 delegates to the Registrar is subject to the limits which the Rules themselves impose; the sanction of striking out at case management presupposes a direction previously given and disobeyed; and, as the court there observed, an occasion appointed only for case management is not one appointed for the disposal of the cause. [21] Case codes stand outside the Rules altogether. The assignment of a code upon registration is a matter of registry administration under the practice directions governing the classification of cases in the e-Filing system. Practice directions are administrative in character: they facilitate the orderly conduct of the courts' business, but they do not have the force of law, they cannot override the ROC 2012, and they neither confer jurisdiction nor create a power to dismiss an action. No provision of the ROC 2012 prescribes case codes or makes the validity of proceedings depend upon them. To forestall misunderstanding: no conflict between Arahan Amalan Bil. 6 Tahun 2013, to which I turn immediately below, and the ROC 2012 arises in this appeal, and Megat Najmuddin (above) is not invoked to resolve one. Its relevance lies a step earlier, in the status it confirms: a practice direction, though it must be complied with once properly and legally issued, stands below statutory rules of court and cannot supersede them. From that subordinate status one conclusion follows of its own force — and would follow from the holding in Megat Najmuddin even if the Arahan Amalan had purported to authorise the striking out of a miscoded action, which, as will be seen, it does not: a practice direction cannot supply a ground of dismissal which the Rules themselves withhold. The classification of case codes is presently prescribed by the Office of the Chief Registrar in Arahan Amalan Bil. 6 Tahun 2013 (Pengkelasan Kod bagi Kes-Kes di Mahkamah Tinggi, Mahkamah Sesyen dan Mahkamah Majistret Seluruh Malaysia), issued on 11 June 2013 and in force from 1 July 2013 in respect of cases filed on or after that date. Its stated purpose, in paragraph 3, is to establish a single Senarai Khas Pengkelasan Kod Perihal Perkara and to secure uniformity of classification across the High Courts and the subordinate courts. Under the Lampiran Pengkelasan Kod annexed to it, in the civil list for the High Court: item 34 assigns Kod 21 NCvC to a writ of summons by and against the Government in the civil stream ("Writ Saman oleh dan terhadap Kerajaan (Sivil)"); item 39 assigns Kod 22 NCvC to the general writ of summons ("Writ Saman"); and item 45 assigns Kod 23 NCvC to a writ of summons founded on tort ("Writ Saman (Tort)"). The suffix "NCvC" denotes the civil, as distinct from the commercial ("NCC"), stream. Paragraph 13 directs that, for High Courts which do not have the specialised courts established at the High Court in Kuala Lumpur — and this Court is one — all subject matters shall ("HENDAKLAH") be given a classification code according to that Senarai Khas; paragraph 12 provides that any subject matter not listed is to be classified under the general civil suit code; and paragraph 16 reminds the courts that they may not assign classification codes to matters before them arbitrarily. What is significant for present purposes is what the Arahan Amalan does not say: it prescribes the classification to be applied, but it neither provides for, nor even adverts to, any consequence for the validity of an action registered under an incorrect code, still less the striking out of such an action. Finally, the statutory setting of the claim is relevant to the question of prejudice. Subsection 7(5) of the Civil Law Act 1956 [Act 67] provides that not more than one action shall be brought for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint, and that every such action shall be brought within three years after the death of the person deceased. By subsection 7(2), such an action is for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, child and any person with disabilities under the care, if any, of the person whose death has been so caused, and is brought by and in the name of the executor of the person deceased an expression which section 2 of the Act defines to include the administrator of a deceased person. The Second and Third Plaintiffs sue as the administrators of the estate of the deceased and, in their own right, as his parents. Section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 prescribes, where it applies, a period of thirty-six months for actions against persons in respect of acts done in pursuance or execution of public duties. Whether and how these provisions apply to the present claims is not before me and is not decided; their existence is material only because it defines the risk to which the striking out of this action exposed the Plaintiffs. E. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION Issue 1: Whether the Miscoding Nullified the Proceedings or Could Justify Striking Out [23] The starting point is to identify what a case code is, and what it is not. The code forms part of the registration number assigned to an action here, "MA-23NCvC-3-06/2026" and serves to identify the registry, the classification of the subject matter, the running number and the year of filing. It is machinery of court administration: it enables the registry to track, allocate and account for cases. It determines neither the jurisdiction of the Court, nor the identity of the parties, nor the cause of action, nor any right or obligation of any litigant. [24] The significance of the code under which this action was in fact registered should not be overlooked. The claim pleaded in the Statement of Claim (Enclosure 2) is a claim in negligence a claim founded on tort. The action was commenced by writ, and Kod 23 NCvC, under which it was registered, is the code which item 45 of the Lampiran to Arahan Amalan Bil. 6 Tahun 2013 assigns to a writ of summons founded on tort ("Writ Saman (Tort)"). On the face of the governing classification, therefore, the registration of this action under code "23NCvC" was not obviously wrong at all. If the objection was that the presence of the Government of Malaysia as the Third Defendant attracted a different code such as Kod 21 NCvC, which item 34 of the same