1. ) XXXX v Mohamad Hafizudin Bin Mohd Ali (CB-A53KJ-41-02/2024)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: CB-A53KJ-41-02/2024

Lampiran

Lampiran 12; iv.Afidavit Balasan yang diikrarkan oleh Kishan a/l Govinda Raju pada 13.8.2024 di Lampiran 13. 3.ALASAN-ALASAN PERMOHONAN OLEH DEFENDAN ADALAH SEPERTI BERIKUT: 3.1Tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif adalah susulan daripada suatu kemalangan jalan raya yang berlaku pada 3.5.2018. Hazmi bin Mat (si mati Pertama) merupakan penunggang motosikal TX3584 manakala Rohani binti Abdul Latif (simati Kedua) serta Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua merupakan pembonceng motosikal TX3584. 3.2.Kemalangan dikatakan berlaku di antara Defendan yang memandu motokar No. WPE 6960 dan motosikal no. TX 3584 yang ditunggang oleh simati Pertama 3.3.Disebabkan kemalangan tersebut, Simati Pertama telah meninggal dunia pada 3.5.2018, manakala simati Kedua telah meninggal dunia pada 10.5.2018; 3.4.Manakala Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua telah mengalami kecederaan akibat kemalangan tersebut. 3.5.Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua membawa tuntutan ini untuk kecederaan kepada diri sendiri serta di bawah Seksyen 7 Akta Sivil untuk kehilangan tanggungan. 3.6.Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif yang difailkan pada 23 Februari 2024 adalah di luar jangka masa yang dibenarkan iaitu lebih daripada 3 tahun selepas kausa tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif terakru (yakni pada tarikh kematian simati-simati berdasarkan Seksyen 7 (5) Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956. 3.7.Tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif di bawah Seksyen 7 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 adalah mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan dan suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. 4. HUJAHAN PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF Merujuk kepada afidavit bantahan pihak Plaintif, Plaintif menyatakan bantahan, bahawa permohonan Defendan adalah cacat dan tidak teratur dari segi undang-undang kerana ianya dibuat di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (b) dan (c) dan/atau (d). Tidak wujud sebarang kaedah seperti ini dalam Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2021. Sepatutnya di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (1) (b) dan/atau (c ) dan/atau (d) tanpa memilih di bawah peruntukkan mana permohonan ini dibuat.Plaintif-Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa, Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan dalam tindakan ini bertarikh 23.2.2024 tetapi telah difailkan pada 21.2.2024. 5.Plaintif juga menghujahkan bahawa pada waktu kejadian dimana Plaintif Pertama dan Kedua kehilangan ibubapa mereka, mereka berumur 8 dan 6 tahun masing-masing.Kedua-dua Plaintif Pertama dan kedua adalah kanak-kanak di bawah umur dan had masa tidak bermula sehingga mereka mencapai umur dewasa. Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa Pliding pihak Defendan adalah cacat dan tidak mempertikaikan isu ini. 6.Plaintif juga menyatakan bahawa saman dan pernyataan tuntutan telah difailkan sebelum had masa luput. HUJAHAN DEFENDAN 7.Defendan menyatakan bahawa, isu sama ada Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 23.2.2024 atau difailkan pada 21.2.22024 tidak menjejaskan hak Defendan dalam memfailkan Notis Permohonan tersebut kerana ianya secara jelas menunjukkan bahawa Writ Saman dan Pernyataan tersebut difailkan di luar jangka masa yang dibenarkan iaitu lebih daripada 3 tahun selepas kausa tindakan Plaintif-Plaintif terakru (iaitu pada tarikh kematian simati-simati) berdasarkan peruntukkan undang-undang yang sedia ada. 8.Isu permohonan pihak Defendan dibuat di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (b) dan (c) dan/atau (d) adalah suatu kesilapan dan/atau ketinggalan yang tidak disengajakan dan tidak mencacatkan keseluruhan permohonan Defendan di Lampiran 10. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH ISU PERTAMA: Kedua-dua Plaintif Pertama dan Kedua adalah kanak-kanak bawah umur, dan sama ada had masa tidak bermula sehingga mereka mencapai umur dewasa. ISU KEDUA: Sama ada Pliding pihak Defendan yang cacat serta tidak mempertikaikan isu ini ISU PERTAMA: 9.Pihak Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua boleh membawa tuntutan ini kerana mereka belum mencapai umur dewasa (18 tahun) dan pliding pihak Defendan yang memplidkan “defence of limitation”. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Lee Cheng Yee v.Tiu Soon Siang t/a Tiyor Soon Company [2004] 1 CLJ 1 CA. “In his riposte, the appellant/plaintiff's counsel submitted that the issue of limitation was not specifically pleaded in the defence of the respondent, and neither was a request made that the matter be set down as a preliminary issue. As such, it was his submission that the respondent is not entitled to rely on the limitation to defeat the claim. We would in principle have been persuaded by this submission, but for the timely intervention of the respondent's counsel who drew our attention to the case of Kuan Hip Peng v. Yap Yin & Anor [1964] CLJU 69; [1964] 1 LNS 69; [1965] 31 AMR 212. The brief facts of the case were that the plaintiff who in fact was suing by his next friend was claiming compensation under s. 7 of the Civil Law Ordinance for loss arising from the death of his father as a result of the alleged negligent driving of a motor vehicle owned by the first defendant and driven by the second defendant. The alleged negligent driving occurred on 22 November 1960 and the plaintiff's father died on 23 November 1960. A writ was issued on 27 November 1963, ie, four days after the expiry of the period of three years in contravention of s. 7(5) of the Civil Law Ordinance. No defence was filed by the defendants, but on 27 January 1964, the defendants took out a summons under O. 25 r. 4 for an order that all proceedings in the action be stayed on the ground that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of court process. The application was supported by an affidavit stating, "The action commenced by the writ of summons herein must necessarily fall because it was not brought within three years after the death of the deceased person in question." The application came before Hashim J (as he then was) who adjourned it into open court for hearing, and in the event, made an order that the plaintiff's suit be dismissed. On appeal to the Federal Court, Thompson LP in dismissing the appeal had this to say: Now it is clear from the general course of reasoning upon which it is based and from the reference to the Real Property Limitation Acts that the case of Dismore v. Milton, supra, has no application in relation to a Statute of Limitations which is absolute and without exceptions. Where there are exceptions which would affect the operation of the statute it is clear that a plaintiff need not plead them until the defence of limitation has been raised on the pleadings by the defendant (see Dawkins v. Penrhyn, supra;Busch v. Stevens). But that is not the position in the present case. The terms of section 7(5) of the Civil Law Ordinance are absolute and contain no exceptions. They are that "such action shall be brought within three years after the death of the deceased person". It is true that, as Goddard L.J. said with reference to the corresponding section of the English Act, the section "merely prescribes a period of limitation" (Lubovsky v. Snelling) and that it does not contain a condition precedent or anything of the sort. Nevertheless the period is absolute. There is no room for doubt as to when it begins to run. It runs from the death of the person of whose support the plaintiff has been deprived. The cause of action arises on death (see Seward v. "Vera Cruz"). There are none of the saving provisions in favour of a plaintiff that were found in the Statute of James I and are to be found today in the English Limitation Act of 1939 or our own Limitation Ordinance of 1953. There is no question of infancy or disability or anything of the sort or of acknowledgment. The only way in which the consequences of the section could be avoided would be if there had been some agreement not to plead the statute and this would constitute a new cause of action (Lubovsky v. Snelling, supra) and would require to be set out in the Statement of Claim.” 10.Mahkamah merujuk Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (1) (b),(c), (d) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, yang menyatakan seperti berikut: Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18, r. 19) (1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that— (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. (2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under subparagraph (1)(a). 11. Dalam kes See Thong & Anor V Saw Beng Chong [2013] 4 MLRA 259 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: - “[9] An applicant for striking out under O 18 r 19 can rely on any one or more than one sub-paragraphs (a) to (d). So far, there is no authority to say otherwise. Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia clearly confirms that an applicant under this rule is entitled to rely on any or all of the grounds specified in the rule. An application under this rule is not void and ineffective merely because sub-paragraph (a) had been pleaded together with sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d). The only limitation imposed under sub-rule (2) is that for an application under sub-paragraph (a), no evidence is admissible. However, where the court proceeds to decide an application under any other sub-paragraph, affidavit evidence should be admissible. Even though sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) are to be read disjunctively, it does not mean that an applicant cannot rely on more one sub-paragraph in his application.” 12.Dalam kes Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors V United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 1 MLRA 611, di mana Mahkamah menyatakan seperti berikut: “[13] The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It [1993] 1 MLRA Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd 615 is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it “obviously unsustainable” (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L & NW Ry Co [1892] 3 Ch 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in para materia with our O 33 r 2 Rules of the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” 13.Mahkamah ini, setelah meneliti tuntutan Plaintif-Plaintif di bawah Seksyen 7 Akta Sivil 1956, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa tuntutan Plaintif adalah suatu “abuse of the process of court” kerana ianya dibawa di luar had masa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Seksyen 7(5) Akta Sivil 1956. 14.Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Lee Cheng Yee (supra) menyatakan bahawa: i.Sesuatu tindakan di bawah Seksyen 7 Akta Sivil 1956 harus dibawa dalam linkungan masa 3 tahun dari tarikh kematian simati; ii.Isu umur dewasa infancy dan kecacatan “disability” tidak akan akan menjadi sesuatu pengecualian. Mahkamah juga merujuk kes Kuan Hip Peng v. Yap Yin & Anor [1964] 1 MLRA 727: “The plaintiff in these proceedings is an infant suing by his next friend and he is claiming compensation under s. 7 of the Civil Law Ordinance for loss arising from the death of his father as a result of the alleged negligent driving of a motor vehicle owned by the first defendant and driven by the second defendant. The alleged negligent driving occurred on 22 November 1960, and the plaintiff's father died on 23 November 1960. The writ (with statement of claim endorsed) was issued on 27 November 1963, that is four days after the expiration of the period of three years mentioned in sub-section (5) of s. 7 of the Civil Law Ordinance which reads as follows (the italics are mine): Not more than one action shall be brought for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint, and i every such action shall be brought within three years after the death of such deceased person." No defence was filed but on 27 January 1964 the defendant's took out a summons under O. 25 r. 4 for an order that all further proceedings in the action be stayed and that the writ be struck out on the ground that the claim endorsed on it was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. The basis of the application is thus stated in the supporting affidavit: The action commenced by the Writ of Summons herein must necessarily fail because it was not brought within three years after the death of the deceased person in question. The application came before Hashim J who adjourned it into open Court for hearing and in the event made an order that "the plaintiff's suit be dismissed". 15.Berdasarkan kes-kes di atas, adalah jelas bahawa tiada sebarang pengecualian di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Sivil 1956 untuk membenarkan Plaintif-Plaintif memfailkan tuntutannya di luar had masa yang diperuntukkan walaupun mereka belum mencapai umur dewasa. 16. ISU KEDUA Mahkamah merujuk kes Joseph Anthony & Anor v Dr. Muhammad Arif Mohamad Rasat & Ors [2023] 6 MLRH 599, di mana Mahkamah Tinggi menyatakan seperti berikut: [169] I consider it settled law that: i. a defendant need not plead the limitation defence under s 2 of PAPA and s7(5) of the Civil Law Act in order to rely on these two sections to dismiss a suit. This is because the terms of limitation in these two sections are absolute and contain no exceptions. ii. It is only when a defendant wants to rely on the defence of limitation under the Limitation Act 1953 that he must plead the limitation defence. This is because the terms of limitation in the Limitation Act 1953 are not absolute but contain exceptions. Further, s 4 of the Limitation Act states that limitation under the Limitation Act shall not operate as a bar unless specially pleaded as a defence. 17.Mahkamah turut merujuk kes Tasja Sdn Bhd v Golden Approach Sdn Bhd [2011] 1 MLRA 135, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan seperti berikut: [25] After scrutinizing the authorities above we agree with the submission of the plaintiff that in an application for striking out under O 18 r 19(1) RHC on the ground of limitation to bring an action, a distinction must be made as to which provision of the law is used to ground such application. If it is based on s 2(a) of PAPA or s 7(5) of the Civil Law Act, where the period of limitation is absolute then in a clear and obvious case such application should be granted without having to plead such a defence. 18.Mahkamah juga memutuskan bahawa, permohonan pihak Defendan dibuat di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 (b) dan (c) dan/atau (d) adalah suatu kesilapan dan/atau ketinggalan yang tidak disengajakan dan tidak mencacatkan keseluruhan permohonan Defendan di Lampiran 10. Bantahan pihak Plaintif tersebut ditolak oleh Mahkamah. Mahkamah merujuk kes : Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar A-Haj v. Datuk Captain Hamzah Mohd Noor & Another Appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 329 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: [46] The technical non-compliance of any rule may be remedied where there is an accidental omission or oversight by a party. A general provision such as O. 1A RHC is for the court or judge to give heed to justice over technical non-compliance. It must not supersede a mandatory requirement of the Rules. O. 1A RHC cannot be invoked when a party intentionally disregards in complying with the Rules. Otherwise, parties would be encouraged to ignore the Rules. Thus in this case, O. 1A RHC does not apply as the respondents had intentionally disregarded O. 6 r. 7(2A) RHC for their own reasons. 19.Berdasarkan kes-kes yang dirujuk di atas, Mahkamah ini juga mendapati tiada keperluan untuk pihak defendan memplidkan “defence of limitation” kerana seksyen 7 (5) Akta Sivil 1956 adalah absolute dan tiada sebarang pengecualian diperuntukkan. 20.Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes TUNG KEAN HIN & ANOR v. YUEN HENG PHONG [2019] 3 MLRA 580 dimana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut: - [39] The doctrine of laches is based on the Latin maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt (the law serves the vigilant, not those who sleep). It is a defence of an equitable claim based on the length of time the plaintiff has allowed to lapse before commencing proceedings. Similarly, in the appeal before us, we are of the considered view that His Lordship erred when he failed to give due consideration to the fact that the plaintiff had slept upon her alleged rights and interest over the Property , if any, and had not taken any steps upon the discovery of the alleged forgery only deciding to comm ence this action in 2014. No reason was given for the delay in commencing action, an inaction with one eye's open so to speak 21. Maka, setelah mempertimbangkan hujahan-hujahan dan juga nas-nas perundangan dan juga atas alasan-alasan tersebut, Mahkamah ini, setelah meneliti Afidavit Sokongan tersebut dan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan, Mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan Defendan di Lampiran 10 dengan kos. 22.Plaintif-Plaintif hanya dibenarkan membawa tuntutan di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Sivil 1956 untuk kehilangan tanggungan dalam had masa yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 7 (5) Akta Sivil 1956. AHMAD RIZKI BIN ABDUL JALIL Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen 2 Temerloh Pahang. 14 Mac 2025. Peguam Plaintif-Plaintif: Tetuan Sahril Niza & Co. Peguambela & Peguamcara Pasir Gudang, Johor. Peguam Defendan : Tetuan Naicker & Associates. Peguambela & Peguamcara Kuala Lumpur.