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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL: NO: P-02(NCVC)(W)-1821-10/2015
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Court of Appeal of Malaysia10 Nov 2017P-02(NCVC)(W)-1821-10/2015
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“now follow. 3 [4] For ease of reference the parties will be referred to as they were described in the High Court. BRIEF BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The 1st Defendant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 which deals with wholesale and retail sales of automotive parts, batteries and accessories. [6] The 1st De”
“(c) The Defendants had failed to plead any recognizable defences provided under the Defamation Act 1957; 6”
“here was no judicial appreciation 14 of the evidence adduced before it (see Hamit Matusin & Ors v Penguasa Tanah dan Survey & Anor Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 251; Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87). The Appeal Before Us [21] The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendants was premised on the tort of defamat”
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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL: NO: P-02(NCVC)(W)-1821-10/2015
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YOKOMASU MARKETING SDN BHD (No. Syarikat No: 904778-V)
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THEOH CHARNG FA (NRIC No: 740310-02-5283) ...PERAYU-PERAYU DAN CHOR TSE MIN (NRIC No: 730217-07-5375) ...RESPONDEN [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Pulau Pinang Guaman No: 23NCVC-6-08/2013 Antara Chor Tse Min (No. K/P: 730217-07-5375) ...Plaintif Dan
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Yokomasu Marketing Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 904778-V)
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Theoh Charng Fa (No. K/P: 740310-02-5283) ...Defendan-Defendan] 2 CORAM: IDRUS BIN HARUN, JCA MARY LIM THIAM SUAN, JCA ASMABI BINTI MOHAMAD, JCA JUDGMENT OF THE COURT INTRODUCTION [1] The Appellants (“the Defendants in the High Court”) had appealed against the decision of the High Court in Penang which allowed the Respondent’s (“the Plaintiff in the High Court”) claim with costs. Vide the decision dated 29th September 2015, the Appellants were ordered to pay the Respondent damages for defamation in the sum of RM200,000.00. The 1st Appellant was further ordered to pay the sum of RM76,000.00 being the outstanding salary and directorship’s fee totaling RM2,000.00 per month from August 2012 to date of judgment. Costs and interests were also ordered against the Defendants. [2] Having perused the records of appeal, the written submissions filed herein and having heard the arguments of both learned Counsel for the Respondent and the Appellants we allowed the appeal with costs of RM30,000.00 here and below. [3] Our reasons for doing so now follow. 3 [4] For ease of reference the parties will be referred to as they were described in the High Court. BRIEF BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The 1st Defendant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 which deals with wholesale and retail sales of automotive parts, batteries and accessories. [6] The 1st Defendant was established by both the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant on 16th June 2010. [7] The Plaintiff is a director and the Sales Manager of the 1 st Defendant, who holds 40% shares of the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant is also a director of the 1st Defendant who holds 60% of the shares. The Plaintiff’s monthly basic salary is RM1,500.00 plus RM500.00 as directorship fee. [8] On 29th March 2011, one Ong Bee Wah was appointed as another director of the 1st Defendant and in 2013, the 2nd Defendant sold one of his shares to Ong Bee Wah at RM1.00. [9] On 15th January 2013, the 1st Defendant had caused a notice to be published in the Sin Chew Newspaper (“the impugned Notice”) in Mandarin, which was translated to Bahasa Malaysia as follows: 4 “Dengan ini memberi Notis bahawa Pemegang Saham Syarikat kami iaitu CHOR TSE MIN (K/P No. 730217-07-5357) telah pada bulan September 2012 meletak jawatan. Oleh yang demikian mulai dari tarikh tersebut beliau tidak mempunyai sebarang hak atau kuasa untuk mewakili Syarikat kami dalam apa jua urusniaga dan juga untuk mengutip/memungut apa-apa wang. Juga dalam tempoh masa 3 hari ini Penama dikehendaki melaporkan diri ke Pejabat ini untuk menyelesaikan segala masalah berhubung dengan Syarikat kami. Jikalau tidak segala akibatnya hendaklah ditanggung oleh Penama sendiri. Dengan ini disiarkan Notis ini untuk makluman. YOKOMASU MARKETING SDN BHD (904778) 113, 115 & 117, Jalan Kota Permai, Taman Kota Permai, 14000 Bukit Mertajam, Penang. 13/1/2013” [10] According to the Plaintiff, the impugned Notice was calculated to expose the Plaintiff to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of a reasonable man. The Plaintiff further contended that a cursory reading of the impugned Notice would obviously mean that the Plaintiff is an unethical and dishonest businessman. [11] On 21st November 2013, the Plaintiff brought a civil suit for defamation against the 1st and 2nd Defendants seeking for, amongst others, the following reliefs:
a
(a) his outstanding monthly salary of RM2,000.00 including his directorship fees of RM500.00 from August 2012 until the date of judgment; 5
b
(b) general damages;
c
(c) aggravated damages; and
d
(d) a formal apology by the Defendants to the Plaintiff in Sin Chew Newspaper and the Star Newspaper within 7 days of the date of judgment. IN THE HIGH COURT The Plaintiff’s Case [12] The Plaintiff’s case is summarized as follows:
a
(a) The impugned Notice which was published in Sin Chew Newspaper on 15th January 2013 is defamatory of the Plaintiff. The words in the impugned Notice as particularized at paragraph 9 of the Amended Statement of Claim were calculated to expose the Plaintiff to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of reasonable man;
b
(b) It was further contended that the words in the impugned Notice were false and in its ordinary and natural meaning bore the imputation that the Plaintiff is devoid of integrity;
c
(c) The Defendants had failed to plead any recognizable defences provided under the Defamation Act 1957; 6
d
(d) The impugned Notice was made to cause clients and employees of the 1st Defendant as well as friends, family and the general public to have a perception that the Plaintiff is a cheat, dishonest, unreliable, incompetent, undignified, and a problematic person;
e
(e) The words published in the impugned Notice were untrue, confusing and defamatory to the Plaintiff as the words in their usual and ordinary meaning implied that the Plaintiff is unethical and devoid of integrity; and
f
(f) The 2nd Defendant had deliberately and unlawfully interfered in the business between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The Defendants’ Case [13] In brief, the Defendants’ case is as follows:
a
(a) The 1st and 2nd Defendants are two separate legal entities and the Plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd Defendant for his outstanding salary is unmaintainable;
b
(b) Prior to the current proceedings, the Plaintiff had brought a complaint to the Labour Department for unlawful termination. As a result, the 1st Defendant was ordered to pay a sum of RM1,500.00 as full and final settlement. Therefore, Plaintiff 7 cannot bring another claim for his outstanding salary against the 1st Defendant;
c
(c) The 2nd Defendant did not publish or cause to publish the impugned Notice as the Notice only bore the name of the 1st Defendant; and
d
(d) The impugned Notice did not accuse the Plaintiff of any wrongdoing as the words used in their usual and ordinary meaning are not defamatory to the Plaintiff. FINDINGS OF THE LEARNED JC [14] The learned JC made the following findings: Defamation
a
(a) The burden of proof lies on the Plaintiff to show:
i
(i) the words are defamatory;
Subparagraph
(ii) the words refer to Plaintiff; and
Subparagraph
(iii) the words were published.
b
(b) The impugned Notice can be summarized as:
i
(i) Plaintiff resigned from the 1st Defendant company in September 2012; 8
Subparagraph
(ii) Plaintiff had no authority or rights to represent the 1st Defendant or to make any collection of payment on behalf of the 1st Defendant with effect from September 2012;
Subparagraph
(iii) Plaintiff had to report to the 1st Defendant’s office to settle all problems pertaining to the 1st Defendant and if the Plaintiff failed to do so, the Plaintiff would bear all the consequences. Defamatory Words
a
(a) The learned JC was of the view that the impugned Notice bore the imputation that the Plaintiff was a person who had created problems in the 1st Defendant and had resigned on September 2012. The Court found the impugned Notice would lower the Plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. Therefore, the words used were defamatory.
b
(b) As there was no dispute that the publication was referring to the Plaintiff and that the impugned Notice was published, the burden then shifted to the Defendants to raise their defence in accordance with the law.
c
(c) The Defendants pleaded that the publication of the impugned Notice was not caused by the 2nd Defendant and in the 9 alternative, the words used were not defamatory of the Plaintiff.
d
(d) The learned JC noted that based on the evidence of the 2nd Defendant, the Plaintiff did not resign as Director of the 1st Defendant and at no time did the 1st Defendant terminate or remove the Plaintiff as the Director. The Plaintiff had also attended the Board of Directors’ Meeting on 15th March 2013, which was after the publication of the Notice. At the meeting, nothing was mentioned with regards to the Plaintiff’s resignation or removal.
e
(e) Therefore, the learned JC came to the conclusion that the publication of the impugned Notice on 15th January 2013 was made with malice and had caused injury to the Plaintiff’s reputation.
f
(f) With regard to 2nd Defendant’s defence that the impugned Notice was not caused by the 2nd Defendant, the learned JC was of the view that the impugned Notice was caused by the 2nd Defendant. This is because, the 2nd Defendant is the largest shareholder of 60%, is the Managing Director and signed most of the cheques issued by the company. In fact, the 2nd Defendant had signed the cheque, being payment for the impugned Notice in the Sin Chew Newspaper. 10
g
(g) In addition, the 2nd Defendant had made a police report, reporting that the Plaintiff was missing since October 2012 together with the company’s Toyota Hilux, company’s payments, receipt book and delivery orders. The learned JC found both Defendants were liable for the said defamation. Unlawful Interference
a
(a) The Plaintiff also pleaded the tort of deliberate interference of the Plaintiff’s interest by unlawful means.
b
(b) The learned JC found there was no clear evidence to show the unlawful interference by the 2nd Defendant in the business between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant. The fact is, the 2nd Defendant is the Managing Director holding 60% of the shares and as such, he will not deliberately do something that will affect the business of the 1st Defendant.
c
(c) The learned JC found the Plaintiff had failed to prove unlawful interference. Plaintiff’s Outstanding Salary and Directorship Fee
a
(a) The Plaintiff’s basic salary is RM1,500.00 and his director’s fee is RM500.00. The Plaintiff had not been paid his salary and director’s fee since August 2012. 11
b
(b) The Order dated 28.03.2014, granted by the Labour Department was only an order for the 1st Defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s basic salary and it does not relate to the Plaintiff’s termination or removal.
c
(c) The learned JC found, the Plaintiff had established his claim for his outstanding salary and director’s fee. Since the 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant are two separate legal entities, the liability to pay for the outstanding salary and director’s fee to be borne by the 1st Defendant only. Damages
a
(a) The learned JC found the Defendants had defamed the Plaintiff. Hence the Plaintiff would be entitled to damages. After considering all relevant factors, the learned Judge awarded the sum of RM200,000.00 to the Plaintiff as damages.
b
(b) The learned JC ordered as follows:
i
(i) The Defendants to pay damages of RM200,000.00 to Plaintiff for the defamation;
Subparagraph
(ii) The 1st Defendant to pay the outstanding salary and director’s fee in a sum of RM2,000.00 per month from 12 August 2012 until the date of judgment, all amounting to RM76,000.00;
Subparagraph
(iii) Payment of interest at 4% per annum on the total judgment sum from the date of filing of the suit until date of judgment and 5% per annum from the date of judgment until full realization; and
Subparagraph
(iv) Costs of RM20,000.00 to the Plaintiff. OUR DECISION The law [15] We were mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relation to findings of facts made by the court of first instance. [16] In the course of that, we had sought guidance from the very often quoted case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng v Gan Yook Chin [2003] 2 MLJ 97 where the Court of Appeal held as follows: “an appellate court will not, generally speaking, intervene unless the trial court is shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision. But appellate interference will take place in cases where there has been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence.” 13 [17] Reference is also made to the decision of the Federal Court in Gan Yook Chin v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng [2004] 4 CLJ 309 where the Federal Court held that the test of “insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence” adopted by the Court of Appeal was in relation to the process of determining whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or findings correctly on the basis of the relevant law and the established evidence. [18] In the above case, the Federal Court had also stated, the Court hearing the appeal is entitled to reverse the decision of the trial judge after making its own comparisons and criticisms of the witnesses and of its own view of the probabilities of the case. It is also entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court and reverse the decision if it is wrong. [19] At the end of the case, the trial judge has a duty to explain how the said court had come to its findings and/or how it appraised the evidence and issues which will determine the outcome of the case before it. In doing so the Judge need not explain or identify every factor that he had considered. If the learned Judge failed to do so, his decision can be set aside (see English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd, DJ & C Whithers (Farms) Ltd v Ambic Equipment Ltd, Verrechia (trading as Freightmaster Commercials) v Commissioner of Police Metropolis [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 3 ER 385). [20] The appellate court must be slow to interfere with the findings made by the trial court unless if it be shown there was no judicial appreciation 14 of the evidence adduced before it (see Hamit Matusin & Ors v Penguasa Tanah dan Survey & Anor Appeal [2006] 2 CLJ 251; Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87). The Appeal Before Us [21] The Plaintiff’s case against the Defendants was premised on the tort of defamation. The Plaintiff pleaded that the Defendants had caused the impugned Notice to be published on 15th January 2013 in Sin Chew Newspaper (see paragraph 8 of the Plaintiff’s Amended Statement of Claim dated 21st November 2013 (“ASOC”)). [22] According to the Plaintiff the words in the impugned Notice, in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean, the meanings as ascribed by the Plaintiff in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his ASOC (see pages 46 to 48 of the Core Bundle). These words according to the Plaintiff, imputed that the Plaintiff is a cheat, dishonest, unreliable, incompetent, undignified, and a problematic person. The words as particularized at paragraph 8 of the ASOC were calculated to expose the Plaintiff to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of reasonable man. [23] It was further contended that the words in the impugned Notice were false and in its ordinary and natural meaning bore the imputation that the Plaintiff is devoid of integrity. The impugned Notice was issued with malice intent, published and circulated. 15 [24] In a defamation case, such as this, the learned JC has a duty to rule on the three essential ingredients of the tort of defamation before he proceeds to decide on the defences pleaded by the Defendants, if any. Firstly, the learned JC ought to determine if the impugned Notice was capable of bearing the defamatory meaning as ascribed in paragraph 13 of the ASOC. Secondly the learned JC ought to examine if the impugned Notice referred to the Plaintiff. Lastly the learned JC ought to decide if the impugned Notice was published to a third person (see Ayob Saudi v TS Sambanthamurthi [1989]1 CLJ (Rep) 321). (also see Rahman Talib v Seenivasagam & Anor [1965] 31 MLJ; Kian Lup Construction v Hong Kong Bank Malaysia Bhd [2002] 7 CLJ 32; Syed Husin Ali v Sharikat Penchetakan Utusan Melayu Berhad & Anor [1973] 2 MLJ 56; Tun Datuk Patinggi Haji Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Bre Sdn Bhd & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 393). [25] The test to be applied has been laid down in the case of Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 CLJ 461 (Chok Foo Choo), where the Court held that in order to ascertain if the words complained of are defamatory of the plaintiff, one has to examine if the words complained of in their natural and ordinary meaning “impute to the plaintiff any dishonourable or discredible conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part?”. If the answer is in the affirmative, the words complained of is defamatory of the Plaintiff. The Court in Chok Foo Choo stated as follows: 16 “In my judgment, the test which is to be applied lies in the question: do the words published in their natural meaning impute to the Plaintiff any dishonourable or discredible conduct or motives or a lack of integrity on his part? If the question invites affirmative response, then the words complained of are defamatory.” [26] Guided by the above authority, our next task is to examine, if the impugned Notice in its ordinary and natural meaning, imputes to the Plaintiff that he is a cheat, dishonest, unreliable, incompetent, undignified, and a problematic person as ascribed in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the ASOC and/or whether the impugned Notice was likely to expose the Plaintiff to hatred, ridicule or contempt in the mind of reasonable man as claimed. In short, whether the words in the impugned Notice in its ordinary and natural meaning bore the meaning that the Plaintiff is devoid of integrity. [27] Upon perusal of the impugned Notice, we found that the said Notice was published by the 1st Defendant to notify its clients specifically and the public at large the following:
a
(a) the Plaintiff had resigned from the 1st Defendant in September 2012;
b
(b) from September 2012, the Plaintiff had no right or authority to represent the 1st Defendant and/or to have any dealings whatsoever with the 1st Defendant’s clients and/or to collect any payments due to the 1st Defendant from its clients; and 17
c
(c) the Plaintiff was required to report for duty at the 1st Defendant’s office within 3 days from the date of the impugned Notice to resolve all issues with the 1st Defendant, otherwise the Plaintiff would be personally liable. [28] We were of the view that the impugned Notice would have to be examined in the light of the events, facts and/or circumstances leading to the publication of the same. The evidence before the learned JC showed the following, which prompted the 1st Defendant to cause the said impugned Notice to be published on 15th January 2013:
a
(a) the Plaintiff had not been coming to work at the 1st Defendant since August 2012;
b
(b) the Plaintiff collected monies from the 1st Defendant’s clients but had failed to deposit the same to the 1st Defendant’s account and/or to hand over the collections to the 1st Defendant and/or to account for the same;
c
(c) the Plaintiff failed to report at the 1st Defendant premises to carry out carry out his duties and responsibilities as a Sales Manager and/or Director;
d
(d) various attempts were made by the Defendants, either vide letters or phone calls to locate the Plaintiff, however the Plaintiff could not be located and/or contacted. Even if he could be contacted he appeared to be evasive. In fact the 18 Plaintiff had abandoned his position as a Sales Manager in the 1st Defendant;
e
(e) despite a notice of demand having been issued by the 1st Defendant to request the Plaintiff to pay the sum of RM2,412.25 belonging to the 1st Defendant which the Plaintiff had collected from the 1st Defendant’s clients, the Plaintiff failed to respond to the same;
f
(f) the Plaintiff had taken along with him assets belonging to the 1st Defendant, a Toyota Hilux Car bearing Registration Number PKF 2623, a HTC Wildfire handphone and a GPS device. As a result of the Plaintiff’s action in taking the vehicle from the 1st Defendant, Public Bank had repossessed the vehicle and sued the 1st Defendant for the balance of the monies still due and owing under the hire purchase agreement;
g
(g) due to the Plaintiff’s failure to report for work, the 1st Defendant had problems filing its 2012 Financial Statements with the CCM on or by 31st August 2012;
h
(h) the Plaintiff turned up for the Board of Directors’ meeting on 15th March 2013 only after the impugned Notice had been published on 15th January 2013; and
i
(i) a Police Report was lodged on 21st December 2012. 19 [29] Having examined the words of the impugned Notice, we were satisfied that to our mind any ordinary person reading the impugned Notice would not assume anything defamatory of the same. The impugned Notice did not accuse the Plaintiff of any wrongdoing. Instead he was required to contact the 1st Defendant to settle outstanding issues between them. The words of the impugned Notice definitely did not have the effect and/or the meaning as ascribed by the Plaintiff in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the ASOC. [30] From the events we outlined in paragraph 27 above, the reason for the impugned Notice to be published was to locate and/or track down the Plaintiff who had, since August 2012 gone missing, to enable the Defendants resolve outstanding issues between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The publication of the impugned Notice was the best avenue and/or the last resort for the Defendants to locate the Plaintiff. [31] We observed, despite the events as outlined by us in paragraph 27 above, the learned JC chose to ignore these glaring facts and proceeded to give extensive meanings to the words in the impugned Notice which meanings are unsubstantiated in law and on the facts. We were therefore satisfied that the learned JC had failed to fully appreciate the facts and evidence before him when he ruled that a case for defamation had been made out against the Defendants on the standard required in law. [32] With respect to the award of RM76.000.00, we were of the view that the learned JC had erred in ordering the 1st Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM2000.00, being the Plaintiff’s salaries and director’s fee 20 when there was clear evidence before His Lordship that the Plaintiff had failed to report for work since August 2012. The Plaintiff had by his own admission testified that he was wrongfully terminated and a default order was made by the Labour Court dated 28th March 2012, wherein the 1st Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM1500.00 being the full and final payment for the Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful termination. Alternatively, we were of the view, at most, the Plaintiff is only entitled to his director’s fee. [33] Based on the aforesaid, we fully agree with the contention of the Defendants that there is duplicity of claim here. Hence the same ought to be rejected by the Court. DAMAGES [34] In the event, for some reasons, we were wrong in resolving the case at hand in the manner we did, and assuming a case had been made out against the Defendants for defamation, we found that the award of RM200,000.00 as general and aggravated damages excessive. In awarding damages for a claim founded on defamation we were guided by the established authorities enunciated by the higher courts. One such case which is often quoted by the courts across the country is the case of Chin Choon v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569 where His Lordship Justice Sri Ram JCA had made reference to the book entitled “Defamation Law, Procedure & Practice” by Price & Doudu 3rd Edition at page 208 which had laid down the principles to guide the court in assessing compensatory damages for defamation cases as follows: 21
a
(a) the gravity of the allegation;
b
(b) the size and influence of circulation;
c
(c) the effect of publication;
d
(d) the extent and nature of claimant’s reputation;
e
(e) the behavior of the defendant; and
f
(f) the behavior of the claimant. [35] Perhaps it would be appropriate at this juncture for this Court to examine the pattern and/or trend of damages awarded by the courts, in order to ascertain what would be a fair and suitable damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff. In Chin Choon v Chua Jui Meng [2005] 2 CLJ 569 for instance where the defamation case involved a Cabinet Minister, the Court of Appeal saw it fit to reduce the award of damages of RM1.5 million to only RM200,000.00. The Court ruled that the award of RM1.5 million awarded by the High Court was excessive. In AJA Peter v OG Nio & Ors [1979] 1 LNS 1; [1980] 1 MLJ 226 which case concerned a claim by an insurance supervisor of an insurance company against another agency supervisor, the award of damages of RM15,000.00 was reduced to RM9,000.00. [36] The amount of damages to be awarded by the Court in each case depends on the facts and the circumstances of the case. Looking at the facts of this case and the status of the Plaintiff, we were of the view that the sum of RM200,000.00 is rather excessive. Even assuming we were wrong in our appreciation of the facts and the law, and that the 22 Defendants are liable for the tort of defamation, we were of the view that a global figure RM50,000.00 for general and aggravated damages would be adequate to vindicate the Plaintiff to the public and console him for the wrong done to him by the Defendants. CONCLUSION [37] Having examined the pleadings, the notes of proceedings, and having heard the respective learned Counsel, we found that the learned JC had not given sufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence both testimonial and documentaries as well as the established principles of law concerning the tort of defamation. We were constrained to hold that the learned JC had failed to judicially appreciate the evidence and/or the law presented before him so as to render his decision plainly wrong and upon curial scrutiny it merits our appellate intervention. Hence, we unanimously allowed this appeal and set aside the order of the learned JC dated 29th September 2015 with costs of RM30,000.00 herein and below subject to payment of allocator fees. The deposit is refunded to the Plaintiff. signed (ASMABI BINTI MOHAMAD) Judge Court of Appeal, Malaysia Dated 10th November 2017 23 Parties:
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Messrs Anoop & See Advocate & Solicitor For and on Behalf of the Appellant No. 55-12-B, Menara Northam Jalan Sultan Ahmad Shah 10050 George Town Pulau Pinang [Ref: L 5560] … Mr. Venodjit Singh
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Messrs Jeevaretnam & Co Advocate & Solicitors For and on Behalf of the Respondent Suite 201 21, Beach Street 10300 Pulau Pinang [Ref: No. JV/CO/053/2013/hzh] … Mr. J. Shamesh (Ms. Charlotte Williams with him)
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