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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI PULAU PINANG DI NEGERI PULAU PINANG WRIT SAMAN: BA-22NCvC-36-01/2021
BA-22NCvC-36-01/2021
High Court of Malaysia20 May 2026
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“he First Defendant also maintained that the irrevocable Power of Attorney PA 710/1997 remained valid and enforceable notwithstanding the death of the deceased, by virtue of section 6 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949, as it had been granted for valuable consideration and expressly stated to be irrevocable.”
“73. On this basis, the Second Defendant argued that the 1997 SPA had either been terminated, rescinded, or had otherwise become unenforceable pursuant to section 40 of the Contracts Act 1950.”
“(a) Whether the Second Defendant's title is defeasible under section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code on the basis that it was obtained through a forged or non-existent court order;”
“was placed on authorities including National Land Code decisions such as OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Johor Darul Takzim [1999] 1 MLRA 256; [1999] 2 MLJ 511; [1999] 2 CLJ 949; [1999] AMR 1943, Sia Hiong Tee & Ors v Chong Su Kong & Ors [2015] 3 MLRA 652; [2015] MLJU 233; [2015] 8CLJ 1173; [2015]”
“] AMR 1943, Sia Hiong Tee & Ors v Chong Su Kong & Ors [2015] 3 MLRA 652; [2015] MLJU 233; [2015] 8CLJ 1173; [2015] 4 AMR 31 and Ahmad Md Daud & Anor v Che Yah Man [2009] 2 MLRA 530; P2009] 6 CLJ 530; [2009] MLJU 396 in support of the doctrine of deferred indefeasibility and the principle that an immediate transferee ca”
“gard to section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code together with the decision of the Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Berhad [2015] 6 MLJ 1; [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2015] 5 MLRA 665; [2015] AMEJ 1824, particularly for the propositions that there is nothing in the National Land Code which expressly or i”
“Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Johor Darul Takzim [1999] 1 MLRA 256; [1999] 2 MLJ 511; [1999] 2 CLJ 949; [1999] AMR 1943, Sia Hiong Tee & Ors v Chong Su Kong & Ors [2015] 3 MLRA 652; [2015] MLJU 233; [2015] 8CLJ 1173; [2015] 4 AMR 31 and Ahmad Md Daud & Anor v Che Yah Man [2009] 2 MLRA 530; P2009] 6 CL”
“this regard, reliance was placed on authorities such as Yeo Ping Tieng & Ors v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] 6 MLRA 616; [2020] 3 MLJ 269; [2020] 1 CLJ 776 and Tang Peng Huat & Anor v Tan Boon Chong & Anor [2015] MLRAU 8; [2015] 3 MLJ 200.”
“such as Hassan bin Kadir v Mohamed Moidu bin Mohamad [2018] Supp MLJ 266; [2011] 4 AMR 677; [2011] 5 CLJ 136, Yeo Ping Tieng v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] 6 MLRA 616; [2020] 1 CLJ 776; [2019] MLJU 1504; [2017] AMEJ 0202 and He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah Ishak [2020] 5 MLRA 98; [2020] MLJU 916; [2020] 7 CLJ 271; [2020] 5 AMR 645.”
“culars with specificity was fatal to the claim. In support thereof, reliance was placed on the decision in Tung Kean Hin & Anor v Yuen Heng Fong [2019] 9 CLJ 493; [2019] 3 MLRA 580; [2019] 2 MLJ 334; [2018] AMEJ 1658, where it was held that a general allegation of fraud, unsupported by proper particulars, was insuffici”
“ted by authorities such as Hassan bin Kadir v Mohamed Moidu bin Mohamad [2018] Supp MLJ 266; [2011] 4 AMR 677; [2011] 5 CLJ 136, Yeo Ping Tieng v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] 6 MLRA 616; [2020] 1 CLJ 776; [2019] MLJU 1504; [2017] AMEJ 0202 and He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah Ishak [2020] 5 MLRA 98; [2020] MLJU 916; [2020] 7 CLJ 271”
“266; [2011] 4 AMR 677; [2011] 5 CLJ 136, Yeo Ping Tieng v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] 6 MLRA 616; [2020] 1 CLJ 776; [2019] MLJU 1504; [2017] AMEJ 0202 and He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah Ishak [2020] 5 MLRA 98; [2020] MLJU 916; [2020] 7 CLJ 271; [2020] 5 AMR 645.”
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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI PULAU PINANG DI NEGERI PULAU PINANG WRIT SAMAN: BA-22NCvC-36-01/2021
8
MOHAMAD IZUWAN BIN IBRAHIM Sebagai Wakil Harta Pesaka RUSLINA BINTI ABD RAHIM, Si mati (NO. K/P: 910421-08-6213)
1
MOHAMAD HISYAM BIN SELAMAT Sebagai Wakil Harta Pesaka SELAMAT BIN DAHLAN, Si Mati (NO. K/P: 721222-10-5255)
1
MOHAMAD HAMIZAN BIN SELAMAT (NO. K/P: 740625-10-5675)
2
KHAIRUL NIZAM BIN MOHD MASNAN (Beramal sebagai rakan kongsi di sebuah firma guaman yang dikenali Tetuan Dzulkufifli Jaafar Nizam & Co.)
3
GEV INTEGRATED (M) SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 1074993-D) ... PIHAK-PIHAK KEEMPAT
1
This case concerns a parcel of land which was initially transferred to one party, who subsequently subdivided and disposed of portions of the land to several sub-purchasers through informal arrangements. Thereafter, the same parcel of land became the subject of a separate and subsequent transfer to another entity.
2
Serious questions arise in relation to both sets of transactions. The circumstances surrounding the dealings disclose a number of irregularities which cast substantial doubt on their propriety and legitimacy.
3
The present proceedings therefore involve competing claims and counter-allegations among multiple parties. The Plaintiffs commenced this action against several Defendants, who in turn instituted third-party proceedings against a Third Party. The Third Party subsequently brought fourth-party proceedings against multiple Fourth Parties.
4
In these circumstances, this Court is required to carefully examine the sequence of events and transactions, assess the credibility and effect of the evidence adduced, and ultimately determine the parties' respective rights, interests, and liabilities arising from the disputed dealings.
5
The parties have framed the issues for determination in different ways, reflecting the complexity of the factual and legal disputes arising from the transactions in question.
6
The Plaintiffs contended that the following issues were agreed upon between the Plaintiffs, the First Defendant, the Second Defendant, the Third Defendant, and the Third Party for the purposes of the main action:
a
Sama ada Plaintif-plaintif atau Defendan Pertama atau Defendan Kedua merupakan pemilik sah dan sebenar dan/atau pemilik berkepentingan bagi hartanah yang terdiri daripada 4/12 bahagian tanah yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik No. 6646, Lot No. 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor ("hartanah tersebut");
b
Sama ada Mohamad Hamizan bin Selamat mempunyai hak dan kuasa di sisi undang-undang untuk menjual 4/12 bahagian tanah tersebut kepada Defendan Kedua;
c
Sama ada Pihak Ketiga ada memberi kebenaran dan/atau persetujuan kepada Sharil untuk menjalankan transaksi jualbeli kepada Defendan Kedua;
d
Sama ada Pihak Ketiga telah menandatangani dua surat "Letter of Acknowledgement" bertarikh 4 Jun 2016 dan 29 Jun 2016 bagi mengakui penerimaancek-cek berjumlah RM550,000.00 sebagai deposit dan baki harga jualan;
e
Sama ada pendaftaran pindah milik 4/12 bahagian tanah daripada Selamat bin Dahlan kepada Defendan Kedua, berasaskan Perintah Mahkamah bertarikh 24 Mac 2015 dalam Guaman No. 24NCvC- 1147-08/2014, boleh diketepikan; dan
f
Sekiranya tuntutan Plaintif dibenarkan, sama ada Defendan Kedua berhak menuntut indemniti, sumbangan atau gantirugi daripada Defendan Pertama selaku pentadbir harta pusaka Selamat bin Dahlan dan/atau daripada Pihak Ketiga.
7
The Plaintiffs further submitted that the central issue in the action is as follows: "Who shall be the valid and rightful owner/proprietor of the property concerned, whether it shall be the Plaintiffs who claim to be the beneficial owners, or the First Defendant as the former registered proprietor, or the Second Defendant as the current registered proprietor."
8
As for the First Defendant, it was submitted that following the recording of a Consent Judgment between the Plaintiffs and the First Defendant during the course of the trial, pursuant to which the First Defendant withdrew his Counterclaim and consented to the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs, the dispute narrowed into four principal legal issues, namely:
a
Whether the Second Defendant's title is defeasible under section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code on the basis that it was obtained through a forged or non-existent court order;
b
Whether the First Defendant's change of position during the trial is legally effective and ought to be reflected in the final judgment;
c
Whether the Plaintiffs have established beneficial ownership over the said property pursuant to the doctrine of bare trust; and
d
Whether the Power of Attorney PA 710/1997 remains valid and enforceable notwithstanding the death of the donor.
9
The Second Defendant, on the other hand, framed a broader range of issues for determination, encompassing, inter alia:
a
The validity and enforceability of the Sale and Purchase Agreement and Power of Attorney dated 24 January 1997;
b
Whether the Plaintiffs acquired any beneficial or equitable interest in the said property;
c
Whether the purchase price under the said agreement had been fully paid;
d
Whether the Plaintiffs possess the requisite locus standi and are entitled to equitable reliefs;
e
Whether the Second Defendant is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice;
f
Whether allegations of fraud and forgery in relation to the impugned transactions have been established;
g
Whether the transfer and registration of the said property in favour of the Second Defendant ought to be set aside; and
h
Whether the First Defendant is liable to indemnify or contribute to the Second Defendant in respect of the Plaintiffs' claims.
10
The numerous issues raised by the parties may, however, be more usefully compartmentalised according to the respective relationships between the parties and the nature of the disputes involved.
11
The principal issues arising between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants may be distilled into the following:
a
Whether the Sale and Purchase Agreement and Power of Attorney dated 24 January 1997 are valid and legally enforceable, and whether the First Plaintiff thereby acquired a beneficial interest in the said property;
b
Whether the terms of the said agreement were complied with, including whether the purchase price was fully paid, and whether the First Plaintiff was entitled to deal with the said property, including the sale of portions thereof to the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs;
c
Whether the agreements entered into between the First Plaintiff and the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs are valid and enforceable, and whether the latter thereby acquired equitable interests in the said property;
d
Whether the Plaintiffs possess the requisite locus standi and are entitled to the equitable reliefs sought, including whether they come before the Court with clean hands;
e
Whether the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs are in lawful occupation of the said property and have constructed houses thereon;
f
Whether the late Selamat bin Dahlan held the said property as a bare trustee for the benefit of the Plaintiffs;
g
Whether the subsequent dealings concerning the said property, including the alleged sale to the Second Defendant and the Court Order dated 24 March 2015, are valid and effective;
h
Whether the Second Defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, and whether fraud and/or forgery have been established in relation to the impugned transactions; and
i
Whether the registration of the transfer of the said property into the name of the Second Defendant ought to be set aside, together with the consequential reliefs that may arise therefrom, including the status of the Registrar's caveat.
12
The core issues arising between the Second Defendant and the Third Party are as follows:
a
Whether the Third Party is liable to indemnify or contribute to the Second Defendant in respect of the Plaintiffs' claims; and
b
Whether the Third Party bears liability in relation to the acts and representations made concerning the alleged sale of the said property.
13
Finally, in relation to the Third-Party proceedings against the Fourth Parties, the principal issue for determination is whether the Fourth Parties bear any liability, whether by way of indemnity, contribution, or otherwise, arising from the transactions concerning the said property and the claims advanced in these proceedings.
14
The First Plaintiff, Zainul Akmal bin Kamsani, is the purchaser who had entered into a Sale and Purchase Agreement with the late Selamat bin Dahlan in respect of the said property.
15
The Second to the Eighth Plaintiffs are Rozlan bin Ahmad Zainuddin, Haimiyusry bin Shuhaimi, Ahmad Zamri bin Shuhaimi, Faridah binti Harun, Maria binti Musa, Mashuri bin Bakri, and Mohamad Izuwan bin Ibrahim, the latter acting in his capacity as administrator of the estate of the late Ruslina binti Abd Rahim.
16
The First Defendant, Mohamad Hisyam bin Selamat, is the administrator of the estate of the late Selamat bin Dahlan, who was formerly the registered proprietor of the said land.
17
The Second Defendant, Anuar bin Abd Ani, is the purchaser in the subsequent transaction and is presently the registered proprietor of the said property. His position is that he is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, having paid the sum of RM550,000.00 for the acquisition of the said property.
18
The Third Defendant, the Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang, is a nominal party joined for the purpose of giving effect to any consequential orders of this Court, without any implication as to liability for costs.
19
The Third Party, Mohamad Hamizan bin Selamat, is one of the sons of the late Selamat bin Dahlan and was brought into these proceedings by the Second Defendant.
20
The First and Third Fourth Parties, namely Sahril bin Kushairi and GEV Integrated (M) Sdn Bhd respectively, were joined to these proceedings by the Third Party.
21
This case centres upon a parcel of agricultural land measuring approximately three acres held under No. Hakmilik 6646 (formerly EMR 6154) , Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (hereinafter referred to as "the said Land"). The present dispute concerns, in particular, the 4/12 undivided share previously registered in the name of the late Selamat bin Dahlan (hereinafter referred to as "the said property") measuring approximately one acre.
22
The said Land was originally registered in the names of the following proprietors:
a
Jarudy bin Tukiran-1/12 share;
b
Kamisah binti Muslimin-3/12 share;
c
Marzuki bin Kidam-2/12 share;
d
Selamat bin Dahlan-4/12 share;
e
Morsidah binti Mustam-1/12 share; and
f
Shamsuddin bin Diran-1/12 share.
23
Pursuant to a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 24 January 1997, the late Selamat bin Dahlan agreed to sell the said property to the First Plaintiff for a purchase price of RM80,000.00. Contemporaneously, the deceased executed a Power of Attorney dated 24 January 1997 in favour of the First Plaintiff in respect of the said property, which was subsequently registered at the Shah Alam High Court on 28 January 1997 under Presentation No. PA 710/1997.
24
The First Plaintiff contended that the full purchase price had been paid and that he thereafter subdivided the said property into eight smaller plots, which were subsequently sold to the Second to the Eighth Plaintiffs between 1997 and 2004.
25
It is not disputed that the transfers of the said plots could not be registered in favour of the purchasers due to the restriction imposed under section 205(3) of the National Land Code, which prohibits the creation of undivided shares in agricultural land below the prescribed minimum area of 2/5 hectare.
26
The Plaintiffs further contended that the said property could not be transferred into the name of the First Plaintiff due to the absence of the original issue document of title, a situation which persisted until the demise of the late Selamat bin Dahlan on 14 March 2011.
27
It was subsequently discovered that Letters of Administration in respect of the estate of the deceased had been obtained in the Shah Alam High Court under No. 31NCvC-177-04/2015, pursuant to which the First Defendant was appointed as administrator of the estate.
28
Sometime in 2018, the Plaintiffs became aware, through a contractor engaged to clear part of the said Land, that the Second Defendant had purportedly acquired the said property from members of the deceased's family.
29
Upon conducting searches at the Klang Land Office and the Shah Alam High Court, the First Plaintiff discovered that the Second Defendant had been registered as proprietor of the said property pursuant to a purported court order dated 24 March 2015.
30
Further enquiries revealed that both the purported court order and the case number relied upon were non-existent. By a letter dated 27 March 2018, the Shah Alam High Court confirmed the same and subsequently lodged a police report.
31
In response thereto, the First Plaintiff lodged a police report and, on 14 February 2018, entered a private caveat over the said property under Presentation No. 845/2018.
32
The Second Defendant's case is that he had purchased the said property from Mohamad Hamizan bin Selamat, who was subsequently joined as the Third Party, for a total consideration of RM550,000.00. The payment was said to be evidenced by two Letters of Acknowledgment dated 4 June 2016 and 29 June 2016 respectively, purportedly signed by the Third Party, acknowledging receipt of RM55,000.00 and RM495,000.00.
33
Following the alleged purchase, the Second Defendant applied for subdivision of the said Land pursuant to sections 140 to 144 of the National Land Code, which application was approved by the Third Defendant on 25 September 2017.
34
However, following complaints lodged by the First Plaintiff and one Yusop bin Jaridi, who claimed an interest in the said property, the Third Defendant entered a Registrar's caveat on 21 March 2018 under Presentation No. 1547/2018 over the 4/12 share registered in the name of the Second Defendant, bearing the endorsement "Kes Penipuan Pindahmilik Tanpa Pengetahuan Pemilik Tanah".
35
A further Registrar's caveat under Presentation No. 6081/2019 was subsequently entered on 25 September 2019 over the entirety of the said Land.
36
In 2019, the Plaintiffs commenced proceedings by way of Originating Summons in the Shah Alam High Court against, inter alia, the estate of the deceased, the Second Defendant, and the Klang Land Office. By a decision dated 8 October 2020, the learned Alice Loke JC struck out the Originating Summons on the ground that the matter was unsuitable for determination by way of Originating Summons, with liberty to file afresh and with no order as to costs.
37
The present writ action was thereafter commenced on 27 January 2021.
38
On 11 November 2022, the Second Defendant commenced third-party proceedings against Mohamad Hamizan bin Selamat, and the Third-Party Notice was issued on 25 November 2022. The Second Defendant contends that the Third Party is liable to indemnify him in the event that the Plaintiffs' claims succeed.
39
The Third Party, in turn, invoked Order 16 rule 9 of the Rules of Court 2012 to bring in the Fourth Parties. The Third Party contends that he neither possessed the authority to transact the sale of the said property nor received the proceeds of sale, which he alleges were instead paid to the First and Third Fourth Parties through the firm of Messrs Dzulkifli, Jaafar, Nizam & Co.
40
The First and Third Fourth Parties deny any knowledge of the impugned transactions and further deny having received the sum of RM550,000.00.
41
On 19 December 2023, the First and Third Fourth Parties filed an application to strike out the fourth-party proceedings. This Court dismissed the said application, holding that the issue of whether the sale proceeds had in fact been paid to the said Fourth Parties ought properly to be determined at trial, with costs in the cause.
42
The trial of this action proceeded over a total of nine (9) days, commencing on 11 November 2024 and concluding on 10 December 2025. At the close of the oral evidence, the Court directed the parties to file written submissions, which were duly filed and exchanged.
43
A total of nine (9) witnesses testified at the trial on behalf of the respective parties.
44
The Plaintiffs called four (4) witnesses, namely:
a
Zainul Akmal bin Kamsani (PW1), the First Plaintiff;
b
Yusop bin Jaridi (PW2);
c
Fa'erah Nurul Ainni binti Izanny (PW3), who was at the material time a Senior Assistant Registrar of the Shah Alam High Court; and
d
Haimiyusry bin Shuhaimi (PW4), the Third Plaintiff.
45
Each of the Plaintiffs' witnesses filed witness statements, which were marked respectively as WSPW1 (Enclosure 187), WSPW2 (Enclosure 188), WSPW3 (Enclosure 189), and WSPW4 (Enclosure 190).
46
The First Defendant called one (1) witness, namely Mohamad Hisyam bin Selamat (DW1), who is the First Defendant. His witness statement was marked as WSDW1 (Enclosure 199).
47
The Second Defendant called two (2) witnesses:
a
Anuar bin Abd Ani (DW2), the Second Defendant; and
b
Khairul Nizam bin Muhammad Masnan (DW3), the advocate and solicitor who acted for the Second Defendant in the purchase of the said property.
48
A witness statement was filed for DW2 and marked as WSDW2 (Enclosure 181).
49
No witness statement was filed for DW3.
50
The Third Defendant did not call any witness at the trial. Instead, the Third Defendant elected to rely on affidavits filed in the earlier originating summons proceedings, namely the affidavits affirmed by:
a
Nor Syahirah binti Norizan, Assistant District Officer (Bahagian Pindahmilik dan Lelongan), Pejabat Daerah/Tanah Klang; and
b
Ahmad Fitri bin Ahmad, Assistant District Officer (Bahagian Pembangunan Tanah), both of which are contained in Enclosure 81. Learned State Counsel confirmed that the Third Defendant would rely on the contents of the said affidavits as its evidence in these proceedings.
51
The Third Party called one (1) witness, namely Mohamad Hamizan bin Selamat (TPW1). His witness statement was marked as WSTPW1 (Enclosure 180).
52
The Fourth Parties called two (2) witnesses:
a
Sahril bin Kushairi (FPW1), the First Fourth Party; and
b
Siti Zaitun binti Abdul Latif (FPW2), a director of the Third Fourth Party.
53
The witness statements of the said witnesses were marked respectively as WSFPW1 (Enclosure 178) and WSFPW2 (Enclosure 179).
54
A total of 218 enclosures were filed in these proceedings. However, for the purposes of the trial, the following cause papers were primarily relied upon and referred to by the parties:
a
Ikatan Pliding dated 9 September 2022 (Enclosure 76);
b
Ikatan Dokumen Bersama dated 12 September 2022 (Enclosure 81);
c
Jilid (Enclosure 82);
d
Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan dated 29 September 2022 (Enclosure 83);
e
Ikatan Dokumen Defendan Ketiga dated 11 November 2022 (Enclosure 115);
f
Ikatan Pliding Tambahan dated 3 March 2023 (Enclosure 129);
g
Ikatan Dokumen Bersama Tambahan dated 3 March 2023 (Enclosure 130);
h
Ikatan Pliding Pihak Ketiga dan Keempat dated 11 September 2023 (Enclosure 151);
i
Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan dated 6 November 2024 (Enclosure 194);
j
Ikatan Dokumen Tambahan Defendan Kedua dated 19 November 2024 (Enclosure 204); and
k
Ikatan Dokumen Pihak Ketiga dated 20 April 2025 (Enclosure 205).
55
The Plaintiffs' case, which is now substantially supported by the First Defendant, is that the disputed 4/12 share in the said Land had long ago been validly sold by the late Selamat bin Dahlan to the First Plaintiff pursuant to the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 24 January 1997, together with an irrevocable Power of Attorney registered as PA 710/1997.
56
The Plaintiffs contended that the purchase price was fully paid, possession was delivered, and portions of the said property were thereafter sold to the Second to the Eighth Plaintiffs, who have occupied the land and constructed their respective homes thereon for many years.
57
The Plaintiffs further contended that the subsequent registration of the Second Defendant as proprietor of the said property was procured through a purported court order dated 24 March 2015 bearing case number 24NCVC-1147-08/2014, which, according to confirmation obtained from the Shah Alam High Court Registry, does not exist. The Plaintiffs therefore asserted that the impugned transfer was founded upon a forged or void instrument and is liable to be set aside pursuant to section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code.
58
Significantly, during the course of the trial, the First Defendant revised the position initially taken in his Defence and Counterclaim. The First Defendant, who is the administrator of the estate of the late Selamat bin Dahlan, acknowledged under oath that the deceased had indeed sold the said property to the First Plaintiff in 1997. The First Defendant further admitted that he had never dealt with the Second Defendant, had never received any part of the alleged purchase consideration of RM550,000.00, and only became aware of the impugned transfer in 2018.
59
In consequence, a Consent Judgment was recorded between the Plaintiffs and the First Defendant during the trial, pursuant to which the First Defendant withdrew his Counterclaim and consented to the reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs. The First Defendant accordingly aligned himself with the Plaintiffs' position and opposed the Second Defendant's continued assertion of title over the said property.
60
The First Defendant submitted that the Second Defendant's title is defeasible under section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code as the registration was obtained through a forged or non-existent court order, which constitutes a void instrument in law. Reliance was placed on authorities including National Land Code decisions such as OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Pendaftar Hakmilik Negeri Johor Darul Takzim [1999] 1 MLRA 256; [1999] 2 MLJ 511; [1999] 2 CLJ 949; [1999] AMR 1943, Sia Hiong Tee & Ors v Chong Su Kong & Ors [2015] 3 MLRA 652; [2015] MLJU 233; [2015] 8CLJ 1173; [2015] 4 AMR 31 and Ahmad Md Daud & Anor v Che Yah Man [2009] 2 MLRA 530; P2009] 6 CLJ 530; [2009] MLJU 396 in support of the doctrine of deferred indefeasibility and the principle that an immediate transferee cannot obtain an indefeasible title through a forged or void instrument, even if acting in good faith.
61
The First Defendant further submitted that the Plaintiffs had acquired beneficial ownership of the said property under the bare trustee doctrine. It was argued that upon payment of the purchase price under the 1997 agreement, the deceased became a bare trustee holding the legal title for the benefit of the First Plaintiff, whose equitable interest subsequently extended to the Second to the Eighth Plaintiffs. In this regard, reliance was placed on authorities such as Yeo Ping Tieng & Ors v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] 6 MLRA 616; [2020] 3 MLJ 269; [2020] 1 CLJ 776 and Tang Peng Huat & Anor v Tan Boon Chong & Anor [2015] MLRAU 8; [2015] 3 MLJ 200.
62
The First Defendant also maintained that the irrevocable Power of Attorney PA 710/1997 remained valid and enforceable notwithstanding the death of the deceased, by virtue of section 6 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949, as it had been granted for valuable consideration and expressly stated to be irrevocable.
63
Accordingly, both the Plaintiffs and the First Defendant seek, inter alia, declarations that the purported court order and the transfer in favour of the Second Defendant are void, orders restoring the title to the estate of the deceased, and consequential declarations recognising the Plaintiffs' beneficial interests in the said property.
64
It is therefore apparent that the real controversy in these proceedings ultimately lies between the Plaintiffs, supported by the First Defendant, on the one hand, and the Second Defendant on the other.
65
The Second Defendant's case is that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the 4/12 share in the land now held under Title No. 6646, Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor ("the said land"), having been registered as proprietor on 28 June 2016.
66
The Second Defendant contended that, at all material times, he had no knowledge whatsoever of:
a
the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 24 January 1997 allegedly entered into between the late Selamat bin Dahlan and the First Plaintiff;
b
the Power of Attorney dated 24 January 1997 executed in favour of the First Plaintiff; and
c
the subsequent sale and purchase transactions between the First Plaintiff and the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs involving the various subdivided portions of the said land.
67
The Second Defendant maintained that prior to the purchase, he had undertaken the usual and reasonable steps expected of a purchaser, including conducting a land search at the relevant Land Office and carrying out a physical inspection of the said land. According to the Second Defendant, there was nothing to suggest the existence of any prior claim or adverse interest affecting the said land.
68
The Second Defendant further contended that he had paid the full purchase consideration of RM550,000.00 for the purchase of the said land, which payments were acknowledged by the vendor through letters of acknowledgement dated 4 June 2016 and 29 June 2016.
69
The Second Defendant denied any involvement in, or knowledge of, any alleged fraud, forgery, misrepresentation, or irregularity relating to the transfer of the said land, including the alleged court order dated 24 March 2015 said to have facilitated the registration of the transfer in his favour. The Second Defendant further maintained that he was never called by the police or any enforcement authority to assist in investigations relating to the alleged fraud.
70
The Second Defendant also asserted that, after being registered as proprietor of the said land, he expended substantial sums, allegedly amounting to RM669,600.00, for the construction of eleven (11) rental houses on the said land. He further stated that he had engaged a licensed surveyor and initiated preliminary steps towards subdivision of the land.
71
In resisting the Plaintiffs' claims, the Second Defendant advanced several legal contentions regarding the validity and enforceability of the Plaintiffs' alleged interests in the said land.
72
First, the Second Defendant contended that the Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 24 January 1997 between the late Selamat bin Dahlan and the First Plaintiff ("the 1997 SPA") had been breached by the First Plaintiff, particularly in relation to the payment terms stipulated therein. The Second Defendant relied on the evidence elicited during cross-examination, including admissions by the First Plaintiff that the balance purchase price was not paid within the contractual timeline stipulated in the agreement.
73
On this basis, the Second Defendant argued that the 1997 SPA had either been terminated, rescinded, or had otherwise become unenforceable pursuant to section 40 of the Contracts Act 1950.
74
Secondly, the Second Defendant contended that the Power of Attorney dated 24 January 1997 ("the 1997 PA") was ineffective and unenforceable insofar as dealings with the land were concerned, as the same was registered only at the High Court but not at the relevant Land Office. In this regard, the Second Defendant relied on section 4 of the Powers of Attorney Act 1949 and section 309 of the National Land Code.
75
The Second Defendant therefore argued that the First Plaintiff lacked the necessary legal authority to deal with or dispose of the said land to the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs.
76
The Second Defendant further disputed that the First Plaintiff had fully paid the purchase price of RM80,000.00 to the late Selamat bin Dahlan under the 1997 SPA. In support of this contention, the Second Defendant relied, inter alia, on:
a
the pleadings originally filed by the First Defendant; and
b
the evidence elicited during cross-examination, which, according to the Second Defendant, disclosed an absence of documentary proof of full payment by the First Plaintiff.
77
Arising from the foregoing matters, the Second Defendant contended that:
a
the 1997 SPA and the 1997 PA were invalid and/or unenforceable;
b
the First Plaintiff did not acquire any beneficial or equitable interest in the said land;
c
the First Plaintiff lacked the legal capacity or authority to enter into the subsequent sale and purchase agreements with the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs; and
d
the subsequent sale and purchase agreements entered into between the First Plaintiff and the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs were similarly invalid and unenforceable.
78
The Second Defendant further disputed the Plaintiffs' reliance on equitable doctrines, including the assertion that the Plaintiffs possessed beneficial or equitable ownership over the said land. The Second Defendant contends that the Plaintiffs had themselves breached the terms of the 1997 SPA and therefore did not come before the Court with clean hands.
79
The Second Defendant also contended that the occupation of the said land by the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs was unlawful or otherwise unsupported by valid legal title or enforceable equitable rights.
80
As against the First Defendant, the Second Defendant maintained that, in the event the Plaintiffs' claim succeeds and the Second Defendant's title is defeated, the First Defendant, as administrator of the estate of the late Selamat bin Dahlan, is liable to indemnify the Second Defendant in respect of:
a
the purchase consideration of RM550,000.00 paid for the said land;
b
the alleged construction costs incurred on the said land; and
c
all consequential losses and damages suffered by the Second Defendant.
81
In summary, the Second Defendant's position is that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the Plaintiffs' alleged interests, that the Plaintiffs possess no valid legal or equitable interest in the said land, and that the Plaintiffs' claims ought therefore to be dismissed.
82
The Third Defendant is the relevant land authority responsible for the administration of land matters pertaining to the subject land, including the registration of dealings, processing of applications for subdivision, and maintenance of the land register pursuant to the provisions of the National Land Code.
83
The Third Defendant maintained a neutral position in relation to the competing proprietary claims advanced by the Plaintiffs and the Second Defendant, and does not itself claim any interest in the subject land.
84
The position adopted by the Third Defendant, as reflected in the affidavits affirmed on its behalf, is that the Plaintiffs themselves had acknowledged that the transactions entered into between the Plaintiffs and the late Selamat bin Dahlan and/or his representative could not be effected by way of transfer and registration under the land title.
85
The Third Defendant contended that such position is consistent with the prohibition contained in section 205(3) of the National Land Code, which prohibits the transfer of agricultural land where the effect would be to create an undivided share measuring less than two-fifths of a hectare.
86
In this regard, the Third Defendant further contended that by reason of the restriction imposed under section 205(3) of the National Land Code, the alleged rights and interests claimed by the Plaintiffs could not be endorsed or registered against the document of title to the subject land.
87
The Third Defendant further stated that insofar as the Plaintiffs sought reliefs relating to recognition and registration of their alleged interests in the subject land, such reliefs were not capable of implementation or enforcement under the prevailing provisions of the National Land Code.
88
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Third Defendant confirmed that it had received an application for subdivision of the subject land pursuant to sections 140 to 144 of the National Land Code.
89
The Third Defendant stated that at the material time, the subdivision application complied with the relevant requirements, checklists, and statutory conditions prescribed under sections 140 to 144 of the National Land Code.
90
Accordingly, the said application for subdivision was approved on 8 September 2017, and a letter of approval dated 25 September 2017 was subsequently issued to the Second Defendant, subject to the conditions imposed therein for further compliance and action.
91
However, the Third Defendant further stated that from the date of the approval of subdivision on 25 September 2017 until the filing of the present action on 20 November 2019, the Second Defendant had failed to fulfil the conditions stipulated in the approval for the purposes of further action by the Third Defendant.
92
The Third Defendant further stated that on 7 February 2018, it received complaints and objections from the heirs of Jarudy bin Tukiran and Kamisah binti Muslimin, together with police reports lodged by one Yusop bin Jaridi concerning the subject land and allegations relating to the impugned transfer.
93
Following the complaints received, and upon consideration of the circumstances surrounding the disputed transfer of the subject land, the Third Defendant proceeded to enter Registrar's caveats over the relevant portions of the land in order to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the dispute.
94
In particular, the Third Defendant confirmed that:
a
a Registrar's caveat was entered on 21 March 2018 under Presentation No.1547/2018 against the relevant 4/12 share of the subject land registered in the name of the Second Defendant, bearing the notation "Kes Penipuan Pindahmilik Tanpa Pengetahuan Pemilik Tanah"; and
b
a further Registrar's caveat was subsequently entered on 25 September 2019 against the entirety of the subject land.
95
The Third Defendant relied on the affidavits affirmed by its officers, including officers from the Land Administration and Auction Division as well as the Land Development Division of the Klang District and Land Office, in setting out the administrative steps taken in relation to the subject land.
96
The Third Defendant did not call any witnesses at trial and instead relied on the documentary evidence and affidavits already filed.
97
In the premises, the Third Defendant maintained that all actions taken by it in relation to the subject land were carried out pursuant to its statutory duties and administrative responsibilities under the National Land Code, without taking any position on the ultimate merits of the competing ownership claims between the Plaintiffs and the Second Defendant.
98
The Third Party, in opposing the third-party proceedings commenced by the Second Defendant and in support of his fourth-party claim against the First Fourth Party and Third Fourth Party, contended that the Second Defendant had failed to establish any legal or factual basis for indemnity or damages against him.
99
In essence, the Third Party's position was that he had never dealt directly with the Second Defendant in relation to the sale or transfer of the subject land, had never executed any sale or transfer documents in favour of the Second Defendant, and had never received any part of the alleged purchase price. According to the Third Party, the entirety of the Second Defendant's dealings was conducted through the First Fourth Party and persons associated with the First Fourth Party, without the Third Party's participation or authority.
100
The Third Party further contended that the Second Defendant's claim for indemnity, comprising the refund of the alleged purchase price of RM550,000.00, compensation for the construction of houses on the land, and any damages or costs awarded in favour of the Plaintiffs, was misconceived because the alleged losses, if any, were caused solely by the First Fourth Party, the Third Fourth Party, and other persons involved in the impugned transaction.
101
The Third Party's account of events may be summarised as follows.
102
According to the Third Party, sometime in or around June 2016, he was introduced to the First Fourth Party, who represented that he was able to assist in resolving issues relating to the estate of the Third Party's late father, Selamat bin Dahlan, particularly in relation to the subject land. The Third Party stated that, at the material time, the land remained registered in the name of the deceased and there were unknown occupants on the land. The First Fourth Party allegedly represented that he could resolve those issues.
103
The Third Party asserted that approximately six months later, sometime in January 2017, the First Fourth Party informed him that the land had already been sold. However, the Third Party maintained that neither he nor the beneficiaries of the estate had executed any sale or transfer documents, and none of them had received any proceeds from the alleged sale.
104
The Third Party further stated that he only met the Second Defendant for the first time sometime in mid-2017, after the impugned transaction had already taken place. According to the Third Party, the Second Defendant informed him during that meeting that the Second Defendant had purchased the land through the First Fourth Party but was thereafter unable to contact the First Fourth Party. The Third Party maintained that he similarly had no knowledge of the sale and was also unable to contact the First Fourth Party at that stage.
105
The Third Party further averred that, in February 2020, he was contacted by the Second Defendant's solicitor, one Mr Khairul Nizam bin Mohd Masnan (DW-3), and requested to attend at the solicitor's office. During that meeting, the Third Party was shown several letters of acknowledgement and authorisation purportedly bearing his signature. The Third Party denied having signed those documents in 2016 and asserted that the signatures appearing therein were not his signatures.
106
The Third Party's case was that, upon his objection being raised, DW-3 reprinted the said documents and pressured or induced him into signing them in February 2020, whilst informing him that the purchase monies had already been released to the Third Fourth Party and that he should pursue the matter with the First Fourth Party instead.
107
Following the discovery that his name had allegedly been used in the transaction, the Third Party issued a solicitor's letter to Messrs Dzulkifli Jaafar Nizam & Co seeking an explanation as to how the transfer had taken place. Thereafter, the Third Party lodged police reports against the First Fourth Party, and DW-3 in December 2022 and January 2023.
108
The Third Party consistently maintained throughout the proceedings that:
a
he never offered or agreed to sell the land to the Second Defendant;
b
he never represented himself as the administrator or authorised representative of the estate to the Second Defendant;
c
he never signed any sale and purchase agreement or Form 14A in favour of the Second Defendant;
d
he never authorised the First Fourth Party to sell the land on his behalf; and
e
he never received any portion of the alleged purchase price.
109
The Third Party further submitted that the Second Defendant's own evidence supported the Third Party's version of events. In particular, the Third Party emphasised that the Second Defendant repeatedly admitted during cross-examination that all negotiations and dealings concerning the purchase of the land were conducted through the First Fourth Party and not through the Third Party.
110
The Third Party highlighted the Second Defendant's evidence that:
a
the property was first introduced to the Second Defendant by one Wak Sabri and the First Fourth Party;
b
The First Fourth Party represented himself to the Second Defendant as acting on behalf of the Third Party and the beneficiaries of the estate;
c
the Third Party was not present during the first meeting concerning the purchase on 4 June 2016;
d
the alleged deposit of RM55,000.00 was not paid upon any request made by the Third Party;
e
The Second Defendant never saw the Third Party execute any sale and purchase agreement or Form 14A;
f
The Second Defendant accepted that there was in fact no executed sale and purchase agreement or Form 14A at all; and
g
The Second Defendant relied entirely upon the First Fourth Party and the First Fourth Party's "team" in proceeding with the transaction.
111
The Third Party further relied heavily upon the Second Defendant's admissions that the purchase monies were paid to the Second Defendant's own solicitors, Messrs Dzulkifli Jaafar Nizam & Co, and were thereafter released to the Third Fourt Party rather than to the Third Party.
112
The Third Party also stressed that there was no documentary evidence whatsoever showing that the Third Party had received the alleged purchase price of RM550,000.00 or the alleged sum of RM300,000.00 said to have been paid to him.
113
In that regard, the Third Party submitted that the Second Defendant had failed to prove actual payment to the Third Party by any credible documentary evidence, such as receipts, bank transfers, or proof of remittance, notwithstanding the substantial sums allegedly involved.
114
The Third Party further contended that the letters of acknowledgement and authorisation relied upon by the Second Defendant did not conclusively establish receipt of monies by the Third Party. According to the Third Party, those documents were disputed, were allegedly reprinted in February 2020, and in any event could not override the objective documentary evidence showing that the monies had been released to the Third Fourth Party instead.
115
The Third Party also challenged the Second Defendant's claim for construction costs and damages amounting to RM669,600.00. The Third Party pointed to the Second Defendant's admissions during cross-examination that there were no receipts, invoices, payment vouchers, or proof of payment produced in support of those alleged losses.
116
The Third Party further argued that the Second Defendant's claim was fundamentally inconsistent with the pleaded case. In particular, the Third Party submitted that although the Second Defendant pleaded that the Third Party had executed sale documents and received purchase monies, the Second Defendant's own oral testimony contradicted those pleadings.
117
The Third Party additionally contended that allegations of fraud and forgery had not been properly pleaded by the Second Defendant with the requisite particulars as required under Order 18 rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012.
118
The Third Party further submitted that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the First Fourth Party was the person who orchestrated and managed the transaction from beginning to end. In support of that contention, the Third Party relied upon evidence showing that:
a
the First Fourth Party introduced the land to the Second Defendant;
b
the First Fourth Party represented himself as acting for the beneficiaries;
c
the First Fourth Party handled the transfer process;
d
the First Fourth Party dealt directly with DW-3;
e
the First Fourth Party instructed the release of monies;
f
the First Fourth Party allegedly promised to replace the land or refund the monies after disputes arose; and
g
the monies were ultimately released to the Third Fourth Party.
119
The Third Party also relied upon the evidence of DW-3, who admitted, inter alia, that:
a
he dealt primarily with the First Fourth Party throughout the transaction;
b
the Third Party was not present during the initial transaction meetings;
c
he did not witness the Third Party signing the disputed documents in 2016;
d
the first time he met the Third Party was only in February 2020;
e
the disputed documents were reprinted in 2020 after the Third Party denied signing them earlier; and
f
there was no written stakeholder agreement authorising the solicitor to hold monies on behalf of the Third Party.
120
The Third Party further submitted that the defences advanced by the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party amounted to bare denials unsupported by credible rebuttal evidence. According to the Third Party, despite serious allegations having been levelled against them, the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party failed to adequately challenge or rebut the evidence adduced by DW-1, DW-2, DW-3, and TPW-1.
121
The Third Party therefore urged the Court to draw an adverse inference against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party, particularly in relation to the failure to produce documentary evidence concerning the receipt and disbursement of monies.
122
In summary, the Third Party's position was that the Second Defendant had failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, any involvement by the Third Party in the sale and transfer of the subject land or in the receipt of the alleged purchase monies. The Third Party contended that, if any liability arose in relation to the Second Defendant's alleged losses, such liability rested instead with the First Fourth Party, the Third Fourth Party, and those directly involved in the impugned transaction.
123
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party resisted the Third-Party proceedings brought against them by the Third Party. In essence, they contended that the Third Party had failed to establish any legal or factual basis upon which liability could be imposed upon them. Their contentions may be broadly summarised under five principal grounds.
124
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party contended that the documentary and oral evidence adduced during trial failed to establish any direct involvement on the part of the First Fourth Party in the impugned transaction relating to the said land.
125
In particular, they submitted that the First Fourth Party's name did not appear in the critical documents forming the basis for the release of the purchase monies, namely the letters of acknowledgement and letters of authorisation at pages 247, 251 and 252 of the agreed bundles of documents. Likewise, there were no banking details belonging to the First Fourth Party reflected in any of the transaction documents.
126
They further argued that the monies in question were released to GEV Integrated Sdn Bhd, namely the Third Fourth Party, pursuant to representations and letters of authorisation allegedly executed by the Third Party himself, and not pursuant to any instruction, representation or written direction issued by the First Fourth Party.
127
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party also contended that GEV Integrated Sdn Bhd was allegedly appointed by the Second Defendant and the Third Party themselves in relation to the transaction, and not by the First Fourth Party.
128
Accordingly, they submitted that the Third Party's allegation against the First Fourth Party was founded merely upon the assertion that the First Fourth Party had been introduced to the Third Party for purposes relating to the administration of the deceased's estate. However, such introduction, standing alone, was insufficient to establish the necessary legal nexus or causal connection required to sustain a claim for indemnity or contribution.
129
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party further contended that the Third Party had failed to disclose any reasonable cause of action against them.
130
They argued that the Third Party had neither pleaded nor established the existence of any contractual relationship, whether express or implied, between himself and the First Fourth Party or the Third Fourth Party. Likewise, there was no pleaded or proven duty of care owed by them to the Third Party, particularly in circumstances where the First Fourth Party was said not to have participated in any financial transaction relating to the said land.
131
Further, no statutory provision had been identified which imposed any legal obligation upon the First Fourth Party or the Third Fourth Party to indemnify the Third Party.
132
They submitted that the Third Party's contention that the Second Defendant ought properly to pursue his claims against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party, rather than against the Third Party, did not in itself constitute a valid cause of action against them. At most, such matters constituted part of the Third Party's defence to the Second Defendant's claim, and could not independently sustain the fourth party proceedings.
133
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party next submitted that the Third Party's pleadings failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under Order 18 rule 12(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 relating to allegations of fraud.
134
They argued that no specific allegations of fraud had been properly pleaded against either the First Fourth Party or the Third Fourth Party. In particular, there were no particulars identifying how, when, where, or by what means the alleged fraud was said to have been perpetrated by them.
135
Accordingly, they submitted that insofar as the Third Party's claim was premised upon allegations of fraud, the failure to plead such particulars with specificity was fatal to the claim. In support thereof, reliance was placed on the decision in Tung Kean Hin & Anor v Yuen Heng Fong [2019] 9 CLJ 493; [2019] 3 MLRA 580; [2019] 2 MLJ 334; [2018] AMEJ 1658, where it was held that a general allegation of fraud, unsupported by proper particulars, was insufficient in law.
136
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party further contended that the proceedings brought against them constituted an abuse of the process of the Court.
137
They argued that the evidence adduced at trial showed that the Third Party himself had allegedly represented to the solicitors involved that he was the administrator of the deceased's estate and had himself executed the letters of authorisation relating to the release of monies to GEV Integrated Sdn Bhd. In those circumstances, they contended that the Third Party was improperly attempting to shift responsibility onto parties who had no direct involvement in the relevant representations or transaction documents.
138
They further submitted that had the Third Party not been joined as a party in the main action, the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party would likewise never have been brought into the proceedings. According to them, this demonstrated that the fourth party proceedings were commenced merely as an attempt by the Third Party to avoid liability arising from the Second Defendant's claim.
139
In support of their contention on abuse of process, reliance was placed on Malaysia Building Society Bhd v Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamed [19981 2 CLJ 340; [1998] 1 MLRA 67; [1998] 2 MLJ 425; [1998] 2 AMR 1666, where the Court recognised that proceedings instituted for collateral or improper purposes may amount to an abuse of the Court's process.
140
The First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party also relied on the fact that this Court had earlier allowed the Second Fourth Party's application to set aside the Third Party's claim against it.
141
They submitted that the Second Fourth Party, being the solicitors' firm directly involved in holding and releasing the purchase monies and witnessing the relevant documentation, was plainly the party with the closest nexus to the impugned transaction. Accordingly, if the Court had found that no sufficient cause of action existed against the Second Fourth Party, it followed, a fortiori, that the claims against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party, whose alleged involvement was said to be even more remote, were unsustainable.
142
They further maintained that the evidence demonstrated that the only individual directly connected to GEV Integrated Sdn Bhd through the relevant letters of authorisation was the Third Party himself, together with the Second Defendant who had allegedly agreed to the transaction structure involving the solicitors' firm and GEV Integrated Sdn Bhd.
143
In summary, the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party contended that the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that:
a
the First Fourth Party's name did not appear in the critical financial documents relating to the impugned transaction;
b
no banking details belonging to the First Fourth Party appeared in the transaction documents;
c
the monies were released to GEV Integrated Sdn Bhd pursuant to the Third Party's own representations and letters of authorisation, and not pursuant to any direction by the First Fourth Party;
d
the Third Party himself had represented that he was acting as administrator of the deceased's estate; and
e
no reasonable cause of action had been disclosed against either the First Fourth Party or the Third Fourth Party.
144
Accordingly, they prayed that the Third Party's claims against them be dismissed with costs, together with such further or consequential relief as the Court deemed fit and appropriate.
145
It is evident that this case presents a complex and unfortunate web of transactions, representations, denials, and competing claims involving numerous parties, layered proceedings, and serious allegations of fraud and forgery. In a dispute of this nature, where each party seeks either to assert title, resist liability, or shift responsibility onto another, it is unsurprising that the evidence before the Court reveals significant inconsistencies and irreconcilable versions of events.
146
It is immediately apparent to this Court that not every party involved in these transactions has been truthful. Equally, the evidence does not necessarily point to a single wrongdoer acting alone. On the contrary, the circumstances surrounding the impugned dealings suggest the possibility of involvement by more than one individual or entity in the events which ultimately culminated in the disputed transfer of the said property.
147
What is, however, clear and beyond serious dispute is that the transfer and registration of the said property in favour of the Second Defendant were procured through reliance upon a purported Court Order dated 24 March 2015 bearing case number 24NCVC-1147-08/2014, which the evidence conclusively establishes to be non-existent. While this Court observed during the course of trial that the Second Defendant (DW2) gave evidence in a manner that was generally consistent, composed, and appeared to be honest, it is nevertheless unfortunate that his registration ultimately rested upon a non-existent Court Order. The evidence adduced, particularly through the testimony of PW3 and the documentary confirmation issued by the Shah Alam High Court Registry, strongly supports the conclusion that the impugned registration was procured through forgery and/or fraud, rendering the Second Defendant's title defeasible in law.
148
In the circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the Second Defendant's title is defeasible in law. The applicable legal principles governing defeasibility under section 340 of the National Land Code are well settled and admit little controversy in cases involving forged or void instruments.
149
It is equally undisputed that the First Defendant is the lawful administrator and personal representative of the estate of the late Selamat bin Dahlan. Indeed, during the course of the trial, the First Defendant candidly acknowledged that the deceased had previously sold the said property to the First Plaintiff and accordingly withdrew his Counterclaim and consented to the Plaintiffs' claims.
150
The position ultimately adopted by the First Defendant was, in substance, that the estate of the late Selamat bin Dahlan no longer retained any beneficial interest in the disputed 4/12 share, the same having already been disposed of by the deceased during his lifetime.
151
In the circumstances, and having regard to section 340(2)(b) of the National Land Code together with the decision of the Federal Court in Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Berhad [2015] 6 MLJ 1; [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2015] 5 MLRA 665; [2015] AMEJ 1824, particularly for the propositions that there is nothing in the National Land Code which expressly or impliedly excludes equitable interests in alienated land and that the protection afforded under the proviso to section 340(3) of the National Land Code is unavailable in the present case, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the declaratory and consequential reliefs sought.
152
The fact that the transactions could not immediately be perfected by way of registered transfer due to the restriction contained in section 205(3) of the National Land Code does not, in the circumstances of this case, extinguish or negate the equitable and beneficial interests arising from the agreements and conduct of the parties.
153
Accordingly, the Consent Judgment between the Plaintiffs and the First Defendant is recorded, and judgment is entered in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant in terms of the following reliefs:
a
a declaration order that the sale and purchase agreement dated 24 January 1997 between Selamat bin Dahlan and Zainul Akmal bin Kamsani for the sale of the 4/12 share for the property held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) is in order, valid and enforceable in law;
b
a declaration order that the Power of Attorney dated 24 January 1997 with registration No. PA 710/1997 issued by Selamat bin Dahlan to Zainul Akmal bin Kamsani, as attorney of Selamat bin Dahlan is valid and is legally enforceable to enter into the sale and purchase agreement on behalf of Selamat bin Dahlan to dispose the 4/12 share of the land held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) to the Second Plaintiff till the Eighth Plaintiff;
c
a declaration order that the following agreements entered into between the First Plaintiff and the Second to Eighth Plaintiffs are valid and legally enforceable
i
Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 3 February 1997 entered with Rozlan bin Ahmad Zainuddin;
II
(ii) Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 7 March 1997 entered with Haimiyusry bin Shuhaimi;
III
(iii) Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 7 March 1997 entered with Ahamd Zamri bin Shuhaimi;
IV
(iv) Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 16 January 2002 entered with Faridah binti Harun;
v
Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 16 January 2002 entered with Maria binti Musa;
VI
(vi) Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 28 November 2002 entered with Mashuri bin Bakri;
VII
(vii) Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 30 September 2004 entered with Ruslina binti Abd Rahim.
d
a declaration order that Selamat bin Dahlan is the bare trustee for the Second Plaintiff till the Eighth Plaintiff for the 4/12 share of the land registered in his name for the land held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154);
e
a declaration order that the Second Plaintiff till the Eighth Plaintiff are the beneficial owner of the 4/12 share of the land registered in the name of Selamat bin Dahlan held under No. Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154);
f
a declaration order that the sale of the 4/12 share of the land held under No. Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) to the Second Defendant is null and void and legally wrong;
g
an order for the Third Defendant to revoke or cancel the registration dated 28 June 2016 for the transfer of 4/12 share held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) via Nombor Perserahan 3131/2016 in the name of the Second Defendant;
h
an order for the Second Defendant to hand over the original document of title held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) to the Third Defendant for the revocation or cancellation of the transfer to be conducted failing which the Third Defendant shall be ordered to revoke or cancel the document of title and shall issue a replacement title for the said land and to carry out the orders of this Court;
i
an order for the Third Defendant to register on the document of title for the land held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) that the 4/12 share of the land to be registered in the name of the Sixth Plaintiff, Maria binti Musa as trustee for the interest of the Second Plaintiff till the Eighth Plaintiff;
j
an order for the Registrar Caveat No. Perserahan 1547/2018 lodged on 21 Mac 2018 on the 4/12 share of the land held under No Hakmilik 6646 No Lot 3620, Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang, Negeri Selangor (formerly known as EMR 6154) to remain;
k
an order for the Third Defendant to carry out the orders as stated above and to enforce the orders of this Court.
154
The Second Defendant's counterclaim against the Plaintiffs is dismissed.
155
The decision reached is further supported by authorities such as Hassan bin Kadir v Mohamed Moidu bin Mohamad [2018] Supp MLJ 266; [2011] 4 AMR 677; [2011] 5 CLJ 136, Yeo Ping Tieng v Elitprop Sdn Bhd [2019] 6 MLRA 616; [2020] 1 CLJ 776; [2019] MLJU 1504; [2017] AMEJ 0202 and He-Con Sdn Bhd v Bulyah Ishak [2020] 5 MLRA 98; [2020] MLJU 916; [2020] 7 CLJ 271; [2020] 5 AMR 645.
156
The principal difficulty confronting this Court, however, does not end with the determination that the Second Defendant's title is defeasible and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs sought. The more difficult questions concern the allocation of responsibility for the losses arising from the impugned transactions, and the extent to which the various claims for indemnity, contribution, or compensation may properly be sustained on the evidence before the Court.
157
In particular, this Court must determine whether the Second Defendant has established any entitlement to indemnity or contribution against the Third Party, having regard to the circumstances under which the Second Defendant purportedly acquired the said property.
158
This Court must further determine whether the Third Party has in turn established any legal or factual basis to shift liability onto the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party arising out of the same series of transactions and events.
159
These issues must ultimately be determined not upon suspicion, conjecture, or hindsight, but upon the totality of the evidence adduced before the Court, assessed in light of the applicable legal principles and the burden of proof resting upon the respective parties.
160
This Court now turns to the issue of the Second Defendant's third-party claim against the Third Party.
161
The Third Party's position throughout the proceedings was, in essence, that he had no involvement whatsoever in the sale and transfer of the said property to the Second Defendant, that he never received any portion of the alleged purchase monies, and that the entirety of the transaction had been orchestrated instead by the First Fourth Party and persons associated with him.
162
This Court is unable to accept the Third Party's evidence in its entirety.
163
While there are undoubtedly serious irregularities surrounding the impugned transaction, and while the evidence suggests substantial involvement on the part of other individuals including the First Fourth Party, the objective evidence before the Court nevertheless demonstrates that the Third Party was not wholly detached from the transaction as he now seeks to portray.
164
In particular, this Court is unable to ignore that documents bearing the Third Party's name and purported signature formed part of the very foundation upon which the transaction proceeded. Further, the evidence establishes that the Second Defendant entered into the transaction on the representation that the Third Party was acting on behalf of the estate of the late Selamat bin Dahlan.
165
Significantly, even on the Third Party's own version of events, he acknowledged meeting the Second Defendant sometime in 2017 after the transaction had already taken place and becoming aware that the Second Defendant had purportedly purchased the land. Yet there is little evidence demonstrating any immediate or decisive step taken by the Third Party at that stage to repudiate the transaction or notify the relevant authorities that his name and authority had allegedly been misused.
166
This Court further notes the evidence of DW3 that the Third Party attended at the solicitor's office in February 2020 and executed or re-executed certain documents relating to the transaction. Although the Third Party contended that he had been pressured into doing so, the fact remains that his conduct materially contributed to the continued appearance of legitimacy surrounding the transaction.
167
This Court accepts that the Second Defendant may have acted imprudently and with insufficient caution in proceeding with a transaction involving agricultural land, estate property, and informal intermediaries without proper sale documentation. However, the evidence does not establish that the Second Defendant himself was party to the forgery relating to the non-existent Court Order or that he knowingly participated in the fraud which ultimately rendered his title defeasible.
168
As between the Second Defendant, whose title has now been defeated, and the Third Party, whose conduct and representations materially enabled or facilitated the transaction to proceed, the equities of the case nevertheless favour the Second Defendant insofar as the claim for recovery of the purchase monies is concerned.
169
In the circumstances, this Court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the Second Defendant has established his entitlement to indemnity against the Third Party in respect of the purchase monies paid for the said property.
170
Accordingly, judgment is entered in favour of the Second Defendant against the Third Party for indemnity in respect of the sum of RM550,000.00, being the purchase consideration paid by the Second Defendant in relation to the impugned transaction.
171
However, the remaining claims advanced by the Second Defendant against the Third Party, including the alleged construction costs, consequential losses, and damages, are disallowed. In this regard, this Court accepts the Third Party's submission that those alleged losses were not satisfactorily proven by credible documentary evidence. In particular, the Second Defendant failed to produce sufficient supporting documents such as receipts, invoices, payment vouchers, proof of remittance, or other contemporaneous records capable of substantiating the alleged expenditure and losses claimed.
172
This Court now turns to the Fourth Party proceedings commenced by the Third Party against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party.
173
The Third Party's case was, in substance, that the First Fourth Party together with persons associated with him had orchestrated and managed the impugned transaction from beginning to end, and that the purchase monies paid by the Second Defendant were ultimately channelled to the Third Fourth Party.
174
There is undoubtedly evidence before the Court raising serious suspicion as to the involvement of the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party in the impugned transaction. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that the First Fourth Party played a substantial role in introducing the transaction, dealing with the relevant parties, and facilitating communications relating to the purported sale of the said property.
175
Further, the evidence also demonstrates that monies connected with the transaction were released to the Third Fourth Party through the solicitors' firm involved in the transaction.
176
Nevertheless, suspicion, however strong, cannot by itself substitute for proof of legal liability.
177
This Court must ultimately determine the Fourth Party proceedings based upon the pleaded causes of action, the legal duties said to arise, and the evidence actually establishing entitlement to indemnity or contribution against the Fourth Parties. In that regard, this Court accepts the submission of the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party that the Third Party's pleadings and evidence fell materially short of establishing a complete and sustainable legal basis for indemnity against them.
178
In particular, allegations suggestive of fraud or dishonest conduct were not pleaded with the degree of particularity ordinarily required under Order 18 rule 12 of the Rules of Court 2012.
179
Further, notwithstanding the various allegations levelled against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party, the Third Party did not sufficiently establish the existence of any contractual relationship, agency arrangement, legal duty, or other recognised basis in law upon which indemnity or contribution could properly be imposed against them.
180
While the evidence may justify suspicion that the First Fourth Party and/or persons associated with him were involved in aspects of the impugned transaction, this Court is not satisfied that the Third Party has, on a balance of probabilities, established a legally sustainable claim entitling him to indemnity or contribution against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party.
181
Accordingly, the Third Party's claims against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party are dismissed.
182
Having considered the submissions of the Plaintiffs on costs, the nature and complexity of the proceedings, the duration of the trial, the volume of documentary evidence and pleadings involved, as well as the applicable principles under Order 59 rules 16 and 19 of the Rules of Court 2012, this Court awards costs in the sum of RM80,000.00 to the Plaintiffs against the Second Defendant.
183
Insofar as the First Defendant and the Third Defendant are concerned, this Court makes no order as to costs.
184
In the case of the First Defendant, the position ultimately adopted during the course of the trial substantially aligned with that of the Plaintiffs, culminating in the recording of the Consent Judgment.
185
As for the Third Defendant, the Court accepts that the Third Defendant acted primarily in a neutral and administrative capacity pursuant to its statutory responsibilities under the National Land Code.
186
In respect of the third-party proceedings, judgment having been entered in favour of the Second Defendant against the Third Party for indemnity in the sum of RM550,000.00, this Court awards costs of RM50,000.00 to the Second Defendant against the Third Party.
187
As the fourth-party proceedings have been dismissed, the Third Party shall pay costs in the sum of RM20,000.00 to the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party.
188
Before concluding, this Court records its appreciation to learned counsel for all parties for the professionalism, industry, and assistance rendered throughout the conduct of this trial. This Court further acknowledges the comprehensive and carefully prepared written and oral submissions advanced by counsel, which greatly assisted the Court in analysing and resolving what was undoubtedly a highly complex and factually layered dispute involving multiple parties and competing claims.
189
For the reasons set out above, the Plaintiffs' claims are allowed in the terms stated herein, the Second Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed, judgment is entered in part in favour of the Second Defendant against the Third Party, and the Third Party's claims against the First Fourth Party and the Third Fourth Party are dismissed. Dated: 7 July 2026 (CHOONG YEOW CHOY) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Counsel: For the Plaintiffs Loo Hui Yee (TS Teoh, Anthoa & Co) For the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant Ammar bin Muhammad Afifah binti Ramli [Ammar & Co] For the 2 $ ^{n d} $ Defendant Hussin bin Mohd Razak [Messrs Mohd Irwan Mohd Mubarak] For the 3rd Defendant : Siti Radziah binti Makrudin (ALA) [Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor] For the 3rd Party A. Ravikumar (Ravi & Yasrin Ismail) For the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ & $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ $ 4^{\mathrm{th}} $ Parties : Karam Singh (Karam Singh Sangha & Co.)
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