(F) OUR ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 315 [26] Upon due consideration of this appeal, we are unanimous in our decision that both appeals are devoid of merit. We are satisfied that the LHCJ was correct in intervening. The Labour Court proceeded upon an erroneous appreciation of the evidence, failed to consider material deficiencies in the proof adduced, and treated the 320 Appellants’ pleaded claims as having been established notwithstanding substantial gaps in both the documentary and oral evidence. Such errors struck at the very foundation of liability and quantum, and accordingly warranted appellate intervention. 325 [27] The threshold issue before this Court is therefore a narrow but decisive one. It is not whether, as a general proposition, service charge may lawfully be utilised by a hotelier to discharge the statutory obligation to pay minimum wage. That question has been authoritatively answered in the negative by the Federal Court in 330 Crystal Crown Hotel & Resort Sdn Bhd (Crystal Crown Hotel Petaling Jaya) v Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Hotel, Bar & Restoran Semenanjung Malaysia [2021] 2 MLRA 696; [2021] MLJU 385. 335 [28] The real question is whether the Appellants, on the evidence adduced before the Labour Court, proved the specific monetary claims they claimed. On that question, the ordinary rules of proof continue to apply. The burden of proof in establishing a case is on the Appellant. It is not the Respondent’s duty to disprove it. The 340 evidentiary burden is trite that those who allege a fact are duty-bound to prove it (see s.101, 102, and 103 of the Evidence Act 1950). This court in Selvaduray v Chinniah [1939] 1 MLJ 253, 254, CA held: "The burden of proof under section 102 of the Evidence Enactment is upon 345 the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side, and accordingly, the plaintiff must establish his case. If he fails to do so, it will not avail him to turn around and say that the defendant has not established his. The defendant can say it is wholly immaterial whether I prove my case or not. You have not proved yours". 350 [29] In Crystal Crown, the Federal Court held that hoteliers are not entitled to utilise employees’ service charge to satisfy their statutory obligation to pay minimum wage, and that service charge cannot be incorporated into a clean wage or used to top up minimum wage. The 355 Federal Court reasoned that minimum wage legislation concerns “basic wages”, whereas a service charge is a distinct cash benefit collected from customers and held for eligible employees. That principle is binding on this Court, and we apply it without reservation. 360 [30] However, Crystal Crown is not the authority for the proposition that every employee who alleges an unlawful service charge arrangement is automatically entitled to judgment for any sum claimed. It does not dispense with proof of contractual entitlement, proof of quantum, or proof of actual deduction or shortfall. The legal 365 principle in Crystal Crown must be applied to proven facts; it cannot itself supply missing evidence. [31] The Appellants’ claims were for specified monetary sums. They were therefore required to prove, on the balance of probabilities, three 370 essential elements: entitlement to the alleged service charge points, the value of those points for each month claimed, and the fact and amount of any deduction, withholding or shortfall. Without proof of these matters, liability and quantum could not lawfully be ascertained. 375 [32] As to entitlement, we find that the High Court found that the employment contracts did not uniformly confer an entitlement to three service charge points. Some contracts referred generally to service charge without specifying three points; some Appellants had no complete contracts before the Labour Court; and the Appellants’ 380 reliance on the “Benefit Program” document was unsafe. We find that document was not shown to have been incorporated into the contracts of employment, was not signed by the Respondent, did not bear the Respondent’s letterhead, and was not supported by cogent evidence establishing contractual force. These were not minor 385 technicalities but material deficiencies in proof. [33] As to valuation, the Appellants relied substantially on photographs of alleged service charge schedules. We find that the witnesses were unable to establish with sufficient certainty who took 390 the photographs, when they were taken, whether they corresponded to the months claimed, whether the figures were final, or whether they were applicable to each Appellant. In a claim requiring month-by-month quantification, such evidence could not safely sustain the award made by the Labour Court. 395 [34] As to deduction or loss, the evidence was likewise incomplete. Payslips were not produced for all months claimed. We find that the Labour Court was therefore not in a position to verify, for each Appellant and for each month, whether there had been a deduction, 400 whether the deduction corresponded to the alleged service charge points, and whether the amount claimed represented an actual shortfall. The claim could not be properly proved by assumption, generalisation, or extrapolation from incomplete records. 405 [35] We accept that an employer is ordinarily expected to maintain proper wage records. But that proposition does not reverse the legal burden in a civil claim for a liquidated sum. Where the Appellants chose to advance quantified claims over specified periods, they had to adduce sufficient evidence to enable the tribunal to determine 410 liability and quantum. The absence of such proof was fatal, particularly where the Respondent disputed entitlement, authenticity, valuation and computation. [36] The Appellants submitted that the LHCJ failed to apply Crystal 415 Crown. We find that the LHCJ had not departed from Crystal Crown. Rather, he held that the Appellants had failed to establish the evidential foundation necessary to recover the sums claimed. We are of the opinion that this conclusion is not inconsistent with the Federal Court’s decision. 420 [37] We are of the opinion that Crystal Crown establishes an important rule concerning the nature of service charges and the statutory obligation to pay minimum wage. It does not remove the need to prove the pleaded debt. A court must still examine whether 425 each claimant has demonstrated that the sum claimed is legally and factually due. In the present appeals, the LHCJ was entitled to conclude that the Labour Court had treated the legal principle as a substitute for proof. 430 [38] We find that the LHCJ also considered the evidence of express consent and consent by conduct. It found that certain Appellants signed letters accepting the restructuring, while others joined after the new structure had been implemented and continued employment for several years, with knowledge of the wage structure reflected in their 435 payslips. The Labour Court did not sufficiently engage with this evidence. [39] We emphasise that consent cannot validate what the law prohibits. If the only question were whether an employee may contract out of minimum wage legislation, the answer would plainly be no. 440 However, in these appeals, consent and conduct were relevant to the factual inquiry: what terms governed the employment relationship, what the Appellants knew, what they accepted over time, and whether they could later assert a different contractual entitlement without proving it. The LHCJ did not use consent to weaken social legislation. 445 Instead, he saw consent as one factor among other evidence. [40] The Appellants are correct that the earlier Wan Noor Rizal decision was not binding on the Labour Court. Nevertheless, where an earlier decision involved the same employer, similar 450 documentation, and substantially similar service charge issues, it was a relevant matter that the Labour Court ought at least to have considered and, if necessary, distinguished. The LHCJ did not treat that decision as a binding precedent. He regarded the Labour Court’s failure to address it as one indication that the Labour Court’s 455 evaluation was incomplete. We see no appealable error in that approach. [41] We further agree with the LHCJ that limitation was a relevant consideration. To the extent that any portion of the claims fell outside 460 the applicable statutory period, the Labour Court was required to identify and exclude those sums. Its failure to do so provided an additional reason for appellate intervention. 465