2 v Sri Rimba Mentari Development Sdn Bhd (BA-24FC-1463-10/2016)

Namun, pada 16.1.2017, Plaintif telah memfailkan satu permohonan iaitu Kandungan 8, memohon kebenaran daripada Mahkamah ini untuk meminda Kandungan 1 bagi maksud meminda nama Plaintif kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad. Pindaan nama Plaintif yang dipohon adalah selaras dengan suatu Perintah Perletakanhak yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam Saman Pemula No. 24NCC-104-2009 bertarikh 15.1.2010, yang mana kesemua aset-aset, dengan segala hak faedah dan kepentingan yang berterusan di bawah hakmilik CIMB Bank Berhad dipindahmilik dan diletakhak kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad (SEASAM Berhad).

Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 8 pada 17.4.2017.

Kandungan 1 Plaintif ini telah disokong oleh afidavit-afidavit diikrarkan oleh Ahmad Kamal Bin Kadir pada 18.10.2016 (Afidavit Sokongan – Kandungan 2) dan 15.12.2016 (Afidavit Jawapan – Kandungan 4). Ahmad Kamal Bin Kadir adalah merupakan Naib Presiden Corporate & Commercial Recovery Plaintif. 4 B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [5] Melalui surat tawaran bertarikh 11.4.1997 (Surat Tawaran) yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan bersama Perjanjian Kemudahan bertarikh 5.9.1997 (Perjanjian Kemudahan), Plaintif telah memberi dan Defendan telah bersetuju menerima pelbagai kemudahan perbankan termasuk antara lain; kemudahan overderaf bagi jumlah RM100,000.00 dan kemudahan terma berjumlah RM RM120,000.00 dan jumlah keseluruhan kemudahan yang diterima oleh Defendan daripada Plaintif adalah berjumlah RM220,000.00 (kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan tersebut).

Bagi menjamin kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan tersebut, Defendan yang merupakan tuanpunya berdaftar tanah yang dipegang di Geran No: 34366/M1-B/4/47, Lot No: 18262 Bangunan No:M1-B Tingkat No.4, Petak No:47 yang terletak di Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (hartanah tersebut) telah bersetuju menggadaikan hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif melalui Gadaian Perserahan No. 25086/2009 yang didaftarkan pada 18.11.2009.

Defendan kemudiannya telah memungkiri syarat-syarat yang terkandung di dalam terma-terma perjanjian kemudahan- 5 kemudahan perbankan tersebut apabila gagal membuat pembayaran ansuran yang ditetapkan.

Di atas kemungkiran berterusan Defendan tersebut, pada 2.3.2015 Plaintif melalui peguamcaranya Tetuan Shaikh David Raj telah menyampaikan sesalinan Notis Kemungkiran Terhadap Gadaian melalui Notis Borang 16D di bawah seksyen 254 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (KTN) bertarikh 2.3.2015 untuk Defendan meremedikan kemungkiran tersebut dalam tempoh masa empat belas (14) hari dari tarikh penyampaian Notis Borang 16D tersebut diterima bagi menuntut pembayaran balik keseluruhan jumlah wang yang terhutang bagi kemudahan overderaf dan kemudahan terma termasuk faedah yang patut dibayar dan terhutang oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif.

Defendan telah gagal/mungkir untuk mematuhi Notis Borang 16D tersebut dan sehingga kini masih gagal meremedi kemungkirannya.

Setakat tarikh 20.4.2017, jumlah yang terhutang oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 6 Bagi Kemudahan Overdraft - Jumlah terhutang setakat 20.4.2017 adalah RM646,107.80. Bagi Kemudahan Terma - Jumlah terhutang setakat 20.4.2017 adalah RM390,446.53. C. KEDUDUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG PROSIDING HALANG TEBUS Kausa yang bertentangan [11] Undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa di dalam sesuatu prosiding halang tebus, bagi penguatkuasaan hak atau remedi statutori yang ada kepada pemegang gadaian (chargee), Mahkamah akan hanya mengeluarkan satu perintah menjual sesuatu hartanah yang digadai oleh pemberi gadaian (chargor) melalui lelongan awam sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tidak wujud suatu kausa yang bertentangan.

Seksyen 256

Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) telah memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “(3) On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary”. 7 [13] Di dalam pentakrifan frasa kausa yang bertentangan, Mahkamah ingin merujuk kepada kes Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad [1997] 1 MLJ 77. Di dalam kes Low Lee Lian ini, di muka surat 82 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menerangkan tiga kategori kes yang mewujudkan kausa yang bertentangan menurut seksyen 256(3) KTN seperti berikut: “In our judgment, 'cause to the contrary' within s 256(3) may be established only in three categories of cases. First, it may be taken as settled that a chargor who is able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine housed in s 340 of the Code establishes cause to the contrary. That section provides as follows: 340(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible.

The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible –

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law.

Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in sub-s (2) – 8

it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and

any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser.

Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent –

the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or

the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. In other words, a chargor who is able to demonstrate that the charge, the enforcement of which is sought, is defeasible upon one or more of the grounds specified under sub-ss (2) and (4)(b) above will be held to have established cause to the contrary under s 256(3). The decision of Smith J in Subchent Kaur v Chai Sau Kian [1958] MLJ 32, of the former Federal Court inPhuman Singh v Kho Kwang Choon [1965] 2 MLJ 189, of Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then was) in Overseas Union Finance Ltd v Lim Joo Chong [1971] 2 MLJ 124 and that of Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Syarikat Perumahan Luas Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1988] 3 MLJ 352 (affirmed on appeal) sufficiently illustrate the proposition now under discussion. Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s 256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale. For example, failure on the part of the chargee to prove the making of a demand or service 9 upon the chargor of a notice in Form 16D would constitute cause to the contrary. So too, where the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the chargee. See Co-operative Central Bank Ltd v Meng Kuang Properties Bhd [1991] 2 MLJ 283. However, in such a case, it would be open to the chargee to subsequently serve a notice or a proper notice (as the case may be) before commencing proceedings afresh as the cause shown to the contrary does not in substance affect the chargee's right to apply for an order for sale. Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order for sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule of law or equity. This principle finds its origins in the judgment of Aitken J in Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1939] MLJ 296 at p 298 where he said: I agree that equitable principles should not be invoked too freely for the purpose of construing our Land Code, but surely a chargor, who shows that there would be no need to sell his land if the chargee paid up in full what is due from himself in another capacity, has shown good and sufficient cause why the land should not be sold. Section 149 of the Land Code obviously contemplates that there may be cases in which charged land should not be sold, even though there has been a default in payment of the principal sum or interest thereon secured by the charge; and it seems to me that a chargor may 'shew cause' either in law or equity against an application for an order for sale, and that the courts should refuse to make an order in every case where it would be unjust to do so. By 'unjust' I mean contrary to those rules of the common law and equity which are in force in the Federated Malay States. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [14] Di dalam mencapai pendekatan terhad dengan memberikan tiga kategori kausa yang bertentangan ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan 10 telah memberikan alasan-alasannya dengan berkata di muka surat 87 begini: “As earlier observed, unless a chargor can bring himself within one of the three categories of cases set out earlier in this judgment, no cause to the contrary would be shown and the court will be obliged to make an order for sale. It would not be sufficient, as was done in the instant case, to allege mere breaches by the chargee of the loan agreement between the chargee and the borrower or even of the terms of the annexure to the charge in order to resist an application under Section 256(3) of the Code. An allegation that the chargee acted in breach of contract, while it may give rise to an independent action in personam, is insufficient per se to defeat the ad rem rights of a chargee under his registered charge to an order for sale. We are conscious that the approach we have adopted results in a very narrow and restrictive interpretation of s 256(3) of the code. But there are good reasons of policy for such an interpretation. It must not be forgotten that in the ordinary way, banks and other financial institutions loan moneys deposited with them by their customers to a borrower on the faith of the security of a charge created over the landed property of the borrower, or as here, of a third party. In the event of a default by the borrower, the lending institution normally looks to early recovery of all or a substantial part of the money due to them from a sale of a security. If the courts of this country interpret the phrase ‘cause to the contrary’ appearing in s 256(3) of the Code liberally, then, institutional lenders 11 would loose confidence in their right to realize their security through an order for sale. Financial institutions would then become reluctant to lend money to bonafide entrepreneurs. Commerce would come to a standstill and the development of land and industries in this country which are largely dependent upon loans from banks would cease. No judgment of this court will be designed to produce such a consequence.” D. TENTANGAN DEFENDAN [15] Permohonan Plaintif ini telah ditentang oleh Defendan. Di dalam menentang permohonan Plaintif ini, Defendan telah memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan (Kandungan 3) dan Afidavit Lanjutan (Kandungan 5) yang diikrarkan oleh Abu Zahar bin Abu Bakar yang masing-masing diikrarkan pada 21.11.2016 dan 27.12.2016. Abu Zahar bin Abu Bakar adalah seorang pengarah Defendan. [16] Defendan di dalam percubaannya untuk membuktikan wujudnya kausa yang bertentangan, di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya telah menimbulkan alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan tidak tahu terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian kerana Defendan tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan draf gadaian ataupun dokumen gadaian. Apabila 12 Defendan telah tidak dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian, Defendan tidak boleh dikatakan telah memungkiri terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. ii. Penyampaian Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan adalah tidak sah dan defektif kerana Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D ke alamat yang bukan lagi diduduki oleh Defendan. iii. Defendan pada 2.11.2006 telah memfailkan tindakan writ saman terhadap Plaintif melalui Guaman Sivil S1-22- 1092-2006 untuk membantah penjualan hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam yang dijadualkan pada 6.11.2006 di mana di dalam tindakan tersebut Mahkamah telah mengeluarkan perintah injunksi menghalang Plaintif untuk meneruskan jualan hartanah tersebut. permohonan Plaintif ini adalah satu penghinaan Mahkamah. iii. Tindakan Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa menurut seksyen 21(2) Akta Had Masa 1953. 13 iv. Tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh prinsip / doktrin res judicata. v. Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan prosiding halang tebus ini terhadap Defendan. Alasan i: Defendan tidak tahu terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian kerana Defendan tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan draf gadaian ataupun dokumen gadaian. Apabila Defendan telah tidak dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian, Defendan tidak boleh dikatakan telah memungkiri terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. [17] Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian atau draf gadaian. Oleh kerana tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan draf ataupun dokumen gadaian, maka Defendan juga telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan tidak tahu mengenai terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. Di dalam keadaan begini, adalah menjadi pengataan Defendan bahawa Defendan tidak boleh dikatakan telah memungkiri terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. 14 [18] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa alasan yang ditimbulkan oleh Defendan ini adalah satu alasan yang tidak berasas dan tidak bermerit langsung. [19] Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa berdasarkan Eksibit “AZ-1” yang terkandung di Afidavit Jawapan Abu Zahar bin Abu Bakar (Kandungan 3), Defendan telah memberikan suatu surat wakil kuasa kepada Plaintif melalui Surat Penyerahanhak bertarikh 5-9- 1997 (“Surat Penyerahanhak”) di mana pihak Defendan melantik Plaintif dan/atau mana-mana pegawainya sebagai wakil pihak Defendan yang antara lain bagi membenarkan untuk pengwujudan dan pendaftaran gadaian ke atas hartanah tersebut. [20] Adalah tidak dinafikan oleh Defendan bahawa pada 5.9.1997 Defendan dan Plaintif telah menandatangani suatu Deed of Assignment (Ikatan Penyerahanhak) yang mana Defendan sebagai Penyerah hak (Assignor) dan Plaintif adalah Penerima / Pemegang serah hak (Assignee). [21] Artikel 2, Artikel 3 dan Artikel 4 Ikatan Penyerahanhak bertarikh 5.9.1997 telah jelas memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 15 ARTICLE II RECITALS

2.01 FACILITY The Assignee has granted the Facility to the Assignor for the Purpose.

2.02 TITLE TO THE PROPERTY Individual issue document of title or subsidiary title to the Property has not been issued as yet.

2.03 TERM OF FACILITY AGREEMENT It is term of the Facility Agreement, inter-alia, that prior to issue of the document of title or subsidiary title to the Property and the registration of the Charge in respect in respect of the Property in favour of the Assignee as security for the Indebtedness, the Indebtness shall be secured by this Assignment. ARTICLE III

3.01 ASSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT In consideration of the Facility to be granted and to continue to grant to the Assignor upon the terms and conditions contained in the Facility Agreement, the Assignor as beneficial owner hereby absolutely all of the Assignor’s rights and title to and interest whatsoever in the property including all rights and title to and interest whatsoever of the Assignor in the Pricipal Agreement and/ or the Sale and Purchase Agreement to the Assignee as security for the Indebtness.

3.02 TITLE TO THE PROPERTY It is expressly agreed, however, that notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Assignor shall remain liable under the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement to observe and perform all of the conditions and obligations therein provided to be observed and performed by him, and the Assignee shall have no obligation or liability under the Principal Agreement and/ or the Sale Purchase Agreement by reason of or arising out of this Assignment, nor shall the Assignee be required or obligated in any manner to observe or perform any of the conditions or obligations of the Assignor under or pursuant to the Principal 16 Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement (except to make progressive releases out of the proceeds of the Facility to the Developer/Vendor under the terms and conditions of the Facility Agreement) or to present or file any claim, or to take any other action to enforce the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreement. ARTICLE IV

4.01 ASSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT The Assignor hereby convenants with the Assignee that he:

Will duly observe and perform all of the conditions and obligations imposed upon him under the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

Will deliver the individual issue document of title or subsidiary title to the Property immediately upon its issue;

Will not without the prior written consent of the Assignee in writing:

Terminate or agree to terminate the Principal Agreement and/or the

(ii) Agree to any variation of the terms of the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement; or

(iii) Assign or transfer or sell or create or suffer to be created any assignment of his right and title to and interest whatsoever in the Property including all his rights and interest under the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

Will upon the issuance of the individual issue document of title to the Property, immediatelyexecute and deliver to the Assignee:

The Memorandum of Transfer, as transferee to the Property; and

(ii) The Charge and the annexture thereto, as Chargor in favour of the Assignee, as Chargee upon such terms and conditions as are provided in the Facility Agreement or as the Assignee may then at its absolute discretion determine; 17

To be responsible for and to pay to the Government or any local or other authority all charges due and outgoings whatsoever whether by way of fines, premia, assessment rates, quit rents, stamp duty, registration fees or any other charges fees or impositions issue of any separate document of title of any separate document of title to the Property;

To indemnify the Assignee against all claims, demands, actions, fines, penalties and the legal proceedings whatsoever made against or charged or imposed upon the Assignee by the Government or local or other authority or any person or body or corporation whatsoever arising from or in connection with any act or omission done or omitted to be done by any person whatsoever in respect of or pertaining to the property; and

Will executed and delivered such further documents and do such other acts and thing as the Assignee may from time to time request. [22] Berdasarkan peruntukan-peruntukan Ikatan Penyerahanhak yang ditandatangani antara Plaintif & Defendan, oleh Defendan tidak boleh mengatakan bahawa mereka tidak tahu akan terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang termaktub di dalam gadaian yang didaftarkan hanya semata-mata kononnya telah tidak dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian atau drafnya. Walhal Defendan sememangnya mempunyai pengetahuan penuh akan gadaian yang didaftarkan dan telahpun memberikan kuasa mutlak kepada Plaintif untuk pendaftaran gadaian ke atas hartanah kepunyaan Defendan tersebut. Alasan Defendan bahawa memandangkan dokumen gadaian telah tidak dibekalkan kepadanya maka 18 Defendan tidak tahu terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian adalah satu “lame excuse” yang merupakan rekaan semata-mata yang sengaja diada-adakan. Alasan ii: Penyampaian Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan adalah tidak sah dan defektif kerana Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D ke alamat yang bukan lagi diduduki oleh Defendan. [23] Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa penyampaian Notis Borang 16D adalah tidak sah dan defektif kerana Defendan tidak pernah menerima sesalinan Notis Borang 16D kerana Notis Borang 16D telah dihantar oleh Plaintif ke alamat Defendan di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. [24] Defendan telah cuba mengatakan bahawa alamat Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur (Menara City One) adalah merupakan pejabat berdaftar bagi Ming Consultants (M) iaitu alamat setiausaha syarikat Defendan. Defendan di dalam percubaan menafikan penerimaan Notis Borang 16D telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan telah berpindah ke alamat lain pada tahun 2007 iaitu Lot 02-AD, Level 19

Menara Pandan B, Pesiaran MPAJ, Pandan Indah, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. [25] Menurut Defendan kononnya pada masa penyerahan Notis Borang 16D dibuat penyampai pada tarikh 18.03.2015, ketika itu (18.03.2015), pejabat berdaftar Defendan tidak lagi di Menara City One tetapi adalah di alamat Lot 02-AD, Level 5, Menara Pandan B, Persiaran MPAJ, Pandan Indah, 55100 Kuala Lumpur (“Pejabat Berdaftar No. 2 tersebut”) semenjak tahun 2007 (lebih kurang 9 tahun). [26] Untuk pengataan ini, Defendan telah merujuk kepada Carian Rasmi SSM bertarikh 9.11.2016 yang telah mengesahkan bahawa pada 05.09.2007 pejabat berdaftar Defendan telah bertukar. Defendan telah juga mendakwa bahawa Plaintif mempunyai pengetahuan penuh bahawa alamat perniagaan Defendan juga telah bertukar ke Suite No. 4.07, Tingkat 4, Plaza Prima, Batu 4 1/2, Jalan Kelang Lama, 58200 Kuala Lumpur (“Alamat Perniagaan No. 2 tersebut”).:- [27] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Surat Akuan penyampaian oleh Karunakaran A/L Thuraikannoo (Eksibit “AKK-6”, Kandungan 2) 20 yang telah ditugaskan oleh Tetuan Shaikh David Raj untuk menyampaikan Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan yang telah menyatakan seperti berikut: SURAT AKUAN “Saya, KARUNAKARAN A/L THURAIKANNOO (No. K/P: 640321-08-5857), seorang warga Malaysia yang cukup umur yang beralamat di No. 1 Blok R, Jalan 25/28, Taman Sri Muda, Shah Alam, 40400 Selangor Darul Ehsan dan seorang Kerani bagi Tetuan Shaikh David Raj, M-2-19 Plaza Damas, 60 Jalan Sri Hartamas 1, Sri Hartamas, 50480 Kuala Lumpur dengan sesungguhnya dan sebenarnya mengaku seperti berikut:

Seperti diarah oleh Tetuan Shaikh David Raj, Peguamcara bagi CIMB Bank Berhad beralamat di Corporate & Commercial Recovery, Tingkat 6, Menara Bumiputra Commerce, No. 11 Jalan Raja Laut, 50350 Kuala Lumpur, saya telah pada 18.3.2015 menyampaikan “Notis Kemungkiran Mengenai Suatu Gadaian” bertarikh 2.3.2015 ke atas Penggadai, SRI RIMBA MENTARI DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD dengan cara Kediri berserta dengan surat pendua Tetuan Shaikh David Raj bertarikh 2.3.2015 di alamat berdaftar iaitu Level 5, Menara City One, No. 3 Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur dan juga di alamat perniagaan di Suite 6.36-6.37, 6th Floor, Plaza Imbi, No. 28 Jalan Imbi, 55100 Kuala Lumpur.

Sesalinan surat bertarikh 2.3.2015 dengan Notis Kemungkiran Mengenai Suatu Gadaian bertarikh 2.3.2015, dilampirkan disini dan ditanda sebagai eksibit “A”. 21 [28] Di dalam kes ini Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D secara Kediri ke dua-dua alamat pejabat berdaftar dan alamat tempat perniagaan Defendan iaitu di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur dan di Suite 6.36-6.37, 6th Floor, Plaza Imbi, No. 28 Jalan Imbi, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. [29] Menurut Plaintif sebelum penghantaran Notis Borang 16D tersebut pada 18.3.2015, Plaintif telahpun membuat carian rasmi ke atas alamat berdaftar Defendan pada 2.3.2015 di Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) dan hasil carian rasmi SSM tersebut telah mendapati bahawa alamat berdaftar Defendan adalah di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. Carian rasmi telah juga dibuat pada 20.9.2016 dan hasil yang sama iaitu alamat berdaftar Defendan adalah di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur dan alamat perniagaan adalah Suite 6.36-6.37, 6th Floor, Plaza Imbi, No. 28 Jalan Imbi, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. (Sila lihat Eksibit “AKK-1”, Kandungan 4). 22 [30] Di dalam perkara berhubung cara penyampaian dan penyerahan, seksyen 431(1)(d) dan seksyen 431(2) di dalam Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 telah memperuntukkan: “431. Methods of service. (1) Without prejudice to any other method of service, a notice may be served on a person or body for the purposes of this Act-

by sending the notice by pre-paid registered post to the person or body at an address for service given in pursuance of any provision of this Act, or, where no such address has been given- (i) at the person's usual or last known abode or place of business; or (ii) at the body's registered office or usual or last known place of business; or

A notice served by pre-paid registered post under paragraph (d) of subsection (1) shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter containing the notice would be delivered in the ordinary course of post; and it shall be sufficient proof of service that the letter was [31] Berhubung dengan perkara penyampaian dan penyerahan kertas-kertas kausa kepada Defendan, Mahkamah ini merujuk pertamanya kepada klausa 10.4 dokumen gadaian. Klausa 10.4 memperuntukkan berikut: 23

10.4 In the event of any breach by the Borrower of any of the agreement, convenant, term, stipulation and undertaking herein and on the part of the Borrower to be observed and performed occurring and continuing for a period of not less than fourteen (14) days it shall be lawful for the Bank fourthwith to give notice to Borrower under section 254 of the National Land Code 1965 or Section 148 of the Sabah Land Code (Cap 81) or section 111 of the Sabah Land Ordinance (Cap 68) requiring the Borrower to remedy the said breach within a period of not less than fourteen (14) days and service of such notice shall be effected in the same manner as a notice demanding payment of the balance due as herein provided. [32] Manakala klausa 18.1 dokumen gadaian pula telah memperuntukkan berkenaan penyampaian notis dan proses. “18. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND PROCESS

18.1 Every notice, demand or other communication under this Charge shall be in writing and may dispatched as follows:-

if to the Bank, by registered letter sent to its address specified at the head of this Charge;

if the borrower it may, at the option of the Bank, be delivered personally or by prepaid letter, and be sent to his address specified in Section 1 of the schedule hereto OR his usual OR last known place of residence”. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) 24 [33] Di dalam perkara penyampaian Notis Borang 16D, Defendan seterusnya cuba menyatakan bahawa Plaintif di dalam kes ini ada mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan alamat Defendan yang lain. [34] Di dalam kes ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Plaintif telahpun menyampaikan Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan dengan sempurna di mana Plaintif mempunyai pilihan untuk menyerahkan kertas kausa saman pemula kepada Defendan berpandukan mod penyampaian di dalam dokumen gadaian tersebut yang jelas menyatakan “be sent to his address specified in Section 1 of the schedule hereto OR his usual OR last known place of residence”. [35] Di dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D ke kedua-dua alamat berdaftar dan alamat perniagaan yang tertera di kedua-dua carian SSM dan alamat-alamat adalah alamat Defendan yang biasa dan alamat Defendan yang terakhir diketahui oleh Plaintif” (OR his usual OR last known place of residence). [36] Di dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Hong Leong Bank Bhd v. HGM Machinery Sdn Bhd (formerly known as 25 Handee Engineering & Consultancy Services Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2013] 9 MLJ 412 yang telah memutuskan antara lain bahawa: “The plaintiff were justified and entitled to issue or send the said notices of demand to the address as stated in the guarantee notwithstanding the said letter of 5 January 1999 stating the purported ‘new address’ of the fifth defendant given that under cl 21 of the said guarantee, the plaintiff were entitled to issue the said notices of demand EITHER to the last known address of the fifth defendant or the address as stated in the said guarantee (see para 150)”. [37] Di dalam kes Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd v. Rinta ak Dali (A) Chayar ak Dali (F) & Anor [2014] 9 MLJ 263, Mahkamah telah menggariskan seperti berikut: “From the letters of demand sent to the defendants, the plaintiff was obviously aware of other addresses used by the defendants. Although the plaintiff had served the letters of demand at these other addresses, it did not mean that all cause papers or proceedings must be served on the defendants at all these addresses. There was no requirement 26 and no necessity to include these other addresses in the proceedings and to serve all cause papers and proceedings at all these other addresses”. [38] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa kalaupun Plaintif mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan alamat Defendan selain daripada yang tercatat di dalam carian SSM, Plaintif adalah tidak bertanggungan atau tidak bertanggungjawab untuk menyerahkan Notis Borang 16D kepada alamat Defendan yang lain selain daripada alamat berdaftar. Apa yang jelas di sini adalah; Notis Borang 16D telahpun diserahkan kepada alamat yang merupakan alamat berdaftar Defendan dan alamat perniagaan yang telah dinyatakan di carian SSM yang merupakan alamat terakhir yang diketahui Plaintif sebelum penyampaian Notis Borang 16D tersebut pada 18.3.2015. [39] Berpandukan kepada kes-kes yang telah diputuskan serta berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Notis Borang 16D telah diserahkan dengan sempurnanya kepada Defendan. 27 Alasan iii: Defendan pada 2.11.2006 telah memfailkan tindakan writ saman terhadap Plaintif melalui Guaman Sivil S1-22- 1092-2006 untuk membantah penjualan hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam yang dijadualkan pada 6.11.2006 di mana di dalam tindakan tersebut Mahkamah telah mengeluarkan perintah injunksi menghalang Plaintif untuk meneruskan jualan hartanah tersebut. Permohonan Plaintif ini adalah satu penghinaan Mahkamah. Tindakan Plaintif dihalang oleh prinsip-prinsip res judicata, waiver dan estoppel. [40] Di dalam perlupusan muktamad guaman sivil yang difailkan Defendan terhadap Plaintif melalui Guaman Sivil S1-22-1092- 2006, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telahpun mengeluarkan perintahnya pada 9.3.2011. Perintah bertarikh 9.3.2011 tersebut adalah seperti berikut: “(a)Defendan dihalang samada mereka sendiri ataupun melalui pengarah-pengarah atau pengkhidmat-pengkhidmat atau agen-agen-agen atau sesiapa di antara mereka atau sebaliknya dari melupuskan Hartanah Plaintif yang dipegang di bawah Geran 34366/M1-B/4/47, No. Petak 47 dalam Tingkat No. 4, Bangunan 28 No. 41B, Lot 18262, Daerah Petaling, Mukim Sungai Buluh, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan [“Hartanah tersebut”] melainkan pelupusan melalui jualan lelongan selaras dengan perintah jualan di bawah kanun Tanah Negara 1965;

Defendan diwajibkan memperolehi Perintah Jualan di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 sekiranya Defendan ingin melupuskan Hartanah tersebut. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini). [41] Adalah jelas daripada Perintah bertarikh 9.3.2011 bahawa pihak Plaintif adalah diberikan kebenaran untuk melupuskan Hartanah tersebut melalui jualan lelongan selaras dengan suatu Perintah Jualan dibawah Kanun Tanah Negara. [42] Kandungan 1 ini adalah saman pemula yang telah dimulakan oleh Plaintif selaras dengan perintah yang diberikan pada 9.3.2011. [43] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini prinsip-prinsip res judicata, waiver dan estoppel yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan adalah tidak terpakai di dalam kes Plaintif. 29 [44] Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memulakan prosiding halang tebus terhadap gadaian yang telah didaftarkan bagi pihaknya atas hartanah tersebut. Prinsip undang-undang di dalam suatu prosiding halang tebus adalah jelas dan mantap bahawa di mana hak pihak pemegang untuk gadaian menguatkuasakan hak atau remedinya atas gadaian tersebut adalah mantap dan jitu. (Sila lihat: Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad v Saujana Pertiwi Sdn Bhd [2003] 7 MLRH 243: “The Plaintiff further contended that even though the 3 actions arose from the granting of the same Overdraft facility but each of the actions taken was based on different documents by different parties and concerning different issues. In support of its contention the Plaintiff referred to the case of Co-operative Central Bank Bhd. v. Belaka Suria Sdn. Bhd. [1991] 2 CLJ 453 (Rep); [1991] 3 CLJ 2131; [1991] 3 MLJ 43, where the learned Judge ruled:- "In principle, a chargee has a right to institute an action for recovery of the debt and also a right to assert the power of sale on the incumbered property, the 2 actions are not the same." After having considered this matter carefully, I agreed fully with the contention by the Counsel for the Plaintiff. The decision of the Federal 30 Court case of Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. [1997] 2 CLJ 36; [1977] 1 MLJ 77 which states:- "Now, it is trite that a chargee/creditor may pursue any or all remedies to recover monies lent by him. He may enforce his statutory charge against the chargor by way of proceedings in under S. 256 of the Code. He may sue the principal debtor (who may or may not be the chargor) upon the personal covenant contained in any loan agreement that was entered into between the parties. He may proceed against the surety who has guaranteed the loan. And he may sue all these courses simultaneously, contemporaneously or successively." (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini). Alasan iv: Tindakan Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa menurut seksyen 21(1) dan 21(2) Akta Had Masa 1953. [45] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan bahawa tindakan Plaintif terhadapnya adalah satu tindakan yang lapuk yang dihalang oleh had masa menurut seksyen 21 Akta Had Masa 1953 (AHM 1953). [46] Defendan di dalam kes ini telah cuba menghujahkan bahawa kausa tindakan Plaintif seharusnya dianggap bermula pada 16.3.1998 apabila tindakan in personam dimulakan oleh Plaintif 31 dan/atau pada 21.3.1998 berdasarkan surat-surat tuntutan Mazwan/Plaintif. [47] Benarkah dakwaan Defendan bahawa tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh tempoh had masa yang diperuntukan di bawah seksyen 21 AHM 1953? [48] Seksyen 21 AHM 1953 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Section 21. Limitation of actions to recover money secured by a mortgage of charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land.

No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on land or personal property or to enforece such mortgage or other charge on land or personal property or to enforce such mortgage or charge, or to recover proceeds of the sale of land or personal property after the expiration of twelve years from the date when the right to receive the money accrued.

No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued. 32 Provided that if, after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, the right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to have accrued until the date on which his possession discontinued.

The right to receive any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or ther charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall not be deemed to accrue so long as that property comprises any future interests or any life insurance policy which has not matured or been determined.

Nothing in the preceding subsections of this section shall apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land but the provisions of this Act relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an action.

No action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land, or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due. Provided that –

Where a prior mortgagee or other incumbrancer has been in possession of the property mortgaged or charged, and an action is 33 brought within one year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent incumbrancer, he may recover by that action all the arrears of interest which fell due during the period of possession by the prior incumbrancer or damages in respect thereof, notwithstanding that the period exceeded six years.

Where the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises any future interest or life insurance policy and it is term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest shall be treated as part of the principal sub of money secured by the mortgage or charge, interest shall not be deemed to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued.

This section shall not apply to any mortgage or charge of a ship. [49] Berhubung dengan tempoh masa 12 tahun menurut seksyen 21

AHM 1953 ini, molek sekiranya Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Peh Lai Huat v. MBF Finance Bhd [2009] CLJ 69. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Peh Lai Huat ini telah memutuskan antara lain bahawa: “…Similarly, S 21(2) of the Limitation Act which reads:- 34

No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued: Provided that if after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to have accrued until the date on which his possession discontinued. Also has no application to this case. That is because the cause of action here, that is to say, the right to exercise the statutory remedy of an Order for Sale did not arise until after the Appellate had failed to remedy the default specified in the Form 16D notice…” [50] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada kes Jigarlal K. Doshi @ Jigarlal A/L Kantilal Doshi v. Resolution Alliance Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 61 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan juga telah memutuskan antara lain seperti berikut: “The law is clear that the cause of action by a chargor does not accrue from the date of default of repayment of the loan but instead from the time the chargor fails to remedy the default as specified in the Form 16D Notice”. 35 [51] Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif melalui peguamcaranya telah mengeluarkan Notis Borang 16D bertarikh 2.3.2015 terhadap Defendan dan Borang 16D tersebut telahpun disampaikan kepada Defendan untuk memberikan notis kepada Defendan supaya meremedikan kemungkirannya terhadap pinjaman-pinjaman tersebut. Defendan telah tidak mematuhi notis tersebut dan gagal meremedikan kemungkirannya. [52] Justeru itu, Plaintif telah memfailkan saman pemulanya di Kandungan 1 pada 18.10.2016. Di dalam hal, adalah jelas di sini bahawa tindakan saman pemula Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh had masa langsung. Alasan v: Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan prosiding halang tebus ini terhadap Defendan. [53] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan bahawa Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan Saman Pemula kerana letakhak kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad (“SEASAM Berhad”) namun tajuk saman pemula masih lagi atas nama CIMB Bank Berhad. 36 [54] Berhubung perkara ini Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 15.1.2010 jelas menyatakan bahawa semua hak-hak, manfaat-manfaat dan kepentingan-kepentingan CIMB adalah letakhak kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad (“SEASAM Berhad”) termasuk akaun kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan yang telah diberikan kepada Defendan beserta gadaian ke atas hartanah tersebut. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini telahpun membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda nama Plaintif kepada SEASAM BHD. Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini isu locus standi yang ditimbulkan oleh Defendan adalah suatu isu yang tidak berasas dan tidak mempunyai merit langsung. KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH [55] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa alasan-alasan yang ditimbulkan Defendan di dalam percubaannya untuk membuktikan atau menunjuk sebab atau mewujudkan kausa yang bertentangan bagi menghalang satu perintah penjualan hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam adalah alasan-alasan penafian semata-mata yang tidak langsung termasuk di dalam mana-mana tiga kategori yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Low Lee Lian. 37 [56] Justeru, Mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan Plaintif di dalam Kandungan 1 dengan memberikan perintah bahawa hartanah tersebut dijual melalui lelongan awam atas terma-terma yang dinyatakan dalam Kandungan 1. Defendan juga adalah diperintah untuk membayar kos kepada Plaintif sebanyak RM6000.00. Tarikh lelongan awam ditetapkan pada 25.5.2017. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 20 April 2017 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Shaikh David Raj Cik Anita Natalia Peguam Defendan - Tetuan W.P Leong & Partners Encik Leong Wey Pyu