7-Eleven Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Sayuti Bin Ismail (WA-22NCvC-697-12/2025)

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WA-22NCvC-697-12/2025 DALAM PERKARA MAHKAMAH TINGGI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN SIVIL NO.: WA-22NCVC-697-12/2025 ANTARA 7-ELEVEN MALAYSIA SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 198401008445 (120962-P)) ... PLAINTIF

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(ii) falsified and/or caused to be falsified attendance records through the Plaintiff's payroll system;

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(iii) caused or facilitated the payment of monthly salaries and related sums into personal bank accounts held by the $ 3 ^{rd} $ to $ 1 1^{th} $ Defendants; [5] On 30 July 2025, the Plaintiff interviewed the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant and the $ ^{2nd} $ Defendant separately where the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant denied performing or instructing certain "face-in" and "face-out" actions using the Zebra or Honeywell digital devices and did not admit that the Ghost Employees were fictitious and was not questioned on the receipts of the monthly salary payments (Enclosure 4, paragraph 10(a)). Whereas the $ ^{2nd} $ Defendant admitted to assisting the $ ^{1st} $ Defendant with the "face-in" and "face-out" actions using Zebra or Honeywell digital devices but denied having received any money (Enclosure 4, paragraph 10(b)). [6] The Plaintiff alleged that the fraudulent payroll scheme was orchestrated by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants and was conspired with the $ 3^{\mathrm{rd}} $ to $ 11^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendants to defraud the Plaintiff. [7] The Plaintiff issued show cause letters dated 30 July 2025 to the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants seeking for their explanation and to revert within five (5) working days. The $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendant on 31 July 2025 tendered its resignation letter and the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant on 4 August 2025 tendered its resignation letter, both with immediate effect (Enclosure 4, paragraph 12). [8] The Plaintiff alleged that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant failed to return a company issued mobile phone (Enclosure 4, paragraph 13). [9] On 9 December 2025, an ex-parte order for Mareva Injunction by the Plaintiff against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants was allowed, followed by an ad interim order on 23 December 2025. The Plaintiff seeks the continuation of these orders and a Disclosure Order under Enclosure 3. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS Good Arguable Case [10] The learned counsel for the Plaintiff relying on the case of S & F International Limited v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd (1985) 1 MLJ 62 FC submitted that this Court may exercise its discretion to grant a Mareva injunction based on the three tests to be shown:

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(ii) the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants have assets within jurisdiction; and

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(iii) there is a risk of the assets being removed before judgment could be satisfied. [11] Relying on the case of Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 CA, the Plaintiff's counsel submitted that the Plaintiff has a good arguable case as the facts had been specifically set out showing the fictitious employment records and the manipulated attendance which are supported by documentary records, system data and witness statements. [12] Briefly, the Plaintiff's counsel submitted that the scheme created by the $ ^{1 \mathrm{st}} $ and $ ^{2 \mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants was a falsified attendance data that is recorded in the Plaintiff's payroll system where monthly salary payments were automatically processed into the bank accounts of the Ghost Employees which were then diverted for the $ ^{1 \mathrm{st}} $ and $ ^{2 \mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants' benefit (Enclosure 2, paragraphs 23-25). [13] It was further submitted that the Defence of the $ 5^{th} $ to the $ 9^{th} $ Defendants dated 2 February 2026 contains serious and specific allegations against the $ 1^{st} $ and $ 2^{nd} $ Defendants which include statement that the $ 1^{st} $ Defendant induced and misled the $ 5^{th} $ to $ 9^{th} $ Defendants into participating in the fraudulent scheme and caused them to be wrongly recorded as employees of the Plaintiff (Enclosure 28, paragraphs 10- 11). It was also pointed out that the $ 5^{\mathrm{th}} $ to $ 9^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendants seek contribution and/or indemnity from the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant (Enclosure 28, paragraphs 1-4). [14] On the precise quantum of the Plaintiff's losses, it is claiming for RM687,754.40 and the Plaintiff's counsel submitted that the actual total loss may increase upon completion of the verification process and disclosure of relevant financial record (Enclosure 8, paragraph 5(c)-(e), Enclosure 38, paragraph 7(q).). [15] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants learned counsel on the other hand submitted that the Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating that there exists a good arguable case against the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants. It was submitted that the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the three prerequisites before the court may issue a Mareva injunction: The Customs and Tax Administration of The Kingdom of Denmark v Saling Capital Ltd & Ors And Other Appeals (2022) 1 MLJ 316, COA. It was argued that the Plaintiff's supporting affidavit revealed that the allegations are based on suspicion rather than on concrete evidence. [16] It was further submitted that the Plaintiff had alleged that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants committed fraud however failed to plead the particulars of fraud which is fatal to their claim: Kenneth Choong Yew Phing v Yap Beng Lee & Ors (2020) MLJU 1475 HC. [17] The Court heard that the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant duties as the Operations Manager were primarily administrative which require high-level verification. It was further submitted that as the Operations Manager, the 1 $ ^{st} $ Defendant depended on reports and verifications from supervisors under his charge, specifically the 2 $ ^{nd} $ Defendant who managed daily store operations, on its representations that the employees in question were active and working. [18] It was submitted that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant denies knowledge of any Ghost Employees and places the burden of proof on the Plaintiff to provide the specific evidence per individual and per period, that those people had never worked. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant identified the $ 5^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendant as the individual who actively introduced and proposed the part-time workers and claimed that the $ 5^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendant actively deceived and misled him by representing that these individuals were genuine, had reported for duty and were eligible for the payroll system. [19] The Plaintiff's counsel also submitted in reply to the Defence of the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants that despite the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendant's assertion that his scope of work were limited to supervising staff members and were administrative in nature, the Plaintiff averred that the $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendant and the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant did in fact created a fictitious employment record and manipulate the attendance data (Enclosure 58, paragraph 3). [20] As submitted by both learned counsels, there are three-fold tests to be satisfied by the applicant for a Mareva Injunction. It is within this Court's discretionary powers to provide a Mareva Injunction and such discretionary powers of the Court must be exercised judiciously: section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. For a Mareva injunction, all the stringent three-fold tests must be satisfied: Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor (1988) 1 MLJ 97 SC. [21] As this application is before a trial, the Court is not required to make a finding of the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. On the first test as to whether the Plaintiff has a good arguable case, I find the assertions and allegations of the Plaintiff are based on suspicion. The Plaintiff did spell out the manipulated attendance data and the payroll scheme (Enclosure 2, paragraph 24 and Enclosure 4, paragraph 10) however the bank statements of the witnesses or financial transactions to show that the salary based on the automatic payroll were debited according to the falsified leave days were not exhibited. [22] The police report dated 22 August 2025 (Enclosure 4, pages 269-272) by the Plaintiff reported its suspicion where some are extracted and reproduced here: "SUSPEK DISYAKI MEMANIPULASI KEHADIRAN PEKERJA ASING DI BAWAH SELIAAN SAYUTI BIN ISMAIL DENGAN MEMINTA WANG TERSEBUT KEPADA PEKERJA ANGGARAN RM200-RM400 SETIAP BULAN BERMULA PADA TAHUN 2025." [23] The actual loss could not be ascertained as the Plaintiff has yet to complete the verification process and disclosure of the relevant financial record (Enclosure 8, paragraph 5(c) - (e)). This is further supported by the police report which stated that the company, the Plaintiff, did not possess a complete information (Enclosure 4, page 270): "...TINDAKAN INI TELAH MENYEBABKAN KERUGIAN KEWANGAN KEPADA SYARIKAT YANG DIANGGARKAN BERJUMLAH RM 658,551.17. NAMUN BEGITU, JUMLAH SEBENAR TIDAK DAPAT DIPEROLEHI SECARA TEPAT MEMANDANGKAN PIHAK SYARIKAT TIDAK MEMPEROLEHI MAKLUMAT LENGKAP BAGI TARIKH SEBENAR BEBERAPA PEKERJA TERSEBUT BERHENTI KERJA." Assets within Jurisdiction [24] The Plaintiff's counsel forwarded the argument that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants being Malaysian citizens and having residential addresses in Malaysia are likely to have assets in the jurisdiction (Enclosure 4, paragraph 26). [25] The Plaintiff's counsel further submitted that based on the information received, the $ 3^{rd} $ to $ 11^{th} $ Defendants allowed their personal details and bank accounts to be used by the $ 1^{st} $ and $ 2^{nd} $ Defendants but did not direct the misconduct (Enclosure 4, paragraph 22). It was submitted that the Plaintiff believed the $ 1^{st} $ and $ 2^{nd} $ Defendants caused those monthly salaries to be subsequently channeled and/or shared in whole or in part between the 1 $ ^{st} $ and 2 $ ^{nd} $ Defendants which are the assets within the jurisdiction. [26] The counsel for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants pointed out that merely stating the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants are of Malaysian citizens is not sufficient to suggest that the assets will be dissipated. It was submitted that the Plaintiff has yet to produce any evidence demonstrating that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants had transferred or concealed or dealt with any assets that has the effect of stultifying the judgment. [27] I viewed that there must be clear evidence that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants have assets within the jurisdiction, and identify the assets available: Third Chandris Shipping Corpn v Unimarine SA (1979) 2 All ER 972. I do not agree with the argument that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants being Malaysian citizens are presumed to have assets in Malaysia. The Plaintiff must produce evidence demonstrating that they possessed the assets within the jurisdiction attending to the third test, that there is real risk that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants had transferred or dealt with the assets. Real Risk of Dissipation [28] The Plaintiff's counsel submitted that there is a real risk of dissipation of assets by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants based on the evidence of their resignation without notice, giving evasive answers during the interviews, non-returning of the mobile phone by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant and that their conduct throughout the investigation showed concealment and lack of probity (Enclosure 4, paragraph 27). The Plaintiff's counsel argued on the behaviour of the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants immediate resignation was an attempt to evade accountability. [29] The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants' counsel submitted that there is no real risk of asset dissipation because the Plaintiff has provided no direct evidence of asset disposal or unusual financial transactions. It was the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant's counsel contention that the Plaintiff cannot collectively label all records as false without specific, month-by-month, and individual-by-individual verification against the actual attendance records. [30] In this instant case, I find no direct evidence of asset by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants. I too took into account the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant's contention that his resignation was not an admission of guilt but was the result of continuous pressure from the Plaintiff, who allegedly demanded that he confessed to the misconduct. The $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants' behaviour, the resignation without notice, giving evasive answers during the interviews as claimed by the Plaintiff, and non-returning of the mobile phone by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant do not necessarily support a present risk of dissipation based on the principles in Maxi Wonder Sdn Bhd & Ors v DCS Trading Sdn Bhd (2025) MLJU 876 HC. [31] There must be evidence to show that the assets were being disposed intentionally or have the effect of stultifying any judgment in favour of the Plaintiff: Aspatra Sdn Bhd (supra). In this instant case, the Plaintiff who bears the burden of proof, has yet to prove all three tests for a Mareva Injunction. Disclosure Order [32] I agree with the Plaintiff's submission that a Disclosure Order is vital to assist the Plaintiff in locating the allegedly misappropriated funds and for the Plaintiff to take measures to preserve and/or protect the stolen monies pending trial: Meridian Asset Management Sdn Bhd v Ong Kheng Hoe & Ors (2010) 7 CLJ 1 FC. [33] My finding is that there was no proof of the assets disposed intentionally. Further to that, the $ 5^{\mathrm{th}} $ to $ 9^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendants allegation that their ATM cards and bank account access details were kept and withheld by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ Defendant, it would then be necessary to apply for a Disclosure Order for the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants to disclose the whereabout and particulars of those bank accounts and related banking instruments. [34] I find that the Plaintiff did not discharge the burden of demonstrating that all three stringent tests were met that warrants a Mareva Injunction. Although the Plaintiff provided an undertaking as to damages and submitted that it has a strong financial position (Enclosure 4, paragraph 29), I am being extremely careful as Mareva Injunction is a drastic remedy which may injure the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants of irreparable harm before the full merits of the case could be ventilated and determined. [35] I sought clarification on the employment status of the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants to which the counsel informed that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants are currently unemployed, the more for this Court to hear and decide whether there is a real risk that the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants would dissipate the assets. I am therefore more inclined to allow for a Disclosure Order to obtain the information from the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants' bank accounts and related banking instruments for the disclosure of the whereabout of the monies purportedly transferred and shared by the $ 1^{\mathrm{st}} $ and $ 2^{\mathrm{nd}} $ Defendants. [36] These are essential to obtain the evidence of unusual financial transactions or movement of funds to show that there is asset within the jurisdiction and that there is a real risk of asset dissipation. The objective is for all the relevant evidence to be produced at the trial to facilitate a fair disposal of the trial and to eliminate any surprise tactics between the parties. CONCLUSION [37] In light of the above reasons, Enclosure 3 is partially allowed that is only for the Disclosure Order at prayers 4 and 5. Dated 8th April 2026 (ZALITA BINTI ZAIDAN) (JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER) (HIGH COURT CIVIL NCVC3) (HIGH COURT OF KUALA LUMPUR) (IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY, MALAYSIA) Plaintiff's Counsel Hoi Jack S'ng & Foong Wai Leong Messrs Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill $ 1^{\mathrm{st}}-10^{\mathrm{th}} $ Defendant's Sitinur Sabrina Mohammad Counsel Messrs Aimee & Zaim Arif Cases Referred: S & F International Limited v Trans-Con Engineering Sdn Bhd (1985) 1 MLJ 62 FC Ninemia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 CA The Customs and Tax Administration of The Kingdom of Denmark v Saling Capital Ltd & Ors And Other Appeals (2022) 1 MLJ 316, COA Kenneth Choong Yew Phing v Yap Beng Lee & Ors (2020) MLJU 1475 HC Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 21 Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor (1988) 1 MLJ 97 SC Third Chandris Shipping Corpn v Unimarine SA (1979) 2 All ER 972 Maxi Wonder Sdn Bhd & Ors v DCS Trading Sdn Bhd (2025) MLJU 876 HC Meridian Asset Management Sdn Bhd v Ong Kheng Hoe & Ors (2010) 7 CLJ 1 FC Act/Law Referred: Section 50 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 Articles Referred: