A One Piling Sdn Bhd v Blue Seal (M) Sdn Bhd (WA-22NCC-384-06/2025)

The Plaintiff P filed a notice of application dated 16.6.2025 in Enclosure 3 for an interlocutory prohibitory injunction against the 1st D1 and the 2nd Defendant. Enclosure 3 is made under Order 29 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012.

On 24.6.2026, a previous judge granted an ad interim injunction.

On 2.1.2026, I dismissed Enclosure 3. Here are the grounds of my decision. injunction application in Enclosure 3

Enclosure 3 prayed for the following : An injunction prohibiting the 1st and 2nd Defendants, whether by themselves, their directors, officers, servants, agents or otherwise howsoever, from transferring, disposing of, dealing with, or in any way encumbering any of the 1st Defendant and 2nd or business undertakings, whether movable or immovable, pending the full and final disposal of this suit;

The grounds for the interlocutory prohibitory injunction as stated in Enclosure 3 reads : a) There are serious questions to be tried. The 2nd Defendant was incorporated and operated by the Defendants as a sham company and a fraudulent device to obtained by the Plaintiff against the 1st Defendant in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA - 22 NCvC - 17 - subsequent Court of Appeal judgment in Appeal No. W - 02 (NCC) (W) - 666 - 04 / 2023 reduced the damages awarded from RM 19,498,666.73 to RM 12,359,536.75. b) The balance of convenience lies in overwhelmingly in favour of the Plaintiff, as the risk of prejudice to the Plaintiff is far greater should the injunction be refused, compared to any potential inconvenience to the Defendants. The balance of convenience clearly favours the granting of the injunction in favour of the Plaintiff. Without the injunction, there is a real risk that the Defendants may transfer, dispose of, or encumber the shares, assets, or business undertakings of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, thereby causing interests. On the other hand, the Defendants will suffer no undue hardship or prejudice by being restrained from such dealings pending the final determination of this suit. c) Damages would not be an adequate remedy in the circumstances particularly as the acts of the Defendants effectively prevent the Plaintiff from enjoying the fruits of the litigation obtained in Suit 17, thereby risking irreparable loss. Background facts

The present suit arises from a judgment obtained by P against D1 in Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA - 22 NCC - 17 - suit 17

The judgment of the High Court dated 28.3.2023 2023 HC judgment and affirmed on appeal, awarded P damages in the sum of RM judgment debt D1 has failed to satisfy the judgment debt.

P has undertaken various enforcement actions, including garnishee proceedings and judgment debtor summons proceedings. But has thus far only managed to recover the sum of RM 490,487.58.

In the present suit, P claims that D1 has been preventing the satisfaction of the judgment debt through its conduct and that of the other Defendants named herein. As prayed for in paragraph 74 (a) of the statement of claim, P is seeking to make all the twelve Defendants herein jointly and severally liable pursuant to section 540 (1) of the Companies Act 2016 for the debts of D1.

that :

The 3rd to 6th Defendants are the directors and / or shareholders of D1;

The 7th to 12th Defendants are the directors and / or shareholders (or former directors and / or shareholders) of the 2nd Defendant;

The 7th to 12th Defendants are former employees of D1; and

The sole purpose of incorporating the 2nd Defendant was to fraudulently assume and continue the business operations, assets, and client base of D1, with the primary objective of evading enforcement of any judgment that P could get in suit 17 at that material time after the initiation of suit 17 by P.

In essence, P s claim :

is in respect of the judgment debt obtained by P against D1 in suit 17; and

is premised upon the alleged fraudulent attempt to evade the satisfaction of s debts by all the twelve Defendants collectively, which P is now seeking to make them jointly and severally liable pursuant to section 540 (1) of the Companies Act 2016.

I dismissed P s injunction application in Enclosure 3 because :

damages are an adequate remedy; and

is an abuse of the process of the court as it amounts to a wrongful collateral attack on an 2023 HC order .

Here is my explanation. Analysis and findings

I begin with the observation of the Federal Court in Lian Keow Sdn Bhd & Anor v Overseas Credit Finance (M) Bhd & Ors [1982] 2 MLJ 162 at 163, which explains the duty of the court when considering whether to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction : temporary and discretionary remedy. To consider whether to grant it or to refuse it the court is not concerned with the chances of success or failure of the appellants in proving their civil suit at the forthcoming trial, neither is the court's function to evaluate the evidence and materials before it for that purpose. The court is simply concerned with what it has to do in the meantime in order to protect the right of the parties so that no irreparable injury would be caused to either of them. Further whilst the court is not concerned with such questions the court must however, be satisfied that there are serious questions to be gone into in that suit, lest an application for an injunction should be made on frivolous and vexatious grounds.

This observation is pertinent in the present case. A reading of affidavit in support dated 16.6.2025, affidavit in reply dated 6.8.2025 and the statement of claim in this action reveals that P has in effect almost completely reproduced the statement of claim in its affidavit in support.

It appears that P, by this injunction application, is seeking to try the whole claim by affidavit. That cannot be permitted as at this stage the merits of the claim are not in question.

In considering whether an interlocutory injunction ought to be granted or refused, the Court must be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried. And then proceed to consider whether on the balance of convenience, the injunction should be granted.

I refer to the Supreme Court case of Associated Tractors Sdn Bhd v Chan Boon Heng & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 408 at 409 which held : of an action is governed by established principles. These principles have been developed over the years and the position in law now is that all that the court needs to be satisfied with before exercising the discretion to grant an injunction is that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious. There is no longer a need for the prima facie case test. In other words as long as the court is satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried, that will constitute a basis to proceed to consider whether on the balance of convenience the injunction should be granted Damages are an adequate remedy

Further, when considering whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted or refused, of paramount importance is the question of whether or not damages would be an adequate remedy.

On this aspect, the Supreme Court in Associated Tractors (supra) said (at page 409) : most important factor to consider as a matter of principle is the question of whether in lieu of the injunction damages would be an adequate and proper remedy because in the matter of injunctions and exercising its jurisdiction the court acts upon the principle of preventing irreparable damage. As Lindley LJ said in London & Blackwell Rly Co v Cross at p 369 : The very first principle of injunction law is that you do not obtain injunction for actionable wrongs for which damages are the proper remedy. The respondents in their counterclaim sought for the return of the $ 90,000 as the sum allegedly paid towards the purchase of the machine and damages and interest. It is clear therefore that this is a case where, even holding the defendants to their counterclaim, damages would be an adequate remedy. Therefore, the injunction was in our view not properly granted

In the present case, I consider that P . Essentially P is trying to recover the judgment debt owed by D1. They are seeking to make the other Defendants jointly and severally liable for the debts of D1 pursuant to section 540 (1) of the Companies Act 2016.

In the circumstances, damages are an adequate remedy. There will be no irreparable damage to P if the injunction is not granted.

I rely on the Court of Appeal case of Perak Hydro Renewable Energy Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor v Wak Ngah Pili a/p Bah Adim (suing on behalf of [2022] 6 MLJ 698 at 720 - 721 which said : Damages is an adequate remedy [60] It was also held in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor @ Harun bin Abdullah & Ors that the judge would be entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations, such as any adequate alternative remedy that would satisfy the plaintiff's equity, such as an award of monetary compensation in the event that he succeeds in establishing his claim at the trial. [61] It is the defendants submission that damages will be an adequate remedy to the plaintiffs should the court refused to grant the interlocutory injunction sought by the plaintiffs. [62] The defendants submitted that despite praying for a declaration against the defendants, the plaintiffs have also prayed for damages in the amended statement of claim. This can be seen in para 61 (n) of the amended statement of claim where the plaintiffs prayed for the defendants to pay damages to the plaintiffs for trespass and damages be assessed by the court. We are aware the damages are for the trespass to lands if the plaintiffs succeed in their claim. [63] Be that as it may, the prayer indicates that damages are an adequate equitable jurisdiction does not arise in this action. [66] In the circumstances of this case and the application for interlocutory injunction, it is our considered view that the damages are an adequate remedy and therefore the court will refuse the grant of the interlocutory injunction Abuse of process

Another reason for dismissing Enclosure 3 is that injunction application is an abuse of the process of the court. It amounts to a wrongful collateral attack on the 2023 HC order given in suit 17, which order remains valid and binding. P is estopped from challenging issues already decided by the 2023 HC order.

As pleaded in the statement of claim and also as stated in P affidavit in support, P obtained the 2023 HC judgment in suit 17 against D1 on 28.3.2023. What P omitted to mention in its affidavit in support is that on 18.7.2023, P applied for a post - judgment Mareva injunction in suit 17 in aid of the execution of the 2023 HC judgment.

The post - judgment Mareva injunction application was dismissed by the court on 20.9.2023. P only admitted to this fact at paragraph 24 (b) of its affidavit in reply, after D1 had raised it at paragraph 25 of D1 affidavit dated 16.7.2025.

The crux of P post - judgment Mareva injunction is its alleged proof of dissipation of assets by D1. Which was premised on D1 audited financial statements dated 31.3. D1 2022 audited report

The allegations can be seen at paragraphs 12.4 to 12.5 of P supporting affidavit affirmed on 18.7.2023 in its application for the post - judgment Mareva injunction. P alleged that D1 2022 audited report indicated that D1 whilst losses were increasing and business operations generally were shrinking, and yet D1 was paying substantial dividends to themselves. This is evident from a reading of the notes of proceedings dated 20.9.2023 exhibited in D1 affidavit in reply.

These allegations by P in the post - judgment Mareva injunction application were answered by D1 at paragraphs 12 to 30 of D1 reply affidavit affirmed on 10.8.2023. In consequence thereof, the court in suit 17 dismissed the post - judgment Mareva injunction application on 20.9.2023.

In doing so, the learned judge made the following findings in relation to D1 2022 audited report and the payment of dividends : th April 2023 does not constitute or does not show of a risk of dissipation especially when taking into account they involve transactions that were done before the trial or decision.

I further find that the transactions and payment of dividends made were not in themselves out of the norm.

There is also no evidence of lack of probity or h

P accepted the correctness of the decision by the court in suit 17 as is manifested by the fact that they did not appeal against the decision of the learned judge. On this point, I refer to the Federal Court case of Ann Joo Steel Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor and another appeal [2020] 1 MLJ 689 at 701 which held : It must be borne in mind that all the defendants participated in that appeal proceedings together with their respective counsel. They should have raised their objections there. Moreover, they had accepted that decision as they never appealed on the 1995 order. By not appealing the said order means the defendants accepted the correctness of the decision

The 2023 HC order dismissing P post - judgment Mareva injunction and the findings of fact by the learned judge on P allegations in relation to D1 2022 audited report thus remain valid and binding on the parties. This means that as far as interlocutory injunctive relief is concerned, P is bound by the learned j 20.9.2023 when the court dismissed the post - judgment Mareva injunction application.

Notwithstanding the fact that the 2023 HC order dismissing the application for the post - judgment Mareva injunction remains valid and binding and the acceptance by P of the court in relation to D1 2022 audited report, P now in June 2025 filed Enclosure 3 for ostensibly an interlocutory prohibitory injunction and are challenging the court post - judgment Mareva injunction application on 20.9.2023.

Paragraph 57 of P affidavit in support filed in connection with the injunction application in Enclosure 3 - is noteworthy. It can be seen there that P has exhibited D1 2022 audited report as evidence of alleged dissipation of assets by D1. Notwithstanding that the issue has already been resolved vide P the post - judgment Mareva injunction.

In its affidavit in support filed in connection with the injunction application in Enclosure 3, P avers at paragraph 56 : Furthermore, the Directors of BSM, namely the 3rd to 6th Defendants, caused and / or permitted BSM to pay substantial dividends to themselves iabilities, including the Judgment Debt. The 3rd to 6th Defendants deliberately failed and / or neglected to take into stripping BSM of assets available for satisfaction of debts.

This averment by P is a blatant disregard of the 2023 HC order. What P is doing here is making a collateral attack on the c 20.9.2023 in suit 17, which they did not appeal. That cannot be permitted.

I refer to the Federal Court decision of Ann Joo Steel (supra) which said (at pages 704 - 705, 708 and 710) : This court had in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Bandar Nusajaya Development Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 MLJ 689 held that judicial pronouncements have always been clear that a court order holds good and is valid until it is set aside. An order of a superior court must be deemed to be valid and must be obeyed until it is set aside in proceedings commenced for the purpose of setting it aside (see Khaw Poh Chhuan v Ng Gaik Peng & Ors [1996] 1 MLJ 761 (FC)). The Supreme Court in Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd (in receivership) v Chee Pok Choy & Ors [1997] 2 MLJ 105, reminded that a superior court like the High Court is a court of unlimited jurisdiction. Quoting Lord Diplock's statement in Isaacs v Robertson [1984] 3 All ER 140 the Supreme Court held that it must be obeyed and could only be challenged in a direct application to set it aside. [58] Now, even if the 1995 order is a nullity in our view, the defendants should not be allowed to impugn the 1995 order, in the way that they did. The list of authorities above is clear on the procedure to be adopted. The defendants sat on the 1995 order which they believed to be a nullity for a span of 15 over years, only to raise it as a defence to an action of trespass. If this is allowed, it will lead to serious implications. The effect of which, floodgates will be opened to a never - ending litigation. It certainly removes the valued certainty that court s process provides. Besides, it allows a backdoor way of appealing on a decision of the court, way out of the given time under the law. [59] It cannot be opened to any person to decide upon himself whether an order of a court which binds him is wrongly issued and does not require his obedience. Until such time it is set aside or varied the order of court is entitled to the obedience and respect from all parties. Any person who fails to obey an order of court runs the risk of being held in contempt with all its attendant consequences (see Wee Choo Keong v MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor and another appeal [1993] 2 MLJ 217). [60] It must be borne in mind that, there is a legal presumption that an order of a court is validly made, unless it was obtained by fraud, etc. It bears repeating that the 1995 order was made by the High Court with unqualified participation of all relevant parties. The parties were also represented by their respective counsel as disclosed in the 1995 order itself. A court order regularly made cannot be ignored on the belief of a party that it is a nullity. Any such attempt would militate against the basic legal position as pronounced in the various earlier cases on the subject, that a regularly made order of court must be observed at all costs. [65] The fundamental principle which is pivotal in all these decisions, is that the sanctity of a court order must at all times be observed, and a party bound by that order of a court has no business deciding for himself that a binding order of a court need not be observed because in his view it is not valid. If court orders are allowed to be ignored with impunity, it will ruin the authority of judicial order, which is the core of all judicial systems. In line with our jurisprudence, court orders must be respected and complied with. There will be no end to litigation if parties are allowed to determine for themselves that any order of the court would be observed or otherwise. [66] It is, therefore, a long established principle of law that one may apply to set aside an order of a superior court but it must be made in a direct and specific proceeding filed for that purpose be it in the same proceedings or a separate one. It cannot be contested merely by raising it as defences in a suit as being undertaken in these appeals. The underlying reason for this legal jurisprudence to be adhered to, is not difficult to appreciate. It is to preserve the sanctity as well the finality of an order of court. We therefore do not find any reason to

Further, by making a collateral attack on the 2023 HC order dismissing its application for the post - judgment Mareva injunction, P is in effect asking this court to interfere with the 2023 HC order and the decision of another court of co - ordinate jurisdiction. P is asking one High Court to interfere with the decision and findings of another High Court. That cannot be permitted.

Yet another reason why is an abuse of the process of the court is that although Enclosure 3 is couched in terms of an application for an interlocutory prohibitory injunction, it is actually a second application for a post - judgment Mareva injunction. As such, it is an abuse of the process of the court since any application for a post - judgment Mareva injunction application must be made in the court where the original judgment was obtained i.e. in suit 17.

In Wako Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd v Lim Lean Heng & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 401, the High Court remarked that a post - judgment Mareva injunction is not an injunction to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of litigation. The High Court said (at page 407) : the first defendant is over and done with. The plaintiff have obtained judgment against the first defendant, and are now endeavouring to recover the judgment debt. They need a Mareva injunction to freeze or preserve the assets of the first defendant so that they will be available for satisfying the judgment by some means or other. A Mareva injunction is an equitable relief but it is not an injunction to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of litigation. It is an aid to execution, and in this case the plaintiff need not show a good arguable case because they have already shown that by obtaining judgment. They only have to show a risk of dissipation by the first defendant of his assets and that the assets they want preserved are his assets.

In the present case, although the prayer for the injunction set out in Enclosure 3 is couched in terms of an application to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of litigation, it is crucial to note that in its affidavit in support, P admits that what they are trying to do is to enforce the 2023 HC judgment. In other words, what P is actually seeking is a second post - judgment Mareva injunction in aid of enforcement or execution of the 2023 HC judgment.

This is plain from a reading of paragraphs 77 (f), 78 (a), 78 (c), 79 (a), 79 (b), 79 (c) and 79 (d) of P affidavit in support, which are reproduced below. serious Defendants. Asteo was incorporated and operated by the Defendants as a sham company and a Judgment Debt. I have been advised that the following are some of the bona fide issues to be tried in this proceedings :

Whether the A One Piling is entitled to a prohibitory injunction to prevent further disposal of assets and business, and secure enforcement of the judgment. 78 (a) The Plaintiff has already obtained a judgment against BSM for the outstanding debt, which remains unsatisfied to date. Despite repeated demands, the judgment debt has not been paid; 78 (c) There is a real and substantial risk that BSM and / or the other Defendants will continue to dissipate, transfer, or conceal assets, whether directly or indirectly through Asteo unless restrained by an injunction, thereby and rendering any subsequent relief ineffective. 79 (a) The Plaintiff is a judgment creditor seeking to enforce a final and binding judgment. The failure of BSM to satisfy the judgment debt, coupled with the conduct of BSM, Asteo, and the other Defendants in dissipating or concealing assets, shares and business interests, justifies the grant of injunctive relief to preserve the Plaintiff's rights. 79 (b) If the injunction is not granted, there is a real risk that BSM, Asteo, and / or the other Defendants will further dissipate or transfer the assets, shares, and business undertakings of BSM and / or Asteo thereby frustrating enforcement and rendering the Plaintiff s judgment hollow and incapable of satisfaction. 79 (c) The injunctive relief sought is prohibitory in nature and does not unduly prejudice the Defendants, save that it restrains them from dealing with the assets, shares, and business of BSM and Asteo in a manner that would defeat a subsisting judgment. 79 (d) The Plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is refused, as it may permanently lose the opportunity to recover the judgment debt once the assets, shares, or business have been depleted, divested, or placed beyond the

The averments above from P affidavit in support contain admissions that P, vide the present injunction application in Enclosure 3, seeks to enforce a subsisting judgment. The subsisting judgment in question is the 2023 HC judgment which P obtained in suit 17.

The High Court case of MIMS Career Sdn Bhd v Armand Mikhayl Yeoh Abdullah & Ors [2025] MLJU 1935, where the facts are similar to the present case, is instructive. The judgment in the MIMS case was as a result of an arbitral award obtained by the plaintiff which was subsequently registered as a judgment of the court. Following registration of the Award, the Plaintiff sought to enforce the Enforcement Judgment against the Principal Defendants through Judgment Debtor Summons ( JDS ) proceedings commenced on 26.5.2022. During the course of these JDS proceedings, it was discovered that the Principal Defendants had transferred assets to the 4th to 7th Defendants, with these transfers occurring largely before the Award was made in March 2020, and a few occurring after the Award but prior to its registration in December 2021. For instance, property for the 4th Defendant was purchased in June 2019, well before the Award was made. [4] While the overall pattern of transfers involved the 4th to 7th Defendants and other recipients, the Plaintiff seeks to recover assets from all the Defendants (1st to 7th Defendants) through this fresh action (the present act), alleging fraudulent dispositions and constructive trusts, whilst simultaneously seeking Mareva injunctive relief against only the 1st to 4th

The High Court in the MIMS case then went on to state as follows : D. The true nature of this application is a post - judgment Mareva injunction [7] The central issue before this Court is the true nature of this Application. While the Plaintiff maintains that this Application is a pre - judgment Mareva injunction in a fresh tracing action, the Defendants contend that it is, in substance, a post - judgment Mareva application in aid of execution [9] The Plaintiff reiterated its position that this Application is a pre - judgment Mareva injunction application, and it is not in aid of the execution of the Award / Enforcement Judgment, but is based on a new cause of action premised upon constructive trust and conspiracy to defraud. [10] However, this position is inconsistent with the Plaintiff's Written Submissions in Enclosure 41 which states, inter alia, as follows : i) Paragraph 2, where the Plaintiff states : When the Plaintiff sought to enforce the HC Registration Order through garnishee and judgment debtor summons proceedings, cogent evidence was uncovered demonstrating that D1 to D3 had actively dissipated their assets to others, including the 4th to 7th Defendants ( D4 to D7 ), to frustrate the Final Award. ii) Paragraph 3, where the Plaintiff, with reference to the Statement of Claim, states : Premised upon the above, the Plaintiff filed this action on the grounds of fraudulent disposition and constructive trusteeship against D1 to D7 to recover such assets as was dissipated by D1 - D3 to frustrate the Final Award and the HC Registration Order iii) Paragraph 23, where the Plaintiff states : When the above is taken as a whole, there is cogent prima facie evidence that D1 - D3 had, contrary to their testimony in the JDS Proceedings, taken steps to fraudulently dispose their assets or provided such assets to third parties, including D4, as constructive trustees to defeat the Final Award. iv) Paragraph 26.2, where the Plaintiff submits that the 4th Defendant s business activities constitute : prima facie evidence of knowing involvement in D1-D3's scheme to defeat the Final Award. v) Paragraph 28, where the Plaintiff concludes : Finally, we submit that by D1 - D3's previous conduct, and by the prima facie case against D1 - D4 of fraudulent disposition or involvement, engagement and facilitation of D1 - D3 s dishonest scheme to defeat the Final Award, an inference can at this point be reasonably drawn of their lack of probity, justifying the inference of a risk of dissipation should Encl. 3 not be allowed. [11] The above statements are consistent with the Plaintiff s Statement of Claim and affidavits filed in support of Enclosure 3. [12] Therefore, despite the Plaintiff s characterisation of this Application as a pre - judgment Mareva application, I find that the substance and purpose of the Application reveal that it is, in reality, a post - judgment Mareva application presented under the guise of a pre - judgment one. The following, inter alia, supports this conclusion : i) This Application is expressly tied to enforcement of the Award registered as a judgment on 7.12.2021 (Enforcement Judgment). ii) As highlighted earlier, the Plaintiff has repeatedly submitted that the and Enforcement Judgment. iii) Therefore, the relief sought in this Application is to preserve assets for satisfaction of an existing judgment debt. iv) conspiracy, which are essentially enforcement mechanisms intended to recover assets connected to the existing judgment, i.e. the Enforcement Judgment. To put it simply, the constructive trust claim arises from the allegation that the Principal Defendants dissipated assets in order to avoid satisfaction of the Award, which was subsequently registered. v) This Application comes after extensive JDS proceedings where the very same asset transfers were discovered and examined. vi) In the present action the Plaintiff is seeking to recover those very assets. Post - judgment Mareva injunction requirements [13] For the grant of a post - judgment Mareva injunction, the established test requires the Plaintiff to demonstrate that : i) There is a real risk of the debtor dissipating assets with intention to deprive the creditor of satisfaction of the judgment debt; ii) The injunction must act as an aid to execution. [16] I have summarized the key distinctions between post - judgment and pre - judgment Mareva injunctions in the comparison table below : [NB: only item No. 4 is reproduced below] - Aspect Pre - Judgment Post - Judgment Court where the application is made Any competent court with jurisdiction over the matter where the action is filed and pending trial Court where original judgment was obtained (Asma Baizura bt Mohamad Omar & Anor v Pengiran & Anor [2023] MLJU 474) [17] The essential difference between pre - judgment and post - judgment Mareva injunctions can be summarised as follows : i) pre - judgment Mareva injunctions are to preserve a defendant's assets pending the determination of a claim, while post - judgment injunctions assist in enforcing an established judgment. ii) The former protects potential rights (if the applicant obtains judgment in his in favour), while the latter enforces established rights, but only when conventional enforcement mechanisms are insufficient and the injunction is necessary to prevent deliberate frustration of the judgment. The fundamental flaw in this application [18] Based on the above, this Application suffers from a fundamental conceptual flaw. It attempts to obtain post - judgment relief (preservation of assets for enforcement of an existing judgment) through the mechanism of a pre - judgment application in a fresh action. This is procedurally improper and legally untenable. [20] The Plaintiff cannot circumvent these requirements by fashioning this Application as a pre - judgment Mareva injunction through a fresh action, while in substance seeking relief that is effectively in aid of execution of an existing judgment.

Quite apart from the paragraphs in P affidavit in support referred to earlier and like the plaintiff in the MIMS case, the following paragraphs in P affidavit in support fortify that the present injunction application in Enclosure 3 is made with a view to aiding P in enforcing the 2023 HC judgment. For the reasons stated below, BSM has been preventing the satisfaction of the Judgment Debt through its conduct and that of the other Defendants named herein. By reason of such conduct, which will be further stated below, the Plaintiff is constrained to explore other legal avenues available to it in order to recover the sums legitimately due to it pursuant to the Judgment Debt.

expansion, but rather a calculated and fraudulent scheme to defeat the Plaintiff's rights as a judgment creditor.

amless business continuity under a different name and corporate identity, with the intention of defeating the Plaintiff's rights as a judgment creditor.

The above facts, taken together with the matters stated earlier, demonstrate a concerted effort by all the Defendants to dissipate assets and business operations with the intention of frustrating the enforcement of the Judgment Debt

The Defendants, through a series of deliberate actions, transferred BSM s core business operations, clients, staff, equipment, and infrastructure to Asteo with the intention of frustrating the enforcement of any judgment the Plaintiff was likely to obtain in Suit 17 62 (c) BSM transferred its vehicles (e.g., Toyota Hilux and Nissan Vanette) and vacated its original premises at No. 2, Jalan Palam 34/18B only for that same premises to become Asteo s new business address; which is dissipation of corporate assets to frustrate judgment enforcement against BSM.

At all material times, all the Defendants acted in concert and with common intention to deliberately obstruct, frustrate, and evade payment of the judgment debt owed to A One Piling pursuant to the judgment obtained in Suit 17. 64 (b) the act of making the employees and / or former employees of BSM, namely Yap Kui Lai, Mohamad Aizam, Jassirin Bin Jonis and Lim Fui Moon as shareholders to avoid tracing back to BSM and to mask true ownership and control of assets and business interests relevant to the Judgment Debt; 64 (e) the suppression, concealment, and misrepresentation of material facts and assets with the intent to deceive the Plaintiff and frustrate the enforcement of the Judgment Debt

In truth, P wishes to enforce its rights as a judgment creditor of D1 and not merely as a creditor of D1. In its capacity as judgment creditor of D1, P seeks to enforce the 2023 HC judgment and seeks the aid of this court to preserve the assets of D1 to enable such execution. In the premises, P here has abused the process of the court by the present application in Enclosure 3 for a second post - judgment Mareva injunction in the guise of an interlocutory prohibitory injunction. Conclusion

For the reasons above, I dismissed Enclosure 3. I awarded costs of RM 15,000 to D1 and the 2nd Defendant respectively. Dated 9 February 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels N. Chandran, Dhanaraj Vasudevan and Malar Loganathan (Messrs. Kamil Hashim Raj & Lim) for the Plaintiff K. Sureindhren and Lee Yeok Choo (Messrs. Lee Y C & Co.) for the 1st, 3rd to 6th Defendants Lee Chan Leong (Messrs. Chan Leong & Co.) for the 2nd, 7th to 9th Defendants Case reference 1. Lian Keow Sdn Bhd & Anor v Overseas Credit Finance (M) Bhd & Ors [1982] 2 MLJ 162 2. Associated Tractors Sdn Bhd v Chan Boon Heng & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 408 3. Perak Hydro Renewable Energy Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor v Wak Ngah Pili a/p Bah Adim (suing on behalf of herself and 22 individuals from the Senai tribe, as listed [2022] 6 MLJ 698 4. Ann Joo Steel Bhd v Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Pulau Pinang & Anor and another appeal [2020] 1 MLJ 689 5. Wako Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd v Lim Lean Heng & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 401 6. MIMS Career Sdn Bhd v Armand Mikhayl Yeoh Abdullah & Ors [2025] MLJU 1935 Legislation reference 1. Section 540 (1) of the Companies Act 2016 2. Order 29 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012