Aafiyat Marketing Sdn. Bhd. v MUHD SHAKIR AS-SALAM BIN YA (KA-22NCvC-44-10/2023)

This is a legal dispute where the court must decide whether the protection of a company's commercial goodwill against allegations of deceptive marketing prevails over a defendant's right to fair comment and his pursuit of scientific accountability. 13/03/2026 13:21:35

The Plaintiff (formerly known as OHR Marketing Sdn Bhd before its name change on 27.02.2024) is a trading corporation incorporated in 2014. The Plaintiff carries on the business of packaging and distributing various health and food products, most notably an olive oil product known as “Olivie Plus 30X”.

The Defendant is an individual carrying on a competing business in the olive oil market under the brand name “Zoutina Prestige”. The Defendant also operates a Facebook account under the name "Muhd Shakir As-Salam", which was set to "public", thereby allowing his posts to be accessed and read by any Facebook user globally.

The Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendant is grounded in the tort of defamation (libel). The claim arises from a series of continuous attacks by the Defendant on his public Facebook account, targeting the Plaintiff's product tagline, "30X times more antioxidants".

Based on the Statement of Claim, the Defendant published four (4) consecutive impugned statements on his Facebook account between August and September 2023 (“the Impugned Statements”). The chronological extractions of the Facebook publications are as follows.

The First Statement (published on 22.08.2023), the Defendant published a post stating: "Sempena bulan Merdeka ini, marilah sama-sama kita MERDEKAKAN penjajahan LAMPANTE & 30 X kali Ganda Polifenol dari pemikiran rakyat Malaysia." (In conjunction with this Merdeka (independence) month, let us together LIBERATE the colonisation of LAMPANTE & 30 Times More Polyphenols from the minds of Malaysians.)

In the Second Statement (published on 18.09.2023), the Defendant escalated the attacks by challenging a celebrity influencer who promoted the Plaintiff's product, attaching an article about global olive oil scams, and publishing the following words: "’30X polifenol drpd minyak zaitun lain' adalah tag line scammer minyak zaitun dunia." ('30X more polyphenols than other olive oils' is the tagline of global olive oil scammers.)

In the Third Statement (published on 19.09.2023), the Defendant uploaded a photograph prominently displaying the label and bottle of the Plaintiff's specific product, Olivie Plus 30X, accompanied by the following caption: "PENTING! Membuat DAKWAAN PALSU tentang FAKTA PRODUK semata-mata untuk meningkatkan jualan merupakan satu JENAYAH PENIPUAN terhadap PENGGUNA!" (IMPORTANT! Making FALSE CLAIMS about PRODUCT FACTS solely to increase sales is a CRIME OF FRAUD against CONSUMERS!)

The Defendant in the Fourth Statement (published on 20.09.2023) published a final post demanding proof from the Plaintiff, stating: "Woi….Sampai bila hangpa nak aku tunggu COA hangpa? 30X polifenol daripada minyak zaitun lain adalah scammer penipuan minyak zaitun antarabangsa." (Hey…. How long do you guys expect me to wait for your COA? '30X more polyphenols than other olive oils' is an international olive oil scam.)

The Plaintiff pleads that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the aforementioned posts, particularly terms such as "lampante", "scammer minyak zaitun dunia", and "jenayah penipuan", are entirely false and highly defamatory. The Plaintiff claims that Impugned Statements were motivated by malice from a direct competitor, calculated to lower the Plaintiff's corporate image in the estimation of right-thinking members of society, and exposed the Plaintiff's business to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.

Consequently, the Plaintiff initiated this civil suit seeking, inter alia, injunctive reliefs to compel the deletion of the Impugned Statements and to restrain further publication, as well as claims for general, aggravated, and exemplary damage. The Plaintiff’s Case 12. The Plaintiff submitted that they have successfully proven the three essential elements of defamation:

The words complained of are defamatory;

The words refer to the Plaintiff; and

The words were published to a third party.

They argued that the natural and ordinary meaning of the Defendant's words, viewed objectively, imputed that the Plaintiff was a "cheat" and a "scammer". They also highlighted that publication to third parties was indisputable, given the engagement in the Facebook comments section.

The case of Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad & Anor [2014] 4 MLJ 242 was cited by the Plaintiffs’ learned counsel to establish these three fundamental elements of a defamation action.

The Plaintiff argued that the burden of proving the defence of justification lies squarely on the Defendant, and the Plaintiff is not required to disprove it.

The Plaintiff further asserted that the Defendant failed to substantiate his claims with facts, noting that the article relied upon by the Defendant (regarding another brand of olive oil, Dr Gundry's Olive Oil (“Dr Gundry’s Olive Oil”) which was the subject of focus in the article quoted by the Defendant) could not justify the specific claim that the Plaintiff's Olivie Plus 30X lacked 30 times more antioxidants.

Moreover, the Plaintiff argued that both the defences of justification and fair comment must fail because the Defendant was actuated by malice. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendant's claim of "educating the public" was merely a ruse and that his true motivation was self-interest, profit, and a deliberate attempt to mislead the public into believing the Plaintiff was a scammer.

A major component of the Plaintiff's submission was addressing the damages suffered by the corporate entity. The Plaintiff submitted that libel is actionable per se, meaning there is no legal requirement for the Plaintiff to prove actual financial damage or loss, because the law presumes that damage inherently results from the publication of defamatory statements.

The Plaintiff argued that their corporate image and reputation were severely tarnished, lowered in the estimation of end-users, and exposed to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule. Consequently, the Plaintiff prayed for RM400,000 in compensatory damages, RM300,000 in aggravated damages, and RM300,000 in exemplary damages. The Plaintiffs cited Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad Bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185, Dr Jenni Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154 and JB Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew [1982] 1 MLJ 239 to support their contention. The Defences 20. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff failed to discharge its legal burden of proving that the Impugned Statements were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning or by innuendo. The Defendant further asserted that the Plaintiff failed to adduce credible evidence showing any actual or presumed injury to its trading or business reputation.

The Defendant cited Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors [2018] 4 MLJ 209 to establish that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Plaintiff to prove the three essential elements of defamation (the statement was defamatory, referred to the plaintiff, and was published to a third party).

Relying on Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957, the Defendant’s learned counsel argued that the Impugned Statements published were true in substance and in fact. The Defendant argued that there was substantial truth to the "sting" of the posts, specifically that the Plaintiff's label claiming "30 times more antioxidants" was an unverified extraordinary claim associated with discredited products globally (such as Dr Gundry's Olive Oil).

Under Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, the Defendant argued the posts were expressions of opinion based on true facts concerning matters of undisputed public interest, namely food safety, labelling accuracy, and consumer protection. The Defendant maintained that the use of the word "scammer" was a critique of an unverified marketing tactic, not a personal attack on the Plaintiff's moral character. The Defendant relied on the judgment of Graceful Frontier Sdn Bhd & Ors v Theow Say Kow @ Teoh Kiang Seng & Anor [2025] MLRHU 2378 to define a comment as a "statement of opinion on facts”.

The Defendant strongly denied acting maliciously or out of commercial rivalry. They argued that the Defendant acted bona fide as an educator and as a certified olive sommelier to correct dangerous public misconceptions about extra-virgin olive oil. The Defendant emphasised that he relied on authoritative, publicly verifiable sources (such as the International Olive Council standards) and did not publish the posts recklessly.

Citing Norhadza Ahmad Razali v Muhammad Ezanie Noorazman & Ors [2022] MLRHU 706, the Defendant stands affirmed by the definition of "malice" in law as an act done intentionally without just cause, and that malice cannot be inferred if a person genuinely believes in the truth of what they say.

The Defendant argued that the damages claimed by the Plaintiff were grossly disproportionate, exaggerated, and entirely unsupported by evidence. The Plaintiff failed to call witnesses to testify to reputational harm or to produce documentary evidence of lost contracts, customer complaints, or a decline in sales. In fact, the Defendant pointed out that Plaintiff's own agents claimed sales increased by 30-40% after the posts were made. The Defendant heavily relied on cases like MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [1995] 1 MLRA 322, Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais Yatim v Amizudin Ahmat [2012] 1 MLRH 519, and Dato' Dr Tan Chee Khuan v Chin Choong Seng [2010] MLRH 723, which were discussed together within another primary authority of Syed Nadri Syed Harun & Anor v Lim Guan Eng & Other Appeals [2019] 2 MLRA 387. Decision and Findings of the Court 27. Based on the submissions by the parties, the documentary evidence, and the testimonies of all witnesses, this Court decides in favour of the Plaintiff and allows the defamation claim. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has successfully discharged its burden of proving that the Impugned Statements were defamatory in their natural and ordinary meaning, explicitly referred to the Plaintiff, and were unequivocally published to third parties.

In contrast, the Defendant had failed to substantiate his pleaded defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege, a failure further underscored by the clear presence of malice as the Defendant was driven by commercial rivalry rather than a bona fide public duty.

Furthermore, as a trading corporation, the Plaintiff is entitled to vindicate its commercial reputation without the absolute need to prove actual financial loss. Herein are my reasons, which I have structured into separate issues. A. Elements of Defamation i. The Words Complained of are Defamatory in Nature 30. The Plaintiff submitted that the natural and ordinary meaning of the Defendant's words, viewed from an objective standpoint, clearly possessed a defamatory tendency. The Plaintiff argued that the use of terms such as "lampante" which in the context of olive oil, means that the oil is unfit for human consumption in its raw state, "scammer minyak zaitun antarabangsa" (global olive oil scammer), and accusations of committing "jenayah penipuan" (crime of fraud) implied that the Plaintiff was deceitful, untrustworthy, and making false claims to increase sales. The Plaintiff contended that these Impugned Statements successfully lowered the company in the estimation of right-thinking members of society and exposed it to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.

In rebuttal, the Defendant argued that the Impugned Statements were not defamatory but were expressions of opinion made in the context of public education on olive oil grading standards. The Defendant asserted that the words were merely rhetorical questions, such as "Mana buktinya?" and "Sampai bila hangpa nak aku tunggu COA hangpa?" aimed at inviting scientific verification, rather than asserting a factual falsehood. The Defendant further argued that the term "scammer" was used in reference to a global marketing tactic, not as a personal attack on the Plaintiff’s moral character or business integrity.

Finally, the Defendant claimed the words did not injure the Plaintiff's reputation, alleging that the Plaintiff's sales had actually increased following the Impugned Statements.

This Court rules in favour of the Plaintiff on this element. Applying the objective test established in Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371, the Court must consider the natural and ordinary meaning of the words as a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would understand them. The Defendant’s explicit accusations that the Plaintiff had committed "jenayah penipuan" (criminal fraud) and its labelling of the business as a "scammer" go far beyond mere educational commentary or rhetorical inquiry. Not forgetting that the Defendant has also accused the Plaintiff of selling lampante (olive oil that is not fit for human consumption).

To ordinary members of society, accusing a health product distributor of selling fake or substandard products inherently imputes dishonourable conduct and a lack of business integrity. Consequently, the Court finds that the words complained of are indeed defamatory and severely disparage the Plaintiff's commercial goodwill.

For completeness, while counsel submitted no authorities on this specific point, this Court's finding is heavily fortified by the 'impressionistic approach' to social media defamation established in the persuasive English High Court decision of Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433. Applying this approach, an ordinary, reasonable Facebook user scrolling through the Defendant's posts would not pause for an elaborate linguistic analysis; rather, they would walk away with the immediate, damaging impression that the Plaintiff is running a fraudulent enterprise. ii. The Words Refer to the Plaintiff 36. The Plaintiff argued that there could be no dispute that the Impugned Statements targeted them. Although the Defendant attempted to argue the posts were general, he specifically attacked the exact tagline printed on the Plaintiff's product label: "30X polifenol drpd minyak zaitun lain" (30X polifenol from the other olive oil). Furthermore, in the Third Statement dated 19.09.2023, the Defendant explicitly uploaded a picture of the Plaintiff’s Olivie Plus 30X bottle. The Plaintiff highlighted that the Defendant himself admitted during cross-examination that the post referred to the Plaintiff's product.

In his defence, the Defendant contended that his posts were general, non-targeted, and aimed at the broader issue of lampante-grade olive oils in the Malaysian market, without singling out the Plaintiff. The Defendant argued that the "30X polyphenol" slogan is a common tagline used by global scammers, such as Dr Gundry's Olive Oil, and that he was merely warning the public about this worldwide phenomenon rather than attacking the Plaintiff directly.

Again, this Court rules in favour of the Plaintiff on this element. The legal test is whether the words would reasonably lead people acquainted with the Plaintiff to the conclusion that they were the person referred to. The Defendant’s argument that he was making a general educational broadcast collapsed upon the undeniable fact that he uploaded a direct photograph of the Plaintiff’s Olivie Plus 30X bottle on 19.09.2023. Moreover, the Defendant used the Plaintiff's exact, unique marketing tagline. Given the Defendant's own admission during cross-examination that the 19.09.2023 posting referred to Olivie Plus 30X (of the Plaintiff’s), any reasonable reader would unequivocally identify the Plaintiff as the target of the defamatory attacks.

Again, for completeness, although not explicitly canvassed by the parties during their submissions, this Court finds it highly instructive to refer to the persuasive English High Court decision of Monroe v Hopkins (supra) when evaluating the nature of social media publications. In navigating the modern landscape of digital defamation, Warby J established that determining the meaning and target of a social media post requires an "impressionistic approach." The court must not subject short social media posts to an elaborate, isolated analysis; instead, it must read them in their wider context, including the conversational thread, surrounding posts, and the platform's interactive nature. (It is noteworthy that the English Court of Appeal subsequently refused the defendant permission to appeal, cementing this approach as sound law).

Applying this 'impressionistic approach' to the present case, the Defendant's piecemeal defence—that his initial publications were merely general educational broadcasts—collapses entirely when the Impugned Statements are read as a continuous, contextual series. By the time the Defendant published the Third Statement on 19.09.2023, featuring the exact photograph of the Plaintiff's Olivie Plus 30X bottle, any ordinary, reasonable reader scrolling through his public Facebook timeline would invariably connect the earlier 'scammer' and 'lampante' references directly to the Plaintiff's product. The publications must be viewed as a cumulative, targeted attack, rather than isolated, general musings. iii. Publication to Third-Party 41. The Plaintiff submitted that the element of publication is indisputable. The Impugned Statements were published on the Defendant’s Facebook account, "Muhd Shakir As-Salam", which was set to "public". Because the account was not private, the posts could be accessed, read, and engaged with by anyone globally. The presence of numerous third-party comments in the comments section constitutes direct proof of publication.

The Defendant did not deny that the Impugned Statements were made on his Facebook page. However, the Defendant attempted to downplay the publication by arguing that the posts "did not go viral" or were not widely shared, thereby suggesting that the Plaintiff’s claim of tarnished reputation was merely an assumption. The Defendant also highlighted that the commentators in the comment section attacked the Defendant rather than the Plaintiff, proving no harm was done.

This Court firmly rejects the Defendant's attempt to downplay the severity of the publication. As astutely submitted by the Plaintiff's counsel, the Impugned Statements were published on a borderless, global social media platform with the privacy settings deliberately configured to 'public'. In the modern digital age, publishing defamatory remarks on a public Facebook page inherently means the publication is exponentially more extensive and permanent than that of a traditional local newspaper. The fact that third-party users actively engaged with the posts—regardless of whether they attacked the Plaintiff or questioned the Defendant—serves as irrefutable documentary evidence of widespread publication and dissemination to the public at large.

This Court, again, rules in favour of the Plaintiff on this element. In law, to constitute publication, the defamatory matter must be communicated and made known to at least one third party other than the Plaintiff. The Defendant admitted during cross-examination that his Facebook account was set to "public". The extensive engagement from third-party Facebook users in the comment section is irrefutable evidence that the Impugned Statements were successfully transmitted to and read by the public, or, in this case, by a few or many other third-party users. The Defendant's argument regarding the lack of "virality" or the nature of the commentators' reactions relates strictly to the quantum of damages, not to the liability of publication. Therefore, the third element of defamation is conclusively established. B. The Defences Raised by the Defendant i.

In a defamation action, where the Defendant raises the defence of justification, the law is well-settled that the burden of proof rests squarely and strictly upon the Defendant. The Defendant must prove on a balance of probabilities that the Impugned Statements, the "sting" of the charge, are true in substance and in fact.

It is apt to note here that it is not for the Plaintiff to disprove the Defendant's allegations; it is for the Defendant to prove them. Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 applies, requiring substantial justification of the whole libel.

The Defendant submitted that the Impugned Statements were justified and substantially true as he argued that the "sting" of his posts was directed at the Plaintiff's tagline, "30X Times More Antioxidants," which he claimed was an unverified, extraordinary claim and a known tactic used by global olive oil scammers.

To support this, the Defendant heavily relied on an article published by the Olive Oil Times concerning a different brand, Dr Gundry’s Olive Oil, which used a similar "30x polyphenol" tagline and was allegedly exposed as a scam: “Dr. Gundry’s Olive Oil: Controversial Pitchman Peddles a Dose of Deception” (Bundle B7, p.760) (https://www.oliveoiltimes.com/opinion/gundry-olive-oil-review/89570) (“the Article”).

The Defendant argued that he was merely connecting the dots and educating the public based on this global precedent. Furthermore, the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff failed to publicly disclose an International Olive Council (IOC) accredited Certificate of Analysis (COA) to substantiate their 30X claim. It relied on expert testimony to argue that natural fluctuations in olive oil harvests make a consistent "30X" claim scientifically impossible.

The Plaintiff vehemently opposed this defence, submitting that the Defendant failed to adduce an iota of scientific or documentary evidence during the trial to prove that the Plaintiff’s specific product, Olivie Plus 30X, was "lampante" (unfit for human consumption) or that it contained less than the claimed antioxidants.

The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant's reliance on the Article was fatally flawed because it referred to a completely different product and individual, providing no factual justification regarding the Plaintiff's product.

Crucially, the Plaintiff highlighted a devastating contradiction in the Defendant's case: the Defendant had in his own possession a Chemiservice Test Report (No. 27267/11) which explicitly confirmed that the Plaintiff's product contained a remarkably high level of hydroxytyrosol (233.0 mg/kg). Despite possessing this proof, the Defendant recklessly proceeded to publish the defamatory posts calling the Plaintiff a scammer.

Having evaluated the totality of the evidence, this Court resolves this issue in favour of the Plaintiff and extinguishes the defence of justification. This finding is solidly fortified by the Defendant's evidential shortcomings and his own fatal admissions under cross-examination, thereby rendering this factual determination impervious. The rationales underpinning this conclusion are as follows.

First, a fundamental misconception of the burden of proof. Throughout the trial and in the Impugned Statements, the Defendant continuously demanded that the Plaintiff produce a COA to prove the 30X claim, using phrases like "Sampai bila hangpa nak aku tunggu COA hangpa?".

During cross-examination, the Defendant’s counsel repeatedly challenged the Plaintiff’s witnesses to prove the efficacy of the '30X' tagline. This line of questioning reveals a gross misapprehension of defamation law. In the tort of defamation, the falsity of a defamatory imputation is presumed in the Plaintiff's favour by operation of law. Once publication of the defamatory words is established, the evidential burden shifts entirely to the Defendant to affirmatively prove the truth of his allegations to succeed in a defence of justification. The Defendant cannot publish a highly defamatory statement accusing a corporate entity of being a scammer, of committing a 'crime of fraud' (jenayah penipuan), and of selling a product unfit for human consumption and then improperly attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the Plaintiff to disprove the libel. The duty to prove the 'scam' lies squarely with the accuser, a burden which the Defendant manifestly failed to discharge

Second, the total absence of factual substratum. To succeed in justification, the Defendant must prove the truth of his specific allegation: that Olivie Plus 30X is a scam and/or "lampante". The Court notes as a matter of fact that the Defendant failed to produce any laboratory analysis, clinical trial, or IOC-certified COA showing that the Plaintiff's specific product failed to meet the required standards or lacked the claimed antioxidants.

In fact, the Defendant's own expert witness, SD1, explicitly admitted during cross-examination that she did not conduct any chemical analysis on Olivie Plus 30X to verify its contents. It is worth noting that a defence of justification cannot survive on mere assumptions or generalisations about the olive oil industry. [See NOP, pp. 152 & 153] Soalan saya ada atau tidak Dr. sendiri membuat Analisa kimia, kamu sendiri membuat analisa kimia untuk menunjukkan produk Olivie Plus ini ya tidak mengandungi 30 times more antioxydant. SD1 Saya tidak membuat analysis. Jadi Dr Suhana dalam pengetahuan Dr Suhana ada atau tidak defendan Shakir As-Salam ada atau tidak dia sendiri membuat analisa kimia untuk menunjukkan Olivie Plus 30x ini tidak mengandungi 30 times more antioxydants. Dalam pengetahuan Dr Suhana defendan ada buat dia sendiri ada buat tak Analisa kimia ini? SD1 Tidak. [Emphasis added]

Third, the irrelevance of the Article. The Defendant's attempt to justify his libel by relying on the Article is rejected for the obvious reason that the Article discussed only Dr Gundry's Olive Oil. Ironically, during cross-examination, the Defendant admitted that the article pertained strictly to Dr Steven Gundry's product and not the Plaintiff's. [See NOP, p.173] Dan article ini merujuk kepada produk minyak zaitun yang dikeluarkan oleh Dr Steven Gundry setuju? Yang diedarkan oleh Steven Gundry. Dan kamu setuju dengan saya article ini tidak merujuk kepada produk minyak zaitun Olivie Plus 30X? Betul. [Emphasis added]

Proving that another company committed fraud using a similar marketing tagline does not scientifically or legally prove that the Plaintiff is committing fraud. The leap in logic from "Dr Gundry is a scammer" to "the Plaintiff is a scammer" is defamatory conjecture, not truth.

Fourth, the Defendant's fatal admission during cross-examination. The definitive collapse of the defence of justification came from the Defendant's own mouth. The evidence inadvertently revealed that before making the Impugned Statements, the Defendant possessed a Chemiservice Test Report (No. 27267/11) demonstrating that the Plaintiff’s Olivie Plus 30X contained 233.0 mg/kg of hydroxytyrosol (See Bundle B7 (Vol.5), p.781). It is worth noting that during the trial, SD2 also confirmed that the report in Bundle B7 (Vol.5), p. 781, is the same document as the one in Bundle B1, p. 30, albeit a clearer version.

During cross-examination, the Defendant (SD2) unequivocally admitted to having this document and candidly agreed that it showed the presence of hydroxytyrosol in the Plaintiff's product. [See NOP, p.183] Saya nak baca jawapan En Shakir ‘Hasil laporan ini adalah hasil laporan daripada tahun 2011 lagi dan tidak dikemaskini sama sekali. ’ ya. Betul? Betul. Jadi kamu setuju dengan saya laporan daripada Chemiservice ini menunjukkan bahawa Olivie Plus 30X ini mengandungi 233 mgkg ini hydroxytyrosol. Setuju atau tidak? Setuju. Saya mohon maaf. [Emphasis added]

Therefore, the Court finds as a matter of fact that the Defendant knew, or ought to have known, that there was documented scientific backing for the Plaintiff's product. Yet, he deliberately chose to suppress or ignore this fact and publicly label the Plaintiff a "scammer".

When a defendant publishes a defamatory statement that is directly contradicted by documentary evidence in his own possession, the defence of justification completely collapses. The Defendant has failed to prove the substantial truth of his allegations as required under Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957, and consequently, the Plaintiff succeeds on this point.

In attempting to discharge the strict burden of proving the substantial truth of his defamatory allegations, the Defendant relied heavily on the testimony of SD1, Dr Suhana binti Samat, an Oleo Chemist and certified Olive Oil Sommelier.

However, after a careful evaluation of her testimony, this Court finds that the evidence adduced by SD1 lacks the requisite probative value and weight to sustain the defence of justification.

During cross-examination, SD1 made a fatal concession: she explicitly admitted that she did not conduct any independent laboratory testing or chemical analysis on the Plaintiff’s actual product, Olivie Plus 30X, to verify its antioxidant content.

When specifically asked by the Plaintiff's counsel if she or the Defendant had conducted a chemical analysis to prove the product lacked the claimed antioxidants, she flatly replied, "Saya tidak membuat analysis" and confirmed the Defendant did not do so either. Instead, SD1’s testimony was predicated entirely on general academic journals and sample test results of other olive oil brands.

She utilised these journals to illustrate a general scientific theory that phenolic levels (such as hydroxytyrosol) naturally fluctuate globally depending on harvest, climate, and processing, thereby theorising that maintaining a consistent '30X' claim is impossible.

While this Court acknowledges her scientific generalisations regarding the olive oil industry, general hypotheses and literature reviews cannot serve as substitute proof in a court of law.

In an action for defamation, where a defendant accuses a specific plaintiff of committing criminal fraud ("jenayah penipuan") and selling fake products ("scammer"), the defendant must prove the substantial truth of the specific 'sting' of the libel.

General scientific hypotheses regarding global harvest volatility do not prove the specific allegation that the Plaintiff's Olivie Plus 30X is a scam. Most critically, the Defendant cannot overcome the concrete documentary evidence of the Plaintiff’s Chemiservice Test Report (No. 27267/11), which explicitly recorded a remarkably high hydroxytyrosol reading of 233.0 mg/kg, with mere theoretical assumptions.

To further substantiate the factual validity of the '30X' tagline, the Plaintiff successfully established the mathematical and scientific correlation through their witness, SP3 (Dr. Norfahana binti Abd Talib). SP3 comprehensively explained to the Court, by referencing several journal articles that analysed regular Extra Virgin Olive Oil (EVOO) samples from Italy, Spain, and Turkey, that the average highest hydroxytyrosol content found in regular EVOO is approximately 7.0 mg/kg. Consequently, multiplying this baseline average by 30 yields a threshold requirement of 210 mg/kg. Given that the Chemiservice Test Report (and a separate Canadian clinical study) confirmed the Plaintiff's product contains 233.0 mg/kg (and 233.6 mg/kg respectively), SP3 conclusively demonstrated that the product indeed contains more than 30 times the antioxidants of regular olive oil, as it comfortably exceeds the 210 mg/kg benchmark.

Crucially, the veracity of this 233.0 mg/kg reading was cemented during the cross-examination of the Defendant himself (SD2). The Plaintiff’s counsel successfully elicited a fatal admission from SD2, who explicitly conceded and confirmed to the Court that the Chemiservice Test Report showed the Plaintiff's product contained 233.0 mg/kg of hydroxytyrosol. This admission is devastating to the Defendant's case. It unequivocally proves that the Defendant was fully aware of the report and its high antioxidant reading, yet maliciously chose to suppress this vital information while publicly and recklessly labelling the Plaintiff a 'scammer'.

Since SD1 failed to produce any actual scientific data or independent laboratory analysis on the impugned product to rebut the Plaintiff's documentary evidence, her testimony is wholly insufficient to discharge the Defendant's legal burden of proof.

The Defendant attempted to rely on Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1957 and the case of Khalid Yusoff v Pertubuhan Berita Nasional Malaysia (Bernama) & Ors [2014] 6 MLRH 486 to argue that the defence of justification should succeed based on the 'substantial truth' of the publications. This Court finds the Defendant's reliance on this statutory provision and case law to be wholly misconceived. Section 8 applies to save a defence of justification only when minor or distinct charges fail to be proved, provided the unproven words do not materially injure the Plaintiff's reputation beyond the truth of the remaining charges.

In the present case, the statutory protection under Section 8 cannot be invoked. The core 'sting' of the Defendant's publications was the grave accusation that the Plaintiff is a 'scammer', committing 'jenayah penipuan' (criminal fraud), and selling 'lampante' oil unfit for human consumption. These are not minor, peripheral, or severable details; they constitute the gravamen of the defamatory attacks. Because the Defendant failed to adduce a shred of credible scientific evidence to prove the truth of these primary allegations, the defence of justification collapses in its entirety. Substantial truth cannot be claimed when the most damaging imputations remain completely unsubstantiated. ii. Defence of Fair Comment 77. To succeed in the defence of fair comment under Section 9 of the Defamation Act 1957, the law requires the Defendant to establish four essential elements. As outlined in the case of Chew Peng Cheng v Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2008] 8 CLJ 418, which the Plaintiff submitted, these elements are:

the words complained of are a comment, although they may consist of inferences of fact;

(ii) the comment is on a matter of public interest;

(iii) the comment is based on facts; and

(iv) the comment is one which a fair-minded person can honestly make on the facts proved.

Crucially, the defence of fair comment is entirely defeated if it is proven that the Defendant was actuated by malice (See Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135).

The Defendant submitted that the Impugned Statements were merely expressions of opinion and fair comment on a matter of public interest, namely, food safety, labelling accuracy, and consumer protection in the olive oil industry. Relying on the case of Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1989] 3 MLRH 120, the Defendant argued that the context of his words, such as using rhetorical questions like "Mana buktinya?" and "Sampai bila hangpa nak aku tunggu COA hangpa?", clearly framed his statements as commentary and public inquiry rather than assertions of fact.

The Defendant further relied on Graceful Frontier (supra) to argue that his comments were based on the existing public facts of the Plaintiff’s marketing tagline and the global controversy surrounding the "30X polyphenol" claims made by other foreign brands like Dr Gundry Olive Oil.

The Plaintiff fiercely rebutted this defence, submitting that the Impugned Statements were not comments at all, but bare, unsubstantiated allegations of fact.

The Plaintiff premised that accusing a company of being a "scammer", committing "jenayah penipuan" (criminal fraud) and selling a product not fit for human consumption crosses the boundaries of fair criticism and constitutes a direct factual attack on the Plaintiff’s business integrity.

Furthermore, the Plaintiff argued that a fundamental prerequisite for fair comment is that it must be predicated on facts. Since the Defendant failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the product Olivie Plus 30X lacked the claimed antioxidants or was scientifically defective, the defence must collapse for want of a factual substratum.

Lastly, the Plaintiff averred that the defence is completely destroyed by malice, as the Defendant’s true motive was to sabotage a competitor to promote his own product, “Zoutina Prestige”.

This Court decides unequivocally in favour of the Plaintiff and dismisses the defence of fair comment in its entirety. The Court bases its decision on strict findings of fact that the Defendant utterly failed to meet during the trial. The reasons are twofold: a. The Impugned Words are Assertions of Fact, Not Comments 86. The Defendant attempted to rely on Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn (supra) to argue that his words were mere rhetorical commentary. This Court distinguishes and rejects the Defendant's application of that case. While rhetorical questions may sometimes constitute a comment, the Defendant's posts went much further. He explicitly published the following: "PENTING! Membuat DAKWAAN PALSU tentang FAKTA PRODUK semata-mata untuk meningkatkan jualan merupakan satu JENAYAH PENIPUAN terhadap PENGGUNA! (IMPORTANT! Making FALSE CLAIMS about PRODUCT FACTS solely to increase sales is a CRIME OF FRAUD against CONSUMERS!)

Calling a corporate entity a "scammer" and accusing them of committing a crime of fraud ("jenayah penipuan") are definitive allegations of fact depicting dishonourable and fraudulent conduct. As established in Chew Peng Cheng (supra), when a writer goes beyond the limits of fair criticism and attacks the character or integrity of the Plaintiff, it passes into the realm of actionable libel. The Defendant cannot shield a direct accusation of criminal fraud under the guise of "public education". b. Total Absence of a Substratum of True Facts 88. Even if this Court were to assume that the words were comments generously, the defence suffers a fatal factual collapse. The Defendant's own cited authority, Graceful Frontier (supra), unequivocally states that to rely on fair comment, the defendant must first establish a sufficient substratum of facts, as per my learned brother Kenneth ST James J: “[106] Third — to rely on the defence of fair comment, the defendant must first "establish a sufficient substratum of facts" on which he draws inferences (or comments). Then he must establish that the facts on which his comments or inferences were made "must be truly stated so that the readers may form their own opinion whether the comment or inferences were well founded". [107] In other words, the substratum of facts that the defendant relies on to make his comments or inferences “must be true and existing”. “A writer may not suggest or invent facts and then comment upon them, on the assumption that they are true.” This means that the defence of fair comment “is not available” to the defendant if he “invented or created the facts he intended to rely” on—Dato’ Sri Dr Mohamad Salleh bin Ismail (supra) at paragraph [45].” [Emphasis added]

The Defendant’s attempt to use his own legal authorities proves inherently self-defeating. The "fact" the Defendant was commenting on was his allegation that the Plaintiff's product was a scam and did not contain 30 times as many antioxidants as the Defendant's product. Yet, as this Court found during the trial, the Defendant produced absolutely no laboratory evidence to prove that the underlying "fact" was true.

Worse still, the Defendant admitted in cross-examination that he possessed the Chemiservice Test Report (No. 27267/11), which proved the Plaintiff's product contained a remarkably high level of hydroxytyrosol (233.0 mg/kg).

Because the underlying allegation (that the product was fake or deficient) was proven to be entirely unsubstantiated, there are no "true facts" upon which a fair comment could be based. The Defendant cannot invent a false premise that a product is a scam and then claim he is making a "fair comment" upon that false premise. iii. Qualified Privilege 92. The Defendant heavily contended that the Impugned Statements were protected by qualified privilege. The Defendant submitted that, as a certified Olive Oil Sommelier and an experienced professional in the olive oil industry, he had a moral and social duty to educate Malaysian consumers about olive oil grading standards and to correct public misconceptions about lampante oil.

This Court unequivocally rejects this contention. The classic test for qualified privilege, as established by the House of Lords in Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309, dictates that a privileged occasion only arises where the person who makes the communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it.

While the Court accepts that food safety and consumer education are broadly matters of public interest, there is absolutely no recognised legal, social, or moral duty for a direct commercial competitor to publish unverified, defamatory accusations of criminal fraud and explicitly label a specific rival company a "scammer" to the world at large on a public Facebook page. The Defendant's claim that he was merely acting in the public interest to educate consumers is entirely defeated by his own conduct in the comments section of the impugned posts (found at pages 35, 37, 38, 41, and 42 of Bundle B1). The evidence unequivocally shows that the Defendant actively used the traction from his defamatory attacks to promote his own brand. He uploaded a promotional picture with hashtags such as '#ZouitinaPrestige' and '#BeliYangOriMakanYangKualiti', directed users to his commercial website ('zouitina.com'), and explicitly pitched his product to commentators by urging them to 'tolong cuba Zouitina prestige yang dapat gold medal' (please try Zouitina Prestige, which has won a gold medal). This proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Defendant was actuated by commercial malice and self-interest, utilising the defamatory postings against the Plaintiff as a free marketing tool for his own financial gain.

Furthermore, in relying on the Reynolds privilege (responsible journalism) to justify his public broadcast, the Defendant wholly failed the test of responsible publication. As established by the Court of Appeal in Syed Nadri (supra), a publisher must take responsible steps to gather and verify the information; a failure to obtain clarification or to verify the truthfulness of the impugned statements defeats the defence.

The Defendant's attempt to cloak his defamatory publications under the Reynolds Privilege of responsible journalism is wholly misguided. As elucidated by the Court of Appeal in Raub Australian (supra) and firmly established by the Federal Court in Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor Sdn Bhd v Tony Pua Kiam Wee [2015] 6 MLRA 63, the defence of responsible journalism and reportage requires the publication to be put forward in a fair, disinterested, and neutral fashion, and it must contain the gist of the plaintiff’s side of the story. The Defendant failed this test on all fronts. He is not a disinterested journalist reporting on a matter of public concern; he is a direct commercial competitor selling his own brand of extra-virgin olive oil ('Zoutina Prestige'). The Defendant failed to take any responsible or fair steps to seek comments or verification from the Plaintiff prior to publication. An imbalanced, partisan attack launched by a commercial rival for self-interest and profit completely lacks the neutrality and disinterestedness required to attract the protection of the Reynolds Privilege.

In evaluating the Defendant's reliance on the Reynolds privilege, this Court finds the principles enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Raub Australian (supra) to be highly instructive. In the Raub Australian (supra) case, the court stressed that when a publication makes serious, accusatory, and damaging allegations, the standard of responsible journalism strictly demands fair and balanced reporting. The publisher is legally required to take reasonable steps to verify the information, which crucially includes giving the defamed party an opportunity to answer the accusations. The court in Raub Australian (supra) explicitly held that publishing serious allegations without attempting to contact the plaintiff to get its side of the story is 'grossly inadequate' and entirely defeats the privilege. Applying this to the present case, the Defendant's conduct falls drastically short of this standard. By his own admission, the Defendant launched a public attack without ever making any prior attempt to contact the Plaintiff to verify the '30X' claim or to request the Plaintiff's Certificate of Analysis (COA). This blatant failure to verify the truth and obtain the Plaintiff's side of the story mirrors the irresponsible journalism condemned in Raub Australian (supra), thereby completely depriving the Defendant of the Reynolds privilege protection

Compounding the Defendant's evidentiary failures, the Defendant has known of and has in his possession the Chemiservice Test Report (No. 27267/11), which explicitly confirmed that the Plaintiff's product contained a remarkably high level of hydroxytyrosol (233.0 mg/kg), before making his defamatory posts. This obviously defeats any application of the defence of qualified privilege. iv. Express Malice defeats the Defences of Fair Comment and

Even if the Defendant had somehow satisfied the elements of fair comment or qualified privilege, it is trite law that both defences are entirely and incurably destroyed by express malice. Based on the totality of the evidence, this Court makes a definitive finding of fact that the Defendant was actuated by express malice on two distinct fronts.

First, an ulterior commercial motive. The Defendant weaponised the guise of 'consumer protection' to assassinate the trading reputation of a direct rival, while actively promoting his own competing brand, “Zouitina Prestige”, in the very same comment sections. To elaborate on this commercial motive, the Court’s attention was drawn to the Defendant's blatant cross-selling in the documentary evidence. As highlighted during the trial, the Defendant did not just passively receive comments; he actively engaged with users like one Alexandria Philip, explicitly urging them: “Tuan tolong cuba Zouitina prestige yang mendapat gold medal di Morocco tahun ini. Pasti lain rasa, lain bau, lain aroma.” (Sir, please try Zouitina Prestige which won a gold medal in Morocco this year. Definitely a different taste, smell, and aroma) (Bundle B1, page 41). He further directed users, such as Firdaus Mokhtar, to his business website, zouitina.com (Bundle B1, page 35), and capitalised on defectors, such as Wan Marzukey (Bundle B1, page 42). This contemporaneous promotional conduct entirely eviscerates any presumption of good faith and cements the finding that the dominant motive was to vent personal commercial rivalry and obtain a private advantage.

Second, a reckless disregard for the truth. The Defendant deliberately suppressed exonerating evidence. During cross-examination, he made a fatal admission, acknowledging that he possessed the Chemiservice Test Report (No. 27267/11)—which explicitly confirmed the high antioxidant content of the Plaintiff's product (233.0 mg/kg)—before making his defamatory posts. To possess concrete documentary proof of a competitor's product efficacy, yet deliberately conceal that context while publicly accusing them of committing "jenayah penipuan" (criminal fraud), labelling them a "scammer" and asserting they sell lampante olive oil which is unfit for human consumption, is the very epitome of actual malice.

As established in Horrocks v Lowe (supra) and applied in Norhadza Ahmad Razali (supra), malice is present when an act is done intentionally with an improper motive, or when the publisher acts with a reckless disregard for the truth. Furthermore, as noted in Lim Guan Eng v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd [2012] 3 MLRH 124, an improper motive to derive financial gain at the plaintiff's expense is a clear indicator of malice.

Based on the totality of the evidence, this Court makes a definitive finding of fact that the Defendant was actuated by express malice. The presence of actual malice fatally destroys the defences of fair comment and qualified privilege. In determining malice, this Court is guided by the principles laid down in S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988]1 MLRA 110 and Horrocks v Lowe (supra), which establish that malice may be inferred where a defendant makes a defamatory statement knowing it to be false or makes it recklessly without caring whether it is true or false, or where the dominant motive is to vent personal spite or obtain a private advantage. The Defendant's conduct in this case is the quintessential textbook example of malice. Despite possessing the Chemiservice Test Report (which verified the high hydroxytyrosol levels in the Plaintiff's product), the Defendant deliberately suppressed this crucial fact and proceeded to recklessly label the Plaintiff a 'scammer'. Such deliberate distortion of facts to derive a commercial advantage over a business rival constitutes a reckless disregard for the truth and an improper motive, sealing the finding of express malice. Consequently, having found express malice as a matter of fact, both the Defendant's defence of fair comment and defence of qualified privilege are completely and incurably destroyed.

Having conclusively established the three elements of defamation and finding that all pleaded defences have been defeated by a lack of factual substratum and the presence of express malice, the liability of the Defendant is established unequivocally. The Court now proceeds to assess the damages to be awarded to the Plaintiff. C. Assessment of Damages & Corporate Defamation

The Defendant heavily contested the Plaintiffs’ claim for damages, submitting that the Plaintiff failed to adduce any credible documentary evidence to demonstrate actual or presumed injury to its trading or business reputation.

The Defendant emphasised that the Plaintiff did not call any witnesses or business associates to testify to reputational harm, nor did they produce records showing a loss of contracts, customer complaints, or a decline in sales.

In fact, the Defendant highlighted that several individuals, believed to be the Plaintiff’s own agents, publicly acknowledged on Facebook that the sales of the Plaintiff's product had actually increased by 30% to 40% following the publication of the impugned posts. Consequently, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s claim of suffering "great loss or damage" was merely a baseless assumption and the suit must fail.

The Plaintiff, conversely, submitted that in an action for libel, damage is actionable per se. Relying on the Court of Appeal's decision in Yeo Ing King v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 CLJ 512, the Plaintiff argued that there is no legal requirement to prove actual financial damage. As established in Yeo Ing King (supra), the law presumes that some damage will naturally flow in the ordinary course of things from the mere invasion of the absolute right to reputation.

Furthermore, the court in Yeo Ing King (supra) rightfully observed that while a company cannot have feelings, it inherently possesses a corporate reputation to protect. The Plaintiff argued that its image as a prominent distributor of high-quality health products had been tarnished globally due to the wide reach of the Defendant's public Facebook account, thus entitling it to compensation.

The Plaintiff further premised that, as a prominent company, its image and reputation for selling high-quality health products had been tarnished globally due to Facebook's wide reach, entitling it to RM400,000 in compensatory damages, RM300,000 in aggravated damages, and RM300,000 in exemplary damages.

This Court finds the Defendant's primary argument, that a corporate entity must prove actual financial loss to succeed in a defamation claim, to be fundamentally flawed in law, as this Court is bound by the Apex Court's pronouncement in Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd, [2021] 7 CLJ 145 (on appeal from Raub Australian (supra)). In that case, Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal FCJ explicitly adopted the House of Lords decision in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2007] 1 AC 359, which settled the legal position regarding corporate defamation.

The Mkini (supra) decision clarified two critical principles regarding corporate defamation. First, it is a trite law that a company may sue for libel to protect its reputation and need not prove actual financial damage or special loss. The law recognises that a company's goodwill and reputation are assets of positive value that are inherently injured by a defamatory publication. Therefore, the primary purpose of an award of general damages is not merely to compensate for quantified financial loss, but for the vindication of the company's trading reputation.

Second, while the Plaintiff's reputation undeniably warrants vindication through general damages, this Court must also apply the caveat established in Mkini (supra) regarding aggravated damages. The Apex Court in Mkini (supra), adopting the rationale in Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781, affirmed that a company stands in a slightly different position than an individual claimant because 'it has no feelings to hurt'. Consequently, considerations of aggravation or injured feelings do not apply to a corporate entity, precluding any award for aggravated damages. As noted earlier, this legal position was rightfully and gracefully conceded by the Plaintiff’s counsel during oral submissions."

Therefore, the law recognises that a company cannot be injured in its feelings, but a libel can injure its reputation and goodwill, and that injury must sound in money. The reputation of a corporate body is not simply something its directors take pride in, but an asset of positive value to it. Furthermore, as Lord Scott observed in Jameel (supra), proving actual damage caused by defamatory material is notoriously difficult because causation problems are usually insurmountable; market fluctuations happen, and it is impossible to determine if financial figures would have been higher had the libel not been published.

To further fortify this legal position, the Federal Court in Mkini (supra) cited with approval the seminal English Court of Appeal decision in English and Scottish Co-Operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Society Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 1. In addressing corporate defamation, the appellate court firmly warned that it is a grave error for a court to conclude that, just because a company has not demonstrated a quantified loss of business, the damages awarded should be treated as merely nominal or trivial. As Goddard LJ emphatically stated in that judgment, there is absolutely no obligation on a plaintiff company to show that it has suffered actual damage. Instead, when a serious libel is committed against a corporate entity's business practices, the law inherently assumes that damage has been suffered, thereby entitling the company to substantial damages.

Therefore, the primary purpose of an award of damages in a libel action for a corporation is not merely compensation for proven financial loss, but the vindication of its trading reputation. The Defendant's reliance on the purported 30% to 40% increase in the Plaintiff's sales post-publication is therefore legally irrelevant to the establishment of liability. A temporary spike in sales does not negate the legal presumption that falsely branding a trading corporation a "scammer" and accusing it of committing "jenayah penipuan" (crime of fraud) inherently damages its commercial goodwill and credit.

Having established that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages without strict proof of financial loss, the Court must now determine the appropriate quantum.

The Defendant rightly cautioned this Court against granting an excessive award, citing the Court of Appeal in Syed Nadri (supra), which referred to MGG Pillai (supra) to assert that the days of million-ringgit awards for defamation have long gone and are consigned to history. The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff's total claim of RM1 million was grossly disproportionate, especially since the posts did not go viral and commentators, rather than the Plaintiff, mocked the Defendant.

This Court accepts the Defendant’s submission on this specific point of quantum. The Plaintiff’s claim of RM1,000,000.00 is indeed excessive and out of touch with the current trend of defamation awards. However, the Defendant's libel was objectively severe. Accusing a health product distributor of criminal fraud and of selling products that are “lampante” (unfit for human consumption) strikes at the very core of its business integrity.

The Court now turns to the Plaintiff's prayer for exemplary damages. Unlike compensatory damages, exemplary damages are strictly punitive in nature and are intended to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar conduct. As established by Lord Devlin in the landmark House of Lords decision of Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, and subsequently applied by our courts in cases such as Roshairee Abd Wahab v Mejar Mustafa Omar & Ors [1996] 1 MLRH 548 and Lim Guan Eng (supra), exemplary damages are restricted to rare and exceptional circumstances. One such circumstance is where the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself, which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff. If the defendant acted with the motive of material gain or economic advantage, the court is justified in awarding exemplary damages to punish that mercenary conduct.

Applying this legal principle to the present case, this Court finds that the attitude and behaviour of the Defendant undeniably justify an award of exemplary damages. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the Defendant's defamatory publications were not made in the course of a bona fide public duty to educate consumers. Rather, they constituted a planned commercial attack (serangan komersial yang dirancang) designed to sabotage a direct business rival. By maliciously labelling the Plaintiff a "scammer" while deliberately suppressing the Chemiservice Test Report, the Defendant's ultimate objective was to divert the Plaintiff's customers to his own competing brand of extra virgin olive oil, "Zoutina Prestige", for his own commercial and financial gain.

The Defendant did not merely commit a tort incidentally; he actively leveraged the defamation as a targeted marketing springboard. By attaching promotional pictures with hashtags like '#ZouitinaPrestige' and '#BeliYangOriMakanYangKualiti' (Bundle B1, pages 37-38) directly to his attacks on the Plaintiff, and actively soliciting the Plaintiff's prospective or current customers in the comment section, the Defendant calculated that the financial gain from diverting the Plaintiff's customer base to his own business would outweigh any potential liability. This mercenary calculation—profiting off the deliberate destruction of a competitor's goodwill—is exactly the type of egregious, profit-driven misconduct that exemplary damages are designed to punish and deter.

Such egregious conduct, driven by commercial greed and the deliberate pursuit of economic advantage at the expense of the Plaintiff's trading reputation, falls squarely within the second category of Rookes v Barnard (supra). Therefore, this Court finds it necessary to award exemplary damages to punish the Defendant and to serve as a stern deterrent against such malicious commercial sabotage. It is to this Court’s mind that exemplary damages of RM50,000.00 are reasonable for this case.

In the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff initially prayed for RM300,000.00 in aggravated damages. However, this Court must record its appreciation for the candour and professionalism of the learned counsel for the Plaintiff during the oral submissions. To be entirely fair to the Defendant, the Plaintiff's counsel expressly conceded that a corporate entity is precluded in law from claiming aggravated damages. This concession correctly reflects the established legal position, as mentioned earlier in para 113 of this judgment, enunciated by the Court of Appeal and affirmed by the Federal Court in Mkini (supra). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claim for aggravated damages is hereby formally dismissed.

After considering all relevant facts, the Court awards the Plaintiff RM200,000.00 as General Damages and RM50,000.00 as Exemplary Damages.

Conclusion Taking into account the severity of the libel, the extent of the Facebook publication, the Defendant's malice as a competitor, and the need to vindicate the Plaintiff's corporate reputation as an asset of positive value, this Court makes the following orders: a) The Court allows the Plaintiff's claim and orders the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff general damages in the sum of RM200,000.00 and another RM50,000.00 as exemplary damages; b) The Court grants an injunction restraining the Defendant, his officers, servants, or agents from further publishing, circulating, or distributing the defamatory statements; c) The Defendant shall pay interest on the judgment sum at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of this order until the date of full and final settlement; and d) Costs of this action are awarded to the Plaintiff. Dated: 12th March, 2026 -------------------------------------------------------------------- YA. Dr. Hj. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR Table of Authorities Cases Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 Chew Peng Cheng v Anthony Teo Tiao Gin [2008] 8 CLJ 418 Chok Foo Choo v The China Press Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 371 Dato' Dr Tan Chee Khuan v Chin Choong Seng [2010] MLRH 723 Dato’ Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia Berhad & Anor [2014] 3 MLRA 92 Datuk Patinggi Abdul Rahman Ya’kub v Abang Mohammad Bin Abang Anding [1979] 2 MLJ 185 Datuk Seri Utama Dr Rais Yatim v Amizudin Ahmat [2012] 1 MLRH 519 Dr Jenni Ibrahim v S Pakianathan [1986] 2 MLJ 154 English and Scottish Co-Operative Properties Mortgage and Investment Society Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 1 Graceful Frontier Sdn Bhd & Ors v Theow Say Kow @ Teoh Kiang Seng & Anor [2025] MLRHU 2378 Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2007] 1 AC 359 JB Jeyaretnam v Lee Kuan Yew [1982] 1 MLJ 239 Khalid Yusoff v Pertubuhan Berita Nasional Malaysia (Bernama) & Ors [2014] 6 MLRH 486 Lee Kuan Yew v Derek Gwyn Davies & Ors [1989] 3 MLRH 120 Solicitor for the Plaintiff : Noorlaili Aziz & Ang Khoon Cheong Messrs. Laili & Co. Advocates & Solicitors Solicitors for the Defendant : Yusma Norazreeny Mohd Yusof Messrs. Azira, Zainah Zainal & Associates Advocates & Solicitors Lim Guan Eng v Utusan Melayu (M) Bhd [2012] 3 MLRH 124 MGG Pillai v Tan Sri Dato' Vincent Tan Chee Yioun & Other Appeals [1995] 1 MLRA 322 Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors v Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd [2021] 7 CLJ 145 Norhadza Ahmad Razali v Muhammad Ezanie Noorazman & Ors [2022] MLRHU 706 Raub Australian Gold Mining Sdn Bhd v Mkini Dotcom Sdn Bhd & Ors [2018] 4 MLJ 209 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 Roshairee Abd Wahab v Mejar Mustafa Omar & Ors [1996] 1 MLRH 548 S Pakianathan v Jenni Ibrahim [1988] 1 MLRA 110 Syed Nadri Syed Harun & Anor v Lim Guan Eng & Other Appeals [2019] 2 MLRA 387 Yeo Ing King v Melawangi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 CLJ 512