Abc v Def (BA-33JP-644-05/2022)

This Grounds is supplemental to the Grounds of Reference which I have written on 11.06.2026 and filed via Encl. 438 (“said Grounds”). All capitalised terms in this Grounds shall bear the same meaning ascribed thereto in the said Grounds.

Unbeknownst to me during that time of preparing the said Grounds, a letter was filed by the learned counsel for the Petitioner Wife on 09.06.2026 via Encl. 437. As I understand the letter, it mainly reaffirms their position that an investigation is still very much a live issue. The stance they took is that notwithstanding the withdrawal of prayer 1.8 in Encl. 20 by the Petitioner Husband, the financial aspect remains an issue proper to be determined by way of investigation before the registrar in light of the remaining prayers.

The letter had thereafter been addressed. I replied on 16.06.2026 via Encl. 443 as follow: “(6) Isu seterusnya menyentuh Surat Pempetisyen Isteri yang difailkan pada 09.06.2026 (“Lampiran 437”). Waima dengan pembalasan pihak Pempetisyen Suami yang difailkan pada 12.06.2026 bahawa Pempetisyen Suami tidak berniat untuk menyentuh perkara yang dibangkitkan buat masa ini, harus ambil maklum bahawa perkara yang dibangkitkan di Lampiran 437, khususnya Perenggan 3(b), adalah dalam pertimbangan saya dalam melakarkan persoalan untuk tujuan ianya dirujuk. Ini boleh dilihat daripada pemerhatian saya yang ditulis di perenggan [17] Alasan tersebut. Ianya pada hemat saya melibatkan:

penterjemahan kaedah-kaedah 66 dan 67 Kaedah-kaedah Prosiding Perceraian dan Hal Ehwal Suami Isteri 1980 (“DMPR1980”); dan juga

(ii) ruang lingkup laporan yang disediakan susulan k.67(2) DMPR1980, yang pada pendapat saya, sebagaimana yang disentuh di Alasan tersebut, harus dibaca bersama k.67(1) dan k.65 DMPR1980.

Ingin saya terangkan dengan lebih jelas bahawa, pada penemuan saya, pendapat pendaftar adalah keatas anggaran relif kewangan yang pemohon layak semata-mata dan untuk relif-relif lain yang dipohon, pendapat pendaftar harus menyentuh perihal sejauh mana yang diperuntukkan di kaedah-kaedah yang disebut di perenggan (6)(ii) diatas sahaja. Ini adalah pada hemat saya konsisten dengan pendirian yang saya ambil sebagaimana yang dijelaskan di ayat pertama dan kedua perenggan [38] tersebut walaupun ianya tidak disentuh secara tersurat atau nyata (explicit) di Alasan tersebut.

Dalam apa jua keadaan, perkara yang berbangkit di Perenggan-perenggan (6) dan (7) diatas merupakan isu penafsiran peruntukkan-peruntukkan berkenaan yang perlu ditangani Yang Arif Hakim. “ [4] I intended to put the matter at rest for the time being. However, I have given the matter a further reconsideration, especially in light of the letter filed by the Petitioner Wife. Consequently, I deemed it appropriate and necessary for this Supplemental Grounds to be issued in order to afford both parties the full benefits of my thought process. This should therefore with a view to assist them to deal with full force of any lacuna that I may have, and allowing the same to be tested in the crucible before Her Ladyship the presiding Judge of the Family Division 2. [5] In doing so, I am mindful of the dicta of his Lordship Mahadev Shankar JCA in Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan Berhad v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang [1996] 3 CLJ 335, CA in respect of the effect of having a supplemental grounds issued after a written grounds (see p. 367, row f – g). Be that as it may, I do not see this Supplemental Grounds as altering or contradicting the stance I have taken in the said Grounds. Conversely, it is necessitated for reasons stated in para [4] above. [6] This Supplemental Grounds deals with two main issues, namely:

The jurisdiction of the registrar wherein financial relief is not an explicit issue;

My respectful observation of the conduct of the registrar in the case of Hoong Wai Kit v Teh Toong Joo (Boonsri Kanjanawadee (f), party cited) [2017] 1 MLJ 592. [7] The first issue above has been dealt with in the said Grounds. If the said Grounds do not suffice, I see no necessity to elaborate further on what I have explained in my reply as reproduced in para [3] above. However, what left to be addressed is with the interpretation of “financial relief”, which necessitates the issuance of this Grounds notwithstanding my reply as reproduced in para [3] above – an issue which I thought to be non-starter in the first place. The interpretation thereof is crucial as it has direct bearing on what the registrar should do next in the context of Encl. 20 at hand, i.e. should he make an order under r.66 of the DMPR1980? Or should he merely form an opinion pursuant to r.67 of the DMPR1980? [8] Bearing in mind the numerous reported cases that we have now, it is my view that the only proper construction of “financial relief” is that it refers to the relief or reliefs of maintenance – whether spousal or children – in monetary form and it be paid by the person so ordered. One must not conflate the terms “financial relief” and “financial means”. For the former, it is prayed for to achieve a certain purpose, such as to maintain a certain lifestyle or whatnot; whereas the latter refers to the capacity one possesses with a view to satisfy the presiding judge that he is entitled to what he had sought for. [9] The answer to the above issue – assuming Her Ladyship the Honourable Judge is with me – would mean that, by discontinuing prayer 1.8 of Encl. 20, there is effectively no issue of financial relief left, and therefore the registrar’s power is conferred by r.66 of the DMPR1980 to make an order and he is confined to that provision. The registrar could not exercise his jurisdiction under r.67(2) of the DMPR1980, for in doing so the registrar will find himself acting beyond the boundaries of the law. [10] I do not see the necessity to elaborate further from what I have explained in para [54] and [55] of the said Grounds on my reasonings, save to state that while one may argue that whether an applicant having the financial means to ensure the upbringing of the children is a subject to be investigated, it does not, in my view, convert the matter to one that fits under r.67(2) of the DMPR1980. In other words, it does not mean that the registrar is at liberty ignore the obligations binding upon him under r.66 by issuing a written opinion for the final determination of the judge. [11] Now I would like to comment, respectfully, on the conduct of the learned registrar in the Hoong (supra) case. This is a paramount issue interconnected with the first issue highlighted in para [6] above. [12] One may observe that vide the excerpt of the registrar’s report reproduced by the learned Judicial Commissioner in para [51] (“Report Excerpt”) that, as it comprehensively demonstrates, the learned registrar had conducted an extensive interview session with the children of the marriage. [13] While it is not apparent as to what the content of the affidavits supporting or rebutting the application is, it can be surmised from the Report Excerpt that the learned registrar was not merely investigating the “allegations made in support of and in answer to the application”. As the Report Excerpt demonstrates, the learned registrar appeared to have go on with identifying what the children did during the weekends, their daily routines, the tuition classes they attended, their hobbies, and the wishes of the children – like what a judge presiding over a quintessential custodial application does. [14] It may be inferred that the learned registrar, in so doing, was in the process of forming the opinion on the reliefs sought for by the relevant applicant in that case; were it otherwise, the interview session would not be as extensive as it was. The report would instead touch merely the issues befitting the description “allegations”, namely, with regard to the incident whereby the elder daughter was hugged by her maternal grandfather (see para 75 of the Report Excerpt, p. 611); or that she was slapped by her uncle (see para 79 of the Report Excerpt, p. 611), among the few incidents reported therein – and only those. [15] Now, this is where the problem manifested itself. Following the view that I have held in paras [38] and [39] in the said Grounds – namely, the investigation shall be confined to the “allegations made in support of and in answer to the application” – as alluded to earlier, the daily lives of the children as mentioned in the Report Excerpt would not have arisen during the course of investigation, unless they were necessitated by the circumstances that there were “allegations” required to be investigated – to reiterate, a matter which is not clear from the brief reading of the law report. [16] The only reasonable conjecture to justify the conduct of the learned registrar is none other than to find that he or she has read r.67(2) of the DMPR1980 in isolation and separation from the provisions that precedes it, namely rr.65(5) and 67(1) of the DMPR1980. This seem to me the only explanation available. This is because without those extensive interview sessions, it would be impossible to form an opinion, which the learned registrar appeared to have reached, following the wordings of r.67(2) i.e. “shall contain … the relief to which, in the registrar’s opinion, the applicant would be entitled if the application was granted”, as could be seen in para [22] of the case law. [17] As a disclaimer, I know full well of my role as a registrar, and therefore I am careful so as to not conclusively determine if the learned registrar had done wrong or otherwise. What I intend to raise here is that, if one is to hold a view that a report so extensive as the Report Excerpt is to be produced by a registrar in an investigation, then it is not wholly unreasonable for the learned registrar to take the course as she appeared to have taken, and r.67(2) of the DMPR1980 must be read in isolation. [18] At the risk of repetition, the approach taken by the learned registrar in the Hoong (supra) case would only be sensible if one is to read r.67(2) without reference to any other provisions that precedes it. If this is the proper construction of the said provision, then one may say cadit questio. [19] However, if one is to follow that line of argument, the question remains unresolved. It is the question as to the source of power, so to speak, a registrar derives his jurisdiction from. The power and obligation for a registrar to investigate originates from r.65(5) of the DMPR1980, and what the registrar does must, figuratively speaking, “respect” the source from which his power originates and through which he wield his power. It is my view that r.67(2) being the basis for a report written as required by r.67(1) of the DMPR1980, shall not be read without regard to r.65(5) of the DMPR1980. The three provisions must, in my view, be read together, as elaborated in para [38] of the said Grounds. [20] In light of the opportunity now presented, I do not think I do any injustice to the parties before me by adumbrating the sequence of steps a registrar ought to take in the circumstances of an investigation under r.65(5) of the DMPR1980, having regard to the analysis I have undertaken of the questions posed:

Firstly, it must of course be an application for ancillary relief as defined by the DMPR1980;

The registrar must identify the principles or the conditions in respect of that particular ancillary relief sought for. In the context that an order for variation is sought for, he must identify which of the three grounds under ss. 83 and 96 of the LRA1976 applies. He shall thereafter identify the relief sought for;

The investigation must then be conducted along that particular pathway identified, to “investigate the allegations made in support of and in answer to the application”;

What the registrar must do next depends on the nature of the relief sought for. This is the dilemma I attempted to describe in the said Grounds. If there is no issue of financial relief, then an order must be given by the registrar, pursuant to r.66(1) of the DMPR1980;

If accompanying the reliefs sought for there is a prayer touching financial reliefs, then the registrar shall formulate a report, touching not only the outcome of investigation, but containing among others, his opinion as to the estimate of financial relief and other relief the applicant is entitled to. This is where the other issue emerges, a proper opinion would not have been reached without investigating matters other that those alleged in the application and the reply thereto. On the contrary, to be able to issue a comprehensive opinion renders inevitable the reading of r.67(2) of the DMPR1980 in isolation from the other preceding provisions – including one which confers power upon registrar to investigate, r.65(5) of the DMPR1980. [21] The above flow, as mentioned earlier, is subject of scrutinization following the matter being referred to the Honourable Judge. [22] This concludes my Supplemental Grounds. I now leave it to the parties to submit thereon, and to Her Ladyship the Honourable Judge presiding in Family Division 2 to make any order/rulings in respect of the Questions posed in the said Grounds as well as the issues stated herein. Date: 18th June 2026 (HENRY HO YIT YAO) Senior Assistant Registrar High Court of Malaya Shah Alam (Family Division 1) Counsels:- For the Petitioner Husband:- Sheni Casinathan and Chris Chin Shang Yoon (Tan Han Rui with them) of Messrs. Jailani & Sheni Advocates & Solicitors No. 236C, Jalan Bandar 13 Taman Melawati 53100 Kuala Lumpur. For the Petitioner Wife:- Srividhya Ganapathy of Messrs. Muhendaran Sri Advocates & Solicitors The Zhongshan Building, 84A Jalan Rotan Off Jalan Kampung Attap 50460 Kuala Lumpur.