Abdul Aziz Bin Ibrahim v Etiqa General Insurance Berhad (DA-25-2-04/2020)

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI KOTA BHARU DALAM NEGERI KELANTAN DARUL NAIM, MALAYSIA PERMOHONAN BAGI SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO: DA-25-2-04/2020 Dalam Perkara mengenai Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia Kes No: 1/1- 2072/19. Keputusan No: 189 Tahun 2020. Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia No. Kes 30(15)(11)/4-1865/18, Keputusan No: 1885 Tahun 2019. Dan Mengenai perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. Antara ABDUL AZIZ BIN IBRAHIM …Pemohon Dan ETIQA GENERAL INSURANCE BERHAD …Responden ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Kes ini melibatkan satu permohonan Semakan Kehakiman oleh Pemohon (Pem) menurut A53 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) untuk membatalkan keputusan Mahkamah Perusahaan (MP) di Kuala Lumpur bertarikh 21/1/2020 melalui Award Mahkamah Perusahaan No. 189 Tahun 2020 dan Award No. 1885 tahun 2019. [2] Kertas-kertas kausa berkaitan permohonan ini adalah seperti berikut:

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(ii) Pernyataan yang difailkan menurut Aturan 53, Kaedah 3(2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 bertarikh 18/4/2020 (“Pernyataan Menurut Aturan 53”);

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(iii) Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Abdul Aziz Bin Ibrahim pada 17/3/2020 (“Afidavit Sokongan”);

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(iv) Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan oleh Pemohon pada 28/4/2021 (“Afidavit Tambahan Pertama”);

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(vi) Afidavit Balasan Pemohon yang diikrarkan oleh Pemohon pada 2/8/2021 (“Afidavit Balasan”);

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(vii) Afidavit Tambahan kepada Afidavit Balasan Pemohon yang diikrarkan oleh Pemohon pada 23/8/2021 (“Afidavit Tambahan Kedua”); dan

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(viii) Afidavit Jawapan Kedua Responden yang diikrarkan oleh Rozima Binti Yahya pada 30/9/2021; Fakta Kes yang relevan [3] Fakta kes ini berbangkit dari satu pertikaian mengenai penamatan perkhidmatan ke atas Pem oleh Responden (Res) di mana satu rujukan telah dibuat oleh Menteri Sumber Manusia di bawah seksyen 20(3) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 (Akta 177). Kes tersebut telah didaftar di MP sebagai kes 30(15)(11)/4-1865/18 dan pada perbicaraan bertarikh 28/6/2019, pihak-pihak yang pada ketika tersebut hadir bersama peguam masing-masing telahpun bersetuju untuk menyelesaikan pertikaian mengenai penamatan perkhidmatan tersebut secara damai di luar Mahkamah. Ia tertakluk kepada terma-terma yang dipersetujui secara bersama-sama oleh kedua-dua pihak. [4] Berdasarkan kepada persetujuan tersebut, Pengerusi MP pada ketika itu iaitu Tuan Paramalingam a/l J. Doraisamy telah melalui Award Pembatalan Kes, membatalkan pertikaian mengenai penamatan perkhidmatan tersebut tanpa sebarang kebebasan untuk memfailkan semula. Award tersebut adalah didaftarkan sebagai Award No 1885 tahun 2019 (selepas ini akan dirujuk sebagai Award Pembatalan). [5] Bersandarkan kepada persetujuan ini, peguamcara Pem pada ketika itu iaitu TN Malini Vepaneswaran & Assoc telah mengemukakan surat bertarikh 11/7/2019 sepertimana yang diekshibitkan sebagai AABI-11AA yang mengemukakan terma persetujuan seperti berikut: 1) Without admission of liability, the Company will pay an ex-gratia sum of RM140,000 to the Claimant through his solicitors with the tax clearance form (compensation for loss of employment) within fourteen (14) days from 28.6.2019; 2) The Claimant solicitors will provide undertaking not to release the monies until tax clearance is obtained and pay whatever tax due directly to the Income Tax Department without reference to the Company; 3) The Company will convert the termination letter into resignation letter and provide the Claimant with a record of service letter; 4) All this are full and final of all claims; and 5) Both parties shall refrain from making any comments against each other. [6] Walaubagaimanapun pada 7/10/2019, Pem telah memfailkan Borang S bagi memohon agar satu Perintah Ketidakpatuhan di bawah seksyen 56 Akta 177 dan Peraturan 2A Peraturan Mahkamah Perusahaan 1967 (“PMP 1967”) dapat diberikan oleh MP terhadap Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank) dan Res. Alasan yang dikemukakan pada ketika itu adalah di atas kegagalan Maybank di dalam mematuhi peraturan serta perjanjian serta kegagalan syarikat menghormati keadilan asasi (“natural justice”) dan menuntut satu perbicaraan penuh dilaksanakan. [7] Borang S tersebut telah didaftarkan di MP sebagai kes nombor 1/1- 2072/19 dan ianya didengar di hadapan Tuan Eddie Yeo Soon di samping panel pekerja iaitu Encik Alfred a/l Ituthiarajoo dan panel majikan iaitu Puan Anita Selvi a/p L. Selvaraju. Panel MP setelah mengambilkira keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh Pem dan Res serta mengambilkira seksyen 30(5) Akta 177, iaitu untuk bertindak mengikut ekuiti, perasaan hati nurani dan merit kes yang substantial tanpa memikirkan kepada perkara-perkara teknikal berbentuk undang-undang, telah sebulat suara menolak permohonan Pem. Keputusan tersebut didaftarkan sebagai Award No 189 tahun 2020 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Award Ketidakpatuhan). Prinsip perundangan berkaitan Semakan Kehakiman [8] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan Semakan Kehakiman adalah mantap dan telah diperbincangkan di dalam beberapa kes. Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147, di dalam menerangkan berkaitan Semakan Kehakiman menyatakan: "It is often said that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but the decision-making process. (See, eg, Chief Constable of North Wales v. Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155). This proposition, at full face value, may well convey the impression that the jurisdiction of the Courts in judicial review proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved party has not received fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. Put differently, in the words of Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety. But, Lord Diplock's other grounds for impugning a decision susceptible to judicial review makes it abundantly clear that such a decision is also open to challenge on grounds of 'illegality' and 'irrationality' and, in practice, this permits the Courts to scrutinise such decisions not only for process, but also for substance. In this context it is useful to note how Lord Diplock defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality and

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(iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By 'illegality' as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that Judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the Courts' exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of irrationality as a ground for a Court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decisionmaker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned 'proportionality' as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development." [9] Manakala skop serta fungsi Mahkamah ini di dalam mengendalikan permohonan Semakan Kehakiman telah disentuh oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Ranjit Kaur S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 8 CLJ 629, di mana Hakim Raus Sharif HMP (pada ketika itu) telah menyatakan: "[15] Historically, judicial review was only concerned with the decision-making process where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety. However, over the years, our courts have made inroads into this field of administrative law. Rama Chandran is the mother of all those cases. The Federal Court in a landmark decision has held that the decision of inferior tribunals may be reviewed on the grounds of "illegality", "irrationality" and possibly "proportionality" which permits the courts to scrutinise the decision not only for process but also for substance. It allowed the courts to go into the merit of the matter. Thus, the distinction between review and appeal no longer holds. [16] The Rama Chandran decision has been regarded or interpreted as giving the reviewing court a license to review without restrain decisions for substance even when the said decision is based on finding of facts. However, post Rama Chandran cases have applied some brakes to the courts' liberal approach in Rama Chandran. The Federal Court in the case of KumpuIan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v. Zaid Mohd Noh [1997] 2 CLJ 11 after affirming the Rama Chandran decision held that there may be cases in which for reason of public policy, national interest, public safety or national security the principle in Rama Chandran may be wholly inappropriate. [17] The Federal Court, in Petroliam National Bhd v. Nik Ramli Nik Hassan [2003] 4 CLJ 625, again held that the reviewing court may scrutinise a decision on its merits but only in the most appropriate of cases and not every case is amenable to the Rama Chandran approach. Further, it was held that a reviewing judge ought not to disturb findings of the Industrial Court unless they were grounded on illegality or plain irrationality, even where the reviewing judge might not have come to the same conclusion. [18] The Court of Appeal has in a number of cases held that where finding of facts by the Industrial Court are based on the credibility of witnesses, those findings should not be reviewed (see William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. S Balasingam [1997] 3 CLJ 235, National Union of Plantation Workers v. Kumpulan Jerai Sdn Bhd (Rengam) [2000] 1 CLJ 681, Quah Swee Khoon v. Sime Darby Bhd [2001] 1 CLJ 9, Colgate Palmolive (M) Sdn Bhd v. Yap Kok Foong & Another Appeal [2001] 3 CLJ 9. However, there are exceptions to this restrictive principle where:

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(2) In a proceeding before the Court on a reference to the Court under subsection 20(3), no evidence shall be given of any proceeding before the Director General under subsection 20(2) other than a written statement in relation thereto agreed to and signed by the parties to the reference.

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(3) No evidence shall be given in proceedings before the Court with regard to any offer relating to any matter connected with the trade dispute made without prejudice by any person or trade union except with the consent of that person or trade union.

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(4) The exclusion specified in subsections (1), (2) and (3) shall also be applicable in any proceedings before any other court.” [18] Mahkamah telah meneliti Nota Prosiding Award 1885 tahun 2019 yang merupakan Award Pembatalan dan mendapati bahawa Pem hadir di hadapan Tuan Pengerusi MP semasa award tersebut diberikan Bersama-sama dengan peguamnya iaitu Ms Malini Vepaneswaran. Award tersebut direkodkan seperti berikut: 1) This reference was called up for mention on 28th June 2019 in the presence of Ms. Malini Vepaneswaran, Counsel for the Claimant, and Dato’ T. Thavalingam (Ms. Shivani Sothirachagan together with him), Consel for the Company. The Claimant as well as the Company’s representative, i.e. Mr. Looi Heong Meng (Head of IR & Governance, Maybank Group) were also present in Court. 2) Both the Claimant and the Company have indicated to the Court that parties have amicably resolved this matter upon terms agreed between themselves. 3) In view of the fact that the matter has been amicably resolved, the Court hereby strikes out the case with no liberty to file afresh. [19] Pada pandangan Mahkamah, seksyen 54 Akta 177 tersebut bukanlah bermaksud bahawa sebelum ada sesuatu penyelesaian sepertimana di dalam kes ini, perlu ada satu Memorandum Persetujuan terlebih dahulu ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua pihak. Apa yang dinyatakan di dalam peruntukan tersebut adalah untuk kebolehterimaan kenyataan bertulis sebarang persetujuan di dalam sesuatu perundingan atau prosiding conciliation. [20] Di dalam kes Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan Dunlop Malaysia v DMIB Bhd [2002] 3 CLJ 706, isu berkenaan surat menyurat pihak-pihak telah disentuh oleh Mahkamah Rayuan seperti berikut: “Before the learned judicial commissioner and before us the learned counsel for the union argued that the Industrial Court was wrong in admitting the letters contrary to the mandatory requirements of sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 54 of the Act as they relate to negotiation or conciliation proceedings or offer relating to a matter connected with the trade dispute. The relevant provisions read: 54(1) Where a trade dispute relates to matters as to which negotiation or conciliation proceedings have taken place under this Act, no evidence shall be given in the proceedings before the Court as to such negotiation or conciliation proceedings other than a written statement in relation thereto agreed to and signed by the parties to the dispute.

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(2)...

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(3) No evidence shall be given in proceedings before the Court with regard to any offer relating to any matter connected with the trade dispute made without prejudice by an person or trade union except with the consent of that person or trade union. Having perused sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 54 we do not agree with the view of the learned judicial commissioner that the learned chairman of the Industrial Court was correct when he observed that the letters were not written during the negotiation to which this trade dispute relates. Certainly some of the letters including the letter of understanding dated 5 September 1994, do make a reference to the statement that both parties shall jointly refer the matter of "rota work system" to the Industrial Court. But having said that, we, however, agree with the learned judicial commissioner when he held that the Industrial Court had properly admitted the documents. These documents show that the terms referred therein had already been made firm and had been agreed to and were actual written agreements between the parties (see Appeal Record Vol 2, and 396 to 418) and thus, they are not caught by sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 54 of the Act, which merely exclude evidence of any negotiations, conciliations or offers made without the other party's agreement. We also agree with the learned judicial commissioner that it is pertinent to note that the two letters complained of were not even relied on by the Industrial Court as the basis of the award.” [21] Perkara berkaitan Memorandum Persetujuan ini turut dibangkitkan oleh Pem semasa pendengaran Permohonan Perintah Ketidakpatuhan. Di dalam Award Ketidakpatuhannya, MP telah menyatakan: “Mahkamah mendapati Pengadu tidak dapat menunjukkan ketidakpatuhan dalam mana-mana terma persetujuan yang dicapai oleh kedua-dua pihak. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti terma persetujuan yang direkodkan oleh Pengerusi dalam Nota Prosiding untuk dibaca bersama No. Award 1885/2019. Berkenaan dengan hujah Peguam Pengadu untuk kes ini dibicarakan, Mahkamah ini tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa dalam Akta Perhubungan Perusahan 1967 khususnya dalam peruntukan ketidakpatuhan dalam seksyen 56. Mahkamah terikat dengan perintah yang kes ini dibatalkan tanpa kebebasan untuk difailkan.” [22] Selanjutnya Pemohon menyatakan bahawa terdapat kekeliruan serta percanggahan di dalam terma-terma yang dipersetujui sedangkan peguamnya ketika itu melalui surat bertarikh 11/7/2019 hanya mengemukakan terma-terma cadangan. Tindakan Pem kini adalah untuk meletakkan bebanan tersebut kepada peguamnya ketika itu sedangkan tiada sebarang keterangan sokongan yang dikemukakan termasuk apa-apa afidavit dari peguam terdahulu bagi menyokong dakwaannya. [23] Mahkamah oleh itu berpendirian bahawa ini bukanlah asas bagi Mahkamah ini untuk merumuskan wujudnya sebarang ketidakpatuhan prosedur di pihak MP. Persetujuan yang telah dimasuki oleh Pem dan Res melalui peguam adalah suatu yang merupakan privi di antara kedua pihak tersebut dan jika wujud sebarang pertikaian ianya bukanlah merupakan satu merit bagi permohonan ini. [24] Mahkamah Tinggi di dalam kes Shining Crest Sdn Bhd & ors v Malaysia Building Society Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 342 telah menyentuh isu berkaitan privy di antara peguam dan anakguam seperti berikut: “[56] Further, in absence of making any credible pleading on fraud against the defendant, the plaintiffs could not now seek to impugn the validity of the Consent Judgment on the allegation that the plaintiffs' previous solicitor had no mandate to enter the Consent Judgment. [57] On the contrary, it is not an inaccurate a statement to make that it is fairly well settled that lack of mandate of the lawyer is not a valid ground to have a consent judgment set aside. The English Court of Appeal has held to such effect in Waugh v. Hb Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] CH 374, as follows:- "The law has become well established that the solicitor or counsel retained in an action has an implied authority as between himself and his client to compromise the suit without reference to the client.... Thus, counsel's alleged lack of authority is invariably never a ground to set aside a consent order or a contract. Any injustice suffered by the client could be resolved in the context of a claim against his counsel". [58] Similarly in our jurisdiction, it has been held by the High Court in Lee Teng Siong v. Lee Geok Thye Holdings Sdn Bhd [2003] 4 CLJ 834 that a counsel's lack of mandate would not be a valid ground to set aside a consent order. The following key passages from the judgment of Vincent Ng J are instructive: - "The applicants' complaint of alleged lack of authority of their counsel and solicitor is without substance, as there is no affidavit from their counsel, solicitor, respondent or other contributories as to the lack of or for misapprehension of his authority. (See Lewis v. Lewis (890) 45 Ch D 281.) And, the fact that negotiation took place over a period of three days clearly showed that all the contributories had authorised their counsel and solicitor to negotiate and conclude a settlement. Counsel and solicitor in the ordinary course of their retainer have the power to enter into compromise or settle disputes. (See Sourendra Nath Mitra and Others v. Tarubala Dasi [1930] 57 Indian Appeals 133 at pp. 138, 139-140, 141, 142 per Lord Atkin; Teh Eok Kee & Anor v. Tan Chiah Hock & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 227.) In the course of his judgment in Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd [1982] Ch. 374, Brightman LJ reviewed a number of the authorities referred to in the foregoing discussion on implied authority and said this (at p. 387): The law has become well established that the solicitor or counsel retained in an action has an implied authority as between himself and his client to compromise the suit without reference to the client, provided that the compromise does not involve matters 'collateral to the action'; and ostensible authority, as between himself and the opposing litigant to compromise the suit without actual proof of authority, subject to the same limitation... Thus, counsel's alleged lack of authority is invariably never a ground to set aside a consent order or a contract. Any injustice suffered by the client could be resolved in the context of a claim against his counsel. (See Waugh v. H.B. Clifford & Sons Ltd (supra); Leow Seng Huat v. Low Mui Yein [1996] 2 BLJ 466.) There is no obligation to prove express authority. A solicitor or counsel by implication had authority to compromise. The petitioner and the court, are entitled to assume the existence of authority when the lack of authority is not specifically brought to the attention of the petitioner or the court at that material time".” [25] Pem di dalam hujahan lanjutnya turut mempertikaikan Award Ketidakpatuhan dengan menyatakan bahawa MP telah memberi pertimbangan yang salah ke atas seksyen 56 Akta 177. [26] Bagi menimbang isu ini, Mahkamah telah meneliti Award Ketidakpatuhan tersebut dan mendapati Yang Dipertua Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia yang mempengerusikan panel MP tersebut, telah dengan tuntasnya merujuk kepada keputusan MP di dalam kes Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perkilangan Perusahaan Makanan v Gold Coin Specialities Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 ILR 260 yang telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Holiday Inn, Kuala Lumpur v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers [1988] 1 CLJ 133 berkenaan seksyen 56 Akta 177 seperti berikut: “Now, s. 56 is concerned with the enforcement in a summary manner of an award made by the Industrial Court or of a Collective Agreement which has been taken cognizance of by the Court under s. 17 after a complaint has been lodged as to its non-compliance. The non-compliance of a term of the award or Collective Agreement must exist as an antecedent fact before the Industrial Court can exercise its powers contained in sub-section (2) therefore. It is therefore a condition precedent that there should be in existence a breach or non-observance of a term of the award or Collective Agreement. This must be satisfactorily established by the complainant.” [27] Mahkamah merumuskan bahawa MP telah merujuk kepada nas yang lazim serta mengaplikasinya dengan tepat di dalam memerintahkan Award Ketidakpatuhan tersebut secara khususnya berkaitan seksyen 56 Akta 177 tersebut. Mahkamah tidak dapat melihat bagaimana pendekatan yang digunapakai oleh YDP MP ini boleh dikatakan terkhilaf. [28] Malahan bagi Mahkamah, MP telah mengambil pendekatan yang berhati-hati serta berhemah dengan merujuk kepada Nota Prosiding yang menunjukkan terma-terma persetujuan di antara pihak di dalam meyelesaikan pertikaian ini secara penuh. Mahkamah turut di peringkat ini menegaskan bahawa persetujuan ini adalah selari dengan surat yang telah dikeluarkan oleh peguam Pem kepada pihak Res. Ini mengukuhkan dapatan dan rumusan MP di dalam kedua-dua award tersebut. [29] Selanjutnya Mahkamah turut mempertimbangkan bahawa MP sebagai sebuah badan berkanun (statutory body) yang diwujudkan melalui satu peruntukan perundangan yang mana kuasanya terhad oleh peruntukan undang-undang (rujuk kes Federal Hotel Sdn Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1983] CLJ Rep 150). [30] Oleh itu keputusan MP di dalam kedua-dua award adalah dibuat berdasarkan bidangkuasa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Akta 177. Mahkamah tidak nampak di bahagian mana MP telah melakukan sebarang tindakan yang melampaui bidangkuasa statutorinya. Pem di dalam afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan tidak berjaya menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah di dalam mana-mana keadaan MP boleh dikatakan telah bertindak sedemikian. [31] Akhirnya, Mahkamah turut ini menyentuh berkenaan tindakan Pem yang bertukar-tukar pendirian ataupun bersikap aprobat dan reprobat berkenaan persetujuan yang telah dimasuki. Ini dapat diperhatikan melalui tindakan Pem yang telah menerima bayaran penyelesaian namun kini mengambil tindakan mempertikaikan pula persetujuan tersebut. Bagi Mahkamah pendirian seperti ini tidak wajar diberi pengiktirafan apatah lagi membenarkan ianya digunakan oleh pihak yang berlitigasi. [32] Mahkamah mengambil pendirian ini berdasarkan nas-nas duluan dan antaranya sepertimana yang telah diputuskan di dalam kes Konsortium Lebuhraya Utara-Timur (KL) Sdn Bhd v. Liew Choong Kin [2018] 6 CLJ 217 seperti berikut; "Based on the above actual facts, the respondent could be said to be taking a different stance before the court in this action and under the law he was not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that he adopts. The learned judge failed to consider that the respondent's claim for trespass and the claim he had already made at the second enquiry arose from the same facts. He should accordingly be estopped from commencing this action. The respondent having made a choice at the second enquiry could be treated as having made an election from which position he should not be allowed to abandon. He had taken a benefit arising out of the course of conduct which he had pursued earlier and with which his subsequent conduct was inconsistent with his election." [33] Perkara yang sama telah ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Kelana Megah Development Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Another Appeal [2016] 8 CLJ 804 telah menyatakan: "[20] The appellant's conduct as described hereinbefore is plainly inconsistent and contradictory. The alleged rights pursued and relief sought through the present action are remarkably inconsistent with and contradict the right pursued and relief sought in the land references.... The appellant's conduct, as it were, could thus be properly described as blowing hot and cold that while the appellant approved the acquisitions they also rejected it. The appellant is not permitted to approbate and reprobate on the issue of the acquisition of the seven plots of land. ... [22] Further, in Cheah Theam Kheng v. City Centre Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Other Appeals [2012] 2 CLJ 16; [2012] 1 MLJ 761, this court cited with approval the English case of Express Newspaper plc v. News (UK) Ltd and Others [1990] 3 AII ER 376 wherein it was stated: In the words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspaper plc v. News (UK) Ltd and others [1990] 3 AII ER 376, at pp. 383-384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is no possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitudes towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance. (emphasis added) [23] The decision of this court in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v. Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 CLJ 491; [2011] 1 MLJ 752 is also instructive. We reproduce the relevant excerpts below: Estoppel by election is related to the principle that a person may not approbate and reprobate (Lissenden v. CAV Bosch, Limited [1940] AC 412 p 478; [1940] 1 All ER 425 at p 418 at p 429 (HL)). Thus, a person having a choice between two courses of conduct is to be treated as having made an election from which he cannot resile. But the person will not be regarded as having so elected unless he has taken a benefit under or a raising out of the course of conduct which he has first pursued and with which his subsequent conduct is inconsistent with his election. (Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) v. Kindersley and another [1951] Ch 112 at pp 119-120; [1950] 2 All ER 549 at p 552 (CA); Ex parte Robertson, In re Morton [1875] LR 20 Eq 733; and Evans v. Bartlam)... If person is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights, as opposed to having a choice between two alternative remedies (United Australia, Limited v. Barclays Bank, Limited [1941] AC 1 at p 29; [1940] 4 All ER 20 at p 37 (HL)) and, with an open mind and with full knowledge he does an unequivocal act showing that he has chosen one, he cannot afterwards pursue the other (Slough Estates Ltd v. Slough Borough Council and another (No 2)[1969] 2 Ch 305; [1969] 2 All ER 988 (CA))." [34] Isu aprobat dan reprobat turut disentuh oleh Mahkamah Agung India di dalam kes R.N Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR [1993] SC 352 seperti berikut: "Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that "a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage. Kesimpulan [35] Bersandarkan kepada pertimbangan-pertimbangan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa Pem telah gagal untuk menunjuk kepada Mahkamah sebarang kewujudan elemen ketidaksahan (“illegality”), ketidakrasionalan (“irrationality”) atau kesalahan prosedur (“procedural impropriety”) di dalam Award Pembatalan dan Award Ketidakpatuhan. [36] Oleh yang demikian, permohonan Semakan Kehakiman sepertimana di K1 adalah ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM 10,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Bertarikh: 27hb Julai, 2022 (DATUK MOHAMAD ABAZAFREE BIN MOHD ABBAS) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi (2) Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Pihak-pihak: Bagi Pihak Pemohon: Encik Mohd Ilias Mohd Nor Tetuan Mohd Ilias & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara 3535-B, Tingkat 1, Jalan Kuala Krai 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi Pihak Responden: Farah Dini Zaini Tetuan T.Thavalingam & Co. Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite K-3-11, Level Solaris No. 2, Jalan Solaris Solaris Mont’ Kiara 50480 Kuala Lumpur. Tarikh Bicara : 13hb. April, 2022 Tarikh Keputusan : 15hb. Jun, 2022 Perundangan Yang Dirujuk:  Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012  Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967  Peraturan Mahkamah Perusahaan 1967 Kes-Kes Yang Dirujuk:  R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147  Ranjit Kaur S Gopal Singh v. Hotel Excelsior (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 8 CLJ 629  Sunway University College v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia [2019] 7 CLJ 55  Paul Raj Chelladurai v Jabatan Telekom (M) Bhd & ors [2000] 4 CLJ 882  Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perusahaan Dunlop Malaysia v DMIB Bhd [2002] 3 CLJ 706  Shining Crest Sdn Bhd & ors v Malaysia Building Society Berhad [2018] 1 LNS 342  Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja Perkilangan Perusahaan Makanan v Gold Coin Specialities Sdn Bhd [2017] 2 ILR 260  Holiday Inn, Kuala Lumpur v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers [1988] 1 CLJ 133  Federal Hotel Sdn Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1983] CLJ Rep 150  Konsortium Lebuhraya Utara-Timur (KL) Sdn Bhd v. Liew Choong Kin [2018] 6 CLJ 217  Kelana Megah Development Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Another Appeal [2016] 8 CLJ 804  R.N Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, AIR [1993] SC 352