Abdul Gaffar Bin Abdul Malick v Nurulhuda Binti Husaini (WA-24NCvC-6229-12/2025)

This is my decision on the Plaintiff's Originating Summons ("OS") dated 21.12.2025 filed pursuant to Sections 52, 54, 55 and 58 of the Mental Health Act 2001 ("MHA 2001"). The Plaintiff seeks an order that the Defendant, his wife, be subjected to a psychiatric inquiry on the basis that she is mentally disordered and incapable of managing herself and her affairs.

The OS is supported by the Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support (Encl. 2) affirmed on 19.12.2025, which sets out a detailed chronology of alleged incidents from early 2024 to December 2025. The Plaintiff relies on police reports, photographs, medical documents, counselling notes, and various communications to substantiate his allegations.

The Defendant opposes the OS. She denies the allegations, asserts that the Plaintiff is the aggressor, and contends that the OS is filed mala fide to gain advantage in ongoing Syariah matrimonial proceedings.

The record before me is extensive. It includes affidavits from both parties, affidavits from family members, affidavits from the Defendant's former husband, medical reports, police reports, counselling notes, and written submissions.

I have considered all materials carefully. I have also considered the statutory framework, the relevant case law, and the nature of the jurisdiction under the MHA 2001. Procedural History

The Plaintiff filed the OS on 21.12.2025 together with Encl. 2 (Affidavit in Support). The Defendant denied the allegations and asserting that the Plaintiff is the violent party. The Plaintiff filed his Affidavit in Reply (Encl. 13) and Affidavit in Reply (2) (Encl. 14), reiterating his allegations and annexing further police reports and photographs.

The Defendant filed her Affidavit in Reply (II) (Encl. 16), and later filed affidavits from her mother and brother (Encl. 20), supporting her narrative and contradicting the Plaintiff's allegations.

The Plaintiff relies on the Supplementary Affidavit of Mohd Nazry (Encl. 17), the Defendant's former husband, who alleges similar behavioural patterns during their marriage. Factual Background

The Plaintiff and Defendant are legally married, having solemnised their marriage on 15.8.2019. Their union has produced three young children, namely Abdul Azeez (born 2020), Abdul Rahman (born 2022), and Abdul Raheem (born 2023).

The Defendant also has an older son, Muhammad Aqil Nazmi, from her previous marriage. All four children lived together with the parties throughout the material period.

Following the marriage, the parties resided as a family at Conezion Residences, Putrajaya, together with the children and a domestic helper. In mid-2025, the family relocated to a second matrimonial home at Presint 14, Putrajaya, where the events described in the affidavits continued to unfold.

The Plaintiff describes the early years of the marriage as harmonious and asserts that behavioural changes in the Defendant began to manifest after the birth of their third child. The Defendant disputes this characterisation, alleging instead that the deterioration of the relationship stemmed from the Plaintiff's conduct. These competing narratives form the backdrop against which the present application is brought.

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant began exhibiting symptoms of mental disorder after the birth of their third child. He alleges impulsivity, emotional instability, aggression, manipulation, hallucinations, and refusal to seek psychiatric treatment.

He alleges multiple incidents of violence, including:

(a) hitting the children (18.1.2025);

(b) hitting him (18.1.2025);

(c) slapping him in a moving car (17.9.2025);

(d) threatening him;

(e) manipulating narratives.

He alleges that the Defendant caused injuries to the children, including head injuries, eye injuries, and ear bruises. He alleges that the Defendant prevented him from entering the matrimonial home and denied him access to the children. He alleges that the Defendant made false police reports against him.

He alleges that the Defendant manipulated the domestic helper to give false statements. He alleges that the Defendant sent long, emotionally charged WhatsApp messages containing accusations, threats, and insults. He alleges that the Defendant has refused psychiatric treatment despite multiple attempts to persuade her.

The Plaintiff relies on several documents which he contends demonstrate the existence of an underlying mental disorder in the Defendant. These include:

(a) the "90 Days Cell Wellbeing Report" dated 14.2.2024 (AG-16);

(b) blood test results issued on 15.2.2024 (AG-17);

(c) counselling notes prepared by relationship counsellor Sharan Kaur on 10.5.2025 (AG-18);

(d) a referral letter issued by Dr Nur Nadiah of Klinik Kesihatan Putrajaya on 30 September 2025 (AG-19), and

(e) a memo from Hospital Putrajaya dated 18 December 2025 (AG-20).

The Plaintiff asserts that these documents collectively indicate abnormalities in the Defendant's emotional regulation and behaviour. Based on these materials, the Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant exhibits symptoms consistent with borderline personality disorder (BPD), Intermittent Explosive Disorder (IED), and broader emotional dysregulation, including difficulties with impulse control and heightened reactivity during interpersonal conflict. He further contends that certain physiological findings in the blood test results may correlate with impaired mood stability or cognitive functioning.

The Plaintiff therefore asserts that the Defendant's behavioural patterns as reflected in the chronology of incidents set out in his affidavit render her unsafe, unpredictable, and ultimately incapable of managing herself and her affairs without psychiatric intervention. He argues that the Court should compel a formal psychiatric assessment to safeguard both the Defendant and the children.

The Defendant denies each and every allegation made against her. She maintains that the Plaintiff's narrative is inaccurate, exaggerated, and driven by ulterior motives rather than genuine concern for her mental health.

The Defendant asserts that, contrary to the Plaintiff's portrayal, it was the Plaintiff who frequently displayed aggressive behaviour during the marriage. She alleges that several incidents of domestic conflict arose from the Plaintiff's own conduct, and that she has been the one protecting the children from his volatility.

The Defendant further states that the Plaintiff voluntarily distanced himself from the family and eventually abandoned the household. She contends that his absence was not due to fear of her behaviour, but due to his own personal and financial difficulties.

The Defendant's position is that the present OS is a strategic attempt by the Plaintiff to gain leverage in ongoing Syariah matrimonial proceedings, particularly in relation to custody and access. She argues that the Plaintiff is attempting to recast a marital dispute as a mental health issue to obtain a legal advantage.

The Defendant also highlights that the Plaintiff's business had recently encountered financial strain, and she believes this has contributed to his decision to initiate the present proceedings. In her view, the OS is motivated by stress, frustration, and an attempt to shift responsibility rather than by any genuine medical basis.

The Defendant states that the Plaintiff has not visited the children for several months, despite having every opportunity to do so. She asserts that his absence contradicts his claim of concern for their safety and wellbeing.

The Defendant further asserts that the Plaintiff has not provided maintenance for the children during the period of separation. She contends that this omission undermines the Plaintiff's credibility and his professed intention to protect the family.

The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff's allegations are fabricated or distorted, and that many incidents have been taken out of context or mischaracterised to portray her negatively.

Finally, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's medical evidence is misconceived. She asserts that the documents relied upon including nutritional scans, blood tests, counselling notes, and referral memos are not psychiatric assessments and do not constitute any formal diagnosis of mental disorder. She maintains that the Plaintiff has misinterpreted these materials and presented them as clinical proof when they are not.

The Court must also remain cautious about the dangers of premature psychiatric labelling. A diagnosis of mental disorder carries profound personal, social, and legal implications. It is not a label to be affixed based on interpersonal conflict, subjective impressions, or layperson interpretations of behaviour.

Psychiatric diagnosis is a specialised medical process requiring clinical examination, structured assessment, and adherence to recognised diagnostic criteria. Without such foundation, the Court cannot and will not treat behavioural allegations as psychiatric illness.

Section 52(1) of the Mental Health Act 2001 confers jurisdiction on the Court to order an inquiry only where the applicant first establishes a prima facie case that the subject person is (a) mentally disordered, and (b) as a consequence of such disorder, incapable of managing herself and her affairs. Both elements must be satisfied before the Court may consider invoking its inquiry powers.

The Court of Appeal in Tan Poh Lee v Tan Kim Choo [2018] MLRAU 277 clarified that the prima facie threshold is not a mere formality. The applicant must place before the Court credible material capable of showing that the allegation of mental disorder is "potentially true". Bare assertions, suspicions, or subjective interpretations of behaviour are insufficient.

It was held in the said case: In determining whether there was a prima facie case, the learned Judge rightly held that there must be allegation that a person is mentally disordered in the application for inquiry and the court has a duty to determine whether the allegation is potentially true. The learned Judge then proceeded to maintain his position that it cannot be simply a case that, once the allegation is made, the inquiry is ordered at once. Otherwise according to the trial Judge, it would be far too easy for anyone to request for an inquiry just by asserting that a person is mentally disordered. We are in agreement with the learned Judge that, at this stage the Court should ascertain whether there is substance to substantiate the allegation in the first place. The question then is what is the degree or standard that is required of the Plaintiffs at this stage, in proving the allegation that a person is mentally disordered? The learned Judge accepted the contention that the degree or standard required is only a prima facie case. Thus at the stage where the application is filed, it does not require that a person is conclusively proven to be mentally disordered. We have no difficulty in accepting the above legal position and the step undertaken by the learned trial Judge, thus far.

In Ng Pik Lian v Tai May Chean [2022] 1 MLRA 314, the Court of Appeal further affirmed that, at this preliminary stage, the Court is entitled to consider rebuttal evidence filed by the respondent. The inquiry mechanism is not triggered automatically upon allegation; the Court must be satisfied that the evidential threshold is met even after weighing the respondent's explanation.

The jurisprudence on s.52 of the Mental Health Act 2001 ("MHA") establishes that an application under this provision involves a structured, two-tier process. At the first tier, the applicant must demonstrate a prima facie case before the Court may consider ordering an inquiry.

The Court's task at this preliminary stage is to determine whether there is sufficient substance in the materials placed before it to show that the allegation of mental disorder is potentially true. It is not necessary nor is it appropriate for the Court to reach any conclusive finding on mental disorder at this stage.

Once a prima facie case is established, the matter proceeds to the second tier, namely the inquiry contemplated under s.52. In Tan Poh Lee v Tan Kim Choo (supra) and subsequently in Ng Pik Lian v Tai May Chean (supra), the Court of Appeal emphasised that the High Court must not collapse these two distinct stages into a single merits-based determination. The inquiry is the mechanism through which the Court gathers the necessary medical and factual evidence before considering any further orders under Part X of the MHA.

In the authorities, the appellate court found error where the High Court judge treated the leave stage as if it were a full hearing on the merits, and prematurely evaluated rebuttal evidence including medical reports before an inquiry had even been convened. This approach effectively short-circuited the statutory process and deprived the applicants of the inquiry that Parliament intended as the next procedural step once the prima facie threshold is met.

Accordingly, where a prima facie case is established, the Court should proceed to order an inquiry without embarking on a detailed assessment of rebuttal evidence. Such rebuttal evidence is properly considered only after the inquiry has been conducted, when the Court must decide whether to make any orders relating to the administration of the respondent's affairs.

While the statutory threshold is not set at an unduly high level, it is equally not intended to be invoked lightly. The Court must be satisfied that there is some medical or objectively verifiable basis for the allegation, and not merely a narrative arising from interpersonal conflict or emotional strain.

The Court must also remain vigilant to ensure that the MHA 2001 is not used as a litigation tool in the context of matrimonial disputes, custody disagreements, or domestic conflict. Mental health legislation carries serious implications, and its processes must not be triggered for collateral or strategic purposes.

The Mental Health Act 2001 is a specialised statutory framework intended to address situations involving genuine mental disorder and resulting incapacity. It is not a tool for untangling the knots of domestic discord. Matters such as marital disagreements, custody or access disputes, maintenance issues, or allegations of abuse and manipulation fall within other legal regimes and must be resolved through the proper matrimonial or criminal processes.

The MHA is designed to intervene only where mental disorder truly exists; it is not meant to serve as a net cast over the turbulence of a failing relationship. It is equally important to recognise that behavioural difficulties even those that appear serious, distressing, or disruptive within a family setting do not, without more, amount to mental disorder within the meaning of the Act.

Human relationships, particularly strained marital ones, often give rise to emotional volatility, impulsive reactions, or poor communication. Such behaviour, while regrettable, is not synonymous with psychiatric illness.

For the Court to invoke its powers under s.52, there must be medical evidence, or at least objectively verifiable indicators, pointing toward the existence of a mental disorder and its impact on the person's functional capacity.

The Court cannot rely on layperson interpretations of conduct, subjective fears, or personal assessments of temperament. The statutory threshold requires more than interpersonal conflict; it requires credible medical grounding. Issues For Determination

The issues are:

The Plaintiff is the Defendant's lawful husband. Their marriage, solemnised in August 2019, remains subsisting, and no decree of dissolution or annulment has been granted. The parties continue to be engaged in parallel proceedings before the Syariah Court concerning matrimonial issues, but those proceedings have not yet reached any final determination.

In this context, the Plaintiff's relationship to the Defendant is not merely domestic but legal in nature. As a spouse who shares parental responsibilities for three young children and who remains directly affected by the Defendant's conduct as alleged, the Plaintiff falls squarely within the category of persons contemplated under the Mental Health Act 2001 who may seek the Court's intervention.

Section 52(3) of the MHA expressly recognises a spouse as a person withstanding to initiate an application for an inquiry. The statutory language is clear and does not require the spouse to demonstrate any additional threshold of proximity or dependency beyond the marital relationship itself.

In light of the subsisting marriage, the ongoing familial responsibilities, and the express wording of s.52(3), I am satisfied that the Plaintiff possesses the requisite locus standi to bring this application. Issue 2: Prima Facie Mental Disorder

Applications under s.52 must be anchored in medical evidence. The statutory framework presupposes that allegations of mental disorder will be supported by clinical material capable of demonstrating that the condition is potentially true.

Nutritional scans, blood tests, counselling notes, and hearsay referral memos do not satisfy this requirement. The Court cannot rely on inference, interpretation, or subjective narrative in place of psychiatric assessment. The absence of medical grounding is fatal to the Plaintiff's case.

The Plaintiff's case, as presented through Encl. 2 and the subsequent affidavits, is detailed, emotive, and reflects genuine distress. The chronology he sets out spans nearly two years and contains numerous allegations of conflict, aggression, and instability within the household.

Encl. 2 itself is lengthy and meticulously narrated. It catalogues a series of incidents which the Plaintiff believes demonstrate that the Defendant suffers from a mental disorder. The Court has read the affidavit in full and acknowledges the seriousness with which the Plaintiff views these events.

The allegations are indeed serious. They involve claims of physical altercations, strained parenting dynamics, emotional volatility, and difficulties in communication. Such allegations, if proven, would be troubling in any family setting.

However, the seriousness of allegations does not, in itself, amount to medical evidence. The statutory threshold under s.52 requires more than behavioural descriptions or subjective interpretations of conduct. It requires credible indicators of mental disorder supported by medical or clinical material.

In this regard, the Plaintiff has not produced any psychiatric report prepared by a qualified psychiatrist who has examined the Defendant. The Plaintiff has also not produced any psychological assessment conducted by a clinical psychologist or mental health professional trained to diagnose psychiatric conditions.

No formal diagnosis from a psychiatrist is before the Court. The Defendant has never been examined by a psychiatrist, and no mental health specialist has certified her as suffering from any psychiatric illness. There is likewise no mental status examination, which is the basic clinical tool used to assess thought processes, mood, cognition, and behaviour in psychiatric evaluation.

No document before the Court applies or even references the DSM-5 criteria, which is the internationally recognised diagnostic standard for mental disorders. The Plaintiff has not produced any psychiatric referral letter initiated by a doctor who personally examined the Defendant. The referral letter relied upon (AG-19) is based on the Plaintiff's own narrative rather than clinical observation.

There is no evidence of any psychiatric follow-up, appointment, or consultation involving the Defendant. There is no record of any psychiatric medication being prescribed to the Defendant at any time.

The medical materials relied upon by the Plaintiff are, in substance, non-psychiatric. They do not diagnose mental disorder, nor do they provide clinical findings that support such a diagnosis.

The Cell Wellbeing Report (AG-16) is a nutritional scan. It measures mineral levels and metabolic indicators. It does not assess mental health, does not involve psychiatric expertise, and does not purport to diagnose any psychiatric condition.

The blood test results (AG-17) are general health indicators. They relate to vitamin levels, kidney function, and insulin levels. They do not assess mood, cognition, or psychiatric functioning.

The counselling notes from Sharan Kaur (AG-18) are prepared by a relationship counsellor. While they reflect behavioural observations made during a counselling session, they do not constitute a psychiatric diagnosis and cannot be treated as such.

The nephrologist referred to in the Plaintiff's affidavit is a specialist in kidney function, not mental health. Any comments attributed to him regarding psychiatric conditions fall outside his area of expertise and cannot be relied upon as psychiatric evidence.

The referral letter (AG-19) issued by Dr Nur Nadiah appears to record information provided by the Plaintiff rather than any clinical assessment of the Defendant. It does not reflect a psychiatric diagnosis made by the doctor herself.

Similarly, the memo from Hospital Putrajaya (AG-20) records the Plaintiff's account of events and concerns. It does not contain any psychiatric findings or diagnosis based on examination of the Defendant. It is therefore not probative of mental disorder within the meaning of the MHA.

The Plaintiff's narrative is internally consistent: he genuinely believes that the Defendant suffers from a mental disorder; that her behaviour is dangerous; that she is incapable of managing herself and her affairs; and that she requires psychiatric intervention. He further believes that only a Court-ordered process under the MHA can compel her to obtain the treatment he considers necessary.

The Court does not doubt that the Plaintiff is genuinely concerned about the Defendant and the children. His fear and frustration are palpable in the way he has chosen to document the events. Nonetheless, the Court's duty is to evaluate the evidence objectively, not to adopt the emotional lens through which one party views the relationship. The legal test under s.52 must be applied dispassionately.

Analytically, the Plaintiff's allegations can be grouped into three broad categories:

(a) behavioural incidents involving arguments, anger, and alleged aggression;

(b) alleged injuries to the children, said to have arisen in the Defendant's care; and

(c) alleged medical indicators, comprising nutritional scans, blood tests, counselling notes, and referral documents.

Behavioural incidents even those that are serious, distressing, or repeated do not automatically equate to mental disorder. Human behaviour is complex, and strained marital relationships often produce extreme reactions on both sides. Domestic violence can occur in the absence of psychiatric illness.

Likewise, manipulation, anger, impulsivity, and emotional instability, while troubling, are not in themselves psychiatric diagnoses and cannot be treated as such without proper clinical assessment.

The Plaintiff's allegations of violence are strongly contested. The Defendant asserts that it is the Plaintiff who has been the aggressor. Her version is supported by affidavits from her mother and brother. The domestic helper's account is disputed. The affidavit of the Defendant's former husband is coloured by the history of their own failed marriage. In this evidential landscape, the Court is faced with competing narratives rather than clear, uncontested facts.

Where the factual matrix is contested in this way, the Court must look for objective indicators, particularly in the form of medical or clinical evidence, to support any allegation of mental disorder. In this case, the Plaintiff has not produced such objective psychiatric material.

The allegations of injuries to the children are undeniably serious and may well warrant attention from the relevant authorities in the context of criminal law or child protection. However, they do not, without more, constitute psychiatric evidence. They may speak to parenting practices, supervision, or domestic safety, but they are not determinative of mental disorder within the meaning of s.52 MHA.

Ultimately, the Plaintiff's medical evidence is the weakest part of his case. It is non-psychiatric in nature, largely hearsay in content, interpretive in tone, and not diagnostic in effect. It does not provide the kind of clinical foundation that the Court requires before it can be satisfied that a prima facie case of mental disorder has been made out under the Act.

(A) The Cell Wellbeing Report (AG-16)

The Plaintiff places considerable weight on the "90 Days Cell Wellbeing Report" dated 14.2.2024. He contends that the report reflects deficiencies in lithium, selenium, and sulphur, and interprets these nutritional findings as indicators of bipolar disorder or Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). In his view, these mineral patterns form an early scientific signal of underlying psychiatric illness.

Having examined the document, the Court finds that it is not a psychiatric assessment. It is, in substance, a nutritional scan designed to evaluate mineral and metabolic patterns. It does not diagnose mental illness, does not apply DSM-5 criteria, does not involve a psychiatrist, and does not include any mental status examination. The report operates in a different domain altogether one concerned with dietary optimisation rather than psychiatric evaluation.

The handwritten annotations appearing on the report such as "brain function", "mood", and "bipolar" are unexplained. They are not attributed to any medical practitioner, nor are they supported by clinical findings. They appear more like interpretive notes than professional conclusions. In the absence of authorship or medical grounding, such annotations cannot carry probative weight.

The Defendant's blood test results do not test for lithium, selenium, or sulphur deficiency. There is therefore no independent medical corroboration of the Plaintiff's interpretation. His attempt to draw psychiatric inferences from nutritional data is speculative. It is akin to reading shadows on a wall and treating them as clinical certainties.

For these reasons, the Cell Wellbeing Report cannot form the basis of a prima facie case under s.52 MHA. It does not provide any psychiatric foundation capable of supporting the allegation of mental disorder.

(B) The Blood Test (AG-17)

The Plaintiff also relies on the blood test results dated 15.2.2024, which record a vitamin D deficiency, elevated urine creatinine, and high serum insulin levels. He contends that these physiological findings support his belief that the Defendant suffers from an underlying psychiatric condition.

The Court finds that these results are general health indicators. They relate to metabolic function, nutritional status, and renal parameters. They do not diagnose mental disorder, nor do they suggest bipolar disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, or cognitive impairment. Nothing in the report connects these readings to psychiatric illness. They are part of the Defendant's physical health profile, not her mental health profile.

The Plaintiff's interpretation of these results is medically unsustainable. It attempts to draw psychiatric conclusions from data that have no psychiatric relevance. It is akin to trying to read the weather from a blood test the information simply does not speak to the issue he seeks to prove.

(C) Counselling Notes (AG-18)

The Plaintiff also relies on the counselling notes prepared by Sharan Kaur, a relationship counsellor who met with the parties during a period of marital strain. He contends that her observations support his belief that the Defendant suffers from a mental disorder.

The Court accepts that counsellors play an important role in assisting couples to navigate emotional and relational difficulties. However, a counsellor is not a psychiatrist. A counsellor cannot diagnose mental disorder, cannot prescribe psychiatric medication, and cannot conduct a mental status examination. Their professional remit lies in facilitating communication and emotional insight, not in making clinical determinations.

The observations recorded in the counselling notes are behavioural, not clinical. They describe interpersonal dynamics, emotional reactions, and communication patterns matters that commonly arise in troubled relationships.

They do not purport to identify psychiatric symptoms, apply DSM-5 criteria, or offer any form of diagnostic conclusion. They are, in essence, a snapshot of the parties' relational climate, not a window into psychiatric pathology.

For these reasons, the counselling notes cannot form the basis of a prima facie case under s.52 MHA. They are akin to a mirror reflecting the emotional turbulence of a marriage, not a medical instrument capable of detecting mental disorder. Their value lies in understanding the relationship, not in establishing psychiatric illness.

(D) Referral Letter (AG-19)

The Plaintiff also relies on a referral letter issued by Dr Nur Nadiah of Klinik Kesihatan Putrajaya. The letter contains a brief handwritten note stating: "Wife was dx with BPD, dx June 2025, prev under private psychiatrist (Dr Sharan Kaur)."

The Plaintiff treats this statement as confirmation that the Defendant had previously been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. The Court finds this statement to be problematic.

The note appears to be based entirely on the Plaintiff's narrative rather than on any psychiatric examination of the Defendant. It is not supported by a diagnosis from a psychiatrist, nor does it arise from any clinical assessment. In substance, it is hearsay. It reads less like a medical conclusion and more like a transcription of what the Plaintiff told the doctor a relay of information rather than a finding of fact.

The evidence before the Court is clear: the Defendant has never been examined by a psychiatrist; she has never been diagnosed with BPD by a psychiatrist; and she has never been prescribed psychiatric medication. There is no clinical record, no mental status examination, and no DSM-5 analysis to support the Plaintiff's assertion.

In these circumstances, the referral letter cannot form the basis of a prima facie case under s.52 MHA. It is akin to a signpost erected on hearsay pointing in a direction without any reliable foundation beneath it. Without clinical grounding, the letter carries no probative value in establishing mental disorder.

(E) Memo from Hospital Putrajaya (AG-20)

The Plaintiff further relies on a memo issued by Hospital Putrajaya which states, in brief terms: "Wife was diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder since 2023." He treats this statement as confirmation that the Defendant has a longstanding psychiatric diagnosis.

The Court finds that this statement suffers from the same evidential defect as the referral letter in AG-19. It appears to be based entirely on the Plaintiff's narrative rather than on any psychiatric examination of the Defendant.

There is no indication that the memo was prepared following a clinical assessment, nor does it reflect a diagnosis made by a psychiatrist. In substance, it is hearsay a repetition of what the Plaintiff reported, not a medical finding.

The memo therefore reflects the Plaintiff's account rather than any independent medical conclusion. It is not supported by clinical notes, mental status examination, DSM-5 analysis, or any record of psychiatric consultation. It stands as an echo of the Plaintiff's assertions rather than a voice of medical authority.

In these circumstances, the memo cannot form the basis of a prima facie case under s.52 MHA. It is akin to a document carried by the wind of allegation rather than anchored in clinical evidence. Without medical grounding, it carries no probative weight in establishing mental disorder.

(F) Summary of Medical Evidence

When viewed cumulatively, the Plaintiff's medical evidence suffers from several fundamental defects. It is:

(a) non-psychiatric in nature;

(b)hearsay, relying on second-hand assertions rather than clinical findings;

(c) interpretive, reflecting the Plaintiff's own conclusions rather than professional opinion;

(d) not diagnostic, offering no formal identification of mental disorder;

(e) unsupported by clinical findings; and

(f) unsupported by any psychiatric evaluation.

Taken together, the materials resemble pieces of a puzzle that do not belong to the picture the Plaintiff seeks to construct. The Plaintiff has not produced any psychiatric report prepared by a qualified psychiatrist. The Plaintiff has not produced any expert opinion capable of assisting the Court on the question of mental disorder.

The Plaintiff has not produced any mental status examination, which is the basic clinical instrument for assessing psychiatric functioning. He has not produced any DSM-5 analysis, the internationally recognised diagnostic framework for mental disorders. He has not produced any psychiatric referral initiated by a doctor who personally examined the Defendant. He has not produced any evidence of psychiatric follow-up, consultation, or treatment.

He has not produced any psychiatric medication record, nor any indication that the Defendant has ever been prescribed medication for mental illness. In truth, the evidential landscape is bare of psychiatric markers it is a path lined with signposts the Plaintiff has drawn himself, but without any clinical foundation beneath them.

In the absence of any psychiatric foundation whether by report, diagnosis, examination, or clinical observation the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case under s.52 MHA. His evidential platform is built on inference rather than medical grounding, and a structure built on inference alone cannot support the statutory threshold. Issue 3: Incapacity to Manage Affairs

Even if the Plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of mental disorder which he has not, he must still satisfy the second statutory requirement under s.52, namely that the Defendant is incapable of managing herself and her affairs.

The evidence before the Court points in the opposite direction. The Defendant manages her household, cares for four children, maintains employment, pays rent, attends to school matters, files affidavits, instructs counsel, and actively participates in ongoing Syariah proceedings. These are not the actions of a person unable to navigate the ordinary demands of daily life.

There is no evidence of financial mismanagement. The Defendant pays her bills, maintains her tenancy, and manages her expenses without difficulty. There is no evidence of cognitive impairment. Nothing suggests confusion, disorientation, memory deficits, or impaired judgment.

There is no evidence that the Defendant is unable to understand legal proceedings. On the contrary, she has filed detailed affidavits, responded to allegations, and engaged counsel in both civil and Syariah matters. There is no evidence that the Defendant is unable to care for herself. She works, attends appointments, and manages her personal affairs independently.

There is no evidence that the Defendant is unable to care for her children. Whatever the parties' disagreements, the Defendant continues to perform parental responsibilities on a daily basis.

The Plaintiff's allegations of incapacity are therefore speculative. They rest on inference rather than evidence, and inference cannot substitute for proof. It is as though the Plaintiff seeks to build a case for incapacity on shifting sand the foundation simply does not hold.

In the result, the Plaintiff has not satisfied the second limb of s.52. The statutory requirement of demonstrating incapacity to manage affairs remains wholly unmet. Issue 4: Bona Fides

The Court must also consider whether the Originating Summons was filed bona fide or whether it is driven by collateral purposes. The Plaintiff's own affidavit reveals that this application is deeply intertwined with multiple ongoing disputes:

(a) marital conflict;

(b) Syariah matrimonial proceedings;

(c) custody and access disputes;;

(d) domestic violence allegations;

(e) police investigations;

(f) financial stress; and

(g) eviction issues.

The OS does not stand in isolation; it sits within a broader landscape of relational and legal conflict. The timing of the OS is notable. It was filed shortly after:

(a) domestic violence allegations were made against the Plaintiff;

(b) police investigations commenced;

(c) Syariah proceedings were initiated; and

(d) the marriage had effectively broken down.

The proximity of these events raises legitimate questions about the Plaintiff's motivation. The evidence also shows that the Plaintiff has not visited the children for several months. Whatever the parties' disagreements, parental contact is a basic indicator of genuine concern. The prolonged absence is inconsistent with the urgency he asserts in these proceedings.

The Plaintiff has likewise not provided maintenance during this period. The failure to contribute to the children's financial needs sits uneasily with his claim that the Defendant is incapable of caring for them and urgently requires intervention. Genuine concern ordinarily manifests in support, not withdrawal.

Further, despite asserting that the Defendant urgently requires psychiatric intervention, the Plaintiff has taken no steps to assist her medically. He has not arranged any appointment, facilitated any consultation, or accompanied her to any medical facility. His conduct does not reflect the behaviour of someone who believes immediate treatment is necessary.

The Plaintiff has also not produced any psychiatric referral initiated by a doctor who personally examined the Defendant. This omission is significant. If the Plaintiff truly believed the Defendant required psychiatric care, the natural and responsible step would have been to obtain a clinical assessment. Instead, the record shows no such effort.

These omissions are inconsistent with genuine concern for the Defendant's welfare. They suggest that the Plaintiff's actions are driven more by litigation strategy than by a bona fide desire to secure medical care.

Viewed cumulatively, the OS appears to be deployed as a strategic instrument within the broader matrimonial conflict a legal lever rather than a medical safeguard. It is as though the Mental Health Act is being used as a tool in a larger contest, rather than as a pathway to treatment.

In the circumstances, I find that the OS is not bona fide. Issue 5: Whether an Inquiry Should Be Ordered

At this final stage, the Court must determine whether an inquiry under s.52 should be ordered. The legal threshold is clear: the Court must be satisfied that the allegation of mental disorder is potentially true, supported by credible evidence.

On the evidence before the Court, the Plaintiff has not produced material capable of meeting that standard. The medical documents relied upon are non-psychiatric, hearsay, interpretive, and unsupported by clinical findings. They do not rise to the level of credible evidence required to trigger the statutory mechanism.

The Plaintiff has therefore not met the prima facie threshold. The evidential foundation is too thin to support the serious step of compelling an inquiry. It is, in truth, a structure built on conjecture rather than clinical grounding a platform that cannot bear the weight of the statutory consequences he seeks to invoke.

In these circumstances, the Court cannot order an inquiry. The statutory safeguards exist to prevent precisely such unsupported applications, and the threshold has not been crossed. Findings

Having considered all the evidence and submissions, I make the following findings:

(a) the Plaintiff has locus standi to bring this application;

(b) the Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of mental disorder under s.52 MHA;

(c) the Plaintiff has not established that the Defendant is incapable of managing herself or her affairs;

(d) the Originating Summons is not bona fide, but appears instead to be deployed as part of a broader matrimonial and custodial dispute; and

(e) no inquiry shall be ordered, as the statutory threshold has not been met.

In truth, the Plaintiff's case stands on a foundation too thin to support the serious statutory consequences he seeks to invoke; it is a structure built on sand, unable to bear the weight of the remedy he asks the Court to impose. The Originating Summons must therefore be dismissed. Conclusion

The Court is also mindful of the principle of proportionality. An inquiry under s.52 is not a routine procedural step; it is an intrusive mechanism that may lead to significant consequences, including the appointment of a committee and the curtailment of personal autonomy.

Such powers must be exercised sparingly and only where the evidential threshold is met. The Court cannot invoke these powers lightly or in response to allegations that lack medical grounding. The seriousness of the statutory consequences demands a commensurate level of evidential substance.

For the reasons set out above, the Plaintiff's Originating Summons is dismissed. i. Costs are awarded to the Defendant in the sum of RM5,000.00; ii. The Defendant remains fully entitled to manage her own affairs. Nothing in the evidence suggests any impairment of her ability to do so. iii. The Plaintiff is at liberty to pursue any matrimonial remedies in the Syariah Court, where such matters properly belong. iv. This Court will not permit the Mental Health Act 2001 to be used as a collateral weapon in matrimonial conflict. The Act is a protective statute, not a tactical device, and its safeguards exist to prevent precisely such misuse. v. The statutory threshold under s.52 MHA 2001 has not been met. The evidential foundation is too insubstantial to support the serious consequences the Plaintiff seeks to invoke a structure built on conjecture cannot bear the weight of the remedy sought. Order accordingly. Date: 24.07.2026 PARTIES For the Applicant: Solicitor: Muhammad Norizul Naufal / Liyana Ain Nasyihin Messrs The Chambers of Liyana Ain Nasyihin Blok D1-10-3 OUG Parklane Serviced Apartment Jalan 1/152, Jalan Klang Lama 58200 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent: Solicitor: Nur Syarina Najla Binti Muhamad Azlan / Shahreena Sidik Messrs Shahreena Sidik & Partners No 37b Jalan SS15/4 47500 Subang Jaya Selangor Darul Ehsan