ABDUL MAJID BIN MD HANIFF v Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (BA-25-129-11/2024)

Enclosure 6 is the Applicant’s application for an interim injunction to prevent the Respondent from evicting the Applicant from the premises at No: 2 (Gerai MPS) Simpang Pasar Borong, Selayang Baru Fasa 3, 68100 Batu Caves, Selangor (Premises) pending the disposal of his substantive application for judicial review. The Applicant obtained leave on 23.4.2025.

After careful consideration of the cause papers and the oral and written submissions of the parties, this Court decided to dismiss the application under Enclosure 6. The following are the reasons for the decision. Background facts

The Applicant filed an application for judicial review to challenge the Respondent’s decision to seal the Premises on 22.8.2024. The Applicant also seeks a declaration that the Respondent has no jurisdiction over the Premises.

The Applicant averred that he operates a business at the Premises. When he applied to renew his business licence, he was informed that the Premises came under the administration of Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur (DBKL). When he approached DBKL, he was told that the area was within their jurisdiction but that applications for licences were temporarily frozen.

The Respondent issued warning notices that they would seal the Premises on 10.7.2024 and 23.7.2024 respectively for arrears of rental. On 22.8.2024, the Respondent sealed the Premises.

The Applicant’s lawyers received the Respondent’s letter dated 25.9.2024 that they were agreeable to extending the Applicant’s tenancy for the Premises until 31.12.2024. The tenancy was however terminated vide the Respondent’s notice dated 27.11.2024. Stay application

In his affidavit in support of the application (Enclosure 7), the Applicant maintained that the Respondent had no authority to demand rental from him as by their own admission, the Premises came under DBKL’s authority. He contended that at all material times he was willing and able to pay the rental for the Premises and was awaiting a response from DBKL.

The Applicant argued that if he vacated the Premises, damages would not be adequate compensation as he would have lost his place of business and source of income. He would also have to terminate his workers resulting in hardship.

In their affidavit in reply (Enclosure 23), the Respondent averred that –

although the local authority for the area was DBKL, the Premises belonged to them;

(ii) the Applicant has been renting the Premises since 2003 and had frequently failed to pay the rental causing them to issue notices for the arrears;

(iii) the last rental agreement expired on 31.12.2023 and there are still outstanding rental arrears;

(iv) although there is no rental agreement for 2024, the Applicant continues to occupy the Premises and operate his business; and

despite the notices for the rental arrears dated 21.3.2024 and 21.5.2024, the Applicant has not paid any rental.

The Applicant referred to the questions to be considered in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193 at 206; [1995] 1 CLJ 293 and prayed that the application be allowed to maintain the status quo until his substantive application is heard and disposed of.

The Applicant reiterated the facts leading to the sealing of the Premises and emphasised that the Respondent had not proven that they were the owners of the Premises and therefore entitled to collect rentals.

The Respondent denied the Applicant’s contentions and stated that they remained the owners of the Premises. DBKL was the local authority for issuing business licences for the area.

The Respondent submitted that the Applicant is estopped from denying their ownership of the Premises as clearly evidenced in the following documents –

the rental agreement (Exhibit “MPS-3” Enclosure 23 page 24) wherein it is stated – “2.1 Tapak gerai adalah kepunyaan Majlis berdaftar di bawah No: 2 dan gerai yang terletak di atas tapak tersebut beralamat: di Gerai MPS Pasar Borong Fasa III, Selayang Baru 69100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan di adalah kepunyaan Majlis”; and

(ii) the rental agreement (Exhibit MPS-6” Enclosure 23) wherein it is stated “Majlis adalah pemilik berdaftar/pemilik benefisial/pihak yang mempunyai kuasa kawalan sah ke atas harta yang mana butirannya dinyatakan di SEKSYEN 4 di JADUAL Perjanjian ini dan …”.

The Respondent cited section 116 Evidence Act 1950 and Rosman bin Haji Abdul Rashi v. Rosmah Begum bte Bahagur Beg [1993] 2 MLJ 196 at 202 and Goh Choon Whey v. KCSB Konsortioum Sdn Bhd & Anor case [2023] MLRHU 1951 at 9 in support of their arguments.

The Respondent denied that the Applicant’s application involved a serious bona fide issue to be tried and that the balance of favoured the Applicant. They argued that damages was an adequate remedy and prayed that this Court does not allow the injunction. Analysis and findings

The law governing interlocutory injunctions is well settled. The Court must apply the principles enunciated in Keet Gerald (supra) –

whether there is a serious bona fide issue to be tried;

(ii) whether damages would be an adequate remedy, and

(iii) where the balance of convenience lies.

There is also the reminder that courts at the interlocutory stage should not engage in a detailed examination of the merits but should determine whether there exists a bona fide triable issue.

On the fact of the present application, this Court is not satisfied that the Applicant has shown a bona fide issue to be tried that warrant granting the injunction to maintain the status quo of the Premises.

Section 116 Evidence Act 1950 reads - “No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through the tenant, shall during the continuance of the tenancy be permitted to deny that the landlord of that tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy a title to the immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that that person had a title to such possession at the time when the licence was given.”

The Applicant’s challenge is focused on the ownership of the Premises of which he has been a tenant since 2003. It is a bit late in the day for him to call into question the Respondent’s ownership.

This Court accepts the Respondent’s submissions that damages would be an adequate remedy in the event the Applicant succeeds in this application. The balance of convenience does not favour the Applicant.

In these circumstances, this application must fail.