ABDULLAH BIN ABD RAHMAN v Pendakwa Raya (CB-44-5-01/2023)

Di dalam pentadbiran keadilan dan pentadbiran jenayah Tertuduh mempunyai kepentingan yang perlu diutamakan. Dia perlu meyakini bahawa perbicaraan yang dijalankan adalah adil dan tidak menimbulkan keraguan berkenaan dengan keadilan yang ditadbirkan. Kegagalan untuk menegakkan keadilan kepada Tertuduh akan menjadikan sistem perundangan jenayah tidak bermakna dan akan menimbulkan kehampaan kepada individu yang sedang menjalani perbicaraan jenayah.

Bagi memastikan sistem pentadbiran jenayah tersebut telus dan dihormati serta diyakini maka perbicaraan perlulah dijalankan dengan adil dan diadili oleh hakim yang adil. Oleh itu terdapat keadaan di mana pihak yang terlibat dalam perbicaraan jenayah mempunyai pandangan bahawa perbicaraannya tidak akan dapat dijalankan kerana terdapat kecenderungan hakim yang membicarakan kes tersebut akan tidak dapat berlaku adil di dalam kes tersebut. Ia mungkin akan menimbulkan keraguan kepada keputusan hakim tersebut. Apa yang lebih penting ialah keadaan hakim yang tidak adil tersebut akan menyebabkan kezaliman akan menimpa Tertuduh.

Bagi mengatasi masalah ini terdapat prosedur untuk permohonan dikemukakan kepada mahkamah untuk mengecualikan seseorang hakim daripada meneruskan sesuatu perbicaraan. Permohonan yang 3 dikemukakan oleh Tertuduh tersebut tidak boleh dianggap sebagai tindakan yang cuba untuk mempertikaikan sistem pentadbiran keadilan di mahkamah jenayah. Pada masa yang sama hakim yang mendengar permohonan tersebut juga tidak boleh memutuskan permohonan tersebut dengan mengutamakan keegoan beliau sebagai hakim yang mendengar kes tersebut. Sebaliknya haruslah memutuskan permohonan pengecualian hakim tersebut berdasarkan kepada prinsip undang-undang yang telah diputuskan oleh mahkamah yang lebih tinggi.

Sesungguhnya permohonan untuk mengecualikan hakim boleh dilakukan tanpa menjejaskan pandangan hakim yang membicarakan kes tersebut kepada pihak yang membuat permohonan tersebut. Jika ini dapat dilakukan ia akan melahirkan sistem pentadbiran jenayah yang sejahtera dan dapat menikmati keadilan yang dicita-citakan oleh semua pihak.

Permohonan ini dibuat adalah disebabkan kes rayuan jenayah No. CB-42LB-04/2021 (Pendakwa Raya v Abdullah bin Abdul Rahman [2022] 1 LNS 233; [2022] 5 MLRH 187). Kes ini telah diputuskan oleh mahkamah ini dengan mengenepikan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang telah melepaskan dan membebaskan Tertuduh tanpa dipanggil membela diri.

Setelah kes itu dikembalikan kepada Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen untuk Perayu membela diri, Mahkamah Sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa Tertuduh telah berjaya menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pembelaan dan Tertuduh dilepaskan dan dibebaskan.

Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut telah dikemukakan notis rayuan ke mahkamah ini.

Disebabkan kes ini telah pernah didengar rayuannya di mahkamah ini maka Pemohon berpendapat bahawa kes ini perlu didengar oleh hakim yang lain yang tidak mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan kes ini sebelum ini. Jika kes ini diteruskan untuk pendengaran oleh mahkamah ini melalui hakim yang sama ia akan memprejudiskan Pemohon. Malahan ia akan menimbulkan ketidakadilan kepada Pemohon di samping ia akan memberikan kerumitan kepada hakim yang mendengar kes tersebut untuk memutuskan rayuan dengan berdasarkan kepada keadilan.

Mahkamah mendapati bahawa itulah salah satu asas utama kepada permohonan ini. Ia dapat dilihat dalam affidavit sokongan yang dikemukakan menyokong permohonan ini. Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa permohonan untuk pengecualian hakim boleh dibuat tanpa pemfailan affidavit jawapan oleh Pendakwa Raya. Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak v Public Prosecutor and other appeals (No 2) [2022] 5 MLJ 135 menyatakan bahawa sekiranya tiada affidavit jawapan difailkan ia akan 5 menyebabkan fakta-fakta dalam affidavit tersebut tidak dipertikaikan. Ini dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[4] It was contended by the appellant that since no affidavit in reply was filed, the truth of the contents of the exhibits are not in dispute. In my view, that does not mean that the legal threshold for bias and recusal has been met. The absence of an affidavit in reply is immaterial because recusal is essentially a question of law.”

Ini dapat difahami dalam kes ini tiada affidavit jawapan yang difailkan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Ia menunjukkan bahawa fakta-fakta yang dideposkan di dalam affidavit permohonan tersebut adalah fakta yang tidak dapat dipertikaikan berkenaan pendengaran rayuan kes ini terlebih dahulu di mahkamah ini dan kewujudan bahawa fakta rayuan ini akan didengar semula di mahkamah ini oleh hakim yang sama mendengar rayuan yang pertama. Walau bagaimanapun mahkamah perlu memutuskan berdasarkan affidavit yang ada di hadapan mahkamah sama ada tindakan untuk mengecualikan hakim dapat ditunjukkan di hadapan mahkamah.

Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas berkenaan permohonan pengecualian hakim ujian yang digunakan dalam konteks perundangan di Malaysia adalah ujian yang dinyatakan sebagai bahaya sebenar untuk berat sebelah (real danger of bias). Ini telah dinyatakan dalam kes Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321. “Having considered the authorities cited and their reasonings, we would follow Gough which is that the test to be applied in the present case is the 'real danger of bias' test. Hence, the question here is whether having regard to the facts and circumstances, was there a real danger of bias on the part of the learned trial judge when he heard the habeas corpus application involving the appellants?”

Ia juga telah dinyatakan terlebih dahulu di dalam kes Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1.

Ia juga ditegaskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Tengku Adnan bin Tengku Mansor [2020] 5 MLJ 220 seperti berikut: “[11] It is important to reiterate at this juncture that both tiers of the courts below, with respect, correctly relied on the law in relation to bias. It is in the application of the test to the facts and circumstances of the case that both parties arrived at diametrically opposing conclusions.

The governing law in this country applies the test laid down in Regina v Gough [1993] AC 646 and is summarily stated to be a ‘real danger of bias’. The test was first adopted in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 by Edgar Joseph J in a judicial review case, reiterated in Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321, the only criminal case dealing with bias in the context of a habeas corpus application and Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor [2006] 2 MLJ 293, another civil matter relating to striking out under O 18 r 19 RHC.

In all these cases the question before the court, as it is in this case is whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the learned trial judge when he heard the case involving the respondent? ‘Real danger of bias’

What does ‘real danger of bias’ mean? In explaining this Lord Goff stated, inter alia: … In my opinion, if, in the circumstances of the case (as ascertained by the court) it appears that there was a real likelihood, in the sense of a real possibility, of bias on the part of a justice or other member of an inferior tribunal, justice requires that the decision should not be allowed to stand. … Furthermore, I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man; and in [2020] 5 MLJ 220 at 229any event the court has first to ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available evidence, knowledge of which not necessarily be available to an observer in court at the relevant time Finally for the avoidance of doubt, I prefer to state the test in terms of real danger rather than real likelihood, to ensure that the court is thinking in terms of possibility rather than probability of bias. Accordingly, having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him …

In Sungai Gelugor Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ explained that with this test, the opinion of the court substituted that of the reasonable man. Secondly, the real danger test he said, was a reasonable compromise between the ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘real likelihood’ of bias test meaning that the court was contemplating a lower standard than that a likelihood or probability of bias. It required a ‘real possibility of bias’. It is important to comprehend that this court did not state that it was imposing a ‘very low’ threshold.

Equally importantly the judge went on to state that this was the preferred test as it would avoid the setting aside of judgments upon ‘quite insubstantial grounds and the flimsiest pretexts of bias’.

And in Tan Heng Chew the Federal Court speaking through Hamid Mohamed FCJ (later CJ) held that even though R v Gough had been refined in the UK in Porter and another v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465, this was to ensure the law was in line with European jurisprudence, which was not applicable in Malaysia. More significantly, the court held that it was incumbent upon the court to be vigilant not to allow parties to engage in ‘judge-shopping’ under the guise of recusal applications.”

Apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan real danger of bias. Ini dapat dilihat melalui pandangan Lord Goff di dalam kes R v Gough [1993] A.C. 646 di halaman 670 seperti berikut: “In conclusion, I wish to express my understanding of the law as follows. I think it possible, and desirable, that the same test should be applicable in all cases of apparent bias, whether concerned with justices or members of other inferior tribunals, or with jurors, or with arbitrators. Likewise I consider that, in cases concerned with jurors, the same test should be applied by a judge to whose attention the possibility of bias on the part of a juror has been drawn in the course of a trial, and by the Court of Appeal when it considers such a question on appeal. Furthermore, I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man; and in any event the court has first to ascertain the relevant circumstances from the available evidence, knowledge of which would not necessarily be available to an observer in court at the relevant time. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, I prefer to state the test in terms of real danger rather than real likelihood, to ensure that the court is thinking in terms of possibility rather than probability of bias. Accordingly, having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him; though, in a case concerned with bias on the part of a justices' clerk, the court should go on to consider whether the clerk has been invited to give the justices advice and, if so, whether it should infer that there was a real danger of the clerk's bias having infected the views of the justices adversely to the applicant.”

Ini lebih jelas lagi dinyatakan dalam Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties [2000] 1 All ER 65 seperti berikut: “By contrast, a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise if there were personal friendship or animosity between the judge and any member of the public involved in the case; or if the judge were closely 10 acquainted with any member of the public involved in the case, particularly if the credibility of that individual could be significant in the decision of the case; or if, in a case where the credibility of any individual were an issue to be decided by the judge, he had in a previous case rejected the evidence of that person in such outspoken terms as to throw doubt on his ability to approach such person’s evidence with an open mind on any later occasion; or if on any question at issue in the proceedings before him the judge had expressed views, particularly in the course of the hearing, in such extreme and unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on his ability to try the issue with an objective judicial mind (see Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568); or if, for any other reason, there were real ground for doubting the ability of the judge to ignore extraneous considerations, prejudices and predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues before him. The mere fact that a judge, earlier in the same case or in a previous case, had commented adversely on a party or witness, or found the evidence of a party or witness to be unreliable, would not without more found a sustainable objection. In most cases, we think, the answer, one way or the other, will be obvious. But if in any case there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal. We repeat: every application must be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. The greater the passage of time between the event relied on as showing a danger of bias and the case in which the objection is raised, the weaker (other things being equal) the objection will be.”

Penelitian kepada fakta kes dalam kes R v Gough (supra) menunjukkan bahawa salah seorang daripada anggota juri dalam perbicaraan adalah merupakan jiran sebelah kepada Tertuduh. Ini dapat dilihat seperti berikut: “After the appellant had been sentenced David Gough started shouting and it was at this point that the juror, Mrs. Smith, recognised him. The facts were placed before the judge who decided, correctly in our view, that he had no jurisdiction to take any action, the appellant having been convicted. … Another matter raised by Mrs. Smith in her statement was that her son-in-law's brother was married to the sister of the Goughs. Although she knew the sister by her Christian name, Valerie, she was unaware of the connection.”

Sementara itu dalam kes Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties (supra) pula ia adalah melibatkan pertembungan kepentingan seorang peguam yang bertindak sebagai hakim dalam kes yang dikatakan beliau mempunyai urusan dengannya sebelum ini sebagai pelanggan.

Sementara itu dalam kes Mohamed Ezam (supra) pula alasan yang dikemukakan untuk hakim mengecualikan diri daripada mendengar kes tersebut adalah seperti berikut: “Before us, En Malik Imtiaz submitted that the application to the judge to recuse himself was based on an 'apprehension of bias' (as opposed to actual bias). According to a press statement issued by the respondent on 11 April 2001, the appellants were detained for, inter alia, their involvement in efforts to organize demonstrations aimed at using militant means. Amongst the more significant and imminent demonstrations was (at that time) one referred to as 'Black 14' which was to have taken place on 14 April 2001. 'Black 14' is the expression used to refer to and 12 commemorate the date of the delivery of the judgment in PP v Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim (No 3) [1999] 2 MLJ 1 by the learned judge, and the said judgment had been the subject matter of great criticism. In the premises, counsel contended that there was a reasonable apprehension on the part of a fair minded person that the said judge might not bring an impartial mind to decide the case, and as such, justice would not be seen to be done. He stated that the court must act impartially and must also be seen to act impartially (Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) HCA 63). In any event, there was a real danger of apparent bias.” Dan Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “In our view, on the facts submitted by counsel and the reasons given by the learned trial judge in the grounds of judgment (at p 601 appeal record), there is no real likelihood of danger, in the sense of a real possibility, of bias on the part of the learned judge when he heard the habeas corpus application. We concede that the only common factor between the appellants and the 'Black 14' judgment of the learned judge is that the appellants were detained by the respondent for organizing demonstrations, one of which was on 14 April 2001 which became the foundation for the 'Black 14' allegation of the respondent. However, we do not think such circumstances give rise to a real danger of bias on the part of the learned judge. Even if we apply the reasonable apprehension of bias test to the circumstances of this case, we would arrive at the same conclusion.”

Seterusnya dalam kes PP v Tengku Adnan bin Tengku Mansor (supra) dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[2] The factual background is that the respondent was charged under s 16(a)(A) of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (‘the Act’) for accepting a bribe of RM1m from Tan Eng Boon (‘Tan’). An alternative charge under s 165 was also preferred against him. Tan was charged under s 16(b)(A) of the Act for giving the bribe, as well as an alternative charge under s 109 of the Penal Code.

The prosecution applied for a joint trial of the cases against the respondent and Tan. This was granted.

Prior to trial, Tan applied to plea bargain pursuant to s 172C of the Criminal Procedure Code (‘the CPC’). Tan pleaded guilty to the alternative charge and was convicted. The prosecution indicated that they would utilise Tan’s testimony in their case against the respondent.”

Berdasarkan kepada fakta tersebut Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “[29] The real danger of bias does not prescribe a very low threshold of bias. What it does is to apply a lower threshold than that of an apprehension of bias or likelihood of bias, as stated by Edgar Joseph Jr J in Sungai Gelugor. But such a threshold does not automatically translate to an extremely low threshold. Fourth ground put forward by the Court of Appeal: The requirement to completely obliterate the facts in the presiding judge’s mind

The Court of Appeal erred in concluding that any presiding judge who hears the facts of a case in the course of recording a plea of guilt on the part of a co-accused in relation to the offering of a bribe, 14 effectively results in a non-erasable bias on the part of the presiding judge, such that he is automatically predisposed against the remaining accused. Such a conclusion is not warranted in view of the following matters, some of which have been referred to above:

judge is a professional who undertakes the job of determining the guilt or otherwise of an accused such as the respondent, on the basis of evidence which has been the subject of the due process of law. That means he relies on evidence that has been subject to the laws of evidence and cross-examination. A judge, unlike jurors, is trained in the law so as to remain impartial despite reading facts relating to a case. This is particularly apparent in today’s world where social media ensures that not only the facts of a case, but a myriad of opinions and comments, are virtually inescapable. It is therefore incorrect to assume that a mere recording or sighting of a factual matrix will create a bias against the respondent;

a judge takes the judicial oath of office, which requires adherence to the Federal Constitution. Article 5 of the FC which enshrines the right to life, encompasses the right to a fair trial (see Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd v Kekatong Sdn Bhd (Bar Council Malaysia, intervener) [2004] 2 MLJ 257 and Gan Boon Aun v Public Prosecutor [2016] 4 MLJ 265; [2016] 6 CLJ 647). The essence of a fair trial is an impartial judge as famously stated in B Surinder Singh Kanda v Government of Malaya [1962] AC 322 where Lord Denning described one of the twin pillars of the laws of natural justice as comprising, inter alia, an impartial tribunal or judge. The laws of natural justice comprising a part of the common law are an intrinsic part of the FC. This fundamental aspect of a judge’s function and independence cannot be undermined by spurious and insubstantial attempts to allege bias.

the practice of a presiding judge continuing to hear a joint trial after one co-accused has pleaded guilty is settled law in this jurisdiction, based on a long line of authorities that implicitly recognised and affirmed that impartiality was maintained in such a joint trial. The reasoning in that line of case law, in both Yap See Teck and Mohd Amin bin Mohd Razali ought not to be lightly disturbed, again on relatively flimsy grounds. That is why a prescribed procedure has been advocated and followed for several decades. That procedure prescribed by case-law takes into consideration the possibility of bias and has dismissed it on cogent grounds. In short, it is implicit that the conduct of a trial in such a manner meets, and does not transgress, the fundamental requirement of impartiality in a judge. The fact that the test for bias in this country was only adopted after Sungai Gelugor cannot erode the jurisprudence that accommodated and ensured impartiality in the older criminal case-law. In view of such impartiality it cannot be said that those cases did not address the test of a real possibility of bias; and

finally the Court of Appeal failed to consider the important fact that even if the case is referred to another judge, the record of the plea of guilt and the facts of the case as adduced by the prosecution and agreed to by the co-accused would be equally available to the new judge. Therefore any allegation of a real danger of bias is palpably unfounded in relation to the original court and original presiding judge.” [21] Seterusnya dalam kes Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abd Razak v PP (supra) permohonan adalah berasaskan kepada seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan [2] penghakiman. “[2] The grounds in support of the application are firstly, a Facebook post dated 11 May 2018 by my husband, Zamani bin Ibrahim and secondly, a letter from the Bar Council of Malaysia stating that I, as Chief Justice, had no objection if lawyers would apply for adjournments to attend an event called Walk of Justice on 17 June 2022 relating to Justice Nazlan.” Dan diputuskan di perenggan [14] dan [15] seperti berikut: “[14] The second ground, the letter, is a non-starter. The letter clearly states that I had no objection should lawyers seek to apply for the adjournments of their cases from the panels hearing their cases. This was not a blanket grant of adjournments. It was simply to say that the different panels and different chairs retain their discretions to grant or refuse adjournments. It was a standard letter. I do not see how this discloses any fear or real danger of bias sufficient to recuse me. [15] Finally, the fact that certain other judges recused themselves in cases involving the appellant in this case does not itself present a reason for me to recuse myself in this case.” [22] Penelitian fakta kes-kes tersebut adalah penting bagi melihat bagaimana ujian pengecualian hakim digunapakai di dalam sesuatu kes. Ini adalah disebabkan fakta dalam sesuatu kes berbeza dengan kes yang lain. Namun ujian bahaya sebenar untuk berat sebelah (real danger of bias) adalah menjadi paksi utama dalam menentukan pengecualian hakim. [23] Begitu juga dalam kes Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri v Raja Petra bin Raja Kamarudin [2009] 4 MLJ 484: “[13] It is now necessary to deal with the merits of the recusal application. On the question of judicial bias, the law in this area is settled. The test is premised on the 'real danger of bias' as propounded in R v Gough [1993] AC 646 which was approved and applied by the Federal Court in numerous cases such as Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Berkerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1; Mohamed Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321; Dato' Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor [2006] 2 MLJ 293 and recently in Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Syarikat Teratai Kg Sdn Bhd) v Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd; Tan Sri Halim Saad & Che Abdul Daim Hj Zainuddin (Interveners) [2007] 5 MLJ 501. In this case, the court was urged to recuse my learned brother Augustine Paul FCJ from being one of the panel members to hear the appeals on the grounds that the respondent had been critical of the learned judge in his website and that there might be a real danger of bias on the part of the learned judge if he sat on the panel to hear the appeals. Be it noted that it is the respondent who was critical of my learned brother Augustine Paul FCJ in his website in 2001. And there was no response by the learned judge against the criticism. Furthermore, the respondent was never cited for contempt for the criticism. With regard to the objection raised by learned counsel about my learned brother Augustine Paul FCJ having dismissed the previous application for habeas corpus by the respondent, it is our view that a judge is not precluded from hearing a case against a person when he had in the past heard another case against the person if the facts in the cases are different. It must also be observed that in the previous habeas corpus application by the respondent, my learned brother Augustine Paul FCJ did not go into the facts of the case as it was agreed by the parties in that case that the decision in one case that was being heard shall be binding on the respondent's application (see Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor & Ors v Inspector General of Police [2001] 2 MLJ 481). So, how on earth might there be a real danger of bias on the part of my learned brother Augustine Paul FCJ to sit on the panel to hear the appeals? On the facts submitted by learned counsel, we found the grounds of the application far-fetched and ludicrous.” [24] Apa yang lebih menarik ialah dalam kes Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 78 YA Mohd Noor Ahmad Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam menangani isu permohonan untuk mengecualikan panel hakim Mahkamah Rayuan atas alasan prinsip keadilan perlu ditegakkan dan wajar ditampakkan ia ditegakkan seperti berikut: “The applicants claimed that while not alleging any actual bias on the part of Denis Ong JCA but an impartial and reasonable and fair-minded bystander with knowledge of the relevant facts would think that there is a real danger of bias that a fair hearing before him will no longer be possible however much he may judiciously strive to avoid it. Hence, they relied on the principle that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. With due respect, to my mind, such notion is only fit for the consumption of the ignorant and unreasonable bystander. I am in complete agreement that, for the reasons my learned brothers have given, the application should be dismissed. It would therefore be mere supererogation for me to furnish a lengthy judgment of my own.” [25] Pada masa yang sama mahkamah juga meneliti keputusan dalam kes Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Syarikat Teratai KG Sdn Bhd) v Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd; Tan Sri Halim Saad & Che Abdul Daim Hj Zainuddin (interveners) [2007] 5 MLJ 501 apabila salah satu daripada isu yang timbul ialah berkenaan dengan komen yang dinyatakan oleh ahli panel Mahkamah Rayuan semasa mendengar rayuan tersebut yang dijadikan sandaran bahawa terdapatnya real danger of bias. Dalam menangani perkara tersebut Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memberikan pandangan seperti berkut: “[94] Hence, considered objectively, we find that there was no basis for the Court of Appeal to make the remarks and findings that there were economic duress, patronage, abuse of governmental positions and powers in complete disregard to taxpayers' money and misappropriation of funds. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal made the remarks and findings purportedly based on 'contemporaneous documents and from the circumstances, oral and documentary evidence, all the independent evidence on record and record of appeal' without properly adverting to any of them. Further, gleaned from the exceptional strong and emotive language used particularly in the main judgment it is our view that a reasonable person would be persuaded to conclude that 'there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant members' of the Court of Appeal 'even though unintentionally, in the sense that they might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of' appellant. [95] The remarks and findings were primarily directed against third parties who were not parties to the suit. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that such remarks and findings did not affect the fairness of the proceeding and its result. For the appellant it was argued that the appellant was found 'guilty by association' with the third parties. [96] With respect we are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. The remarks and findings may appear to have been directed to third parties. But the consequence of those remarks and findings fell upon the appellant. The reason is that the Court of Appeal rolled up the third parties with the appellant and that the appellant was assumed as the ultimate beneficiary of the actions and conduct by the third parties. In fact upon reading those remarks and findings one would be inclined to come to a conclusion that the appellant was 'punished' for the purported misdeeds by the third parties. This summation is borne out of the remark in the main judgment which reads: Assume for a moment that the defendant's present shareholders are mounting this challenge in the name of the defendant. Assume that they are entitled to do so — which is not the law. Even so, they must come to court with clean hands. But they do not. They are the ones who misappropriated the defendant's property — the RM32.5m. They are the ones who, with the support of Tun Daim, oppressed the previous shareholders into parting with their shares. They are the ones who took advantage of all the ideas of Dato' Fawziah and used it for their benefit and obtained huge payments from DBKL and the Federal Government. It is now scarcely open to them to point fingers at the plaintiff. …. [98] We are therefore inclined to agree with the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the remarks and findings found particularly in the main judgment of the Court of Appeal are not supported by evidence 'yet they 'make use of injudicious, unfair and extravagant language' in such extreme, outspoken and unbalance terms in that they were 'out of all proportion to or not commensurate with the circumstances before the court' and they excite an apprehension that the Court of Appeal might not bring an unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the matter before it. There is indeed a real danger that the appellant's case had been unfairly regarded with disfavour, and its arguments were not addressed by the Court of Appeal although they were either submitted or apparent from the record of appeal.' In short the element of real danger of bias is present especially in the main judgment of the Court of Appeal. [99] Having said the foregoing there is still the contention that despite the remarks and findings in the main judgment, the decision of the Court of Appeal should be maintained since there is the supplementary judgment to support it. [100] With respect we find that all the learned judges of the Court of Appeal spoke with one mind. The issue of severing the impugned remarks and findings in the main judgment does not arise. Their own statements on record indicate that position. In particular his Lordship Zulkefli Makinudin JCA said that he 'had read the judgment in draft of my learned brother Gopal Sri Ram JCA and fully agree with the views expressed and all the orders made by his lordship on the said two appeals before us' and that 'the legal issues arising from the above mentioned factual circumstances have been comprehensively dealt with by my learned brother Gopal Sri Ram JCA in his judgment.' His Lordship Hashim Yussof JCA expressed his agreement on what were said in the main judgment. In any event we find that even the remarks as identified in the supplementary judgment are equally unnecessary and unsupported by the evidence adduced. For instance, the finding in the supplementary judgment that it was due to the commitment by DBKL to compensate 'STKG in principle, estimated at RM764m, explains why UEM/Metro Juara bought over STKG on short notice and without due diligence' implies that there was an unhealthy and hidden arrangement between the present shareholders of the appellant and DBKL to the prejudice of the respondent. However, the evidence adduced could not be said to irresistibly support such a conclusion.” [26] Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil maklum bahawa dalam menentukan sama ada permohonan untuk pengecualian hakim daripada mendengar kes hendaklah berdasarkan kepada fakta dalam kes tersebut. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Che Minah bt Remeli v Pentadbir Tanah, Pejabat Tanah Besut, Terengganu & Ors [2008] 5 MLJ 206 seperti berikut: “Secondly, whether or not a judge ought to recuse herself/himself from hearing any case must necessarily be decided on its own facts.” [27] Mahkamah juga memahami bahawa terdapat anggapan seseorang hakim itu adalah layak untuk mendengar sesuatu kes melainkan dibuktikan sebaliknya. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes yang sama oleh Hakim Abdul Malik Ishak: “For my part, I am surprised at the oral application to disqualify this panel. It is a legally constituted panel. I must at the outset make the following germane observations:

That public confidence in our judicial system is rooted in the fundamental belief that those judges, irrespective of race or religion or gender, who adjudicate the manifold cases must always do so without bias or prejudice and they must be perceived as such. It is an acceptable proposition to say that a judge's impartiality is presumed and any party seeking for a disqualification must establish the circumstances and situations to justify the disqualification of the judge. What is the criterion for disqualification? It is the reasonable apprehension of bias. Another pertinent question would be this. What would an informed, reasonable and right-minded person, viewing the whole matter realistically and practically conclude after having deliberated the matter? Yet, another pertinent question is this. Would that person think that it is more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, decide the matter fairly? Fairness is the name of the game. Once fairness is established, the application for disqualification or recusal would fall through. It would collapse like a deck of cards.

There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality. That being the case, the standard of reasonable apprehension of bias must necessarily refer to an apprehension based on serious grounds. Each case must therefore be examined contextually and the inquiry is based entirely on the facts. This panel is impartial. The appeal comes before this panel for the very first time. The appeal relates to the question of leave and the issue on the fatwa (edict) and its ramifications have no role to play at all.

An allegation that the decision of this panel may be tainted by bias or by a reasonable apprehension of bias is a very serious matter. Such an allegation calls into question the impartiality of this panel and it raises doubt on the public's perception of the court's ability to dispense justice according to law. It is rather unfortunate that the serious allegations advanced by Mr Haris stands unaided by an affidavit. Be that as it may, I must categorically say that in adjudicating a case the judge must always keep an open mind. That would in essence be the meaning to be attached to the word 'impartiality'. It is impossible to determine the state of mind of a judge. The state of the judge's mind is as much a fact as the state of his indigestion. Cory J, in Newfoundland Telephone Co v Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities) [1992] 1 SCR 623, at p 636 rightly said that it is obviously impossible to determine the precise state of mind of an adjudicator. The English Court of Appeal in Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd & Anor [2000] 1 All ER 65; [2000] 2 WLR 87; Locabail (UK) Ltd and Another v Waldorf Investment Corporation & Ors; Timmins v Gormley [2000] 2 WLR 870;Williams v HM Inspector Of Taxes & Ors; R v Bristol Betting And Gaming Licensing Committee, Ex parte O'Callaghan [2000] QB 451 with a coram of Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ, Lord Woolf MR and Sir Richard Scott VC aptly said at p472 of the report: The proof of actual bias is very difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge about extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common law is to protect litigants who can discharge the lesser burden of showing a real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias actually exists. There is no suggestion here that members of this panel are consciously allowing extraneous influences to affect our minds in adjudicating the appeal. There is no proof of actual bias against members of this panel and the appellant will find it very difficult to prove it even if she attempts to do so.” [28] Dalam kes Dato' See Teow Chuan & Ors v Ooi Woon Chee & Ors and other applications [2013] 4 MLJ 351 dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[38] In the present applications before us, both the counsel conceded that they are not relying on actual bias as such, but instead on apparent bias arising out of the contents of the judgment, which was substantially copied from submissions of counsel for the first and second respondents. They contended that the content of the judgment is evident of the apparent bias on the part of the court. It is settled law that, in this country a judgment may only be challenged on the ground of actual bias or real danger of bias and not on the ground of apparent bias (see Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Nor & Ors v Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 1 MLJ 321; Metramac Corporation Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Syarikat Teratai KG Sdn Bhd) v Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd; Tan Sri Halim Saad & Che Abdul Daim Hj Zainuddin (interveners) [2007] 5 MLJ 501).” Adakah alasan untuk pengecualian hakim wujud di dalam kes ini? [29] Dalam kes ini isu yang timbul ialah mahkamah ini telah mendengar rayuan buat pertama kali Pemohon dan memutuskan bahawa satu kes prima facie telah dibuktikan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Keputusan ini telah mengakaskan keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Ia dibuat berdasarkan kepada keterangan-keterangan yang dinilai oleh mahkamah semasa rayuan di peringkat kes pendakwaan. Mahkamah ini mempunyai pandangan yang berbeza berkenaan dengan dapatan yang dibuat di akhir kes pendakwaan. Kes ini dikembalikan untuk Tertuduh dipanggil membela diri di hadapan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang sama. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut telah memutuskan bahawa Tertuduh dibebas dan dilepaskan. Pada masa penelitian keterangan-keterangan pada peringkat pendakwaan ia adalah berdasarkan kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan pada peringkat tersebut. Mahkamah ini belum lagi mendengar keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pembelaan. Dalam erti kata lain keterangan pembelaan dipanggil berdasarkan ruang lingkup kes pendakwaan pada masa itu. [30] Ini bermakna sekiranya rayuan didengar sekali lagi oleh mahkamah ini, maka mahkamah perlu meneliti keterangan-keterangan pembelaan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Pemohon dan terikat dengan peruntukan-peruntukan di bawah Kanun Prosedur Jenayah dan prinsip undang-undang berkenaan dengan tugas pihak pembelaan di akhir kes pembelaan yang jelas dinyatakan dalam kes Mat v PP [1963] 29 MLJ 263 dan Rosli bin Yusof v PP [2021] 4 MLJ 479. [31] Penelitian kepada affidavit sokongan tidak dapat ditunjukkan bahawa keadaan seperti yang terdapat di dalam R v Gough (supra) dan Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties (supra) wujud di dalam kes ini. Apa yang ada ialah mahkamah ini pernah mendengar rayuan ini sebelum daripada ini. Ia juga bersandarkan kepada persepsi Pemohon bahawa hakim yang mendengar rayuan ini kelak tidak akan berlaku adil dan memprejudiskan Pemohon disebabkan pernah meneliti keterangan-keterangan di akhir kes pendakwaan sebelum ini. Mahkamah berpendapat persepsi semata-mata tidak mencukupi bagi melepasi ujian di dalam ujian real danger of bias seperti yang diutarakan dalam kes-kes yang dinyatakan di atas. Mahkamah semasa mendengar rayuan ini kelak terikat dengan prinsip undang-undang pendengaran rayuan, undang-undang jenayah, Kanun Prosedur Jenayah, undang-undang keterangan dan prinsip undang-undang lain yang tidak boleh diketepikan oleh mahkamah ini semasa mendengar rayuan ini kelak. Mahkamah tidak boleh semata-mata disebabkan telah memutuskan bahawa Pemohon dipanggil membela diri boleh mengenepikan prinsip undang-undang semasa mendengar rayuan kes ini kelak. [32] Oleh yang demikian mahkamah berpendapat bahawa permohonan ini ditolak. Bertarikh: 22hb. Mac 2023 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Pemohon Salim Bashir dan Najihah Zulkifli Tetuan Salim Bashir Ruswiza & Co Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Bagi Pihak Responden Nurul Balkis Zunaidi Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur