8.2.2024) wherein it was held by way of the said Court Order that the appeal against the decision of the Learned Arbitrator in Arbitration 2 with regards the 2 issues of jurisdiction pursuant to the Notice of Arbitration dated 9.8.2022 was allowed and that the said Notice of Arbitration dated 9.8.2022 was invalid and struck out. Consequently, Maxwell’s solicitors then wrote to the JBHC that it no longer had the mandate to proceed with the Leave Application and withdrew the same. This resulted in the JBHC striking out the Leave Application without liberty to file afresh on 6.3.2024 and the Arbitrator in Arbitration 2 taking the position that his jurisdiction as an arbitrator was nullified vide a letter dated 20.2.2024 from the Arbitrator to the parties therein. [15] From the above sequence of events, it is this Court’s analysis that with regards Arbitration 1, the Plaintiffs had terminated it on their own accord and that they had filed in the substitution application therein in as mentioned above to which the Tribunal had dismissed it. [16] The Plaintiff has relied on 2 authorities to support its case being Commissioner Of The Federal Capital v Insurance Company Of North America [1968] 2 MLJ 143 which is a Federal Court decision and a High Court decision in Dalin Interscope Versicherung Sdn Bhd v Sime Axa Assurance Bhd [2007] 3 MLJ 232; [2007] 2 AMR 24; [2007] 2 CLJ 370. [17] In Commissioner Of The Federal Capital (supra) the Federal Court held that by virtue of section 3(1) of the Civil Law Ordinance and section 23(2) and 25(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964, the High Court has inherent equitable jurisdiction to restrain a defendant from setting up the defence of limitation under a contract (or statute) if the following circumstances are present: (a) two forums with nominal jurisdiction to hear and resolve a dispute between the same parties; (b) the statutory or contractual period of limitation should have expired whilst the question of the appropriate forum to resolve the dispute was pending; (c) it was beyond the control of the aggrieved party to do anything consistent with his legal rights to escape the consequences of his claim being barred by the effluxion of time. [18] I have noted that in the above case, it was argued that the respondent should not be permitted to take advantage of the lapse of time since it was brought about mainly through circumstances beyond its control, namely, the “lamentable delay” by the court in fixing the date of hearing of the application for stay, and partly, on the one hand, by the failure of the respondent to reasonably prosecute his application, and on the other, to the failure of the appellant to ensure that the application was brought on in due time. [19] After perusing the abovesaid case I hold that the facts therein which led the Appellant to apply and for the Federal Court in that matter to allow the said Application is quite different from that before me. [20] Dalin Interscope Versicherung Sdn Bhd (supra) was on the other hand a case involving the statutory period of limitation having expired in 1998. There the plaintiff sought under the inherent jurisdiction of the court for an order that the order of the High Court dated 9 September 1996 (staying the proceedings for the disputes to be referred to arbitration) as affirmed by the order of the Federal Court dated 18 September 2000 be varied by adding the proviso that the defendant be precluded from pleading and relying on the defence of limitation for the period between 17 May 1995 and 18 September 2000 in the arbitration proceedings (the starting date of 17 May 1995 represented the date the defendant first applied for a stay of proceedings whereas the closing date of 18 September 2000 represented the date the Federal Court disposed of the issue whether the proceedings ought to be referred to arbitration). The High Court in applying Commissioner Of The Federal Capital (supra) allowed the Plaintiff’s application therein based on the doctrine of stare decisis. [21] Here in the matter before me, I find, for reasons which I will allude to when the issue of res is addressed later in my judgement, that the Plaintiff did not sought to apply for the order now before this Court at the time when the Appeal at the KLHC was made and when they could and should have done so, or when the KLHC Order 8.2.2024 was given. [22] There is also in my view, no issue of any “lamentable delay” by the KLHC in fixing the date of hearing of the application for stay. I hold therefore that based on the facts before me, Commissioner Of The Federal Capital (supra) does not apply as it was within the control of the aggrieved party i.e the Plaintiff herein to at least file for and apply for an order consistent with his legal rights to escape the consequences of his claim being barred by the effluxion of time. [23] I also hold that the Plaintiff here cannot bring this action in this Court independently on its own as both Arbitration 1 and Arbitration 2 were commenced by 2 separate claimants i.e the Plaintiff and Maxwell. Further it is my finding that the fact is that the documents in enclosure 2 exhibit YS -2 and YS -3 respectively show that Maxwell and the Plaintiff are 2 separate legal entities and that they had both respectively entered into the Letter of Award issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff and Maxwell and the Agreement between the Defendant to the Plaintiff and Maxwell. [24] The issue of the Plaintiff herein not being in liquidation is in this Court’s decision therefore untenable as there does not appear to be any independent or separate arbitration agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant alone. [25] Accordingly, it is clear in my mind that any sanction from JIM must be obtained for the purposes of Arbitration 2 separately. It is also my finding that the Plaintiffs therein in Arbitration 1 and/or Arbitration 2 had not followed the proper and correct procedures, as well as the legal and technical requirements in initiating both Arbitration 1 and/or Arbitration 2 and thus the Defendant cannot be faulted, and in fact in my view having the right to do so, in raising the jurisdictional challenge which they did in Arbitration 1 and/or Arbitration 2. [26] From the said Letter of Award issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff and Maxwell and the Agreement between the Defendant to the Plaintiff and Maxwell, the Plaintiff and Maxwell were for the purpose of definition only described as the “JV Contractor” collectively and “Partner of the JV Contractor” individually. They were never at any material time a single legal entity or described as such. [27] I also agree with learned counsel for the Defendant that Article 41 of the Agreement, envisages that the Plaintiff and Maxwell must initiate any arbitration as one party as the definition of ‘parties’ in the Agreement therein refers to the Defendant and the JV Contractor only. [28] I further hold that the application before this Court now tantamounts to a backdoor appeal against the KLHC Order given on 8.2.2024 referred to above and I find that this is no less than the 3rd time that the Plaintiffs are canvassing the same argument which was raised and decided by Her Ladyship Aliza Sulaiman at the KLHC and which in the circumstances I hold is now res and that the principle of issue estoppel will now bar the Plaintiff from once again raising or relitigating the same issues. [29] The law is clear that parties cannot be allowed to canvass the same issue again and again. See Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad V. Kawal Teliti Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 3 CLJ 783 where the Supreme Court stated: “What is res judicata? It simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties, or in other words, the parties should accept it as the truth; res judicata pro veritate accipitur. The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation - interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action - nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa. Both maxims are the rationales for the doctrine of res judicata, but the earlier maxim has the further elevated status of a question of public policy.” [30] See also Chee Pok Choy & Ors v Scotch Leasing Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 346 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) at the Court of Appeal delivered the unanimous grounds of the said appellate court and had held “Now, res judicata is not merely a technical rule of pleading. It is a doctrine of substantial justice. It is a process whereby justice is achieved procedurally by precluding a party from reagitating in subsequent proceedings a complaint or an issue that has, or could fairly have been disposed in earlier proceedings between the same parties or their privies. It is merely equity in action in the procedural arena. It is sometimes referred [2001] 4 MLJ 346 at 357to as the rule in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 67 ER 313 . In that case, Wigram VC said: In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. The doctrine may thus be seen to encompass several categories. In its narrowest sense, res judicata, I think, refers to estoppel by record. It refers to the actual decision of the earlier action or proceeding. In its wider sense, it encompasses issues and causes of action that could justly and fairly have been equally adjudicated in the earlier suit or proceeding. This wider operation of the doctrine is sometimes referred to ‘constructive res judicata’. It houses the twin concepts of issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel. Like the tree of which they form the branches, they are designed to ensure that there is finality in litigation.” [31] The KLHC Order given on 8.2.2024 is therefore in my decision a final and a non appealable order based on section 18(10) of the Arbitration Act 2005 which provides: “(10) No appeal shall lie against the decision of the High Court under subsection (8).” [32] In reaching to my above decision based in my grounds therein, I had considered the Plaintiff’s other contentions raised by the Plaintiff before me but had found them lacking merit and/or being misconceived and as such have dismissed them for the same reasons which I have given above. [33] Accordingly, I hereby dismiss Enclosure 1 herein with costs. Dated: 7th day of April 2025 sgd. NADZARIN WOK NORDIN HIGH COURT JUDGE CONSTRUCTION COURT 1 COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF: Conrad Young Wye King, Rohan Arasoo a/l Jeyabalah and Tey Siaw Ling (Messrs Harold & Lam Partnership] COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Muhammad Faisal bin Moideen, Julian Ch’ng Wei Shen and Noor Farrah Ain binti Abdul Halim (Messrs Moideen & Max]