Acclivis Technologies and Solutions Pte. Ltd. v Mdt Innovations Sdn. Bhd. (BA-24-29-10/2025)

This judgment concerns a cross-border commercial dispute between Acclivis Technologies and Solutions Pte. Ltd. Judgment Creditor and MDT Innovations Sdn. Bhd. Judgement Debtor. Equipped with a judgment from the Singaporean High Court, the JC had secured a registration of that decision in Malaysia under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1958 (“REJA”). The JD in enclosure 12 is now moving to set aside the registration and to stop enforcement, pointing to its own parallel action in Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit No. BA-22NCvC-583-12/2025 (“Suit 583”). The JD alleges procedural flaws and overlapping issues, while the JC insists the challenge is hopelessly delayed, legally baseless and that a pending civil suit cannot derail recognition of a foreign judgment under REJA. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

On 25th of April 2025, the JC commenced proceedings against the JD in the Singaporean High Court under the Case No. HC/OC 329/2025 (“SGHC Suit 329”). The statement of claim was served on the JD and appearance was not entered nor any defence filed. Subsequently on 21st July 2025 the Singapore High Court entered a Judgment in Default (“SG JID”) in favour of the JC and following which on the 14th October 2025, the JC applied to register the SG JID in Malaysia pursuant to the REJA

On 12 November 2025, this Court allowed the registration after confirming compliance with the statutory requirements and Order 67 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 and a Notice of Registration was issued on 13 November 2025. Both the Registration Order and the Notice of Registration were served on the JD at its registered address on 18 November 2025. Under the Registration Order and Order 67 rule 5(2) ROC 2012, the JD was required to file any application to set aside the registration by the 2nd of December 2025.

However, the JD only filed its Notice of Application on 17 December 2025, fifteen days after the deadline. In addition, the JD instituted Suit 583 in the Shah Alam High Court, alleging that the SG JID was procured by fraud and ascended from illegal moneylending transactions. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

The JD is now seeking in summary, the following reliefs in enclosure 12:

An extension of time to file the NOA;

Setting aside of the Registration Order and the Notice of

A stay of all proceedings in this Originating Summons pending the outcome of Suit 583. ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The issues before this Court are as follows:

Whether there are cogent reasons to grant the JD an extension of time;

Whether the Registration Order is null and void for non-service of the Originating Summons on the JD prior to the hearing;

Whether the alleged use of the wrong form constitutes a curable irregularity; and

Whether the filing of Suit 583 constitutes a special circumstance warranting a stay of these proceedings. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg THE COURTS FINDINGS

(A) Extension of Time

The JD seeks an extension of time on the ground that the Registration Order and Notice of Registration, though served at the JD's registered address on 18 November 2025, were not brought to the attention of the JD's management due to an alleged administrative lapse by its company secretary. The JD admits actual knowledge of the proceedings only on or about 4 December 2025 when its bankers notified them of the court listing. In my opinion, this excuse is without merit for the following reasons.

It is trite law that service of a document on a company's registered address constitutes valid and effective service on the company. The company secretary is the company's agent and notice to the company secretary at the registered address is proper notice. This principle was stated in Jaya Teguh Sdn Bhd v Ctcg Property Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 707, where court held that the company secretary is an agent of the respondent company and notice to the company secretary at the registered address is of course notice to the company, with the company secretary being duty-bound to inform the board accordingly. The court further found that a company cannot selectively choose when a document served at its registered address is deemed acknowledged. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

Similarly, In Tiong Huat Rubber Factory Sdn Bhd v NR Rubber Tech Industries Sdn Bhd [2022] MLJU 2789, the Court decided that if a company secretary delays in passing documents to the company’s management, that does not make the service invalid. The company is still treated as having been properly served, and any complaint lies against the secretary, not the other party. Applying this principle, the JD is taken to have received proper notice of the Registration Order and Notice of Registration on 18 November 2025. This means the JD had until 2 December 2025 to file an application to set aside the registration and since the JD only filed its application on 17 December 2025, it was already 15 days late.

Even accepting the JD's own account that it came to know of the proceedings on or about 4 December 2025, the JD took a further 13 days before filing the notice of application. I find that no credible explanation has been furnished for this additional delay. The principle in Khor Cheng Wah v Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 223 is well established, “the burden lies on the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for the delay and the law does not come to the aid of an indolent litigant”. A lapse by an internal agent of the JD is not a cogent and justifiable reason to warrant an extension of time. Next, I proceed to address the substantive merits of the JD's application even if this Court were to grant the extension of time. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

(B) Whether the Registration Order is Null and Void

The foundation of the JD’s application rests on the assertion that the JC filed an inter partes Originating Summons in Form 5, of the Rules of Court 2012 but proceeded to obtain the Registration Order ex parte without first serving the Originating Summons on the JD. The JD argues that this omission amounts to a breach of a mandatory procedural requirement, thereby rendering the Registration Order null and void and liable to be set aside ex debito justitiae. I am unable to accept this contention for the reasons set out below. Registration Under REJA 1958 is an Ex Parte Proceeding

In my opinion the registration process under REJA 1958 is ex parte in nature. The use of an inter partes form, even if technically incorrect, is a curable irregularity under the Rules of Court 2012 and the JD has suffered no substantial prejudice or injustice. The registration process is designed to be swift and the JD’s right to challenge the registration is preserved through the statutory mechanism provided in REJA 1958. The JD was given ample opportunity to defend the original suit in Singapore but chose not to do so.

I agree with the JC’S contention in the Federal Court’s decision in Mansion Properties Sdn Bhd v Sham Chin Yen & Ors [2021] MLJ 527 refined the guiding principles on the appropriateness of ex parte proceedings as follows: S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

where the statute does not expressly provide whether an application can be made ex parte or otherwise, legislative silence is not determinative;

the court should have regard to the legislative purpose and an ex parte application is appropriate where there is a need for an order to be obtained swiftly; and

where an affected party retains the right to apply to set aside the ex parte order, there may be no reason why the application cannot be heard ex parte.

I am satisfied that the registration of a foreign judgment under REJA is properly undertaken on an ex parte basis for three interrelated reasons below.

Administrative nature of registration

First, the registration process is administrative in character and the Court’s role at this stage is confined to verifying compliance with the procedural requirements prescribed under Sections 3 and 4 of REJA and Order 67 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012. It does not involve adjudication of substantive rights or defences. Accordingly, efficiency and expedition are paramount and the process ought to be disposed of swiftly. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

(ii) Statutory safeguard for JD

Secondly, the law itself protects the JD’s rights and under Sections 5 and 6 of the REJA, the JD is expressly allowed to apply to set aside a registered foreign judgment but only on the specific grounds listed in the statute. This means the JD is not shut out from challenging the registration, rather, the law requires that any such challenge be made through a proper application after registration, instead of at the initial stage.

(iii) Absence of prejudice

Third, no prejudice is occasioned to the JD by an ex parte registration. The JC cannot immediately enforce the Singapore Judgment in Default. Enforcement may only proceed after the JC has served the Registration Order and Notice of Registration on the JD and after the expiry of the 14-day period prescribed under Order 67 rule 5(2) ROC 2012 or the disposal of any setting-aside application filed within the prescribed period. The JD is thus afforded both notice and time to mount its challenge before enforcement can be pursued.

Taken together, these considerations demonstrate that ex parte registration under REJA is not only consistent with the statutory scheme but also fair in its operation, balancing administrative efficiency with the protection of the JD’s rights. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

This contention is supported by the Court of Appeal in Re Raju Jayaraman Ex P Associated Asian Securities [1999] 5 CLJ 23, which observed that an application to have a foreign judgment registered must be made by originating summons and that no appearance need be entered to the originating summons. The case thus supports that the registration process is to be heard ex parte.

I further refer to the High Court’s decision of Mohd Syed bin Syed Jamaludin & Ors v MMIP Services Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] 7 MLJ 80, it was held that a judgment creditor who obtained final judgments from the Singapore High Court in proceedings which the defendants refused to participate in, is clearly entitled to register and execute the same in Malaysia in accordance with the provisions of REJA.

(C) Whether the use of the wrong form constitutes a curable irregularity

The next issue to be determined by this court, is whether the JC used the wrong form, namely an inter partes form instead of an ex parte form to initiate the registration process, rendering the registration null and void.

In my opinion, even if this Court accepts that Form 5 was used rather than Form 6, this does not ipso facto transform the registration proceeding into an inter partes one, requiring any prior service. The use of Form 5 was, at most, an administrative error in the selection S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg of the prescribed form. It cannot alter the fundamentally ex parte character of the registration process as established by statute and jurisprudence.

To hold otherwise would be to elevate form over substance in a manner that undermines the legislative intent of the REJA. The JC had, at the registration hearing, duly explained to this Court of the ex parte nature of the application. Proceeding on that basis, this Court was satisfied that the statutory requirements had been complied with and the registration was properly ordered.

Assuming, without accepting, that the use of Form 5 amounts to non-compliance with the rules, such non-compliance constitutes a mere curable irregularity under Order 2 rule 1 ROC 2012 and does not render the Registration Order null and void.

As affirmed by the Federal Court in Lai Yoke Ngan v Chin Teck Kwee [1997] 2 MLJ 565, the proper approach is that a breach of a rule of court renders the proceeding irregular, rather than void and the Court retains the discretion to excuse such non-compliance. That discretion must be exercised judicially, with due regard to the substantial merits of the case and the overarching interests of justice. Accordingly, any irregularity ought to be cured unless its correction would occasion undue prejudice. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

The Court of Appeal in Lai Yoke Ngan (supra) also held that defects affecting merits or the jurisdiction of the court ought not to be cured in the exercise of the discretionary power, but applying it to the facts herein, the use of the wrong form is plainly not a defect going to the merits or jurisdiction. The registration itself was properly and regularly obtained upon this Court being satisfied with the statutory requirements under REJA 1958.

In my opinion, JD's reliance on authorities such as Ng Moo Yin v Ng Chee Kong [1982] 2 MLJ 42, Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ, Witech BHR Group [2010] 9 CLJ 288 and Maxland v Timatch [2014] 6 MLJ 1 is misdirected. I agree with the JC’s contention, that those cases concerned judgments in default obtained in violation of mandatory procedural rules that directly and immediately enabled enforcement against the defendants without affording them a right to be heard. The present case is fundamentally distinguishable and the JD retains an express statutory right under REJA 1958 to challenge the registration. The registration under REJA 1958 is not final as Sections 5 and 6 provide a complete mechanism for the JD to apply to set aside the judgment that has been registered. For these reasons, I find that the Registration Order is not null and void and the JD's first submission fails. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

(D) Whether There Are Special Circumstances Justifying a Stay based on Suit 583

I turn now to the JD's contention that the filing of Suit 583 constitutes "special circumstance" justifying a stay of the present proceedings.

In my view, this Court alone has jurisdiction to consider any application to set aside the Registration Order and Suit 583 has no jurisdiction to set aside or invalidate the registration of the SG JID. Any declaratory relief sought in Suit 583 to that effect would be futile, as the court there lacks the jurisdiction to begin with. Granting a stay pending the outcome of Suit 583 would therefore serve no useful purpose and would, in fact, be contrary to the legislative scheme of

A stay of these proceedings pending Suit 583 would have the undesirable effect of defeating the very purpose of REJA 1958, which provides for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments of courts between participating countries. It would create an inconsistent situation where a judgment debtor who deliberately chose not to defend foreign proceedings could subsequently escape the enforcement regime under REJA 1958 by instituting fresh local proceedings and securing a stay. Such a result would amount to a contravention of the statutory scheme and undermine the legislative intent underlying REJA 1958. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

The Court of Appeal in Mann Holdings Pte Ltd v Ung Yoke Hong [2019] MLJU 101 plainly held that the mechanism of registration of a foreign judgment is part of the administration of justice of this country and that it is not the function of the registering country, which Malaysia is, to examine the merits of the Singapore suit or even to disapprove the Singaporean judgment.

As mentioned above, the JD was duly served with the cause papers in SGHC Suit 329 and the JD had every opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court or to raise its defences, including the fraud allegation and the alleged illegal moneylending transaction in those proceedings. It is only after the JC registered the SG JID in Malaysia that the JD commenced Suit 583 and sought a stay. This is a collateral attack on the foreign judgment and a transparent attempt to circumvent the due operation of the law.

This Court takes a serious view of the JD's conduct and this situation is comparable to that considered by the courts in Mohd Syed bin Syed Jamaludin & Ors v MMIP Services Sdn Bhd & Ors [2023] 7 MLJ 80, where it was held that defendants who had been given every opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction of the Singapore High Court or to defend the claims, but chose not to, could not subsequently obtain an order to nullify the Singaporean judgments.

The JD's allegation of fraud is founded entirely on the fact that it has filed Suit 583 and nothing more. The JD has exhibited only the S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg cause papers in Suit 583 a writ and statement of claim as the basis for its fraud allegation. These documents represent unproven, unsubstantiated allegations that have not been tested in evidence before any Singaporean courts.

It is well established that a foreign judgment is not impeachable on its merits, as MBF Finance Bhd v Yong Yet Miaw [1991] 2 MLJ 320. The Singaporean judgment must be presumed to be correct in law and fact unless and until it is challenged and overturned by the courts of the original jurisdiction. (Malayan Banking Bhd v Ng Man Heng [2005] 1 MLJ 470). If the JD had grievances about the underlying transaction, the proper course was to raise those matters in the SGHC Suit 329. The JD cannot now seek to relitigate those issues before this Court or through Suit 583, effectively treating the Malaysian courts as an appellate court over the Singaporean High Court.

As the courts observed in Bank of New Zealand v Wong Kee Tat [1990] 2 MLJ 435, a judgment debtor who had been given the opportunity to be heard in the original court but deliberately refused to exercise that opportunity cannot subsequently challenge the foreign judgment on its merits in the enforcing jurisdiction. S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg

For a stay of proceedings to be granted, the applicant must demonstrate the existence of “special circumstances,” as established in Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd v Koperasi Serbaguna Pekerja-Pekerja Ladang Awam [1986] 1 MLJ 44. The Court of Appeal in Ling Peek Hoe v Golden Star [2020] 6 MLJ 689 reaffirmed that the expeditious determination of a claimant’s rights is the norm, and any delay in that process will only be ordered where good reason is shown.

I find that no special circumstances have been established here and the filing of Suit 583, is a unilateral act of the JD's own making, designed to create a self-manufactured obstacle for enforcement. It is not a circumstance that falls within the recognised grounds for granting a stay. The JD cannot create its own "special circumstances" by instituting a collateral action and then decide to invoke those self-generated circumstances to frustrate legitimate enforcement proceedings.

Furthermore, the JD's suggestion that a stay would cause no prejudice to the JC is incorrect. The JC has diligently pursued all available legal remedies to recover the judgment sum, commencing the Singapore proceedings, obtaining the SG JID and registering it in Malaysia pursuant to REJA 1958. A stay would effectively halt all enforcement efforts, resulting in prejudice to the JC by reason of S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg further delay and wasted costs while the JD decides to pursues its collateral attack.

For these reasons, the JD’s Notice of Application in Enclosure 12 is dismissed in its entirety, with costs awarded to the JC. The JD failed to justify an extension of time, the registration was validly obtained ex parte, any irregularity was curable without prejudice and no special circumstances exist to warrant a stay. Date: 24th July 2026 SGD SHOBA DORAI RAJAH JUDICAL COMMISSIONER SHAH ALAM HIGH COURT Solicitor for the Judgment Creditor: Tang Choon Hao [MESSRS FAHRI, AZZAT & CO. (PETALING JAYA)] Solicitor for the Judgment Debtor: Sivanandini a/p S Sreegantham (JD) [MESSRS GAVIN JAYAPAL (PETALING JAYA)] S/N qoGrhasbkqYy7SPBCe0Fg