Prinsip undang-undang berkenaan appellate intervention dalam penemuan yang dibuat oleh hakim perbicaraan telah dinyatakan dalam kes Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395. Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan: “It is trite law that this court will not readily interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the court of first instance to which the law entrusts the primary task of evaluation of the evidence. But we are under a duty to intervene in a case where, as here, the trial court has so fundamentally misdirected itself, that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion. In a case such as this where the task of the court is to determine where the probable truth of the case lies, one can do no better than to recall to mind the words of Viscount Simon (who was in the majority) in the ‘Eurymedon’ (1942) 73 Lloyd LR 217: The appellants, therefore, start in this House under the considerable handicap that there are concurrent findings of fact against them. [Which, we hasten to add, is not the case here.] I am far from saying that in these circumstances the House has no jurisdiction to allow the appeal, but would need very clear and convincing reasoning to justify us in overthrowing what has already been decided. If it could be shown that the course of events affirmed by the learned judge could not occurred, that would be an excellent reason for reversing his view – in these mundane happenings there is no more conclusive argument than non est credendum quia impossibile. If the impeached decision were shown to be an unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or established facts, that might lead to its reversal. If there were so overwhelming a body of valid testimony for the view that has been rejected that a reasonable man would feel bound to accept it, the appeal would succeed.” [penekanan ditambah]