ADM Ventures (M) Sdn Bhd v Renew Capital Sdn Bhd & 8 Lagi (WA-24NCC-47-02/2016)

THRINAKARASI A/L MUNISAMY @ ARRASU (No. K/P: 570919-10-5751)

THIRUMAREN A/L MUNISAMY … PLAINTIF- 15 (No. K/P: 590908-10-5033 PLAINTIF

20 (No. Syarikat: 903791-U)

TUNKU NAQUIYUDDIN IBNI TUANKU JAAFAR (No. K/P: 470308-05-5259)

MARCUS A/L FRANCIS (No. K/P: 710722-04-5443)

DILANTHA RANJULA BANDARA MALAGAMUWA (No. Paspot : OL 3641181)

… DEFENDAN- (No. Syarikat: 1027181-X) DEFENDAN 30 (DIBICARAKAN BERSAMA DENGAN) PENGGULUNGAN SYARIKAT NO:28NCC-857-10/2015 35 Dalam Perkara GT Global Race (M) Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 1027181-X) 40 Dan Dalam Perkara Akta Syarikat 1965 2 Dan 5 Dalam Perkara Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 10 ADM VENTURES (M) SDN BHD … PEMPETISYEN (No. Syarikat: 1115485-X)

(No. Syarikat: 1027181-X)

… RESPONDEN- (No. Syarikat: 903791-U) RESPONDEN (DIBICARAKAN BERSAMA DENGAN) 25 SAMAN PEMULA NO: WA-24NCC-47-02/2016 Dalam perkara GT Global Race 30 (M) Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 8639-U) Dan 35 Dalam perkara Seksyen 181 Akta Syarikat 1965 (Akta 125) Dan 40 Dalam perkara Aturan 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 3 5 ADM VENTURES (M) SDN BHD … PLAINTIF (No. Syarikat: 1115485-X) 10

(No. Syarikat: 903791-U)

TUNKU NAQUIYUDDIN IBNI TUANKU JAAFAR 15 (No. K/P: 470308-05-5259)

TUNKU KHAIRUL ZAIM TUNKU NAQUIYUDDIN (No. K/P: 851112-14-5403)

MARCUS A/L FRANCIS (No. K/P: 710722-04-5443)

DR. RANAWEERA NEIL PRASAD (No. Paspot: LH 229765)

DILANTHA RANJULA BANDARA MALAGAMUWA (No. Paspot : OL 3641181)

FAIZAL MAULANA BIN HASSAN KUTTI 25 (No. K/P: 791102-12-5001)

CITY MOTORSPORTS SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 1166831-U)

… DEFENDAN- (No. Syarikat: 1027181-X) DEFENDAN 30 GROUNDS OF DECISION 35 Encl.77 is the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants’ application dated 30/8/2017 to strike out the Plaintiff’s Amended Originating Summons (‘Amended OS’) dated 12/4/2016 (‘the s.181 Petition’) in WA- 24NCC-47-02/2016 (‘Suit 47’). 40 4 Having considered the Written cum oral Submissions of the 5 respective Counsel for the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants and the Plaintiff, the Court’s findings include the following: [1] The Preliminary Objection of the Plaintiff is regarding the admissibility of the Affidavit of 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants affirmed 10 by Marcus a/l Francis on 27/10/2017 (encl.86). I find the Plaintiff did not comply with the deadline set by the Court i.e. 11/10/2017 but filed it on 30/10/2017, 20 days thereafter. There was no application for extension of time pursuant to O.3 r.2 Rules of Court (‘ROC 2012’) made. Neither was there any explanation for delay. Therefore I 15 disregard the Affidavit of 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants (encl.86) in this proceedings. [2] The Plaintiff’s 181 Petition is premised on s.181 CA 1965 for basically the following reliefs: 20 “a) a declaration that there was a breach of the terms of the 24/6/2015 Agreement on the part of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants; b) an order that the banking signatories be restored to their original groups as at 4/10/2015 and that one signatory of each shareholder 25 approve all monetary transactions of GT Global; c) save for statutory payments, an injunction to restrain the Defendants, whether by themselves or through their servants, agents, employees and/or otherwise howsoever from: 30 i) effecting any payments out of any GT Global banking account, based and acting on the resolutions passed and carried at the Directors Meeting on 5/10/2015 and at any subsequent meetings; or 35 ii) from transferring, charging, pledging or dealing with the assets of GT Global, in particular, the rights benefits and interests of GT Global in the Memorandum of Agreement dated 10/3/2014 between DBKL and GT Global until the 40 further Order of this Honourable Court; 5 d) that the Defendants or entities beneficially owned by one or more of 5 them do reinstate any secret profits derived from the 9th Defendant; e) further and/or in the alternative, an order that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and/or 6th Defendants be required to purchase the shares in GT Global belonging to the Plaintiff, at RM64 million being 40% of the 10 projected profits for GT Global under the Concession granted by Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur or such value as determined by this Honourable Court with the assistance of Court appointed experts; 15 f) that the cost of and occasioned by this application be borne by the Defendants”. [3] The Plaintiff alleged the following conduct under the s.181 20 Petition - “116.1 the affairs of GT Global are being conducted in a manner which is oppressive, discriminatory, prejudicial and/or in disregard of the interest of the Plaintiff, ADM, as the 50% shareholder of GT

116.2 ADM has been denied its legitimate rights and expectation as a shareholder of GT Global and equal representation, participation in and control of the management of GT Global; 30

116.3 RC and the directors of GT Global under its control acted unfairly in resiling from the 24/6/2015 Agreement with ADM and the joint venture;

116.4 the directors of GT Global acted oppressively and in disregard of 35 the interests of ADM in increasing RC’s representation on the GT Global Board and wresting control of the GT Global Board in breach of the terms of the JV and the 24/6/2015 Agreement;

116.5 the directors of GT Global acted oppressively and in disregard of 40 the interests of ADM in wresting control of key management posts, the secretarial office and the finances of GT Global Board in breach of the terms of the joint venture;

116.6 the affairs of GT Global are presently being conducted unilaterally 45 by RC without reference or approval from ADM;

116.7 RC and its representatives acted unfairly in refusing to attend the EGM on 18/9/2015 in order to avoid implementing the 24/6/2015 Agreement; 50 6

116.8 the meetings of the company have been called and proceeded 5 with in breach of the Articles of Association of GT Global, custom and practice and in abuse of the voting powers of the respective directors of GT Global;

116.9 there is dissipation of the finances of GT Global by preferential 10 payments to certain creditors and secret profits to certain directors;

116.10 the claim against ADM for payment of RM8.5 million is misconceived and detrimental to ADM and in breach of the 15 express terms of the 24/6/2015 Agreement;

116.11 the directors and management of GT Global have attempted to wrongful divert the profit centre or hive-off GT Global’s exclusive 10-year concession from DBKL to a third party who is associated 20 with one of more of the Defendants”. (para 116 of the AIS of the Amended OS) These are the grounds acknowledged by the Plaintiff in its Submission upon which the Plaintiff premised its 181 Petition. 25 [4] S.181 of the CA 1965 among others provides - “(1) Any member … of a company … may apply to the Court for an order under this section on the ground –

that the affairs of the company are being conducted or the power of 30 the directors are being exercised in a manner oppressive to one or more of the members … including himself … or in disregard of his or their interest as members, shareholders … of the company; or

that some act of the company has been done or is threatened or 35 that some resolution of the members … has been passed .. which unfairly discriminates against or is otherwise prejudicial to one or more members (including himself)”. 40 [5] On the issue of whether the Plaintiff has locus standi to bring this action against the 7th and 8th Defendants

In Suit WA-22NCC-425-12/2016 (‘Suit 425’) it is by way of a derivative action which is not the same as the claim under Suit 47 45 7 where the Plaintiff is bringing the oppression petition under s.181 CA 5 1965.

(ii) The 7th and 8th Defendants had filed separate striking out applications in Suit 47 (encls.18 and 19 respectively) which were heard and dismissed by Khadijah Idris JC on 13/6/2016 as per the Court’s Order of even date, exh.M-2 in the Plaintiff’s Affidavit in 10 Opposition affirmed by Thirumen a/l Munisamy on 27/9/2017 (encl.85). In her Judgment in ADM Ventures (M) Sdn Bhd v Renew Capital Sdn Bhd & Ors. [2017] MLJU 74, in dismissing the said applications, Her Ladyship at para 63 held - “Facts has shown the conduct of the 7th Defendant in his purported 15 capacity as the COO of the 9th Defendant and also as COO of the 8th Defendant is prejudicial and without regard to the Plaintiff’s interest as a shareholder of the 9th Defendant. I am therefore of the view that the Plaintiff’s claims against the 7th and 8th Defendants is not unfounded or baseless as to render it frivolous or vexations”. 20 It is to be noted the appeals against the decisions were withdrawn.

(iii) In Kondapuram Raghuram v Soo Peng @ Yew Soo Peng [2006] 7 MLJ 510, Ramly Ali J (now FCJ) held - 25 “(1) Relief under s 181 of the Act should be granted where the petitioner can show that the respondents were in control of the Company and were exercising that control in the affairs of the Company in a manner which was oppressive to the petitioner. In appropriate cases, an employee of the company who is responsible for any act 30 which amounts to an act of the company may be cited as respondent in a petition, under s 181 depending under which limb the petitioner relies on his case (see para 17).

Section 181 of the Act can be invoked against any oppression, 35 whether or not that the oppressor is a director or has a controlling interest in the company. The wordings of s 181 conferred the widest jurisdiction on the court as regards parties against whom relief could be sought (see Re Little Olympian Each-Ways Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 420, Lowe v Fahey [1996] 1 BCLC 262, Re a 40 Company [1986] BCLC 68 applied. The wordings of s 181 envisage that a petition can be directed against any person who is involved in the affairs of the company or involved in 8 some act of the company in a manner oppressive or which 5 unfairly discriminates or prejudicial to the members, shareholders of debenture holders, not necessary against the directors or shareholders only (see para 21, 22 & 26)”. (Emphasis added)

(iv) With respect, following the aforesaid Federal Court decision in 10 Kondapuram Raghuram, I find the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants’ reliance on the cases of Koh Jui Hiong & Ors v. Ki Tak Sang & Ors [2009] 10 CLJ 205(HC) and Ng Kok Pooi v. Brunswood ID Sdn Bhd & Ors [2006] 3 CLJ 566(HC) for the proposition that in order for the Plaintiff to file a derivative suit under s.181 minority 15 oppression, the person complained of (i.e Defendants) must be the members and/or shareholders of the company in question (i.e. GT Global); and since the Plaintiff named and included outsiders, ie. D7 and D8, the Plaintiff’s cause of action under minority protection under s.181 CA 1965 is misconceived in law is misplaced.

With respect, the High Court cases of Koh Jui Hiong (supra) and Ng Kok Pooi (supra) do not assist the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants. However I find the Federal Court decision of this case favoured and supported the Plaintiff’s case as discussed below. 25 In Koh Jui Hiong @ Koa Jui Heong & Ors v Ki Tak Sang @ Kee Tak Sang and another appeal [2014] 3 MLJ 10 at p.10-11, in granting leave to the appellant, Ki Tak Sang @ Kee Tak Sang to appeal to the Federal Court, the latter was concerned with the question of whether a co-petitioning company in a s.181 derivative 30 action could be awarded damages. By way of background, CH (CIN Holdings Sdn Bhd), 9th respondent/appellant in the appeals herein held 1.3 million shares in a company named Polymate (‘polymate shares’) . At the material time, Ki Tak Sang was one of the majority 9 shareholders and the managing director of CH and primarily 5 responsible for its financial management. Investigations revealed that the appellant committed irregular financial transactions during his term of office. The 1st to 8th appellants (‘the petitioners’/the minority shareholders in CH’) petitioned the High Court under s.181 CA 1965 and included CH as a co-petitioner despite the fact the matters they 10 sought to be remedied were the affairs and/or acts of the company itself. The High Court among others gave judgment to the petitioners including a ‘buyout order’ that the appellant purchase the petitioners’ minority interest. By consent between the parties, the buyout order was set aside. The sole issue on appeal to the Court of Appeal 15 concerned the damages awarded to CH. The Court of Appeal held CH was only entitled to damages for the amount of polymate shares the appellant had disposed of without authority (see Headnotes at p.10). On the issue of locus, the Federal Court at 27[24] held 20 “[W]hile there is some latitude in the range of respondents who could be properly joined, there is however no such latitude in the joinder of petitioners. ‘There is in my view no room for nominal petitioners …’ (Atlasview Ltd and ors v Brightview Ltd and ors [2004] 2 BCLC 191 at para 31 per Jonathan Crow, sitting as a deputy judge of the High 25 Court)”. The Federal Court further held that this was a derivative action: hence CH had no standing to be a petitioner under s.181 CA 1965 ; could have been but was not joined as nominal respondent but CH could not be a nominal petitioner (at 27 [25]). On the issue of damages, in granting leave to the appellant to 30 appeal, the Federal Court was concerned with the question of whether a co-petitioning company under s.181 derivative action could be awarded damages. After analysing the English, Singapore and 10 Malaysian cases (at pp.28 till 41), the Federal Court at 28[26] opined 5 - “Section 181(2) is a non-exhaustive list that does not limit other types of relief [other than in s 181(2)] that the court could fashion, with the view to bringing to an end or remedying the matters complained of (see Company Law in Context, Text and Materials, by David Kershaw at p 635). As said 10 by Lord Wilberforce in Re Kong Thai Sawmill, s 181 'leaves to the court a wide discretion as to the relief which it may grant, including among the options that of winding the company up'. … Authorities do not support the argument that damages or compensation 15 could not be awarded under s 181”. (41[50]) Whilst the Federal Court took cognisance that the jurisdiction to order relief under s.181(2) CA 1965 is very wide, and in setting the award of damages to CH and dismissing the petitioner’ cross-appeal, 20 among others, held that “An order of a compensatory nature could be made in a petition under s.181(1) of the Act if the order was made with a view to bringing an end to, or to remedy, matters rightly complained of under s.181(1)(a) or (b)” but in the circumstances of Koh Jui Hiong’s case (FC), “the order of damages was not made 25 under s.181(1)(a) or (b) but was made in a defectively - instituted derivative action brought under s.181”. [6] The case of Ng Kok Pooi can be distinguished in that the respondents filed an application to strike out the petition brought by 30 the petitioner who claimed to be a beneficial shareholder of the 1st respondent against all the respondents under s.181 CA 1965. Basically the striking out was on the basis that (i) the petitioner has no locus to present the petition as he was not a registered member of the 1st respondent; and (ii) the petitioner was estopped by his 35 conduct in the previous proceedings filed by him in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court from filing and proceeding with the petition on the 11 basis that he was a shareholder or a member of the 1st respondent 5 with the rights of a shareholder/member. However unlike Ng Kok Pooi’s case, in the instant s.181 Petition, (i) the Plaintiff is a registered member and 50% shareholder of GT Global Race (M) Sdn Bhd (9th Defendant); and (ii) there were no such proceedings initiated prior to this present case. 10 [7] The issue of leave under s.181A (1) CA 1965 is not applicable as the Plaintiff has instituted the s.181 Petition against the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants under s.181 CA 1965. 15 [8] The 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants submitted there was no delay as they filed encl.77 on 30/8/2017 after the Court’s decision in WA- 22NCC-425-12/2016 (‘Suit 425’) and to begin with the Plaintiff has no locus. With respect I find there is substantial delay unexplained on affidavit by the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants in the filing of the striking 20 out action as the issue of locus standi in a derivative action and in an oppression suit are not interrelated. [9] The 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants relied on Ho Num Chon & Anor v. Tech-Lab Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [2017] 5 CLJ 187 for 25 the proposition that simultaneous proceedings under s.181 and s.218 CA 1965 cannot be maintained in law. The 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants highlighted in Tranche 2 Actions (the Plaintiffs are ADM, Thrinakarasi @ Arasu a/l Munisamy (‘Arasu’) and Thirumaren a/l Munisamy (‘Thirumaren’)) which comprised 4 Suits - 30

Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No: WA-22NCC-245-06/2016;

(ii) Kuala Lumpur High Court Winding-up Petition No: 28NCC-857- 10/2015; 12

(iii) Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating Summons No: WA- 5 24NCC-47-02/2016; and

(iv) Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No: WA-22NCC-425-12/2016, and on this ground alone, the case can be distinguished in the manner submitted by the Plaintiff. The 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants argued since Suit 47 is a s.181 Petition and Suit 857 is a s.218 10 Petition based on substantially the same facts and these 2 proceedings are to be tried together, the s.181 Petition cannot be maintained in law based on Ho Num Chon’s case. For completeness, by consent of the parties, the Plaintiff had 15 withdrawn Suit 857 (s.218 Petition) on 3/1/2018. Be it as it may this does not detract from the fact that the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants’ argument is untenable and cannot be sustained. I am inclined to agree with the manner the Plaintiff has analysed Ho Num Chon’s case in that in order to ascertain whether 20 the filing of the 2 petitions under s.181 and 218 CA 1965 (multiplicity of proceedings) amounts to an abuse of process, the following ought to be considered: “i whether both petitions were filed at the same time (See: para 40); 25 ii. whether similar relief is sought in both petitions (See: para 40); iii. whether both petitions are based on substantially the same facts (See: para 40); and 30 iv. whether there was a bona fide reason and purpose for the filing of both the petitions (See: para 37)”. In considering Loh Eng Leong & Ors v. Lo Mu Sen & Sons Sdn Bhd & Ors [2003] 8 CLJ 265 and Eddie Lee Kim Tak v. JK 35 Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [1997] 3 CLJ 894 in Ho Num Chon’s 13 case, Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JC (as he then was), stated at 201[38] 5 as follows: “[38] In the former, the filing of both petitions was not in principle found objectionable, and the judicial examination on the facts found that it was the respondent who had been guilty of abusing the process of the court. In the latter, the concurrent filings were held to be prima facie abusive of the 10 process of the court, and no good reasons were established to show otherwise”. In the case of the Teh Chin Chuan & Anor v Chuan Hong Co & Ors [1999] 5 MLJ 459 (cited by the Plaintiff) the Court had 15 among others to deliberate on the issue of whether the presentation of the originating petition under s.181 CA 1965 had resulted in multiplicity of proceedings in view of an existing winding-up petition filed earlier. The Court found there is nothing in CA 1965 to say the petitioner can only resort to either one of the remedies and the filing 20 of the originating petition could not be a multiplicity of proceeding and/or an abuse of the Court as the originating petition which was filed subsequently was based on fresh evidence (per Abdul Hamid Mohamad J (as he then was) at p.462 E-H & p.463 E). 25 [10] I agreed with the view of the learned JC in Ho Num Chon’s case that ultimately it calls for a careful examination of the facts and circumstances concerning the filing of both the winding up petition and the oppression petition ought to be made prior to determining whether there has been an abuse of process in the filling of 30 concurrent petitions. Hence in Ho Num Chon’s case, in reaching his decision to strike out the winding up petition, I agreed with the Plaintiff’s submission that the learned JC considered - “i. it is clear that the winding up petition and the s 181 petition were based on substantially the same facts and there were common 35 14 prayers sought in the two proceedings which concern the winding 5 up of the respondent [para 8 of Ho Num Chon]; ii. the winding up petition was filed approximately 9 days after the Petitioner’s interlocutory injunction in relation to their s 181 proceedings was dismissed. The Court held that appeared to be a 10 collateral purposed for filing the winding up petition to achieve the same effect of the intended result (See para 46 to 49 of Ho Num Chon); and iii. the petitioners subsequently applied for the transfer of the 181 15 proceedings to the Court hearing the winding up petition. The learned [JC] reached the conclusion that the winding up petition was to unjustifiably avoid the matter from being heard and adjudicated by the Court that had dismissed the petitioner’s injunction application. It was a blatant attempt at having a second 20 bite of the proverbial cherry and indulging in court shopping (See para 59 and in held 5 of Ho Num Chon)”. [11] However I find Ho Num Chon’s case can be distinguished from the present case. This is well depicted by the Table below 25 drawn up by the Plaintiff regarding the history of litigation of the Winding Up Petition (Suit 857) and the Oppression Petition/s.181 Petition (Suit 47) and I agreed with the ‘Submission’ column made by the Plaintiff - “ 30 Winding up Petition (Suit 857) Oppression Petition (Suit 47) Submission Date of filing 13.10.2015 4.2.2016 Both petitions were not filed at about the same time Relief sought a) an order that the 1st Respondent be wound up; and b) cost of the Petition to be borne and paid by the 2nd Respondent to the Petitioner a) a declaration that there was a breach of the terms of the 24.6.2015 Agreement on the part of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants; b) an order that the banking signatories be restored to their original groups as at 4.10.2015 and that one Different reliefs sought 15 signatory of each shareholder approve all monetary transactions of GT Global; c) save for statutory payments, an injunction to restrain the Defendants, whether by themselves or through their servants, agents, employees and/or otherwise howsoever from: i. effecting any payments out of any GT Global banking account, based and acting on the resolutions passed and carried at the Directors Meeting on 5.10.2015 and at any subsequent meetings; or ii. from transferring, charging, pledging or dealing with the assets of GT Global, in particular, the rights benefits and interests of GT Global in the Memorandum of Agreement dated 10.3.2014 between DBKL and GT Global until the further Order of this Honourable court; d) that the Defendants or entities beneficially owned by one or more of them to reinstate any secret profits derived from the 9th Defendant; e) further and/or in the alternative, an order that the 1st, 2nd, 4th and/or 6th Defendants be required to purchase shares in GT Global belonging to the Plaintiff, at RM64 million, being 40% of the projected profits for GT Global under the Concession granted by Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur or such value as determined by this 16 Honourable court with the assistance of Court appointed experts; Facts The winding up petition was filed as a result of the events that occurred following Dilantha requisition for a GT Global Board of Directors meeting which was held on 8.9.2015. This led to the breakdown of the relationship between the relevant parties involved. The oppression petition was filed following the Defendants’ alleged wrongful dissipation of funds of GT Global and the alleged conspiracy among one or more of the Defendants to wrongfully divert and hive off to City Motorsports the exclusive 10-year concession to run the KL Street Race which was granted to GT Global. The alleged attempts to misappropriate the asset and divert the profit centre of GT Global took place after the filing of the winding up petition. The Oppression Petition filed subsequently was filed based on fresh evidence. Both petitions are not based on the same set of facts. [T]he Petitioners have a bona fide reason and a bona fide purpose to present both petitions. ” 5 [12] Following the oppressive conduct alleged in para 116 of the Affidavit in Support of the s.181 Petition, I find the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants’ assertion that the Plaintiff does not have a reasonable cause of action against them is refuted. Further, there are no facts or assertions made in the Affidavit in Support of the 1st to 6th and 9th 10 Defendants’ affirmed by Marcus a/l Francis on 29/8/2017 (encl.78) to support the grounds that the s.181 Petition is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious and it may prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial. The test as held by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 15 36 is whether or not it is plainly obvious that the claim on the face of it is obviously unsustainable. At this stage the Court should not 17 undertake a minute examination of the documents and facts. So long 5 as the pleadings discloses some cause of action or raised some question fit to be decided by the Judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at trial was no ground for the pleading to be struck-out (at p.43 G-I & p.44 A-D) which principle was adopted by the Federal Court in Owen Sim Liang Khui v Piasau Jaya Sdn 10 Bhd & Anor [1996] 1 MLJ 113 (FC) at p.135 I to p.136 A-D and the Court of Appeal in Aras Jalinan Sdn Bhd v Tipco Asphalt Public Co Ltd & Ors [2012] 1 MLJ 510 at 515 [6] to [8]). Conclusion 15 [13] For the reasons discussed above, I concluded the present case is not a case where the Plaintiff’s s.181 Petition is “plain and obviously unsustainable”; nor is it scandalous, frivolous and vexatious and it may prejudice, embarrass or delay a fair trial. In the circumstances, encl.77 is dismissed with costs of 20 RM15,000.00 to be paid by the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants to the Plaintiff. Dated: 28/2/2018 25 30 SGD. (LAU BEE LAN) Judge 35 18 5 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Y.Bhg. Dato’ Prem Ramachandran together with Cik Puvvana Muthuvelu 10 Messrs Kumar Partnership Advocates & Solicitors Suite 12.01 -12.02, 12th Floor Wisma E & C 2 Lorong Dungun Kiri 15 Damansara Heights 50490 Kuala Lumpur Counsel for the 1st to 6th and 9th Defendants: 20 Y.Bhg. Dato’ Dhanaraj together with Encik James Ee Kah Fuk, Cik Kalai Selvi and Encik Muhammad Ariff Messrs K. F. Ee & Co 25 Advocates & Solicitors N-1-2, Pusat Perdagangan Kuchai Jalan 1/127, Off Jalan Kuchai Lama 58200 Kuala Lumpur 30 Counsel for the 7th and 8th Defendants: Encik R. Rishikessingam Messrs Rishi & Partners 35 Advocates & Solicitors H-2-10, Plaza Damas Jalan Sri Hartamas 1 Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur 40 45