Adnan Bin Mat Yusoff v 1. Mazalan Bin Mat Yusoff (DA-22NCvC-30-05/2021)

MAZALAN BIN MAT YUSOFF

2.

KERAJAAN NEGERI KELANTAN …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah merupakan satu permohonan oleh Defendan 1 (Def 1) di Kandungan 10 (K 10) serta permohonan Defendan 2 (Def 2) dan 3 (Def 3) di Kandungan 24 (K 24) di bawah A.18 k.19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM) untuk membatalkan Writ Saman (WS) dan 2 Pernyataan Tuntutan (PT) yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif (Plf) ke atas kesemua Defendan. [2] WS dan PT yang difailkan oleh Plf adalah berkait dengan sebidang tanah di bawah hakmilik GM 490 Lot 1710 Kg Banggol Manok, Jajahan Pasir Mas, Kelantan (tanah tersebut) milik Mat Yusoff bin Abdullah yang merupakan ayah kepada Plf dan Def 1 (ayah mereka) yang memiliki 1/12 bahagian ke atasnya. Hakmilik tersebut telah dipindahmilik oleh ayah mereka kepada Def 1 pada 1/10/2020. [3] Plf mempertikaikan proses pindahmilik tersebut dan memohon deklarasi antara lain agar pindahmilik tersebut sebagai tidak sah dan hakmilik dipindahkan kembali kepada ayah mereka dalam tempoh 14 hari. Secara alternatif, Plf memohon Def 1 untuk membayar nilaian tanah tersebut kepada adik-beradik yang lain termasuk Plf mengikut persetujuan adik-beradik sama ada secara farai’d atau sama rata. [4] Bagi maksud permohonan ini, Mahkamah akan menimbangkan dahulu K 10 sebelum selanjutnya menimbangkan K 24 yang difailkan oleh Def 2 dan Def 3. Mahkamah perlu menyatakan bahawa Plf turut memfailkan Notis Permohonan di Kandungan 14 untuk meminda WS dan PT. Namun di atas persetujuan semasa Pengurusan Kes, K 10 dan K 24 dipersetujui untuk diputuskan terlebih dahulu. 3 Permohonan di bawah A18 k19 KKM 2012 [5] Notis Permohonan di K 10 disokong oleh Afidavit Sokongan (K 11) yang diikrarkan oleh Def 1 serta disokong oleh Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan I (K 12) yang diikrarkan oleh bapa mereka dan Afidavit Sokongan Tambahan II (K 13) yang diikrarkan oleh abang kepada

Plf sebagai jawapan telah memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan (K 17), serta Afidavit Jawapan (K 18) ke atas K 12 dan Afidavit Jawapan (K 19) ke atas K 13. Def 1 selanjutnya telah memfailkan Afidavit Balasan ke atas kesemua afidavit yang difailkan oleh Plf sebagai K 22 yang turut mengekshibitkan Surat Akuan oleh bapa mereka dan Surat Akuan oleh pemilik lain tanah tersebut. Manakala bagi permohonan Def 2 dan Def 3, ia adalah di K 24 yang disokong oleh Afidavit Sokongan di K 25. Tiada Afidavit Jawapan difailkan oleh Plf bagi K 24. [6] Asas kepada permohonan Def 1 adalah Plf tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah dan/atau remeh, menyusahkan dan mengaibkan. Ini kerana Def 1 menyatakan bahawa: a) Hakmilik Def 1 tidak dapat disangkal sebagaimana peruntukan di bawah KTN; dan b) Ayah mereka tidak pernah mengarahkan Plf untuk membuat permohonan kepada Mahkamah bagi membatalkan pindahmilik. 4 Manakala asas permohonan Def 2 dan Def 3 adalah Plf telah menamakan pihak yang salah kerana ia melibatkan Pejabat Tanah dan Jajahan Pasir Mas dan bukannya Kota Bharu. [7] Sebelum Mahkamah menyatakan pertimbangan ke atas permohonan ini, Mahkamah ingin menyatakan bahawa Plf di dalam afidavit-afidavit jawapan yang difailkan telah merujuk tanah tersebut sebagai pesaka, sedangkan ayah mereka, masih lagi hidup. Oleh itu, rujukan sebegitu bukan sahaja salah namun ianya sangat tidak wajar. Prinsip Undang-undang berkaitan A18 k19 KKM 2012 [8] Prinsip berkaitan permohonan sebegini adalah jelas dan mantap. Ia memperuntukkan kuasa kepada Mahkamah ini untuk mengenepikan tuntutan Plf tanpa satu perbicaraan penuh dan oleh itu ia perlu dijalankan dengan penuh berhati-hati serta di dalam kes yang jelas dan nyata sahaja. Kesemuan Def perlu membuktikan bahawa tuntutan Plf adalah secara jelas tidak mapan. [9] Di dalam kes Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & ors v UMBC Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 telah diputuskan oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin bin Hj Abdullah HMA seperti berikut: “The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) of the Rules of the High Courtare well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process 5 under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, at p 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable ' (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L & NW Ry Co [1892] 3 Ch 274 (CA)). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 AllER 871 (CA))... ... It has been said that so long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some question fit to be decided by the judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out (Moore v. Lawson [1915] 31 TLR 418 (CA)); (Wenlock v. Moloney)." [10] Selanjutnya di dalam kes Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 520, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan: “[23] Striking out is only adopted when it is conspicuously clear that the claim is obviously unsustainable. The court must be guided by the root word 'obviously ' because that word is the guiding light which shows that the claim must be plainly or evidently unsustainable in law before the claim is struck out (Pet Far Eastern (M) Sdn Bhd v. Tay Young Huat & Ors [1999] 2 CLJ 886; [1999] 5 MLJ 558 (HC)). Such power should only be exercised by the court sparingly. (Affin Bank Bhd v. Eye Bee Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 291; [2005] 7 MLJ 1; Roslan bin Abdullah v. New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1981] 1 LNS 40; [1981] 2 MLJ 324 (FC); Datuk lr Che Amran bin Mohd Yusoff v. Yayasan Melaka & Others [2003] 1 CLJ 767; [2003] MLJU 6 7;Seng Huat Hang Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Chee Seng & Co Sdn Bhd [1985] CLJ Rep 760; [1987] 1 MLJ 413 (HC); Mooney & Ors v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co & Anor [1966] 1 LNS 109; [1967] 1 MLJ 87 (HC); Honan Plantations Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor and another appeal [1998] 3 CLJ 253; [1998] 2 MLJ 498 (CA); Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (SC); and S Manickam & Ors v. Ismail bin Mohamad & Ors [1996] 1 LNS 117; [1997] 2 MLJ 90). [24] If the pleadings disclose some cause of action or has raised some question fit to be decided, then it is appropriate that the case should be set down for trial, no matter how slight the chances are of succeeding (Saripah bte Manap & Ors v. Emar Sdn Bhd (in dissolution) & Ors[1997] 4 CLJ 194; [1998] 1 MLJ 323 (HC)). And when there are issues to be determined by way of discovery or by way of cross-examination, then the summary process of striking out is not appropriate (Omega Holdings Bhd v. Dato ' Tiah Thee Kian & Ors [2002] 7 CLJ 125; [2002] 6 MLJ 20.)" [11] Manakala di dalam kes Datuk lr Che Amran Mohd Yusoff v. Yayasan Melaka & Ors [2003] 1 CLJ 767, Mahkamah telah memutuskan: "It has been stated ever so often by our courts that it is only in absolutely plain and obvious cases that a plaintiff's claim or action or a party's pleadings would be struck out under any of the limbs ofO. 18 r. 19(1): See eg, Roslan Abdullah v. New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1981] 1 LNS 40; [1981] 2 MLJ 324 (Federal Court). In the instant case, there are serious conflicts or controversies in the multifarious affidavits filled by the parties herein. I am 7 neither bound nor prepared to resolve these conflicts or controversies at this premature affidavit stage, but would only resolve them by way of mature consideration of viva voce evidence adduced at a full hearing of the action herein: Kantan Jaya Marine Services (Pg) Sdn Bhd v. RHB Bank Bhd [2001] 2 CLJ 738; Hii HengTuong Alphonsus v. Lok Min Wah & Ors [1995] 4 CLJ 350 HC.” Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah berkaitan K 10 [12] Berdasarkan kepada prinsip yang telah dinyatakan di dalam kes-kes duluan ini, Mahkamah perlu menimbangkan setiap permohonan ini serta meneliti kesemua afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan sama ada yang menyokong permohonan ini atau afidavit-afidavit balasan yang difailkan oleh Plf. Mahkamah sedar bahawa dari aspek beban, Plf mempunyai beban yang lebih mudah di dalam membantah permohonan ini. Plf cukup sekadar menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah wujudnya satu isu yang mewarankan tuntutannya dibicarakan secara penuh bagi permohonan ini ditolak. [13] Di dalam kes ini, adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa tanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Def 1 oleh ayah mereka pada 1/10/2020. Oleh itu, ia menjadi satu prinsip yang jelas di bawah sistem Torrens yang diamalkan oleh undang-undang tanah di negara kita dan yang dipertahankan di bawah sek 340 Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN), iaitu, hakmilik yang terdaftar bagi tanah tersebut adalah satu keterangan hakmilik yang tidak boleh disangkal. Manakala sek 89 KTN 8 menegaskan kemuktamadan pendaftaran hakmilik di atas dokumen pendaftaran. [14] Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes terbaru Bayangan Sepadu Sdn Bhd v Jabatan Pengairan Dan Saliran Negeri Selangor and ors [2021] 1 LNS 2146 telah memperjelaskan prinsip ini seperti berikut: “Torrens System And Indefeasibility Of Title [25] The nub of the appellant's submission on the 1st leave question is that assuming there was a promise to surrender the Land made by the Previous Owners/(which is denied), such a promise was an unregistered interest which cannot defeat the registered and indefeasible title of the appellant by virtue of sections 89 and 340 of the NLC 1965 relating to the conclusiveness of register documents of title and indefeasibility of title. [26] In this regard, the two most significant statutory provisions are sections 89 and 340 of the NLC 1965:-

"Conclusiveness of register documents of title Every register document of title duly registered under this Chapter shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be conclusive evidence -

that title to the land described therein is vested in the person or body for the time being named therein as proprietor; and

of the conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions subject to which the land is for the time being held by that person or body, so far as the same are required by any 9 provision of this Act to be specified or referred to in that document."

"Registration to confer indefeasible title or interest, except in certain circumstances

The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible.

The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible -

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law.

Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in sub-section (2) -

it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and

any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: 10 Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser.

Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent -

the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or

the determination of any title or interest by operation of law". [27] It is trite that land law in Malaysia is based on title and interest by registration which is derived from the Torrens System. There are two fundamental principles of the Torrens System, namely the mirror principle and the curtain principle. The mirror principle portrays a concept in which the land title mirrors all relevant and material details that a perspective purchaser, lessee and chargee ought to know. This mean that a person can obtain all such material information of the land, based on what is endorsed on the register of document of title and issue document of title. On the other hand, the curtain principle is a concept that dispenses with the need to look beyond the register - as the land itself provides all relevant information reflecting the validity of the same. Ostensibly, the "curtain" is where the principle took its name from. [28] In the case of Yap Ham Seow v. Fatimawati bt Ismail & Ors and another appeal [2013] 9 CLJ 577; [2014] 1 MLJ 645 ("Yap Ham Seow"), Raus Sharif PCA (as his Lordship then was) sitting in the Court of Appeal explained on the issue of ownership as recognised by section 89 of the NLC 1965 as follows:- 11 "[41] Under the circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the fourth defendant's contention that it is the person who is named in the register document of title as the proprietor is the one who is recognised by s. 89 of the NLC 1965....... In determining ownership as in the instant case the court should not be concerned with how the fourth defendant got his name onto the register document of title or whose interest takes priority over the other. Rather, for us the question of critical importance at the end of the day so far as the issue of ownership is concerned boils down to this: Whether the interest of the fourth defendant as the registered proprietor whose name is in the register document of title is indefeasible. This is indeed the thrust of the second issue in the fourth defendant's appeal." [Emphasis added] [29] In the case of Pushpaleela a/p R Selvarajah & Anor v. Rajamani d/o Meyappa Chettiar and other appeals [2019] 3 CLJ 441;[2019] 2 MLJ 553, Azahar Mohamed FCJ (now CJM) had succinctly discussed the legal position of section 89 of the NLC and adopted the proposition in Yap Ham Seow (supra) as follows:- "[146] Now, once the scheme of the provisions of s. 89 is seen, it is apparent that since the register document of title is conclusive evidence of ownership and in the present instance since the register document of title bears the name of the first defendant as the registered proprietor, it follows and becomes conclusive evidence that the first defendant is the registered proprietor unless defeasible pursuant to s. 340 of the NLC. What appears on the registered document of title is conclusive as the register is everything under the Torrens System. In Gibbs v. Messor & Co [1891] AC 248, Lord Watson said - 12 The object is to save persons dealing with registered proprietors from the trouble and expense of going behind the register, in order to investigate the history of their author's title, and to satisfy themselves of its validity. That end is accomplished by providing that everyone who purchases, in bona fide and for value, from a registered proprietor, and enters his deed of transfer or mortgage on the register, shall thereby acquire an indefeasible right, notwithstanding the infirmity of his author's title. [147] In the case of Teh Bee v. K Maruthamuthu [1977] 1 LNS 134; [1977] 2 MLJ 7, it was held that 'the fact that the register document of title was in the name of the appellant was conclusive evidence that the title to the land was vested in the appellant'. The concept of indefeasibility of title under s. 89 of the NLC applies to the person whose name currently appears as the proprietor on the register document of title and not to a former registered proprietor (see Yap Ham Seow). [148] As pointed out by Teo Keang Sood and Khaw Lake Tee in Land Law in Malaysia, Cases and Commentary (3rd Ed) at pp 182- 183: Under the Torrens system, it is the act of registration that vests title or interest; once registered, the title or interest cannot be divested except otherwise statutorily provided. Registration is the cornerstone of the Torrens system. It is not a system of registration or recordation of title, under which what are registered are existing titles or interests; registration under such system does not vest or divest any title or interest. Under the Torrens system, the registered title or interest is also free of all adverse claims or encumbrances not otherwise noted on the register. The effect of registration is to defeat all prior and subsequent unregistered claims. Under this system, and as underscored by section 89 of the Code, the register is 13 all important and conclusive evidence that the title is vested in the person or body for the time being named as the proprietor and that the land is subject to such conditions, restrictions in interest and other provisions as specified in the title. Theoretically, this is known as the 'indefeasibility of title', which is reflected in section 340 of our Code under which it is provided that registration confers an indefeasibility title or interest, until and unless that title or interest is challenged or set aside on any of the grounds set out under section 340(2)". [Emphasis added] [30] It is pertinent to note that the principle of indefeasibility of title is one of the main features and attributes of the Torrens System of conveyance. It involves the proposition that once a person is registered as proprietor of certain land or interest in the land, he or she acquires a title that cannot be vitiated except as provided under section 340 of the NLC 1965. Therefore, section 450 complements section 89 (See Leong Chye & Anor v. United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd & Another Appeal [2021] 6 CLJ 650; Mega Meisa Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Mustapah bin Dorani and another appeal [2020] 1 LNS 1480; [2020] 6 MLJ 594).” [15] Walaubagaimanapun, hakmilik tidak boleh disangkal tersebut masih tertakluk kepada subseksyen 340(2) KTN yang menyatakan; “(2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible-

in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or 14

where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or

where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law.” [16] Di dalam kes ini, Plf di dalam PT mendakwa bahawa pindahmilik yang dibuat oleh ayah mereka kepada Def 1 adalah tidak sah bersandarkan kepada wujudnya elemen pengaruh yang tidak wajar berkaitan pindahmilik tersebut di atas alasan: a) Ayah mereka telah berumur 80 tahun dan ada masalah pendengaran; b) Pindahmilik tersebut tidak dimaklumkan kepada adik beradik yang lain; dan c) Pindahmilik tersebut adalah tanpa sebarang balasan yang sah dan wajar [17] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa alasan-alasan yang dibangkitkan oleh Plf di dalam PT adalah langsung tidak tercakup di bawah subseksyen 340(2) KTN. Di atas alasan ini sahaja pun, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa PT ini tidak membangkitkan apa-apa kausa tindakan ke atas Def 1 dan lebih merupakan satu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. 15 [18] Pandangan Mahkamah ini adalah bersandarkan kepada kedudukan undang-undang bahawa kebolehsangkalan hakmilik hanya dibolehkan apabila ianya tergolong di dalam mana-mana subseksyen tersebut. Alasan-alasan yang dibangkitkan oleh Plf termasuk pengaruh yang tidak wajar bagi pandangan Mahkamah adalah tidak termasuk di bawah mana-mana kategori di bawah subseksyen tersebut. [19] Dalam apa jua keadaan, Mahkamah ini akan tetap menilai keterangan-keterangan afidavit bagi menentukan sama ada Plf telah dapat menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah, sama ada dakwaan pengaruh tidak wajar terwujud di dalam situasi kes Plf ini. [20] Doktrin paksaan tidak wajar selalunya digunapakai di dalam undang-undang kontrak (rujuk seksyen 16 Akta Kontrak 1950 (AK 1950)) serta tuntutan-tuntutan berkaitan probet. Doktrin tersebut telah ditafsirkan oleh AK 1950 sebagai “that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other”. [21] Beban bagi membuktikan bahawa wujud sebarang pengaruh tidak wajar adalah juga seperti beban-beban lain di dalam undang-undang iaitu terletak kepada pihak yang mendakwanya. PK Ahmad Murad Abdul Aziz di dalam kes Wasunan Tonrab & 1 lg v Lee Ah Sin [2020] 1 LNS 2265 yang melibatkan satu kes berkaitan keupayaan testementori pembuat wasiat, telah merujuk kepada 16 keputusan House of Lords di dalam kes Boyse v. Rossborough [1857] 6 HLC 2 dengan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[24] The meaning of undue influence in probate actions was explained by the learned judge in Wingrove v. Wingrove [1885] 11 P.D, page 81. "To be undue influence in the eye of the law there must be – to sum it in a word – coercion. It must not be a case in which a person has been induced by means such as I have suggested to you to come to a conclusion that he or she will make a will in a particular person's favour, because if the testator has only been persuaded or induced by considerations which you may condemn, really and truly to intend to give his property to another, though you may disapprove of the act yet it is strictly legitimate in the sense of its being legal. It is only when the will of the person who becomes a testator is coerced into doing that which he or she does not desire to do, that it is undue influence". It is clear from the speech by the learned Judge that the crucial element in any act of undue influence on a testator is "coercion". In the present case, nowhere in his Affidavit in Reply does the Defendant even allege any coercion by the Plaintiffs on the deceased. It has been held by the House of Lords in Boyse v. Rossborough [1857] 6 HLC 2 that: "the burden of proving that it was executed under undue influence is on the party who alleges it. Undue influence cannot be pressured. This basic principle was reiterated in the Privy Council case of Craig v. Lamoureux [1920] AC 349." Having perused the Affidavit in Reply and submissions by the Defendant, I find that he has failed to prove that the deceased 17 was under any undue influence when he made both the 2016 and 2018 Wills.” [Emphasis added] [22] Bersandarkan prinsip bebanan ini, Mahkamah perlu menilai sama ada Plf telah mengenengahkan apa-apa keterangan yang dapat menyokong dakwaannya. Di peringkat ini ia bukanlah untuk membuktikannya ke tahap imbangan keberangkalian namun sekadar bagi Mahkamah menilai sama ada terdapatnya keterangan yang mapan dan mewajarkan tuntutan Plf dibicarakan. [23] Menyelusuri K 18, K 17 dan K 19 serta PT Plf, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa apa yang dikemukakan oleh Plf kini hanyalah dakwaan-dakwaan yang bersandarkan kepada syak wasangka Plf semata-mata dan keterangan dengar cakap. Tiada apa-apa keterangan yang tuntas dikemukakan bagi membuktikan dakwaan Plf tersebut. Dapatan Mahkamah adalah bersandarkan kepada fakta-fakta berikut: a) Ayah mereka sendiri telah mengikrarkan K 12 yang dengan jelas menyatakan bahawa beliau sedar dan bersetuju untuk memindahkan tanah tersebut kepada Def 1; b) Plf mendakwa ayahnya sudah berusia dan kurang pendengaran, namun tiada suatu keterangan pun yang dapat membuktikan dakwaan Plf tersebut; 18 c) Plf bersandarkan kepada keterangan dengar cakap iaitu kononnya sepupunya Azizah binti Husin menyatakan bahawa ayahnya mengadu sedangkan tiada sebarang afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh penama tersebut; dan d) Dakwaan bahawa ayah mereka mengadu kepada Azizah bin Husin turut disangkal oleh Def 1 dan ayah mereka sendiri. [24] Mahkamah berpandangan, hak ayah mereka untuk memindahkan hartanya semasa hayatnya adalah hak beliau yang tidak boleh dipertikaikan. Plf bukan sahaja tiada hak serta locus untuk memulakan tindakan ini malahan perbuatan seperti ini bercanggah dengan norma kehidupan masyarakat Melayu Islam di mana seorang anak mencabar keputusan ayahnya melalui satu tindakan di Mahkamah. [25] Plf juga bagi pandangan Mahkamah tidak dapat mempertikaikan bahawa proses pindahmilik tersebut telah dibuat secara proses perundangan yang sah. Apatah lagi ianya dilakukan di hadapan seorang Pentadbir Tanah dan di bawah misalan (e) seksyen 114 Akta Keterangan 1950, Mahkamah boleh membuat andaian bahawa tindakan rasmi oleh Pentadbir Tanah tersebut telah dilaksanakan mengikut aturan. [26] Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Mohd Isha Awang v Mohamad Idris Seramal Baris [2020] 9 CLJ 760 telah menyatakan dengan jelas penggunaan misalan (e) ini seperti berikut: 19 “In our view, had the learned JC applied his mind properly, he would have noticed that those documents issued by the relevant authorities are in fact, documents issued by a Government department. The documents show the judicial and official acts which have been performed. It is trite law that the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened in relation to the facts of the particular case that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed (see s. 114(e) of EA). The words "regularly performed" means correctly done (see Commissioners of the Municipality of Malacca v. Sinniah [1970] 1 LNS 22; [1974] 1 MLJ 77). The section also states that the court is required to have regard to the fact that 'judicial act, the regularity of which is in question was performed under exceptional circumstances'. Once the presumption arises, the official act will be presumed to have been regularly done until the contrary is proved (see Evidence, Practice and Procedure, 4th edn, Augustine Paul at p. 908). Peh Swee Chin in Loo Keck Leong v. PP [1992] 3 CLJ 1332; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 195; [1992] 2 MLJ 177, 182 (SC) held that the presumption is of course a rebuttable and optional presumption, based upon the common experience of mankind.” [27] Di atas pertimbangan-pertimbangan ini, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa adalah jelas dan nyata tuntutan Plf adalah secara jelas tidak mapan. Ia bukan sahaja tidak dapat menunjukkan bagaimana ketidakbolehsangkalan hakmilik tersebut boleh tersangkal di bawah sek 380(2) KTN dan di dalam masa yang sama Plf juga gagal menunjukkan melalui keterangan afidavit kewujudan elemen pengaruh tidak wajar ke atas ayah mereka. Dengan kata yang lain tuntutan Plf melalui PT mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang tidak 20 munasabah serta mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan dan adalah satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. [28] Mahkamah dengan ini membenarkan permohonan di K 10 dan membatalkan WS dan PT ke atas Def 1 dengan kos sebanyak RM 2,500 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Analisis dan dapatan Mahkamah berkaitan K 24 [29] Selanjutnya berkaitan K 24, Mahkamah mendapati bahawa Plf telah turut menamakan Def yang salah iaitu dengan menamakan Pejabat Tanah dan Jajahan Kota Bharu. Tindakan ini, jika wujud sekalipun, adalah ke atas Pejabat Tanah dan Jajahan Pasir Mas. Notis Permohonan Def 2 dan Def 3 di K 24 telah disokong oleh Afidavit Sokongan di K 25 dan tiada Afidavit Jawapan difailkan oleh Plf. Malahan Plf mengakui tindakan salahnya ini apabila telah memfailkan Notis Permohonan di K 14 yang bagi Mahkamah adalah tidak boleh menyelamatkan kesilapan yang telah dilakukan. [30] Oleh itu, tindakan Plf ini juga adalah tidak mapan untuk dibicarakan dan oleh itu Mahkamah membenarkan K 24 iaitu Mahkamah membatalkan WS dan PT yang difailkan oleh Plf ke atas Def 2 dan

Memandangkan tiada hujahan difailkan, maka Mahkamah tidak memerintahkan sebarang kos. 21 Kesimpulan [31] Secara keseluruhannya, WS dan PT ke atas kesemua Defendan adalah dengan ini dibatalkan. [32] Memandangkan keseluruhan tindakan kini telah dibatalkan, maka Mahkamah turut memutuskan bahawa tiada isu lagi bagi Mahkamah mendengar serta memutuskan NP oleh Plf untuk meminda WS dan PT sepertimana di K 14. Sehubungan dengan itu K 14 adalah dengan ini dibatalkan tanpa perintah berkaitan kos. Bertarikh: 6hb. Februari, 2022 (DATUK MOHAMAD ABAZAFREE BIN MOHD ABBAS) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi (2) Kota Bharu, Kelantan. 22 Pihak-pihak: Bagi Pihak Plaintif : Puan Nur Arina Binti Rosli Tetuan Ridzuan Awang & Co. Peguambela dan Peguamcara Lot 343, Tingkat 2 Jalan Sultan Yahya Petra 15200 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi Pihak Defendan 1: Puan Siti Syaerah Binti Meor Zul-Kefli 'Auni Tetuan Syaerah & Maryati Peguambela dan Peguamcara No. 2679-E, Jalan Telipot 15150 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Bagi Pihak Defendan 2&3: Tuan Adam bin Mohamed Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Kelantan Blok 5, Aras Bawah, Kota Darulnaim 15050 Kota Bharu, Kelantan. Tarikh Bicara : 06hb. Oktober, 2021 Tarikh Keputusan : 15hb. Disember, 2021 23 Undang-Undang Yang Dirujuk  A.18 k.19 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012  sek 340 Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN),  seksyen 16 Akta Kontrak 1950  seksyen 114 Akta Keterangan 1950 Kes-Kes Yang Dirujuk  Bandar Builders Sdn Bhd & ors v UMBC Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36  Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 520  Datuk lr Che Amran Mohd Yusoff v. Yayasan Melaka & Ors [2003] 1 CLJ 767  Wasunan Tonrab & 1 lg v Lee Ah Sin [2020] 1 LNS 2265  Boyse v. Rossborough [1857] 6 HLC 2  Mohd Isha Awang v Mohamad Idris Seramal Baris [2020] 9 CLJ 760