Aerotree Defence & Services Sdn. Bhd v Ketua Setiausaha Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia (WA-21NCvC-54-09/2025)

(a) suatu perintah injunksi interim untuk menghalang Defendan-Defendan sama ada secara sendiri dan/atau melalui pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau ejen-ejennya dan/atau wakil-wakilnya dan/atau pembantu-pembantunya daripada mengguna pakai kesemua wang atau sebarang jumlah wang yang diterima daripada Affin Bank Berhad di bawah Jaminan Bank No. 06702231530007 berjumlah RM1,870,000.56 sehingga pelupusan penuh prosiding kes ini;

(b) suatu perintah injunksi ad-interim untuk menghalang Defendan-Defendan sama ada secara sendiri dan/atau melalui pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau ejen-ejennya dan/atau wakil-wakilnya dan/atau pembantu-pembantunya daripada mengguna pakai kesemua wang atau sebarang jumlah wang yang diterima daripada Affin Bank Berhad di bawah Jaminan Bank No. 06702231530007 berjumlah RM1,870,000.56 sehingga pelupusan permohonan Plaintif untuk injunksi interim; S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 3

(c) bahawa adalah suatu penghinaan (contempt) kepada Mahkamah untuk mana-mana pihak yang dimaklumkan mengenai Perintah tersebut untuk atau dengan pengetahuan membantu atau membenarkan pelanggaran Perintah tersebut;

(d) semua kos yang berkaitan dengan dan yang timbul daripada permohonan ini dijadikan kos dalam kausa; dan

(e) relief-relief lain yang dianggap adil dan suai manfaat oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.

(a) Surat Setuju Terima bertarikh 17.4.2023 (Bagi Perolehan Perkhidmatan Sewaan Helikopter untuk Pasukan Udara Tentera Darat (“PUTD”) bagi Tempoh 5 Tahun dengan Syarikat Aerotree Defence & Services Sdn. Bhd. (ADSB)) (No. Kontrak: KP/PERO3A/T247/2021/OE) (“SST”) telah ditandatangani oleh D1 yang mana D2 dan/atau D3 telah bersetuju untuk menerima tawaran tender syarikat Plaintif dengan nilai kontrak sebanyak RM187,000,056.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Satu Ratus Lapan Puluh Tujuh Juta Lima Puluh Enam Sahaja) bagi tempoh kontrak selama lima (5) tahun mulai tarikh SST ditandatangani tertakluk kepada dokumen tender yang menjadi sebahagian daripada perolehan S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4 tersebut dan SST tersebut berserta Lampiran A kepada SST;

(b) berdasarkan SST yang telah ditandatangani, syarikat Plaintif perlu menyediakan empat (4) unit helikopter Blackhawk UH-60A (Digital Class Cockpit) yang diperlukan oleh PUTD;

(c) syarikat Plaintif telah mendapatkan suatu jaminan bank bertarikh 14.6.2023 (Jaminan Bank No. 06702231530007) (“Jaminan Bank”) daripada Affin Bank Berhad menurut obligasi di bawah klausa 4(a) dan klausa 12 SST untuk bon pelaksanaan yang tidak boleh dibatalkan berjumlah RM1,870,000.56;

(d) syarikat Plaintif telah memaklumkan kepada pihak D2 dan/atau D3 melalui surat bertarikh 19.10.2023 dan memohon suatu lanjutan masa selama enam (6) bulan daripada tarikh sepatutnya penghantaran dibuat, iaitu akhir bulan Oktober 2023, sehingga selewat-lewatnya bulan Januari 2024 yang mana melalui surat bertarikh 10.1.2024, pihak D2 dan/atau D3 yang telah memberi pelanjutan masa untuk penghantaran helikopter Blackhawk UH-60A sehingga 30.4.2024;

(e) syarikat Plaintif telah menyerahkan status serta jangkaan terkini penghantaran helikopter Blackhawk UH-60A kepada S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 5 D2 dan/atau D3 melalui surat bertarikh 15.8.2024 yang mana syarikat Plaintif juga memohon agar lanjutan masa selama enam (6) bulan bermula dari tarikh lanjutan masa kedua itu ditandatangani yang mana permohonan ini telah dimaklumkan awal melalui surat bertarikh 15.4.2024. Walau bagaimanapun, hanya pada 29.8.2024 syarikat Plaintif menerima maklum balas daripada pihak D2 dan/atau D3 berkenaan dengan lanjutan masa kedua sehingga 30.10.2024;

(f) melalui surat bertarikh 3.10.2024, syarikat Plaintif telah memohon kepada pihak D2 dan/atau D3 untuk semakan semula lanjutan masa kedua atau memberikan lanjutan masa ketiga selama enam (6) bulan bagi penghantaran helikopter Blackhawk UH-60A;

(g) syarikat Plaintif telah menerima suatu surat penamatan bertarikh 31.10.2024 atas alasan bahawa syarikat Plaintif telah gagal membekalkan helikopter/menyempurnakan perkhidmatan dalam tempoh yang ditetapkan menurut klausa 13(g) SST;

(h) pihak D2 dan/atau D3 telah memberikan notis bertarikh 15.8.2025 bagi menuntut bon Jaminan Bank yang berjumlah RM1,870,000.56 kepada pihak Affin Bank dan memberikan arahan agar jumlah tersebut dilepaskan S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 6 kepada D2 dan/atau D3 dalam tempoh masa empat belas

(i) syarikat Plaintif telah membuat bantahan terhadap tuntutan tersebut melalui surat kepada pihak bank bertarikh 18.8.2025;

(j) walau bagaimanapun, pihak bank telah melepaskan jumlah RM1,870,000.56 kepada pihak D2 dan/atau D3 pada 29.8.2025 walaupun secara jelas syarikat Plaintif telah menyatakan bantahan bahawa terdapat pertikaian berkenaan dengan penamatan yang dibuat oleh pihak D2 dan/atau D3;

(k) imbangan kemudahan (balance of convenience) dalam perkara ini adalah berpihak kepada Plaintif dan ianya tidak boleh dipampas dengan kos sebaliknya suatu perintah injunksi interim perlulah diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini; dan

(l) Plaintif beraku janji untuk membayar kepada Defendan-Defendan sebarang ganti rugi yang mungkin dialami oleh Defendan-Defendan (sekiranya ada) akibat daripada perintah atau relief-relief yang dipohon oleh Plaintif seperti yang terkandung dalam Permohonan ini. S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7

(a) peguam cara Plaintif yang bergantung besar pada dua kes utama, iaitu kes Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam Minister of Finance, Government of Sabah v Petrojasa Sdn Bhd [2008] 4 MLJ 641; [2008] 1 MLRA 705 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Petrojasa”) dan kes Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Sabil Mulia (M) Sdn Bhd v. Pengarah Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah & Ors [2005] 2 CLJ 122; [2004] 2 MLRA 583 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Sabil Mulia”), menghujahkan bahawa seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 tidak menghalang Mahkamah untuk memberikan perintah injunksi interim terhadap Kerajaan dan/atau agensinya; dan

(b) peguam cara Defendan-Defendan yang bergantung besar pada kes dua utama, iaitu kes Mahkamah Agung dalam Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang; United Engineers (M) Berhad v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12; [1988] 1 MLRA 178 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Lim Kit Siang”) dan kes Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Kuching Division & Ors v. Kuching Waterfront Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 6 CLJ 751 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Kuching Waterfront”), menghujahkan bahawa menurut seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 dibaca bersama seksyen 54 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 [Akta 137], Mahkamah tidak boleh S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 9 memberikan perintah injunksi terhadap Kerajaan dan/atau agensinya, termasuk injunksi interim.

(a) Seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 “Nature of relief

(a) where in any proceedings against the Government any such relief is sought as might in proceedings between subjects be granted by way of injunction or specific performance, the court shall not grant an injunction or make an order for specific performance, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaratory of the rights of the parties; and

(b) in any proceedings against the Government for the recovery of land or other property the court shall not make an order for the recovery of the land or the delivery of the property, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaring that the plaintiff is entitled as against the S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 10 Government to the land or property or to the possession thereof.

(b) Seksyen 54 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 “Injunction when refused

(a) to stay a judicial proceeding pending at the institution of the suit in which the injunction is sought, unless such a restraint is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings;

(b) to stay proceedings in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought;

(c) to restrain persons from applying to any legislative body;

(d) to interfere with the public duties of any department of any Government in Malaysia, or with the sovereign acts of a foreign Government;

(e) to stay proceedings in any criminal matter; S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 11

(f) to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced;

(g) to prevent, on the ground of nuisance, an act of which it is not reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance;

(h) to prevent a continuing breach in which the applicant has acquiesced;

(i) when equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding, except in case of breach of trust;

(j) when the conduct of the applicant or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the court; or

(k) where the applicant has no personal interest in the matter. ILLUSTRATIONS

(a) A seeks an injunction to restrain his partner, B, from receiving the partnership-debts and effects. It appears that A had improperly possessed himself of the books of the firm and refused B access to them. The court will refuse the injunction.

(b) A manufactures and sells crucibles, designating them as “patent plumbago crucibles” though, in fact, they have never been patented. B pirates the designation. A cannot obtain an injunction to restrain the piracy. S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 12

(c) A sells an article called “Mexican Balm” stating that it is compounded of divers rare essences, and has sovereign medicinal qualities. B commences to sell a similar article to which he gives a name and description such as to lead people into the belief that they are buying A’s Mexican Balm. A sues B for an injunction to restrain the sale. B shows that A’s Mexican Balm consists of nothing but scented hog’s lard. A’s use of his description is not an honest one and he cannot obtain an injunction.”.

(a) dalam kes Lim Kit Siang, Salleh Abas LP yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “Apart from this, the issue of the interim injunction against UEM is absolutely contrary to the expressed words of section 29 of the Government Proceedings Ordinance 1956, as it has in effect indirectly restrained the Government. … This means that no injunction could be directly or indirectly issued against the Government or its officers. Similarly, the court has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction against a private litigant if the injunction would have the effect of restraining the Government or its officers from performing their functions. This has been the interpretation which has been placed by the courts in England as well as in this country.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(b) dalam kes Kuching Waterfront, Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA (pada ketika itu) yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 14 “[11] The second ground is substantive in nature as it relates to the actual jurisdiction of granting the injunction. Even though the High Court has the discretion to grant it, s. 29 of the GPA does not permit the granting of any injunction against the government, and likewise s. 54 of the Specific Relief Act has the same bar for any department of any Government in Malaysia. … … [20] Needless to say the words of s. 29(1)(a) of the GPA are quite clear and there is no reason to depart or whittle away what has been built into it. In Lim Kit Siang v. United Engineers

(M) Bhd & Ors [1987] 2 CLJ 195; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 170, the Supreme Court affirmed the view of the High Court judge as regards the express prohibition in s. 29, though not the extension of its scope. It was unable though to agree that the provision prevents the granting of an injunction against a party (UEM there) having a transaction with the government. … [29] When courts are faced with injunction applications, the factor of balance of convenience has to be considered in the course of their deliberation, and when assessing where the balance of convenience lies, the interest of the public may rightly be taken into consideration (Smith v. Inner London Education Authority [1978] 1 All ER 411). No Government departments can afford to take lightly any admission that the excavated area had posed a threat to the public. As Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) delivering the S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 15 judgment of the Court of Appeal in Tenaga Nasional Berhad v. Dolomite Industrial Park Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 CLJ 695 said: ... I think counsel for the authority is right in saying that where the defendant is a public authority performing duties to the public one must look at the balance of convenience more widely, and take into account the interests of the public in general to whom these duties are owed. [30] To wind up all the above prohibitive provisions, the rationale of allowing the Government, any government department or government servants to carry out its duties to the public, and without fear of any unnecessary impediment, must be one of the many obvious reasons why the GPA and the SRA have been so legislated in that manner. … [36] As we were satisfied that: i. the combined effect of the hurdle of s. 29(1)(a) of the GPA, in that no injunction may be ordered against the Government, and the preclusion of s. 29(1)(b) of the GPA whereby courts cannot order the recovery of the land from the Government or the delivery of property to the respondent had not been overcome; or ii. the balance of convenience founded on public interest or sufficiency of damages favoured the S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 16 non-issuance of an injunction, regardless of the above statutory inhibitions, [37] We accordingly meted down the consequential orders. To reiterate, apart from allowing the appeal as stated in the opening paragraph of this grounds of judgment, we thereupon ordered that the interim injunction be set aside, costs ordered for here and below, and that the deposit refunded to the appellants.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(c) dalam kes Sabil Mulia, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (pada ketika itu) yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “It has been settled since at least 1978 that s. 29 of the 1956 Act does not prohibit the grant of temporary injunctions against the Government. In Tengku Haji Jaafar & Anor v. Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105 it was held that the section “does not take away therefore the right of the court to grant an interlocutory injunction”. This court in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 CLJ 378 treated the ratio in Tengku Haji Jaafar & Anor v. Government of the State of Pahang as settled law. Although the Federal Court reversed our decision in that case on the constitutional point, our judgment on this point was approved sub silentio. Accordingly, it is too late in the day to argue that s. 29 bars the grant of an interlocutory or even an interim injunction against the Government.”. [Penekanan ditambah] S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 17

(d) dalam kes Petrojasa, Arifin Zakaria FCJ (pada ketika itu) yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “[76] In Sabil Mulia (M) Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah & Ors [2005] 3 MLJ 325, the Court of Appeal at p 333 stated: We now turn to consider the position after 1948. It is axiomatic the Crown Proceedings Act 1948 was passed to improve the position of the citizen vis-a-vis his or her rights against the Crown. As Professor Wade in his article Injunctive Relief against the Crown and Ministers [1991] 107 Lq R 4 at 6 says: The Crown Proceedings Act 1948 was a remedial statute, designed to put the Crown, so far as it could properly be done, into the position of an ordinary litigant, so that justice could be done without obstruction by the Crown’s ancient immunities. As Lord Jauncey said in British Medical Association v. Greater Glasgow Health Board [1989] AC 1211 (where, incidentally, Lord Diplock’s Town Investment (Town Investment Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359) dicta were once again disregarded), ‘the general purpose of the Crown Proceedings Act was to make it easier rather than more difficult for a subject to sue the Crown’, and the extension of immunities would ‘run wholly counter to its spirit’. S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 18 [77] In that case the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that the courts have jurisdiction to grant interim and permanent injunctions against any servant of the government. It also held that it is too late in the day to argue that s 29 of the GPA bars the grant of an interlocutory or even an interim injunction against the government. That is not the issue before us, as such I would not venture to say anything more on this save that the courts have moved away from the traditional stand that no order of injunction may be granted against the government.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(a) Sabil Mulia telah diputuskan selepas Lim Kit Siang dan telah berpeluang untuk merujuk dan mengambil kira Lim Kit Siang dalam penghakimannya. Walaupun Sabil Mulia tidak mengikut keputusan Lim Kit Siang yang melarang pemberian perintah injunksi interim terhadap Kerajaan dan/atau agensinya di bawah seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956, namun keputusan Sabil Mulia tersebut telah diikuti dan dipersetujui oleh Petrojasa; S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 19

(b) Petrojasa adalah keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan yang terkini berbanding dengan Lim Kit Siang. Berdasarkan prinsip duluan mengikat (stare decisis), Mahkamah ini adalah terikat dengan keputusan Petrojasa dan Sabil Mulia:

(c) dalam penghakiman Petrojasa dan Kuching Waterfront, Mahkamah bersetuju bahawa Malaysia telahpun beralih daripada pendekatan tradisional bahawa “the Crown can do no wrong”. Sebagai contoh, dalam Kuching Waterfront yang dirujuk oleh Defendan-Defendan, Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA (pada ketika itu) telah menyatakan bahawa – “[19] … Certainly we accede to the view that Malaysia has moved away from the traditionalist approach that the Crown can do no wrong.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(d) dalam prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah ini, perintah injunksi yang dipohon oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan adalah dalam bentuk injunksi interim seperti mana Sabil Mulia dan bukannya dalam bentuk injunksi kekal terhadap Kerajaan seperti mana larangan statutori di bawah seksyen 54 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950;

(e) fakta dalam prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah berbeza dengan Lim Kit Siang dan Kuching Waterfront. Dalam prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah ini, perintah injunksi interim yang dipohon oleh Plaintif adalah untuk S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 20 menghalang Defendan-Defendan daripada mengguna pakai kesemua wang atau sebarang jumlah wang yang diterima daripada Affin Bank Berhad di bawah bon Jaminan Bank tersebut sehingga pelupusan penuh prosiding kes ini dan bukannya untuk menghalang jabatan Kerajaan dan/atau kakitangan Kerajaan daripada melaksanakan tugas harian mereka seperti mana fakta dalam Lim Kit Siang dan Kuching Waterfront, yang mana ia adalah dilarang di bawah perenggan 54(d) Akta Relief Spesifik 1950. Perenggan 54(d) Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 tersebut adalah seperti yang berikut: “54. An injunction cannot be granted— …

(d) to interfere with the public duties of any department of any Government in Malaysia, or with the sovereign acts of a foreign Government;”;

(f) seksyen 54 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 tidak terpakai kepada permohonan Plaintif, iaitu seperti mana yang dihujahkan oleh peguam cara Defendan-Defendan, kerana permohonan Plaintif adalah untuk perintah injunksi interim dan bukan untuk injunksi kekal; S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 21

(g) Plaintif berjaya menunjukkan yang mereka mempunyai kes yang boleh dipertahankan (good arguable case) terhadap Defendan-Defendan dan berpeluang untuk mendapatkan penghakiman terhadap Defendan-Defendan, antara lain bahawa Plaintif telah mematuhi dan melaksanakan terma-terma perjanjian di bawah SST tersebut dan bahawa terdapat progres dalam pelaksanaan kontrak SST tersebut. Ini adalah selaras dengan prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan oleh Wong Kian Kheong JC (pada ketika itu) dalam kes Bumi Armada Navigation Sdn Bhd v. Mirza Marine Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 CLJ 652; [2015] MLRHU 242 seperti yang berikut: “Meaning Of “Good Arguable Case” [64] The following cases explain what is required of a plaintiff to prove a “good arguable case”:

(a) Abdoolcader FJ (as his Lordship then was) held in S & F International Ltd, at p. 283 (CLJ); p. 64 (MLJ), as follows: Mustill, J., held in Ninemia Maritime Corporation v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398 [1983] 1 WLR 1412 on appeal to CA that: (1) Before a Mareva injunction will be granted, a plaintiff must show first that he has a good arguable case, which is more than being barely capable of serious argument, but S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 22 not necessarily one that the judge believes has got more than fifty per cent chance of success; (emphasis added);

(b) Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as his Lordship then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Berhad v. Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 CLJ 900 at 905; [1995] 2 MLJ 213, at 221, decided as follows: The appellants were, as I surmise, applying for a Mareva injunction. As such, the relative strength or weakness of the defence filed during the very early stages of the action is extremely relevant in assessing whether the plaintiff has an arguable case. It is a higher standard than that applicable to the usual application for an injunction. (See The Tatiangela [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 193.) That this ought to be so is not in the least surprising: for the allegation made is that there is a risk of the defendant dissipating his assets with a view to defeating any judgment that the plaintiff may obtain against him. Since the relief is postulated upon a plaintiff’s success in the main action, for example, damages, it is only right and proper that the strength of his case be tested to ascertain how high the probabilities lie in favour of his ultimate success. The higher the degree of success, the greater is the need to protect that event by ensuring that he does not get a judgment that is as good as writ on running water. This, then, is the philosophy of the Mareva jurisdiction as distilled from the authorities upon S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 23 the subject. When a judge comes to assess the strength of a plaintiff’s case, it is a natural and essential part of that exercise to undertake an examination of the defences taken to the main action. The stronger the defence on its face, the less likely that the plaintiff will succeed in his action; and less the reason to grant him interim protection. To invert the proposition, the weaker the defence on its face, the greater is the probability of the plaintiff’s success in getting his judgment. That in my view is the correct approach to be adopted. The English Court of Appeal in an unreported case adopted the same approach. (See Fary Jones Insurance Ltd v. IFM Funding GmbH, decided on 10 April 1979.) (emphasis added);

(c) in Biasamas Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Kan Yan Heng & Anor [1998] 4 CLJ 754 at 759; [1998] 4 MLJ 1, at 5, Haidar JCA (as his Lordship then was) delivered the following judgment of the Court of Appeal: What is a good arguable case is difficult to define. The respondents need not show that they have a case so strong as to warrant summary judgment nor even a strong prima facie case. It would generally be sufficient if the respondents can show on the evidence available, there is a fair chance that they will obtain judgment against the appellants (see Ninemia Maritime Corp v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG; The S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 Niedersachsen [1984] 1 All ER 398, on appeal to CA [1984] 1 All ER 413; [1983] 1 WLR 1412). (emphasis added);

(d) in Lien Hoe Sawmill Co Sdn Bhd v. Yap Sing Hock & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ 1022; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 727, at 731, Zakaria Yatim J (as his Lordship then was) held as follows in the High Court: From the above authorities, it appears that the defendant is entitled to argue that he has a good arguable defence. It is not any arguable defence. To quote Lord Denning in Esefka International case, the defendant must establish that “... There is so much defence to be raised ... that it would not be a case where the plaintiffs have a really good arguable case to succeed”. I agree with Mr. Naban when he said in his written submission that in order to discharge a Mareva injunction a defendant must show such a defence which by its nature goes to the heart of the plaintiff’s case such that the plaintiff can no longer be regarded as having a good arguable case. (emphasis added); and

(e) Abdul Aziz Rahim J (as his Lordship then was) held as follows in Ikatan Innovasi Sdn Bhd, at p. 54: [13] As for the requirements for a Mareva injunction, the law requires the plaintiff (a) to show a good arguable case; (b) to produce evidence that the defendant has assets within the S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 25 jurisdiction, and (c) to show that there is risk of the defendant’s assets being removed from the court jurisdiction. These requirements have been stated in S & F International Ltd v. TransCon Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 CLJ 228; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 280. The plaintiff’s case or that the plaintiff’s case has more than fifty percent chance of success at the trial. What it meant is that the materials produced for the judge’s consideration whether or not to grant Mareva injunction are sufficient for the court to look seriously into the allegation by the plaintiff or the applicant. (emphasis added).”; [Penekanan ditambah]

(h) tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan dalam tindakan ini melibatkan jumlah nilai kontrak dan bon jaminan bank yang besar, iaitu masing-masing sebanyak RM187,000,056.00 dan RM1,870,000.56. Memandangkan Plaintif dapat menunjukkan terdapatnya persoalan-persoalan serius yang perlu dibicarakan, ganti rugi bukan remedi yang mencukupi, perimbangan kemudahan (balance of convenience) yang berpihak kepada Plaintif dan ianya tidak boleh dipampas dengan kos serta kedudukan kewangan Plaintif dan reputasi Plaintif dalam industri pertahanan akan terjejas sekiranya permohonan injunksi interim tersebut tidak dibenarkan, maka untuk mengelakkan ketidakadilan dan kerugian kepada Plaintif, adalah wajar status quo Jaminan Bank tersebut dipelihara dan dikekalkan S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 26 (preserved) sehingga tindakan induk (substantive) kes ini dilupuskan melalui suatu perbicaraan penuh. Prinsip undang-undang ini telah diputuskan dalam kes-kes berikut:

(a) Ghazali Cha JCA yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Expro Marine Sdn Bhd v. Amalgamated Plant Engineering Sdn Bhd [2022] 1 MLJ 61; [2022] 1 MLRA 686 telah memutuskan bahawa – “[76] Regarding this point, the High Court in paras. and 24 of its grounds of judgment held: [23] That upon taking into consideration of all the circumstances of the case and authorities cited by counsels on this issue, it is my considered view that the award of damages itself is not adequate to compensate the plaintiff if the injunctive reliefs are not allowed as the plaintiff’s entitlement to the damages flowing from the breach of contract committed by the defendant is only one aspect of the consequence. [24] I do accept the plaintiff’s submission that there are other possible/ potential adverse consequences that are likely to incur if the injunctive reliefs are not allowed. It is noted that is a possibility that Petronas Carigali Sdn Bhd may terminate the award for the project due to delay in executing the works thereby causing S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 27 both plaintiff and defendant losing the contract forever and in such a situation, damages cannot be adequate remedy to the plaintiff. [77] We agree with the learned High Court Judge that damages are not adequate to compensate the plaintiff if the injunctive relief is not allowed. Based on the background factual matrix and the issues raised, the matter at hand is more than just a breach of the master agreement or its termination. It involves multiple parties and issues unravelled from the arrangement and discussion of the multiple parties. It would be absurd to decide that the award of damages is adequate the compensate the plaintiff while there could be other adverse consequences affecting both parties, such as injury to reputation and goodwill.”.

(b) Abdul Malik Ishak JCA yang menyampaikan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam Tenaga Nasional Berhad v Teobros Development Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 391; [2008] 3 MLRA 565 telah memutuskan bahawa – “What is evident from the facts in Alor Janggus is that the appellants/plaintiffs there had sought, inter alia, damages. And Alor Janggus is good law to hold that the justice of the case should take precedence and where there is any doubt as to the adequacy of the remedy of damages, it is incumbent upon the court to regard damages as an inadequate remedy and S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 then move on to consider the question of the balance of convenience. His Lordship Jemuri Serjan CJ (Borneo) rightly said in Alor Janggus that the grant or refusal of an interlocutory injunction must be decided on the fundamental principle that the court should take whichever course that appears to carry the lower risk of injustice. This principle must be vigorously applied to the present appeal because the respondent is an innocent purchaser who relied on a search of the register document of title to purchase from a public auction held at the High Court of Malacca. There was no way that the respondent could have known of the notice under s 11(2) of the said Act issued by the appellant some 10 years and 9 months earlier. Before us, we have a black and white evidence from the appellant which stated that it is not impossible to re-align the proposed transmission line but the appellant wanted the respondent to foot the bill of RM10m without any explanation as to how the appellant had arrived at that figure. Although it is not for us to make any ruling regarding any re-alignment of the transmission line, this factor is certainly relevant in considering where the justice of the case lies and whether the status quo should be preserved while awaiting a substantive judgment to be made by the High Court of Malacca or the decision of the State Authority of Malacca.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(c) dalam Genting Highlands Bhd & Ors v GM Aero Support Sdn Bhd & Ors [2022] 9 MLJ 275; [2022] 4 MLRH 592, Aliza Sulaiman J telah memutuskan bahawa – S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 29 “Third issue: where does the balance of justice and convenience lie? [101] In answering this question, the court has to consider all relevant matters including the practical realities of the case and must weigh the harm that the injunction would produce by its grant against the harm that would result from its refusal (see Alor Janggus Soon Seng Trading Sdn Bhd & Ors v Sey Hoe Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 241). … [105] I am also in agreement with the plaintiffs’ submission that the defendants’ conduct, as discussed in the analysis of the issues in respect of the EOT application, would tilt the balance of convenience in favour of the grant of the injunction as prayed by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs would suffer greater injustice if relief is withheld at this stage of the proceedings.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(d) dalam Dato’ Seri Yap Seng Yew & Anor v Expo Electronics Sdn Bhd (in liquidation) & Ors [2023] MLJU 1795; [2023] MLRHU 1388, Liza Chan Sow Keng J telah memutuskan bahawa – “[28] By reason that the nature of an interlocutory injunction is to maintain the status quo, there is as such, a need to be mindful of what is the “status quo”. S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 30 [29] “Status quo” is defined:

(i) by Lord Diplock in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1983] 3 WLR 143 at p. 148: “…The status quo is the existing state of affairs; but since states of affairs do not remain static this raises the query: existing when? In my opinion, the relevant status quo to which reference was made in American Cyanamid is the state of affairs existing during the period immediately preceding the issue of the writ claiming the permanent injunction or, if there be unreasonable delay between the issue of the writ and the motion for an interlocutory injunction, the period immediately preceding the motion. The duration of that period since the state of affairs last changed must be more than minimal, having regard to the total length of the relationship between the parties in respect of which the injunction is granted; otherwise the state of affairs before the last S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 31 change would be the relevant status quo.” … [44] I have considered that if the injunction is refused, and the status quo is not preserved, the present Cekap Asia directors whose validity of appointment is to be tested at trial may effect corporate or other actions including appointment of further or additional directors or replace themselves with new directors and may make business decision to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and Cekap Asia. The losses the Plaintiffs may suffer are unquantifiable, and they may not be adequately compensated.”. [Penekanan ditambah]

(i) tuntutan induk Plaintif terhadap Defendan-Defendan melalui Writ Saman tersebut masih belum didengar dan dilupuskan oleh Mahkamah ini. Antara perkara yang diplidkan oleh Plaintif dalam Pernyataan Tuntutannya ialah Plaintif telahpun melaksanakan tanggungjawabnya di bawah SST tersebut dan Defendan-Defendan yang telah memungkiri dan membatalkan kontrak SST tersebut secara salah. Justeru, sekiranya bon Jaminan Bank tersebut dibatalkan dan dibenarkan untuk diguna pakai oleh Defendan-Defendan, ia akan memberikan tanggapan negatif kepada pemain dan/atau ejen industri pertahanan bahawa seolah-olah Plaintif berada di pihak yang salah dan ini tentunya akan menjejaskan nama baik dan reputasi syarikat Plaintif, S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 32 akan menjejaskan peluang perniagaan Plaintif dengan pemain dan/atau ejen industri pertahanan serta akan memprejudiskan Plaintif sebelum perbicaraan substantif kes ini bermula;

(j) Plaintif hanya memohon supaya bon Jaminan Bank tersebut tidak diguna pakai oleh Defendan-Defendan sehingga pelupusan prosiding ini dan Defendan-Defendan telah gagal sama sekali menunjukkan bagaimana permohonan Plaintif tersebut boleh memprejudiskan Defendan-Defendan dan menyebabkan kerugian kepada Defendan-Defendan; dan

(k) sekiranya permohonan injunksi interim ini tidak dibenarkan, Plaintif akan menanggung risiko dan kesan mudarat yang lebih besar berbanding dengan Defendan-Defendan dan ia tidak oleh dipampas dengan ganti rugi.

(a) seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 tidak menghalang Mahkamah untuk memberikan perintah injunksi interim terhadap Kerajaan dan/atau agensinya sekiranya terdapat merit dalam permohonan perintah injunksi interim tersebut; dan S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 33

(b) berdasarkan alasan dan merit dalam permohonan Plaintif tersebut, ini adalah kes yang layak dan sesuai untuk Mahkamah ini membenarkan perintah injunksi interim terhadap Defendan-Defendan di bawah seksyen 29 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956. Bertarikh : 16 MAC 2026 (DR. ARIK SANUSI BIN YEOP JOHARI) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 34 (KUALA LUMPUR) Peguam bagi pihak Plaintif: Datuk Wira Mohd Hafarizam Bin Harun Tetuan Hafarizam Wan & Aisha Mubarak Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara Level 21, @ Menara MARA 232 Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman 50100 KUALA LUMPUR Tel : 03-2602 2004 Faks : 03-2694 1121 Ruj : HWAM/ADSSB/174/2025/DWMHH/ NAH/MLH E-mel: hwam@hwam.com.my Peguam bagi pihak Defendan-Defendan: Tuan Nik Mohd Noor Bin Nik Kar Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Jabatan Peguam Negara Bahagian Guaman No. 45, Persiaran Perdana S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 35 Presint 4 62100 PUTRAJAYA Ruj : PN/WKL/HQ/SB/26/10/2025 S/N z4Gj7e56s0O6yC0DzwHRug **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal