Pernyataan-pernyataan Perayu di dalam Hujahan Bertulis dan Hujahan Balas Perayu adalah bersifat andaian tanpa disokong dengan mana-mana bukti yang telah dikemukan berdasarkan kertas siasatan, keterangan saksi serta kerosakan pada kedua-dua kenderaan yang terlibat di dalam kemalangan. Quantum [16] Regarding the award of special damages for loss of future earnings, the Appellant advanced the following arguments, namely, that the learned Sessions Court Judge: • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila membenarkan awad sebanyak RM336,000.00 untuk kehilangan masa hadapan kerana gagal mengambil kira duluan undang-undang yang Plaintif/Responden gagal untuk mitigate his loss kerana berdasarkan keterangan pakar-pakar di Mahkamah Plaintif/Responden berkebolehan untuk mencari pekerjaan yang bersesuaian dengan kecederaan yang dialami; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila gagal mengambil kira keterangan pakar Rehabilitasi daripada Perkeso Puan Nur Hidayah binti Mohd Yusof yang telah menyatakan bahawa Plaintif/Responden telah menjalani program rehabilitasi di Perkeso untuk membuat pekerjaan beliau seperti sebelum kemalangan dengan memakai kaki palsu yang telah diberikan kepada beliau; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila membenarkan awad untuk kehilagan pendapatan masa hadapan secara penuh kerana Responden/Plaintif sudah mempunyai kaki palsu yang telah diberikan oleh Perkeso; dan • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang kerana tidak menilite laporan-laporan pakar di mana ianya tidak menyatakan bahawa Plaintif/Responden tidak boleh bekerja langsung selepas kemalangan dan awad yang diberikan secara penuh ini merupakan satu unjust enrichment kepada Plaintif/Responden. [17] On the other hand, the Respondent relied on Yang Yap Fong & Anor v Leong Pek Hoon & Anor [1987] 2 MLJ 201 which stated the proper test to be applied in determining the quantum to be awarded for loss of future earnings. … The proper test to be applied is whether some time in the future, due to the effect of the injuries sustained by him, the plaintiff will face a substantial risk of either losing his job or getting a less paid employment. It does not matter whether the plaintiff was in employment or not at the time of the trial so long as the Court is satisfied from evidence that there is a real or substantial risk that his earning capacity will be affected in the future. … [18] In view of the risk that the Respondent will not be able to work in the future, the Respondent submitted that the learned Sessions Court Judge was correct in making the award of RM336,000.00. [19] As for the award for a prosthetic limb amounting to RM2,603,352.00, the Appellant raised the following grounds, namely, that the learned Sessions Court Judge: • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang dengan membenarkan awad sebanyak RM2,603,352.00 untuk kas kaki palsu yang telah disarankan oleh pakar prosthetist Endolite Asia Sdn Bhd tanpa mengambil kira fakta bahawa Plaintif/Responden sudahpun mempunyai kaki palsu yang telah diberikan oleh Perkeso; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang dengan gagal memberi tumpuan kepada fakta bahawa, Plaintif/Responden telah dibekalkan dengan kaki palsu daripada Perkeso selepas penilitian yang rapi oleh Perkeso dan telah bersetuju dengan kaki palsu yang dibekalkan oleh Perkeso; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila gagal memberikan sebarang berat kepada keterangan yang telah diberikan oleh Ketua Jabatan Prostetik, Ortotik dan Penyelidikan dari Perkeso yang telah memeriksa/menilai keadaan Plaintif/Responden sebelum beliau dibekalkan dengan kaki palsu yang bersesuaian dengan beliau; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang dengan tidak mengendahkan fakta yang diterangkan oleh Pakar dari Perkeso bahawa tiada sebarang aduan yang telah diterima oleh Plaintif/Responden selepas beliau telah discharge daripada Pusat Rehabilitasi Perkeso; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila tidak mengendahkan fakta bahawa kos kaki palsu yang disarankan oleh Endolite Asia tidak pernah diuji mahupun dipasang ke atas kaki Plaintif/Responden dan hanya merupakan satu spekulasi yang ianya akan berpatutan untuk kegunaan Plaintif/Responden; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang dengan tidak mengambil kira fakta bahawa Plaintif/Responden telah menjalani ujian dan latihan yang rapi di Perkeso dan dibekalkan dengan kaki palsu yang sesuai untuk kegunaannya; • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang apabila gagal untuk mengambil kira keterangan pakar prostetik Mr. Haider di mana kaki palsu yang digunakan oleh Plaintif/Responden adalah sesuai dan hanya memerlukan modifikasi ke atas soket kaki palsu Sahaja; dan • telah tersilap dan terkhilaf dari segi fakta dan/atau undang-undang dengan tidak mengambil kira keterangan bahawa prostetik yang disarankan oleh Endolite merupakan prostetik yang terlalu advanced memandangkan yang Plaintif/Responden merupakan seorang yang pertama kali menggunakan prostetik. [20] The Respondent disagreed that the learned Session Court Judge had erred in fact and/or in law in making the above award. The Respondent cited the case of Appalasamy a/l Bodoyah v Lee Mon Seng [1996] 3 CLJ 71; [1996] MLJU 30; [1996] 2 MLRH 647 which held that a victim of a tortious act is entitled to seek the best medical facility and the best medical opinion in order to put him back in his original position as though the tort had not been committed. In that case, the plaintiff was awarded the sum of RM132,000 as the cost of acquiring and maintaining an electronic artificial arm. [21] This Court was also urged to take judicial notice of the decision of the High Court in Ramachandran a/l Mayandy v Abdul Rahman bin Ambok Laogan & Anor [1997] 4 MLJ 237; [1996] 3 MLRH 850 which remarked that: The plaintiff is entitled to the best as the purpose of compensation is to put the plaintiff as the victim, so far as money can do the trick, in as near a position as he was before the tort was committed. No one likes to have his leg amputated. A one-legged man should, nevertheless, be showered with sympathy. An advanced prosthesis as recommended by Lee Prosthetic & Orthotic Centre Sdn Bhd, being the most advanced prosthetic in the market, would certainly help the plaintiff to lead a more normal life and he certainly ought to be given a chance to use it. [22] In addition, there was another decision of the High Court in Tan Hui Fang & Anor v Sanmugam a/l Jayaraman [2017] MLJU 1812; [1997] MLRHU 1255, which held as follows: [27] The Sessions Court Judge had allowed the cost of purchasing the prosthesis of the highest end. This was a finding of fact made by the Sessions Court Judge after considering that the other (cheaper) types were not suitable. [28] Based on the trial evidence, the Sessions Court Judge was entitled to arrive at the finding on which prosthesis was best suited, and this shall not be disturbed. The Decision of this Court [23] In adjudicating this appeal, it is incumbent upon this Court to thoroughly assess its merits. To this end, the Court has meticulously reviewed the appeal records, considered the written submissions, and heard the oral arguments before arriving at a decision. [24] In particular, this Court has carefully examined the learned Sessions Court Judge’s grounds of judgment and the authorities relied by the parties. [25] Regarding the findings by the Sessions Court on the issue of liability, the Appellant urged this Court to interfere with the findings by the learned Sessions Court Judge, citing the cases of China Airlines Ltd v Maltran Air Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor Appeal [1996] 2 AMR 2233; [1996] 3 CLJ 163; [1996] 2 MLJ 517; [1996] 1 MLRA 260 and Azimah Basrin Lwn Aziz Abdul Rahman [2014] 1 LNS 19; [2014] MLRHU 9. [26] These cases, together with those cited by the Respondent had expounded on the general principle and the exceptions/situations warranting departure from the established general principle on appellate intervention. [27] The pressing issue for determination in this appeal is whether the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred in fact and/or in law when she held that the Appellant was 100% liable for the said accident. As noted, the basis for the above findings is explained by the learned Sessions Court Judge at paras [4] – [17] of her Grounds of Judgment. [28] This issue relating to liability hinges primarily on questions (and findings) of whether the Appellant had “changed lane” and/or whether the Respondent had proven on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant had indeed changed lane or had all relevant times remained in the same lane. [29] This Court is cognisant of the following facts, that is: that there were two versions as to how the accident had occurred and thus conflicting evidence; that there was no CCTV nor independent witness(es); and that the case has been classified by the Investigating Officer as RTM. [30] Having carefully weighed the evidence before the Court, the submissions by the parties, the relevant authorities and the grounds of judgment by the learned Sessions Court Judge, this Court is of the considered view that the findings by the learned Sessions Court Judge on liability should not be disturbed. [31] On the issue of quantum, I shall first deal with the award for loss of future earnings. As noted, the learned Sessions Court Judge dealt with this aspect of the award at paras [19] – [31] of her grounds of judgment. [32] Once again, the law and authorities on appellate intervention relating to award of damages are trite and uncontroversial. [33] This Court is mindful of the remarks and observations made in cases such as Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] CLJ Rep 300; [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] 1 MLRA 154, Inas Faiqah Mohd Helmi (A Child Suing Through Her Father and Next Friend; Mohd Helmi Abdul Aziz) v Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors [2016] 2 AMR 217; [2016] 2 CLJ 885; [2016] 2 MLJ 1; [2016] 1 MLRA 647 and Sumarni v Yow Bing Kwong & Anor [2008] 1 AMR 259; [2008] 3 CLJ 489; [2008] 1 MLJ 608; [2007] 3 MLRA 504. [34] While this Court is in agreement with the remarks made in the case cited by the Respondent (at paragraph [17]), the Expert Report which the Respondent himself had made reference to, unequivocally stated that while the Respondent “is unlikely to return to current employment” it went on to say that “it is advisable for patient to change the nature of his job”. In other words, on the evidence, the Respondent has not been rendered bedridden for life. The Respondent had also admitted that he has started to carry out light work. [35] This Court thus agrees with the Appellant that the learned Sessions Court Judge should have taken the above factors into account. [36] Considering the factors and available evidence, the award for loss of future earnings is hereby reduced to RM278,400. [37] On the award of 2,603,352 for the prosthetic leg by the Sessions Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge dealt with this head of award at paragraphs [32] – [49] of her grounds of judgment. [38] The Appellant argued that the Sessions Court should have taken into account the Court of Appeal case of Chua Kay Hock & Anor v Lee Hoon Poi [2022] 6 MLJ 88, which is a decision from 2022, rather than solely relying on the two High Court decisions cited by the Respondent, namely, Ramachandran a/l Mayandy v Abdul Rahman bin Ambok Laongan & Anor and Tan Hui Fang & Anor v Sanmugam a/l Jayaraman. [39] This Court’s reading and understanding of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chua Kay Hock is that when there is an alternative, the “reasonable alternative” ought to be accepted, so as to avoid any form of “unjust enrichment”. [40] This Court finds the reasonings put forward by the learned Judicial Commissioner in Chua Kay Hock (at the High Court) as valid and convincing but more importantly, is bound to take into account the following observations by the Court of Appeal, that is: [40] In our considered view, it was not erroneous or baseless for the LJC to hold that if a bionic prosthesis were to be allowed together with loss of future earnings, it would unreasonably set a precedent for all plaintiffs in similar circumstances to claim for a bionic prosthesis instead of a medium, reasonably-priced hydraulic prosthesis leg. It would be fair for us to observe that the much more reasonably priced mechanical prosthesis had for generations been awarded as compensation for amputation cases. As highlighted by the respondent to us and taken into account by the LJC, the hydraulic leg is used widely in the public service/government sector and known to be popular in Malaysia over the years. More importantly, the sophisticated state of the art bionic leg is not widely used in the country and known to lack facilities for after-sales service or repair if it breaks down. Additionally, it is trite principle that a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages is required to mitigate his loss and is entitled only to reasonable compensation and not exorbitant awards save on grounds of necessity in exceptional circumstances when a reasonable alternative is wholly unavailable or inappropriate. There must be sufficient justification shown by the victim for the award of compensation for well above the trend of contemporary awards. [41] Despite the above, this Court finds merit in the following submissions by the Respondent.