Ahmad Mazni bin Baharumshah v 1. Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Langat (BA-24NCvC-724-05/2021)

1.

KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ..... DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENTS (Enclosure 4: Striking Out)

A purchaser of land who has paid the bulk of the purchase price should not prolong his arguments with the vendor regarding the amount of the balance price to the extent of leaving the quit rents for the land unpaid and became overdue for years, thereby risking the forfeiture of the land by the State Authority as a result of the prolonged failure to pay the quit rents.

The facts and outcome of the present case should serve as a valuable lesson to land owners and person claiming for ownership of the necessity to pay the quit rents for the land promptly instead of neglecting the payment of quit rents for years.

The subject-lot, a vacant detached plot of 5,240 square feet of Malay Reserved land, was originally registered in the name of the 3 developer Medan Perimba (M) Sdn. Bhd. : paragraph 8 of the Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support.

The developer sold the subject-lot to one Zamnah binti Karsan before the master title was sub-divided, and Zamnah took a loan from Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd to part-finance the purchase and in consideration thereof Zamnah absolutely assigned the subject-lot to the Bank as security for the loan : see Exhibit “AMB-1” to the Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support.

Before the date of auction sale the developer, by its solicitor’s letter dated 9.6.2011 to the Bank’s solicitors, notified Zamnah’s solicitor that the separate title for the subject-lot had been issued and asked for the differential amount of RM16,089.58 to be paid before the developer would execute and deliver the Memorandum of Transfer directly in favour of the successful bidder: Plaintiff Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 10 and Exhibit “AMB-3”. The differential amount was for additional area in excess of the area stated in the Sale and Purchase Agreement.

After Zamnah defaulted on the loan repayment; the Bank publicly auctioned the subject-lot, and on 3 November 2011, the Plaintiff successfully bade for the subject-lot at a bid price of RM36,000, signed the contract pursuant to the terms of the Proclamation of Sale and paid 5% of the bid price : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-in-Support paragraph 7 and Exhibit “AMB-1”.

By letter dated 8.2.2012 the Plaintiff took the position that the Bank should be responsible for paying the differential amount of 4 RM16,089.88 to the developer : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 11 and Exhibit “AMB-4”.

On or about 21.2.2012 the Plaintiff paid balance of bid price to the Bank : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 9 and Exhibit “AMB- 2”.

As neither the Bank nor the Plaintiff has paid any of the differential amount or part thereof, to the developer, the transfer of the subject lot to the Plaintiff has not been registered even as at the date of hearing of the Enclosure 4.

Quit rents for the subject – lot were not paid by anybody to the Land Office for years.

On 22.12.2016, the Land Office gazetted the forfeiture of the subject-lot : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 16 and Exhibits “AMB-6” and “AMB-7”.

On 7.2.2019, the State Authority via the Land Office forfeited the subject – lot pursuant to the National Land Code on ground of failure to pay quit rents : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support and Exhibit “AMB- 7”.

According to the Plaintiff, he conducted a land search on 4.4.2018 and discovered the forfeiture of the subject-lot : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 14 and Exhibit “AMB-5”. 5

By letter dated 13.12.2018 the Plaintiff appealed to Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan regarding the forfeiture : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 20.1 and Exhibit “AMB-8”.

By letter dated 8.11.2019 the Plaintiff appealed to the Land Office (the 1st Defendant) in respect of the forfeiture of the subject-lot : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 20.2 Exhibit “AMB-9”.

On or about 2.1.2020 the Plaintiff appealed to the Land Office regarding return of the subject-lot : Plaintiff’s Affidavit-In-Support paragraph 20.3 and Exhibit “AMB-10”.

The Defendants did not allow the Plaintiff’s appeal regarding the said forfeiture.

On 31.5.2021 the Plaintiff filed this Originating Summons against the Land Office (as the 1st Defendant) and the State Government (as the 2nd Defendant).

In the present suit, the Plaintiff seeks the following orders and reliefs:

An order that the forfeiture of the subject-lot was null and void;

That the forfeited land be returned to the Plaintiff;

That the Plaintiff be declared as the lawful beneficial owner of the subject-lot; and 6

Other order and /or relief as the Court may think just and proper to award. DEFENDANTS’ O.18 R. 19 APPLICATION

By Enclosure 4 the Defendants made an application for the following orders:

The Plaintiff’s Originating Summons be struck out under O.18 r. 19(a) on ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action;

The Plaintiff’s Originating Summons be struck out under O.18 r. 19(b) on the ground that it is frivolous, vexatious and / or embarrassing;

The Plaintiff’s Originating Summons be struck out under O.18 r. 19(d) on ground that it is an abuse of the process of the Court.

In support of Enclosure 4 application the Defendants rely on these main arguments:

argument that the Plaintiff has no locus standi to challenge the forfeiture because he is not the registered proprietor;

argument that the Plaintiff’s action is time-barred by virtue of section 134 and section 418 of the National Land Code. 7

In opposing the Defendant’s application in Enclosure 4, the Plaintiff argues that there are triable issues as to –

whether the forfeiture was carried out in accordance with the previous of the National Land Code; and

whether the Plaintiff has the right to challenge the forfeiture under section 134(1), section 418(1) of the National Land Code. THE LAW AND PRINCIPLES

In Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 (Tab 3) whereby the Supreme Court has repeated the striking out principles as follow:-

The principles over which the court acted when using his power under any of the paragraph O 18 R 19(1) Rules of High Court 1980 is clear. The continuous process under this rule should be used in cases that is clear and obvious only and the continuos process can only be used when it is clear that one demand or Answer must be on the face of it ‘obviously unsustainable’. It cannot be used with thorough examination of documents and facts of the case to see whether the concerned party have the power of action or defence.”

The Federal Court in Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur [2016] 3 MLJ 1 (Tab 4) 8

1.(a) “[28] The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder is that the claim on the face of it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’. The stress is not only on the word ‘unsustainable’ but also on the word ‘obviously’ ie the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issues of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. It must be determined at trial. “As was laid down in Bandar Builder, the basic test for striking out is that the claim must on the face of it be obviously unsustainable. If one has to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail of the issue of law and/or fact, then the matter is not appropriate to be struck out summarily. (See p 16 para 28)”.

“[58] The ‘obviously unsustainable’ test as adopted by in Bandar Builder, would ensure fair trial and access to the court to litigants. The respondents (the plaintiffs) should be given their day in court to prove their case. The court should not strike out an action purely or for the simple reason that it is ‘unsustainable’. The degree of ‘unsustainability’ must be higher, ie it must be ‘obviously unsustainable’ before the action can be struck out summarily. The court should not pull its shutter down and close its door to the respondents, by striking out their action summarily. The tests as adopted in Bandar Builder must be applicable across the board, including action grounded on fraud, as in the case before us. The learned High Court Judge and the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the respondents’ action is not obviously unsustainable 9 and dismissed the appellant’s application for striking out (See p 21 para 58)”.

Although the Courts are very reluctant to summarily strike out an action under O. 18 r.19 on grounds relating to the substantive merits of the issues in the action, the Courts do not have reluctance in summarily striking out the action on the grounds which do not relate to the substantive merits of the action. Such grounds which do not relate to the substantive merits of the action and upon which the Court are ready to summarily strike out an action include, but are not necessarily limited to, lack of locus standi, want of jurisdiction, expiry of limitation period, premature action, wrong party cited as the defendant, and res judicata.

That the lack of locus standi is a valid ground for summarily striking out an action under O.18 r.19 and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the court is exemplified in the case of Government of Malaysia & UEM v. Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12,[1988] 1 CLJ Rep 63 decided by the Federal Court.

Examples of decided cases where the Courts ordered summarily striking out of action or claim on ground of expiry of limitation period include Golden Approach Sdn Bhd v. Lau Sen Seong & Anor [2019] 3 CLJ 755 at 769 c-d; Tan Sri Eric Cheah Eng Hock v. NKK Corporation (Japan) [2004] 7 CLJ 137 at 141f-g; Tio Chee Hing v. Government of Sabah [1981] 1 MLJ 207 (Federal Court) and Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v. Tio Chee Hing [1987] 2 MLJ 701 (Supreme Court). 10

In substance and effect, the present Originating Summons filed by the Plaintiff is a challenge against the validity of the forfeiture of the subject-lot and/or an appeal to the High Court against the act or decision of the State Authority on the forfeiture.

Subsection 133(1) of the National Land Code provides as follows: “Power of State Authority to annul forfeiture, or re-alienate to previous proprietor on new terms, etc.

(1) Any person or body who was the proprietor of any alienated land immediately before its forfeiture under this Act may at any time apply to the State Authority for the annulment of the forfeiture.”

Section 5 Definitions in the National Land Code provides as follows: “proprietor” means any person or body for the time being registered as the proprietor of any alienated land;”

The relevant provisions are contained in section 134(1) which cross-refers directly or indirectly to sections 100, 129 and 97 of the National Land Code as reproduced below: “Chapter 2 – Collection of arrears of rent Notice of demand 97. 11

Where any rent payable in respect of any alienated land is in arrear, the Land Administrator may cause to be served on the proprietor thereof a notice of demand in Form 6a. (2) A note of the service of any such notice shall be endorsed, by or at the instance of the Land Administrator, on the register document of title to the land to which the notice relates.

Right of charges, lessees, etc., to pay sum demanded

The sum demanded by any notice under section 97 may be paid to the Land Administrator within the time specified in the notice by any of the following persons or bodies in addition to the proprietor, that is to say:

any person or body having a registered interest affecting the land (including a charge of any lease or sublease thereof);

any person or body having a lien over the land, or over any lease or sublease thereof;

any person or body in occupation of any part thereof under any tenancy exempt from registration which has become protected by an endorsement on the register document of title to the land under section 317; and

any person or body having a claim protected by caveat affecting the land or any interest therein, and accordingly, as soon as may be after the notice is served on the proprietor, the Land Administrator shall cause to be served on every such person or body a copy thereof, to which there shall be appended the additional notice set out in the supplement to Form 6a. 12 Forfeiture for non-payment of sum demanded 100. The Land Administrator shall not during the period specified in any notice under section 97 accept the tender by or on behalf of any person or body of a lesser amount than the sum thereby demanded; and if by the end of that period the whole of that sum has not been tendered to him, he shall thereupon by order declare the land forfeit to the State Authority, and the provisions of Part Eight shall have effect with respect thereto accordingly.

(1) Where— (a) any alienated land is liable under section 127 to forfeiture to the State Authority for breach of any condition; and 160 Act 828 National Land Code 227 (b) it appears to the Land Administrator that the breach is capable of being remedied by the proprietor within a reasonable time, the Land Administrator shall serve, or cause to be served, on the proprietor a notice in Form 7a specifying the action required for remedying the breach, and calling upon him to take such action within the time therein specified. 13

Action to enforce forfeiture for breach of condition

The Land Administrator shall take action under this section wherever any alienated land is liable under section 127 to forfeiture for breach of condition and—

he is of opinion that the taking of action under section 128 would not be appropriate; or

the proprietor of the land has failed to comply with any notice served on him under that section.

In either of the circumstances aforesaid, the Land Administrator shall—

cause a notice in Form 7b to be served on the proprietor of the land; and

cause a copy of that notice, to which there shall be appended the additional notice set out in the supplement to that Form, to be served on the like persons and bodies as those on whom notices relating to rent are required to be served by subsection 98(1).

Appeals against forfeiture

The validity of any forfeiture under this Act shall not be challenged in any court except by means of, or in proceedings consequent upon, an appeal under section 418 against the order of the Land Administrator under section 100 or 129; and, notwithstanding anything in any other written law, no such appeal shall be commenced after the expiry of the period of three months allowed for the bringing thereof by the said section 418.

From the abovementioned provisions of the National Land Code there are two broad situations when a land is liable to forfeiture, namely (1) non-payment of quit rent and (2) breach of condition. 14

Forfeiture for non-payment of quit rent is stipulated in the provisions of sections 97 to 100 while forfeiture for breach of condition is stipulated in the provisions of sections 125 to 129 of the National Land Code.

In respect of the proceeding on forfeiture for non-payment of quit rent, the default in payment may be remedied by the registered proprietor or any of the persons listed in section 98 with registered interest in or registered claim to the land.

In section 413(1), the words “any body or person” in the general expression “any body or person aggrieved by the decision” under the National Land Code depend on the type and nature of the decision made. For a decision made on forfeiture for non-payment of quit rent, any “body or person aggrieved by” such decision would be the registered proprietor or any of the persons listed in section 98 with registered interest in or registered claim to the land who were the persons envisaged by section 98 for remedying the default in payment of quit rent, whereas for a decision made on forfeiture for breach of condition, the “body or person aggrieved “ by such decision is the registered proprietor who was the only person envisaged by section 129(1) for remedying the breach.

The wording of sections 5, 98, 129 and 133(1) of the National Land Code has made it clear that the person who has the locus standi to challenge the validity of a forfeiture of land due to default in payment of quit rent is the registered proprietor or any of the persons listed in section 98 with registered interest in or registered claim to the land. The statutory requirement of the registration of a person’s 15 interest in or claim to the land is to ensure that the Land Office knows about the actual existence of such interest or claim on record so that the statutory procedure of giving the registered claimant a notice and opportunity to make the quit rent payment of behalf of the registered proprietor can be implemented and followed by the Land Office, together with a subsequent statutory right of challenge or appeal against the Land Administrator’s decision in spite of the claimant’s registered interest or claim. It is contrary to the policy and spirit of the National Land Code to allow a claimant to lay silent without registering his claim or interest on the records of the Torrens system and then surprise or ambush the Land Administrator with a challenge or appeal against the State Authority’s forfeiture of the land on ground of non-payment of quit rents.

This legal position was also clarified by the decision of the Federal Court in Pemungut Hasil Tanah, Kota Tinggi v. United Malayan Banking Corp. Bhd. [1982] CLJ (Rep) 244 wherein the Federal Court held inter alai as follows: “The learned Chief Justice specifically ordered that the forfeiture be set aside upon the company paying all the rent and penalty due and payable although the appeals against the forfeiture were by both the bank and the company and were heard together. It is true that a person or body whose interest in the land is affected is entitled under s. 98(1) to pay the sum demanded by any notice under s. 97(1) but this right only accrues before a forfeiture has been declared under s. 100, and indeed the right to apply to the State Authority to annul any forfeiture so effected is restricted by s. 133(1) to the registered proprietor of the land 16 immediately preceding the forfeiture and does not ensue to any other person or body however affected or aggrieved. In this case the bank made the payment purportedly pursuant to the order of Court and the Collector in accepting the payment so made also purported to act in accordance with the order of Court against which he had lodged notices of appeal on the very day it was made and which is the very subject-matter of the appeals before us. The payment was therefore made by and accepted from the wrong entity and not in consonance with the specific requirement of the order for payment by the company. If in the face of the tenor of the order of 6 March 1979 the Collector had refused to accept the payment tendered by the bank he might well perhaps have had qualms as to his liability for contempt of Court and he would seem to have lost no time thereafter in applying for a stay.” (emphasis added).

From the affidavits and the exhibits filed in the present suit, it is indisputable that the Plaintiff was not the registered proprietor of the subject-lot immediately before the forfeiture. Moreover, the Plaintiff is not one of the persons listed in section 98 with registered interest in or registered claim to the subject land.

In the premises, it is clear that the Plaintiff has no locus standi to challenge the validity of the forfeiture of the subject-lot.

The fact that the Plaintiff had contractual right vis-à-vis the registered proprietor or had beneficial interest derived directly or indirectly from the registered proprietor is res inter alios as far as it concerns the State Authority’s power of forfeiture of land for default 17 of quit rent payments. Such matters of contractual rights and obligations or beneficial rights and obligations are between the registered proprietor and the Plaintiff inter se, and under the law, they do not concern the State Authority’s power of forfeiture of land. It is either the registered proprietor or person with registered interest in or registered claim the land which has the locus standi to challenge the validity of the forfeiture under the National Land Code.

In the circumstances, this Court has held that this is a clear and obvious case of the lack of locus standi on the part of the Plaintiff here and that the Plaintiff’s suit herein should be struck out under O.18 r.19(b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012.

Subsections 134(1) and 418(1) of the National Land Code provide as follows:

“Appeals against forfeiture

The validity of any forfeiture under this Act shall not be challenged in any court except by means of, or in proceedings consequent upon, an appeal under section 418 against the order of the Land Administrator under section 100 or 129; and, notwithstanding anything in any other written law, no such appeal shall be commenced after the expiry of the period of three months allowed for the bringing thereof by the said section 418. 18

Appeals to the Court

Any person or body aggrieved by any decision under this Act of the State Director, the Registrar or any Land Administrator may, at any time within the period of three months beginning with the date on which it was communicated to him, appeal therefrom to the Court.

Any such appeal shall be made in accordance with any written law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure; and the Court shall make such order thereon as it considers just.

In this section, “decision” includes any act, omission, refusal, direction or order. “

As the aforesaid sections of the National Land Code are specific statutory provisions on limitation period for the appeals and/or challenges against the forfeiture of land, these specific statutory provisions apply to the exclusion of the general provisions in the Limitation Act 1953 insofar as it concerns the challenges and/or appeals against the public authority or officer’s decisions made under the National Land Code. Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1953 (Revised 1981) also expressly provides to this effect, as evident from the said section 3 reproduced below:

“Saving for other limitation enactments This Act shall not apply to any action or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other written law or to any action or arbitration to which the Government or the Government of any State is a party and for which if it were between subjects a 19 period of limitation would have been prescribed by any other written law.”

According to the Plaintiff’s own affidavit, he knew about the forfeiture on or about 4.4.2018 when he conducted a land search on the subject-lot: see the Plaintiff’s Affidavit-in-Support paragraph 14 and Exhibit “ AMB-5”.

This court suit was filed on 31.5.2021, more than 3 years after the Plaintiff knew about the forfeiture. Even the Plaintiff’s appeal letter to the State Authority and the Land Office were issued well after 3 months of his knowledge about the forfeiture.

In Chun Nyook Lin v. Pentadbir Tanah Alor Gajah & Anor [2003] 4 MLJ 550 Low Hop Bing J. (later JCA) held that the time limit of 3 months under section 418(1) of the National Land Code started to run from the date the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the decision which affected the plaintiff’s claim to the land or interest therein. In Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah & Anor v. Bagan Serai Housing Estate Sdn Bhd [2016] 8 CLJ 846 the Court of Appeal held in relation to sections 134(1) and 418(1) of the National Land Code that “the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply strictly with the procedures. For sure, observance of the prescribed procedure is not a mere technicality but mandatory and jurisdictional as well.” In Mohd Nadir Bin A. Syed Ahamed & 13 Ors. v. Zubaidi B. Abdul Hamid & 2 Ors. [1994] 3 CLJ 204 KC Vhorah J (later JCA) held that “the High Court has no power to extend the appeal period prescribed in s. 418 NLC”, and in Zamri bin Mohamad v. Ketua Penolong 20 Pegawai Daerah Kota Setar & 5 lagi [2019] 1 LNS 1427 Abu Bakar Katar J. decided to the same effect.

Hashim Hamzah J in Meloway Corp Sdn Bhd lwn Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Bandar Baharu dan satu lagi [2018] MLJU 729 held that an action to challenge the forfeiture of land which was filed after the expiry of the time limit of three months disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or was an abuse of process.

In the circumstances, this Court has held that it is clear and obvious that the Plaintiff’s suit herein is statute-barred by subsections 134(1) and 418(1) of the National Land Code, and as such this suit is frivolous and vexatious and/or is obviously unsustainable by reason of the expiry of the limitation period.

Even if one were to assume that the Plaintiff were able to escape the provisions of subsections 134(1) and 418(1) of the National Land Code, the Plaintiff would still be caught by the provisions of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Revised 1978).

Section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Revised 1978) provides as follows:

“Protection of persons acting in execution of statutory or other public duty Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or 21 authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect:

the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; (b) whenever in any such suit or action a judgment is obtained by the defendant, it shall carry costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client;

where the proceeding is a suit or action for damages, tender of amends before the suit or action was commenced may be pleaded in lieu of or in addition to any other plea; Laws of Malaysia ACT 1986

if the suit or action is commenced after the tender or offer in writing, or is proceeded with after payment into court of any money in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff does not recover more than the sum tendered, offered or paid, he shall not recover any costs incurred after the tender, offer or payment, and the defendant shall be entitled to costs to be taxed as between solicitor and client as from the time of the tender, offer or payment, and the costs up to the time of such tender, offer or payment shall be in the discretion of the court: Provided that this provision shall not affect costs on any injunction in the suit or action.”

It is clear that the Plaintiff’s suit herein against the Defendants in connection with the forfeiture of the subject-lot under the National Land Code is a proceeding “against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or 22 of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority” within the meaning of section 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Revised 1978).

The forfeiture of the subject-lot occurred on 7 February 2017. The commencement of the present suit by the Plaintiff on 31.5.2021 is clearly after the expiry of 3 years from 7 February 2017. Even if one were to give the Plaintiff the extraneous benefit of the doubt by counting the start date from the date of his admitted actual notice of the forfeiture (i.e. 4.4.2018), the Plaintiff’s suit herein is also statute-barred by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (Revised 1978).

In conclusion, this Court held on 29th October 2021 that there is no triable issue that the Plaintiff lacked locus standi to maintain this suit and that the Plaintiff’s suit herein is barred by limitation period. As such, this Court held that the Plaintiff’s suit herein is obviously unsustainable and should therefore be struck out as being frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of process of the Court under O.18 r.19(b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012.

In the premises this Court allowed the Defendants’ application in Enclosure 4 and ordered that the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons herein be struck out with costs of RM5,000. 23 Dated this : December 2021. Signed ............................................................. TEE GEOK HOCK JUDICIAL COMMISIONER HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM (NCVC 10) To the parties’ solicitors:

For the Plaintiff : Azizul Ashraf bin Abdul Aziz

For the Defendants : Husna binti Abdul Halim

Upon any breach arising of any condition to which any alienated land is for the time being subject— (a) the land shall become liable to forfeiture to the State Authority; and (b) except in a case where a fine is imposed under subsection (1a), or where action for the purpose of causing the breach to be remedied is first required to be taken under section 128, the Land Administrator shall proceed with the enforcement of the forfeiture in accordance with section 129.