The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or inadequate.” [20] Setelah meneliti keseluruhan Rekod Rayuan terutamanya Alasan Penghakiman, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa berkaitan hukuman yang telah dijatuhkan terhadap Perayu, HMS telah memberi pertimbangan kepada jenis kesalahan yang terlibat serta hukuman yang dibenarkan oleh undang-undang, faktor kepentingan awam, faktor pencegahan dan deteren terhadap Perayu dan orang awam, faktor pemulihan terhadap Perayu, fakta bahawa kes telah dijalankan secara perbicaraan penuh dan juga telah turut memberi pertimbangan kepada kepentingan Perayu. [21] Sebagaimana yang telah diputuskan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v. Jafa bin Daud [1981] 1 MLJ 315 bahawa: "A "sentence according to law" means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles." [22] Hukuman yang diperuntukkan bagi kesalahan sebagaimana pertuduhan terhadap Perayu adalah hukuman penjara tidak kurang 5 tahun dan tidak lebih 30 tahun, dan 10 kali sebatan. Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa dalam menentukan tempoh hukuman yang bersesuaian, HMS telah memutuskan bahawa hukuman yang wajar hendaklah juga suatu hukuman yang setimpal, serta hukuman hendaklah dalam lingkungan peruntukan undang-undang yang sedia ada. Di samping itu, hukuman juga perlu selaras dengan niat Parlimen untuk membendung kesalahan yang terlibat. [23] Berdasarkan penelitian, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan alasan HMS yang telah memutuskan bahawa kepentingan awam hendaklah melebihi kepentingan Perayu. [24] Sebagaimana yang telah diputuskan dalam kes PP v. Mohd Fazelan Md Khuzeh [2015] 9 CLJ 221, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menegaskan bahawa bagi kesalahan melibatkan dadah berbahaya, kepentingan awam menjadi pertimbangan utama: "We were of the view that offences involving dangerous drugs ought not to be treated lightly so as not to trivialise the gravity of such offences. Public interest is a paramount consideration. The fact that the respondent is a first offender or that he had pleaded guilty ought to be weighed against the facts of the case, the circumstances in the commission of the offence, the type of drugs involved and the weight of the drugs." [penekanan ditambah] [25] HMS juga telah turut mempertimbangkan jenis dadah yang terlibat di samping kesalahan melibatkan dadah berbahaya merupakan salah satu masalah besar negara yang ‘perlu diperangi habis-habisan’. [26] Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa HMS telah membuat pertimbangan yang betul dalam penentuan tempoh hukuman penjara yang wajar terhadap Perayu. Sebagaimana sedia maklum, hukuman bagi kesalahan terhadap Perayu iaitu hukuman di bawah subseksyen 39A(2) ADB 1952 ini menetapkan hukuman penjara untuk suatu tempoh antara 5 hingga 30 tahun. Kesalahan ini adalah satu kesalahan yang serius yang boleh dilihat apabila pindaan tempoh hukuman penjara seumur hidup dipinda oleh Parlimen sebagaimana diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 3 Akta 345 daripada tempoh penjara 20 tahun kepada 30 tahun. [27] Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Tia Ah Leng v. PP [2004] 4 CLJ 77 telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “The effort of the legislature to curb and deter drugs related offences is well described by Hashim Yeop A. Sani (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102; [1976] 2 MLJ 256 at p. 257: "In respect of offences under the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 1952, there has been a gradual change in the attitude of the legislature during the last few years. The Ordinance has been amended by Parliament a number of times in 1971 (by Act Al12 of 1972) then in 1973 (by Act A194 of 1973) and then in 1975 (by Act A293 of 1975). At the moment there is yet another amendment which is awaiting the Royal Assent. In the legislative exercise in the1973 penalties attached to the various offences under the law were enhanced. For the offence of possession of any dangerous drugs under section 12(2) of the Ordinance, for example, the penalty was increased from a. maximum of $10,000 fine to a maximum of $20,000 fine and the maximum imprisonment was increased from three years to five years. In the legislative exercise in 1975, among other things, a new provision (new section 39A) was inserted whereby it is provided that whoever is convicted of an offence under the Ordinance and the subject matter of which is heroin or morphine of five grammes or more in weight shall be liable to imprisonment (with no option of a fine) for a term not exceeding fourteen years and not less than three years and he shall also be liable to whipping of not less than six strokes. According to the Bill which is at the moment awaiting the Royal Assent another new provision is inserted creating a new offence of planting or cultivating any plant from which raw opium, coca leaves, poppy-straw or cannabis may be obtained. The punishment for the new offence is life imprisonment and whipping. It is common sense to say that behind these legislative exercises was the government's realization albeit gradual, of the problem of drug abuse in this country, the degenerating effect of the misuse of dangerous drugs and the attendant dangers it has posed to society itself. The amendments passed by Parliament therefore reflect the public policy. It must be presumed that behind the public policy is the consideration of public interest. The change in the attitude of the legislature itself during the last three years reflects the seriousness of the problem. In my view the courts will not be performing their functions honestly if the seriousness of the situation is not reflected in the sentence imposed or if the sentence appears to defeat the object of the statute. This is not saying that the courts in the treatment of drug offences should at all times be severe. Each case has to be determined on its own merits. But in every case the courts must be realistic and rational. … As can be seen from the above, the Government and the legislature have taken various steps to curb drug activities and we believe that the courts should also help to curb these activities by imposing stringent punishments provided by the law. In Loh Hock Seng & Anor v. Public Prosecutor (supra) at p. 14, Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) stated: There has been several convictions in the country for trafficking in drugs under section 39B of the Ordinance but the courts have invariably sought out a sense of compassion to exercise mercy and have imposed accordingly only the second alternative of a sentence of life imprisonment, and we understand that this is the first time in which the Public Prosecutor has appealed against the imposition of such a sentence, no doubt in respect of the 2nd appellant in view of the facts and circumstances surrounding and relating to his case. Sentencing in a criminal case must of course bear relation to the particular circumstances of the offender as well as the particular circumstances of the offence. The legislature has in its wisdom and in the implementation of its plenary powers in this respect enacted the imposition of the alternative penalties of death or imprisonment for life under section 39B of the Ordinance with the option and discretion in this regard to be no doubt judicially and judiciously exercised according to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and we can see no reason whatsoever why the statutory enactment of the option for punishment by death cannot and should not be made functionally operative and exercised and applied proprio vigore if the circumstances and facts of the case so warrant, justify, require and perhaps even demand.”. [penekanan ditambah] [28] Merujuk kepada keputusan di dalam kes Tia Ah Leng (supra) di atas, walaupun pindaan kepada ADB 1952 yang dinyatakan merujuk kepada pindaan terdahulu, namun begitu asas yang dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan ketika itu adalah bahawa dengan berlakunya pindaan kepada ADB 1952 yang mana hukuman bagi beberapa kesalahan telah dinaikkan maka Mahkamah wajar mengambilkira faktor ini dalam menentukan hukuman yang bersesuaian. Prinsip yang sama turut terpakai kepada rayuan Perayu ini, di mana berdasarkan pindaan undang-undang terkini, hukuman bagi kesalahan di bawah subseksyen 12(2) ADB 1952 yang boleh dihukum di bawah subseksyen 39A(2) Akta yang sama iaitu hukuman penjara seumur hidup telah dinaikkan daripada 20 tahun kepada 30 tahun, melalui pindaan kepada seksyen 3 Akta 345. Dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa fakta pindaan undang-undang terkini yang melibatkan pertuduhan terhadap Perayu ini juga wajar untuk dipertimbangkan dalam penentuan tempoh hukuman penjara terhadap Perayu ini. [29] Mahkamah ini turut mendapati bahawa HMS telah turut mempertimbangkan faktor pencegahan dan deteren serta faktor pemulihan (rehabilitation) terhadap Perayu, sebagaimana yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v. Mohamad bin Tawakkal [2012] 7 CLJ 372, seperti berikut: “[15] Di dalam kes ini mahkamah perlu seimbangkan ciri "deterrence" dengan ciri "rehabilitation" di dalam mengenakan hukuman yang setimpal dan berpatutan - "to strike a right balance between the two". Sesuatu hukuman yang berciri "deterrence" bukan sahaja menghalang OKT daripada mengulangi kesalahannya di masa akan datang, tetapi juga perlu menghalang orang lain daripada melakukan kesalahan yang sama; manakala hukuman yang berciri "rehabilitation" bertujuan untuk memulihkan OKT menjadi orang yang baik dan dapat diterima oleh masyarakat selepas menjalani hukuman berkenaan. Dalam pada itu kepentingan kaum keluarga si mati perlu juga diambil kira. Keselamatan masyarakat (public safety) perlu juga diambil kira. Kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh OKT di dalam kes ini, sedikit sebanyak telah menyebabkan 'anxiety and fear' di kalangan masyarakat terutamanya masyarakat setempat.”. [30] Fakta bahawa kes terhadap Perayu telah dilaksanakan secara perbicaraan penuh juga telah turut dipertimbangkan oleh HMS dalam penentuan hukuman yang bersesuaian. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah ini berpendapat, fakta tersebut adalah satu fakta yang sememangnya wajar dipertimbangkan dalam penentuan tempoh hukuman terhadap Perayu, sebagaimana prinsip yang telah diperjelaskan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Mohamed Abdullah Ang Swee Kang v. Public Prosecutor [1988] 1 MLJ 167. [31] Selanjutnya, penelitian Mahkamah ini turut mendapati bahawa HMS juga telah mempertimbangkan kesemua faktor-faktor yang dihujahkan di atas dan telahpun mengimbanginya dengan faktor-faktor mitigasi Perayu. Rayuan mitigasi yang dikemukakan Perayu di peringkat perbicaraan melibatkan rayuan berbentuk peribadi. Begitu juga dalam rayuan Perayu di Mahkamah ini, alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan adalah lebih berbentuk peribadi. [32] Dalam perkara ini, Mahkamah ini berpandukan kepada keputusan di dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v. Loo Choon Fatt [1976] 1 LNS 102 di mana diputuskan seperti berikut: “One of the main considerations in the assessment of sentence is of course the question of public interest. On this point I need only quote a passage from the judgment of Hilbery J in Rex v. Kenneth John Ball in deciding the appropriate sentence a court should always be guided by certain considerations. The first and foremost is the public interest. The criminal law is publicly enforced, not only with the object of punishing crime, but also in the hope of preventing it. A proper sentence, passed in public, serves the public interest in two ways. It may deter others who might be tempted to try crime as seeming to offer easy money on the supposition, that if the offender is caught and brought to justice, the punishment will be negligible. Such a sentence may also deter the particular criminal from committing a crime again, or induce him to turn from a criminal to an honest life. The public interest is indeed served, and best served, if the offender is induced to turn from criminal ways to honest living. Our law does not, therefore, fix the sentence for a particular crime, but fixes a maximum sentence and leaves it to the court to decide what is, within that maximum, the appropriate sentence for each criminal in the particular circumstances of each case. Not only in regard to each crime, but in regard to each criminal, the court has the right and the duty to decide whether to be lenient or severe. Presidents and magistrates are often inclined quite naturally to be over sympathetic to the accused. This is a normal psychological reaction to the situation in which the lonely accused is seen facing an array of witnesses with authority. The mitigation submitted by a convicted person will also normally bring up problems of family hardship and the other usual problems of living. In such a situation the courts might perhaps find it difficult to decide as to what sentence should be imposed so that the convicted person may not be further burdened with additional hardship. This in my view is a wrong approach. The correct approach is to strike a balance, as far as possible, between the interests of the public and the interests of the accused. Lord Goddard LCJ in Rex v. Grondkowski [1946] 1 All ER 560, at p 561 offered some good advice when he said: “The judge must consider the interests of justice as well as the interests of the prisoners. It is too often nowadays thought, or seems to be thought, that the interests of justice means only the interests of the prisoners.”. [penekanan ditambah] [33] Mahkamah ini juga berpendapat bahawa HMS telah meneliti serta membuat pertimbangan yang berpandukan kepada prinsip undang- undang yang betul serta telah pun mengimbangkan kesemua faktor-faktor mitigasi dan faktor-faktor pemberatan sebelum menjatuhkan hukuman yang telah diperintahkan. [34] Adalah menjadi satu prinsip undang-undang dalam menjatuhkan hukuman bahawa sesuatu hukuman yang berlandaskan kepada prinsip undang-undang yang betul tidak akan diganggu walaupun Mahkamah lain mungkin menjatuhkan hukuman yang berbeza. Prinsip ini telah diputuskan dalam kes Pendakwa Raya v. Loo Choon Fatt (supra) di atas, di mana Hakim Hashim Yeop Sani (pada ketika itu) menyatakan seperti berikut: "In respect of sentencing there can be only general guidelines. No two cases can have exactly the same facts to the minutest detail. Facts do differ from case to case and ultimately each case has to be decided on its own merits. In practice, sentences do differ not only from case to case but also from court to court. All things being equal these variations are inevitable if only because of the human element involved. But, of course, there must be limits to permissible variations. The principles to be applied in imposing sentence however are the same in every case. The High Court sitting in exercise of its revisionary powers will not normally alter the sentence unless it is satisfied that the sentence of the lower court is either manifestly inadequate or grossly excessive or illegal or otherwise not a proper sentence having regard to all the facts disclosed on the record or to all the facts which the court ought to take judicial notice of, that is to say, that the lower court clearly has erred in applying the correct principles in the assessment of the sentence. It is a firmly established practice that the court will not alter a sentence merely because it might have passed a different sentence.”. [35] Berkenaan hukuman sebatan pula, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan keputusan HMS yang telah menjelaskan bahawa hukuman tersebut adalah sebagaimana termaktub di dalam undang-undang sebagai bilangan yang paling minimum boleh dikenakan oleh mahkamah, sebagaimana prinsip ditetapkan dalam kes PP v. Jafa bin Daud (supra). KESIMPULAN [36] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan dinyatakan di atas, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa tiada kesilapan atau kekhilafan yang telah dilakukan oleh HMS dalam menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 10 tahun bermula daripada tarikh ditangkap dan 10 sebatan yang diperintahkan terhadap Perayu. Dengan ini, Mahkamah ini memutuskan bahawa hukuman yang dijatuhkan oleh HMS dikekalkan dan Rayuan Perayu ditolak. Evawani (Evawani Farisyta binti Mohammad) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Jenayah (2) Alor Setar, Kedah Bertarikh 26 Julai 2024. Bagi pihak Responden: Fatin Farahiyah binti Nadzri