Ajc Property Surveyors Sdn. Bhd v Trec Holdings Sdn. Bhd (WA-22NCvC-310-05/2024)

Whether the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant is time-barred pursuant to Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953? (‘Question 1’)

Whether the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant upon an illegal act vis-à-vis ex dolo malo non oritur actio and/or Ex turpi causa non oritur actio? (‘Question 2’) 27/05/2025 09:42:11 WA-22NCvC-310-05/2024 Kand. 60 (hereinafter referred to collectively as the ‘Questions of Law’). [2] After having considered the affidavit evidence and submissions by the parties, I had dismissed the Defendant’s application on 28.3.2025. [3] These are my full grounds of judgment for purposes of the Defendant’s appeal against my decision. The Cause Papers [4] The cause papers in relation to the application are as follows:

Notice of Application dated 23.7.2024 (encl. 14);

the Defendant’s Affidavit In Support (‘AIS’) affirmed by its Chief Executive Officer, Akid Bin Lam on 22.7.2024 (encl. 13);

the Plaintiff’s Affidavit In Reply (‘AIR’) affirmed by its Managing Director, Sharizal Bin Supian on 9.8.2024 (encl. 20); and

the Defendant’s AIR affirmed by its Director, Douglas Cheng Heng Lee on 29.8.2024 (encl. 21). Background Facts [5] The Plaintiff, formerly known as A Jalil & Co Sdn Bhd, is a company incorporated under the Companies Act 2016 with a registered address at No. 12 (1st Floor), Jalan Suasana 2/7, Bandar Tun Hussein Onn, 43200 Cheras, Selangor. Its business address is 19, Level 1, Jalan Pahang P15, Precint 15, 62050 Putrajaya. The Plaintiff is in the business of property consultancy, valuation and property management, and is registered with the Board of Valuers, Appraisers, Estate Agents and Property Managers. [6] The Defendant is a private limited company with its registered address at K-7-10, Block K, No. 2, Jalan Solaris, Solaris Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur and business address at Lot 438, Jalan Tun Razak, 50400 Kuala Lumpur. The Defendant is in the business of “letting of properties and maintenance”. [7] The Plaintiff alleged that, on 20.6.2017, the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a written agreement i.e. the Proposal and Quotation prepared by the Plaintiff dated 14.6.2017, where the Defendant agreed to appoint the Plaintiff to provide property consultancy services including the Report and Valuation to determine the market value and other claims in relation to the properties Lot Nos. 553 (PT No. 434), 554 (PT No. 435), 555 (PT No. 436), 556 (PT No. 437), 580, 581, & 582, HSD No. 110733, 110735 & 110735, Geran No. 2964, 72979, 72982 & 78349, all located in Section 90, Town & District of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur following a land acquisition of these properties (‘Acquired Lands’) for the “Projek Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) Lembah Klang - Jajaran Sungai Buloh - Serdang - Putrajaya (SSP)”. [8] The Defendant admitted that the parties entered into a contractual relationship but not the fact that a written agreement was executed between the parties in respect of the valuation services relating to the Acquired Lands. [9] According to the Plaintiff, it had provided the services and attended the hearing before the Land Administrator whereby compensation in the sum of RM180,884,245.34 was awarded for the land acquisition (‘Compensation’). The Defendant is said to have accepted the Compensation even though the Plaintiff had estimated the land value and other claims in the sum of RM334,555,987.80. [10] The Plaintiff claimed that the parties had renegotiated the fee structure for the Plaintiff’s services by way of a physical meeting and confirmed vide e-mails dated 14, 16 and 18 August 2017. The payment structure for the services provided by the Plaintiff to the Defendant which was agreed in the Plaintiff’s e-mail titled “Re: Land Acquisition (MRT2 Project) of TREC, Phase 2, Jalan Tun Razak, Kuala Lumpur – Full Valuation Services – Fee Structure” to the Defendant dated 16.8.2017 (‘16.8.2017 E-mail’) reads as follows: “We refer to the meeting with you, your directors namely YBhg Dato’ Douglas and Mr Cher as well as another director on 14 August 2017 with regard to the above matter. As discussed and agreed, we would like to put on record as below :-

Consultancy Fee Structure: it will be based on the compensation awarded by the Land Administrator via the Form H, as follows :-

If the compensation is below RM100 mil., the fee is calculated at 1% based on the said compensation/award.

If the compensation is RM100 mil. up to RM150 mil., the fee is RM2.5 mil.

If the compensation is above RM150 mil. up to RM200 mil., the fee is RM7.5 mil.

If the compensation is above RM200 mil. up to RM305 mil., the fee is RM10 mil.

If the compensation is above RM305 mil., the fee is RM20 mil.

The above is excluding 6% GST.

Mode of payment to us;

If the fee is below RM10 mil., therefore it is to be paid in lump sum within 2 weeks after the compensation (under Form H) has been received.

If the fee is RM10 mil., therefore, it is to be paid in tier (proportionate) within 6 months subject to an interest rate at 5% p.a.

If the fee is RM20 mil., therefore, it is to be paid in tier (proportionate) within 12 months subject to an interest rate at 5% p.a. …

The above consultancy fee structure is applicable for our consultancy and valuation services throughout JKPTGKL’s to the High Court’s level (not including the Court of Appeal or higher Court). The bottom line of the total above fess is subject to the total compensation decide at the JKPTG KL and/or the Court. …”. [11] On 18.8.2017, the Defendant relied by e-mail to the Plaintiff stating that “We hereby confirm and agreed to the consultancy fee structure as per your email dated 16 Aug 2017. I understand that you have received verbal confirmation from Dato Douglas after yesterday’s hearing. This is also to confirm that we have submitted the cheque of Preliminary Valuation of RM3,180.00 on 17.8.2017.”. [12] However, in the instant proceeding, the Defendant alleged that –

the Plaintiff was engaged for the sole purpose of preparing a valuation report to challenge the award proposed by the Land Administrator during the land enquiry and all relevant steps relating thereto in the land acquisition process and no other services were rendered by the Plaintiff to the Defendant; and

in August 2017, the Defendant was unfamiliar with the process of land acquisition and the applicable valuations, hence the Defendant believed the Plaintiff when it was informed that the fee proposed was the norm for valuation services for the purposes of the land acquisition. The Defendant had relied on the representation of the Plaintiff made through Sr. Sharizal Supian. At that time, the Defendant was not aware that the valuation fee structure proposed was illegal, unlawful and/ or unenforceable for not being in accordance with the statutory laws, due to the misrepresentation or fraud by the Plaintiff. The proposed fee structure included the fees for any proceedings thereafter in the High Court, but the matter did not proceed beyond the land enquiry as the Defendant accepted the award made by the Land Administrator. [13] The Plaintiff prepared the “Laporan Dan Penilaian Bagi Maksud Pengambilan Tanah Ke Atas Lot PT 435, PT 436, PT 437, 580, 581 & 582, Hakmilik Masing-Masing HSD 110733, HSD 110734, HSD 110735, Geran 72964, Geran 72979 & Geran 72982, Kesemuanya Di Dalam Seksyen 90, Bandar & Daerah Kuala Lumpur Dan Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur Penilaian (Pindaan)” dated 25.9.2017 (‘Amended Valuation Report’) and the same was submitted to the Land Administrator at the Federal Territories Land and Mines Office, Kuala Lumpur (‘PTGKL’) on or before 26.9.2017. [14] At the hearing before the Land Administrator of PTGKL on 26.9.2017, the award was made in the cumulative sum of RM180,884,245.34 for the Acquired Lands. The “Form H” (Notice of Award and Offer of Compensation) pursuant to s 16 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 in respect of the Defendant's interest in the Acquired Lands was issued on 26.9.2017. [15] The Land Administrator of PTGKL made the payment for the assessment of the Acquired Lands on 12.1.2018. [16] Based on the Compensation, the Plaintiff’s position is that the fee that has to be paid by the Defendant is RM7.5 million. On 20.2.2018, the Plaintiff sent an invoice to the Defendant for the sum of RM500,000.00 and this amount was duly paid by the Defendant on 15.5.2018. [17] However, the Defendant’s version is that, sometime around March 2018, the Plaintiff issued a proforma invoice dated 8.3.2018 to the Defendant for the sum of RM500,000.00 inclusive of GST of 6% vide e-mail for the service rendered in respect of the Land Acquisitions and the Defendant made payment by way of a cheque dated 20.4.2018 under the mistaken belief that the fee was lawfully due to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff then failed to issue the tax invoice and receipt and the Defendant had to repeatedly remind the Plaintiff to issue the same. The Defendant required the tax invoice for the purpose of the Defendant’s output tax for the GST. On 26.7.2018, the Plaintiff issued the tax invoice dated 15.5.2018 for the payment of RM500,000.00 to the Defendant enclosing the official receipt dated 15.5.2018. [18] The Defendant goes on to emphasise that between 2019 and 2023, the Plaintiff did not communicate at all with the Defendant as regards to the purported remaining fee owed to the Plaintiff. It was only on 24.1.2024 that the Plaintiff wrote to the Defendant for the alleged fee owed in respect of the services rendered for the Land Acquisitions wherein an invoice for the sum of RM17,668,980.11 inclusive of 6% SST was enclosed. The Plaintiff is accused of having illegally imposed a fee by charging the first RM100 million at 1% and the remaining balance of RM80,844,245.34 at 20%. [19] The Defendant replied to the Plaintiff's letter on 18.3.2024 asserting that the Defendant did not owe any monies and the payment of RM500,000.00 constitutes full and final settlement of all services rendered by the Plaintiff. [20] The Plaintiff vide its solicitors responded in their letter dated 14.5.2024 denying that the fee of RM500,000.00 was a final and full settlement in respect of the services rendered to the Defendant. [21] On 14.5.2024, the Plaintiff filed the Writ and Statement of Claim claiming for the balance in the sum of RM7 million. The Legal Principles [22] The Defendant’s application was made pursuant to O. 14A, r. 1; O. 33, rr. 2 and 5; and O. 92, r. 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 (‘RC 2012’). These statutory provisions are shown below for ease of reference: “Determination of questions of law or construction (O. 14A, r. 1)

1.

The Court may, upon the application of a party or of its own motion, determine any question of law or construction of any document arising in any cause or matter at any stage of the proceedings where it appears to the Court that –

such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the action; and

such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein.

On such determination the Court may dismiss the cause or matter or make such order or judgment as it thinks just.

The Court shall not determine any question under this Order unless the parties have had an opportunity of being heard on the question.

The jurisdiction of the Court under this Order may be exercised by a Registrar.

Nothing in this Order shall limit the powers of the Court under Order 18, rule 19 or any other provisions of these Rules. … Time of trial of questions or issues (O. 33, r. 2)

The Court may order any question or issue arising in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, and whether raised by the pleadings or otherwise, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter, and may give directions as to the manner in which the question or issue shall be stated.” … Dismissal of action after decision of preliminary issue (O. 33, r. 5)

If it appears to the Court that the decision of any question or issue arising in a cause or matter and tried separately from the cause or matter substantially disposes of the cause or matter or renders the trial of the cause or matter unnecessary, it may dismiss the cause or matter or make such other order or give such judgment therein as may be just. … Inherent powers of the Court (O. 92, r. 4)

For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court.”. [23] The procedure under O.14A of the RC 2012 enables the court to determine any question of law or construction of document where it appears to the court that such question is suitable for determination without the full trial of the action and such determination will finally determine the entire cause or matter or any claim or issue therein [see Petroleum Nasional Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu [2004] 1 MLJ 8 (CA)]. [24] Subsequent decisions have further elucidated on the legal principles in the application of O. 14A RC 2012, for example, in Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan v. Petroliam Nasional Berhad & Other Appeals [2014] 7 CLJ 597, the Federal Court held that the procedure under O.14A RC 2012 and the principles set out in the Petroleum Nasional (supra) are not an exhaustive list and not attempt was made to lay down a hard and fast rule on the application of O.14A RC 2012 while in Director Of Forests, Sarawak & Anor v. Racha Urud & Ors And Other Appeals [2017] 5 CLJ 389, the apex court held that whether a question was suitable for determination under O.14A RC 2012 was when the necessary and material facts relating to the subject matter in question have been duly proved or admitted (see too, Dream Property Sdn Bhd v. Atlas Housing Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 MLJ 812, Low Chee & Sons Sdn Bhd & Anor v Extreme System Sdn Bhd & another Appeal [2011] CLJU 1944, Thein Hong Teck & Ors v Mohd Afrizan bin Hussain and Anor [2012] 2 MLJ 299, MBF Holdings Berhad & Anor v Loy Teik Ngan & Anor [2015] 3 MLRA 42 and Dato’ Sivanathan a/I Shanmugam v. Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLJ 122). [25] Turning to the procedure under O. 33 RC 2012, the High Court in Krishnan Rajan a/l N Krishnan v Bank Negara Malaysia & Ors [2003] 1 MLJ 149 had set out the legal principles in these words: “The principles of law that can be distilled from the long line of established authorities may conveniently be marshalled in these terms:

that the rule confers upon the court a wide discretionary power to order any question or issue in a cause or matter, whether of fact or law or partly of fact and partly of law, to be tried before, at or after the trial of the cause or matter;

(ii) that the application under Order 33 rule 2 of the RHC may not be appropriate where the facts are in dispute or where extrinsic evidence is required to be adduced;

(iii) that the overriding consideration, when taken in its correct perspective, is whether the application would result in a substantial saving of time and expenditure; and

(iv) that the court should be wary and warn itself against the abuse of this process.”. [26] The Defendant contended that the Questions of Law are suitable to be determined under O. 14A of the RC 2012 on the grounds as shall be elaborated below. Question 1: Whether the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant is time-barred pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 [Act 234] (‘LA 1953’) [27] Paragraph 6(1)(a) of the LA 1953 provides as follows: “6. Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions

Save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say –

actions founded on a contract or on tort; …”. [28] The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and to have a definite end to litigation [see Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409 (SC)]. [29] A cause of action founded on contract accrues on the date of its breach and time begins to run from that breach (see Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32, Tan Boon Yen & Yang Lain v. Mayban General Assurance Bhd [2003] 2 CLJ 268, The Great Eastern Life Assurance Co Ltd v Indra Janardhana Menon (representing the estate of the deceased, NVJ Menon) [2006] 2 MLJ 209 and Lotte Chemical Titan (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v Siemens Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 580). [30] Once the Defendant raises the defence of limitation, the Plaintiff burden is on the Plaintiff to establish that the cause of action pleaded by the Plaintiff falls within the period of limitation (see Husli Mok v Superintendent of Lands & Survey & Anor [2012] 1 LNS 969). [31] The Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff's action against the Defendant is time-barred pursuant to paragraph 6(1)(a) of the LA 1953 as the action was brought more than six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued and this can be determined on a preliminary basis without the need for a full trial. [32] It was further submitted that, in this case, the date when the breach of contract occurred can be found in Rule 48 of the Valuers, Appraisers and Estate Agent Rules 1986 [PU(A) 64/1986] (‘1986 Rules’) read together with the Seventh Schedule in the Valuers, Appraisers, Estate Agents and Property Managers Act 1981 [Act 242]. [33] In this regard, s 32 of Act 242 stipulates that: “The Board may with the approval of the Minister make rules as may be necessary for the better carrying out or giving effect to the provisions of Part III to Part VIII.”. [34] Rule 48 of the 1986 Rules provides as follows: “(1) The scale of fees to be charged by the registered valuers, appraisers and estate agents for professional advice or services rendered shall not be more than those prescribed in the Seventh Schedule.

The values specified in the Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be the total amount undertaken under one specific instruction.”. [35] The Seventh Schedule in Act 242 provides for the “Scale of Fees”, among others, as follows: “A. VALUATIONS

Fee payable by the Land Administrator under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 [Act 486] … For awards greater than RM1,000,000 the fee shall be a minimum of RM3,500 plus the fee based on the following rate: … The fees payable shall be based on the amount awarded by the District Land Administrator. It shall be payable upon the submission by the person claiming compensation based upon a valuation report prepared by a registered valuer or appraiser in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Board for the valuation report. It does not include disbursements nor fees/disbursements for work done in preparation for negotiations and court attendance.”. [36] Based on the above cited provisions, the Defendant argued that, for fees in respect of valuation conducted for land acquisition, the right to recover fees accrues when the Valuation Report is submitted. [37] In the instant case, the fees in respect of the valuation conducted for the land acquisition would have accrued on 26.9.2017, being the date, the Amended Valuation Report was submitted to the Land Administrator at PTGKL and when Form H was issued for payment. [38] Thus, the cause of action having accrued on 26.9.2017, would be barred by limitation on 26.9.2023. This suit was commenced only on 14.5.2024, after limitation had set in. [39] After having considered the affidavit evidence and the parties’ submissions, I was inclined to the view that Question 1 cannot be conclusively answered by way of the Defendant’s application in encl. 14 and relying merely on affidavit evidence for the following reasons:

On 8.3.2018, the Plaintiff issued a Tax Invoice for Consultancy Fee in the sum of RM500,000.00 including 6% GST. It is the Defendant’s case that the only services rendered to the Defendant was the preparation of the Amended Valuation Report; the Tax Invoice does not state that it is for part of the fees; and the words “Consultancy Fee” were used by the Plaintiff to avoid the 1986 Rules. The Defendant claimed that payment for the sum of RM500,000.00 was made by way of a cheque dated 20.4.2018. The Plaintiff deposited the cheque into its bank account on 15.5.2018 and issued an Official Receipt for the sum of RM500,000.00 on the same date. The payment by the Defendant, whereby the cheque was cleared and the amount was credited into the Plaintiff’s account on 15.5.2018, is arguably a part payment resulting in a fresh accrual of action as provided under sub-s 26(2) of the LA 1953 which reads: “Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgement or the last payment.”. The filing of the suit on 14.5.2024 would then fall within the statutory limitation period.

The Plaintiff had additionally contended that its cause of action began from 9.2.2024 as there was a fresh accrual of action on acknowledgement made by the Defendant’s Director, Dato’ Douglas Cheng when he sent a WhatsApp message to the Plaintiff’s Managing Director, Mr. Sharizal Bin Supian (‘WA Message’) stating as follows: Dato’ Douglas Cheng: Happy new year bro Now that trec is doing ok again, can we meet to settle what we owe you? … Sharizal: Dato, it's great to hear from you after so long. Let's meet soonest for you to fully settle the balance amount owing to us. Thanks. Dato’ Douglas Cheng: Yes after the 20th, will get kevin to arrange Sub-s 27(1) of the LA1953 provides that the acknowledgment as referred to in s 26 of the LA 1953 shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment. Applying the judgment of the apex court in Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 4 MLJ 478, it would be necessary for this Court to, among others, consider the chronology of events that led to the sending of the WA Message and Dato’ Douglas Cheng’s intention on the same, especially in the light of the fact that the Plaintiff’s invoice on 24.1.2024 is not for the sum of RM7 million, and instead is for a different figure of RM17,668,980.11 inclusive of 6% service tax, before making a determinative finding on whether the WA Message amounts to an acknowledgement of the Plaintiff’s claim by the Defendant such that there is a fresh accrual of the Plaintiff’s right of action. Question 2: Whether the Plaintiff’s action against the Defendant upon an illegal act vis-à-vis ex dolo malo non oritur actio and/ or ex turpi causa non oritur actio [40] The Defendant has framed Question 2 by making reference to two legal maxims, namely, ex dolo malo non oritur action or no right of action arises from fraud and ex turpi causa non oritur actio or no action arises from a dishonourable cause. The Defendant cited the cases of Muhammad Noor Redzuan bin Misran v Muhammad Amirul Hafiz bin Khairulazuin [2020] MLJU 993 and Tan Keen Keong @ Tan Kean Keong v Tan Eng Hong Paper & Stationery Sdn Bhd & Ors and other appeals [2021] 3 MLJ 914 to support the submission that these legal principles are applicable in the instant case. [41] According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff's claim is illegal because the Plaintiff is bound by the fee structure pursuant to Act 242 and the relevant rules and regulations. However, the fees charged and being claimed by the Plaintiff is in breach of Rule 48 of the 1986 Rules read together with the Seventh Schedule in Act 242 which provide the scale fee which the Plaintiff is required by law to follow when undertaking the scope of work for the Defendant. The total fee that should have been charged following the statutory provisions is RM80,312.22. [42] In submitting for the Defendant, Ms. Celine relied on the case of Sri Palmar Development & Construction Sdn Bhd v Jurukur Perunding Services Sdn Bhd [2011] 10 CLJ 725 where the court held that the ceiling fee was a ceiling and going beyond that would be overcharging. The prescribed fee was intended to prevent overcharging. In the instant case, the Plaintiff's claim for RM7 million is far above the prescribed fee and far in excess of the sum already paid by the Defendant i.e. RM500,000.00. [43] The Defendant averred that, at the material time, it had relied on the professionalism of the Plaintiff and its officers and their representations that the fee structure was premised on the ordinary scale fee and therefore, the Defendant agreed to the same. However, the Defendant was misled by the Plaintiff into paying RM500,000.00. [44] The Defendant also accused the Plaintiff of disguising the valuation report fee as a consultancy fee for the following reasons:

the fee structure was premised on the award by the Land Administrator consistent with the Seventh Schedule in Act 242 albeit bearing a different and higher scale;

the scope of work identified for the fee only relates to the preparation of a valuation report and defending the same in the land acquisition proceedings and any referral to the High Court. This does not amount to consultancy services;

the only work produced by the Plaintiff was the Amended Valuation Report which was submitted to PTGKL on 26.9.2017; and

the preparation or consultancy provided by the Plaintiff in respect of the Preliminary Valuation Exercise was the subject of a separate fee, which was paid by the Defendant in the sum of RM300,000.00. [45] The Plaintiff retorted that the Seventh Schedule in Act 242 is in relation to the fee payable by the Land Administrator to the valuer, and not regarding payment as agreed between the valuer and the land owner. Furthermore, the amount which is claimed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant is for consultation services provided and not merely the Amended Valuation Report prepared by the Plaintiff, and as per the agreement between the parties under the proposal and quotation dated 14.6.2017 which was signed by the Defendant on 20.6.2017. Subsequently, negotiations took place to revise the agreed fee structure which was recorded in the 16.8.2017 E-mail. [46] Dato’ Hazman referred to the judgment in Fadzilah & Fikri Sdn Bhd lwn Dolomite Industries Company Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 964 to support his submission that the consultancy services provided by the Plaintiff is not subject to Rule 48 of the 1986 Rules or the scale fees under the Seventh Schedule in Act 242. [47] The learned counsel further argued that the Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff’s services was only limited to the preparation of the valuation report is a plain and obvious misdirection and untruthful statement as the Plaintiff had provided the following services:

Consultation/ advice for the Defendant to hire the best legal firm whereby Messrs. Tommy Thomas was appointed for the expert opinion on the land acquisition matters in respect of the property H.S.(D) 110733, No. PT 435, Seksyen 90 Bandar Kuala Lumpur, Daerah Kuala Lumpur, Negeri Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala

Consultation/ discussion/ advice with Messrs. Tommy Thomas as a valuer expert for the Said Land on 25.8.2017 and 21.9.2017; and

Attendance and submission before the Land Administrator during the hearing for the Said Land. It was emphasised that the relevant witnesses will be called and documents will be produced during the trial to prove the other consultancy services which had been provided by the Plaintiff to the Defendant for the Said Land. [48] In addition, a similar complaint/ report was made by a third party regarding the fee structure that was imposed by the Plaintiff, but in the letter dated 12.6.2019, the Board of Valuers, Appraisers, Estate and Agents and Property Managers (‘Board’) had dismissed the complaint/ report. To this, the Defendant responded by stating that –

the exact facts of the complaint by the third party are not disclosed and are unascertainable. Hence, it cannot be said to be similar to the Defendant’s current allegations;

the findings by the Board do not bind this Court, which is at liberty to consider this issue; and

it is not evident from exhibit “SS-6”, encl. 20 as to whether the Board considered s 32 and the Seventh Schedule in Act 242 and Rule 48 of the 1986 Rules and whether there is any judicial interpretation of those provisions in similar professional organisations. This Court is entitled to interpret and consider these provisions as there are no other precedents from a competent court relating to the same. [49] It is obvious from the gist of the parties’ submissions in relation to the instant application as outlined above that there is a dispute on the facts in this case as well as on the issue of whether the statutory provisions as cited by the Defendant are applicable and the Plaintiff is in breach of the same. [50] Similar to Question 1, I am unable to arrive at a conclusive determination of Question 2 merely based on the affidavit evidence and the submissions of the parties. The dispute can only be resolved by way of a full trial. This is not a case where the entire suit can be determined pursuant to O. 14A, r. 1 and/ or O. 33, rr. 2 and 5 of the RC

Conclusion [51] Based on the aforesaid considerations, the Defendants’ application in encl. 14 was dismissed with costs of RM3,000.00, subject to allocator. Dated: 9 May 2025 (ALIZA SULAIMAN) Judge High Court in Malaya (NCvC2) Kuala Lumpur Counsels/ Solicitors: For the Plaintiff: Dato’ Hazman bin Ahmad (Rafiq Rahimi bin Abdul Ghazi with him) Messrs. Omar Ismail Hazman & Co. Advocates & Solicitors Lot 152-3-10 & 152-3-11, Kompleks Maluri Jalan Jejaka, Taman Maluri 55100 Cheras Kuala Lumpur For the Defendant: Celline Chelladurai (Anne Malar Joseph with her) Messrs. Celine & Oommen Advocates & Solicitors B-3A-12, Gateway Kiaramas No. 1, Jalan Desa Kiara