Akijaya Development Sdn. Bhd. v Hk City Constructions Sdn. Bhd. (AA-24NCC-3-03/2023)

This is an application by the Plaintiff (Akijaya Development Sdn Bhd) for a declaration that the Notice pursuant to section 465(1)(e) read together with section 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016 dated 19.1.2023 issued by the Defendant to the Plaintiff (“Statutory Notice”) is illegal, null and void.

The Plaintiff also filed this application seeking for an injunction to restrain the Defendant, their employees, agents or any other person from presenting a winding up petition against the Plaintiff based on the Statutory Notice.

Alternatively, if the Winding Up Petition had been presented by the Defendant against the Plaintiff based on the Statutory Notice, the Plaintiff seeks for an interim injunction to be issued restraining the Defendant, their employees, agents or any other person from taking any further action in the proceedings of the Winding-up Petition including but not limited to taking any steps to advertise and gazette the said Petition.

The Plaintiff’s reasons for this application are as follows:-

Any winding up petition filed by the Defendant is for incidental purposes and would be an abuse of process of this court;

(ii) The filing of a petition to wind up the Plaintiff was an attempt by the Defendant to circumvent and/or avoid undergoing the arbitration process that has been initiated at AIAC Kuala Lumpur 7.2.2023;

(iii) The amounts claimed by the Defendant based on the statutory notice amounting to RM1,721,726.48 are disputed;

(iv) There is a genuine dispute as to whether the Defendant is entitled to the amount claimed;

The Statutory Notice was an attempt to put undue pressure on the Plaintiff regarding the disputed debt;

(vi) There are serious issues to be determined in respect of the Defendant’s claim against the Plaintiff as alleged;

(vii) The filing of the Winding Up Petition would cause irreparable loss and damage to the Plaintiff;

(viii) The reliefs and injunctions sought in the present case is necessary to maintain the status quo and to prevent the Plaintiff from suffering irreparable loss and damage;

(ix) The balance of probabilities in this matter favours the Plaintiff. BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The Plaintiff is a sole proprietorship incorporated in accordance with the company act with a registered address at No. 87A, Jalan Raja Ekram, 30450 Ipoh, Perak. The Plaintiff does business as a housing developer with a total issued share capital of RM1,634,000.00 divided into 1,634,000 shares of RM1.00 each. [6] The Plaintiff had through a Letter of Appointment dated 11.12.2019 appointed the Defendant as a contractor to build and complete all contract works for 26 units of 2-storey terrace houses on Plot 1 – Plot 28 (Lot 3016 – Lot 3018) and 6 units of 2 storey semi-detached houses on Plot 31-Plot 38, Mukim Durian Sebatang, Daerah Hilir Perak, Perak Darul Ridzuan (“the Project”) for the total sum of RM5,478,800.00. The Letter of Appointment and the PAM Contract 2006 (with Quantities) consist of the entire contract. [7] The Defendant claimed that there arose a dispute between parties whereby the Plaintiff had failed and/or refused to pay the Defendant for work completed. [8] The Defendant had thus commenced an adjudication proceeding against the Plaintiff. [9] Based on the adjudication decision dated 13.12.2021 (Adjudikasi No. AIAC/D/ADJ-3917-2021), as at 8.3.2023, the Plaintiff owes the Defendant an amount of RM1,745,041.72 (together with ongoing interest until the date of full settlement) (“the Adjudication Decision”). [10] The Defendant had filed the Originating Summon No. WA-24C-6- 01/2022 (“SP6”) at the High Court of Kuala Lumpur to enforce the Adjudication Decision. [11] The Plaintiff had filed the Originating Summons No. WA-24C-123- 06/2022 (“SP123”) at the High Court of Kuala Lumpur to set aside the Adjudication Decision and to stay the Adjudication Decision (“SP128”). [12] After a full hearing, the High Court of Kuala Lumpur had decided as follows:-

To allow the Defendant’s claim, SP6 with cost of RM4,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant;

To dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim SP123 with cost of RM4,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant;

To dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim SP128 with cost of RM7,500.00 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. [13] The Plaintiff did not file any appeal against the decision of the High Court in respect of SP123 and SP128. [14] The Defendant had on 31.1.2023 filed a notice of claim against the Plaintiff pursuant to the High Court Order dated 30.6.2022. [15] The Plaintiff had however failed, refused and/or neglected to pay the sum as stated in the Statutory Notice which had led the Defendant to file the Winding Up Petition against the Plaintiff. [16] The Plaintiff had on 13.3.2023, filed this application seeking for, inter alia, an injunction to restrain the Defendant, their employees, agents or any other person from presenting a winding up petition against the Plaintiff based on the Statutory Notice. [17] The Plaintiff contended that it has a strong case against the Defendant in the arbitration proceeding. [18] On 22.3.2023, the Defendant had proceeded to file the Winding Up Petition against the Plaintiff through the “Petisyen Penggulungan” No. AA- 28NCC-16-03/2023 (“Winding Up Petition”) set for hearing on 26.6.2023. [19] On 26.6.2023, the Winding Up Petition was head before the High Court and without any dispute by the Plaintiff and/or the Plaintiff’s solicitor. And the Plaintiff was thus wound up by the court on 26.6.2023. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED [20] It is in my considered view that the issues which arise for the determination of this court are as follows:-

Whether the s.466 statutory notice is invalid;

(ii) Whether there is “bona fide” dispute of the debt justifying the grant of “Fortuna Injunction”; and

(iii) Whether the Plaintiff is commercially solvent.

Whether the s.466 statutory notice is invalid [21] The Plaintiff had on this issue contended that the s. 466 statutory notice was invalid on the ground that the said Notice was based on the adjudication decision made under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) dated 16.12.2021 which was not final in view of the Arbitration Proceeding commenced by the Plaintiff for its LAD claim against the Defendant. [22] The law is well settled that a successful party in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to present a winding-up petition based on adjudication decision under CIPAA as was held in the Court of Appeal case of Likas Bay Precinct Sdn Bhd v. Bina Puri Sdn Bhd [2019] 3 CLJ 499; [2019] 3 MLJ 244. [23] It is worth noting that the Statutory Notice was issued pursuant to an Enforcement Order of the High Court to which the Plaintiff had failed to dispute and/or appeal against. There was clearly debt due and owing by the Plaintiff to the Defendant as determined by the High Court. [24] The s. 466 statutory notice presented to the Plaintiff cannot be said to be invalid as it was clearly based on a valid and enforceable judgment whereby the Plaintiff’s application for stay of the Enforcement Order was also dismissed. It is within the Defendant’s legitimate right to present the statutory notice against the Plaintiff who had failed and/or refused to settle the judgment debt due and owing to the Defendant.

(ii) Whether there is bona fide dispute of the debt justifying the grant of Fortuna Injunction [25] In determining the Plaintiff’s application for a Fortuna Injunction, reference was made by this court to the case of United Malaya Stores Sdn Bhd v. S. Selapa Sivalingam & Anor [2022] 6 CLJ 469 where the High Court had outlined the legal principles to be considered when an application for Fortuna Injunction is made:- “[17] The legal principles that warrant the grant of a Fortuna injunction are well settled as elucidated in the following cases:

Fortuna Holdings Pty Ltd v. The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [1978] VR 83: The decisions of the courts have established the principle that the presentation of a winding-up petition may be restrained by injunction where its presentation would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. The courts apply this principle similarly to restrain the advertisement of a petition already presented. The principle enables companies to be protected from threatened or apprehended oppression and damage from abuse of court process. The basis on which the courts have intervened in the cases cited by counsel, has been that presentation of a winding-up petition might of itself cause irreparable damage to the company. Given that basis, the application of the principle which entitles the courts to intervene to prevent abuse of process, depends on the existence of different elements in two distinct situations considered in the authorities. For convenience I will refer to the applications of the principle in the two situations as the first and second branches of the principle. First branch of principle The first branch applies in cases where the presentation of the petition might produce irreparable damage to the company and where the proposed petition has no chance of success... Second branch of principle The second branch applies in cases where a petitioner proposing to present a petition has chosen to assert a disputed claim, by a procedure which might produce irreparable damage to the company, rather than by a suitable alternative procedure. It may apply in cases where the petition, if presented, has a chance of success. In some cases, both the first and the second branches of the principle apply.

(ii) Mobikom Sdn Bhd v. Inmiss Communications Sdn Bhd [2007] 3 CLJ 295; [2007] 3 MLJ 316, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) explained the basis as follows: [5] The kind of injunction by which an intended winding-up petition is sought to be restrained is known as a 'Fortuna injunction' taking its name from the case in which the juridical basis for the relief was first explained. See, Fortuna Holdings Ptv Ltd v. The Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1978] VR 83. In that case, McGarvie J discussed the basis on which a court acts to restrain the presentation of a winding-up petition and the two branches of the principle that guide courts in the grant of an injunction... [8] In a later passage McGarvie J summed up the two branches of the principle as follows: The first branch applies to cases where the petitioner is incapable of success as a matter of law or through absence of supporting evidence. Where the petitioner is not entitled to present a petition or where the ground alleged is not a ground which can found a winding-up order, the petition is incapable of success as a matter of law, if there is no sufficient evidence to establish an otherwise sufficient ground, the petition is incapable of success for that reason. Thus, the first branch applies where the proposed petition cannot succeed. The second branch applies to cases where there is a more suitable alternative means of resolving the dispute involved in a disputed claim against the company. They are not necessarily cases in which, as a matter of law or through absence of evidence, there is an inherent incapacity of success. They may be cases where the petitioner is entitled to present the petition, the ground is sufficient in law and there is evidence to support the ground. They are cases, though, where, due to the availability of the more suitable alternative remedy, the court hearing the petition would in the circumstances, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to make a winding-up order, at least while the circumstances remain as they are at the time of the application for an injunction. Thus, the second branch applies where, because of the availability of a suitable alternative procedure, the petition is unlikely to succeed in the circumstances existing at the time.

(iii) Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v. Muniammah Muniandy [2011] 1 CLJ 947; [2010] MLJU 2217, the Court of Appeal in referring to the Fortuna and Mobikom cases explained the application of the two branches as follows: [26] The first principle laid down in that case in that an injunction of that nature may be granted by court where the presentation of the petition might produce irreparable damage to the company and where the proposed petition has no chance of success. In order to succeed in getting injunction under this principle, the applicant must satisfy both limbs of the principle i.e.:

the intended petition has no chance of success, as a matter of law as well as a matter of fact; and

(ii) the presentation of such petition (which has no chance of success) might produce irreparable damage to the company. (See: Re A Company [1894] 1 Ch 349; Charles Forte Investment Ltd v. Amanda [1964] 1 Ch 240; [1963] 2 All ER 940 and Bryanston Finance Ltd v. De Vries (No 2) [1976] 2 WLR 41; [1976] 1 All ER 25). [27] This principle is not applicable to the present case. The respondent herein had obtained a valid and enforceable judgment against the insured as well as the insurer (appellant). The intended petition if filed is not bound to fail. He has a good chance to succeed. Therefore, whether or not it causes irreparable damage is of no consequence. Thus, the injunction applied for by the appellant in the present case, cannot be granted by court under this principle. [28] The second principle established in the Fortuna case is that an injunction of that nature may be granted in cases where a petitioner proposing to present a petition has chosen to assert a disputed claim, by a procedure which might produce irreparable damage to the company, rather than by a suitable alternative procedure. [29] This principle applies only to disputed debt. It does not apply to cases where the debt in question is undisputed. As long as the debt cannot be disputed, it is not consequence whether or not it will cause irreparable damage to the company, if presented. A valid and enforceable judgment of court as in the present case, (unless set aside or stayed) cannot be considered a disputed debt. The law is settled on this point. Therefore, an order for injunction as prayed for by the appellant in the present case, also cannot be granted under this principle. [18] The Court of Appeal in Tan Kok Tong v. Hoe Hong Trading Co Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 CLJ 305; [2007] 4 MLJ 355 made clear that in considering a Fortuna injunction, the principle in American Cynamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 does not apply: [8] When deciding whether to grant an injunction to restrain a petition that is based on a statutory demand for a debt, the court must be satisfied that the debt is bona fide disputed on substantial grounds (see Stonegate Securities Ltd v. Gregory [1980] 1 All ER 241). It is not enough that there is a serious question to be tried. In other words, this is one of those cases to which the general test laid down in American Cynamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 does not apply. In Molop Corp Sdn Bhd v. Uniperkasa (M) Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 LNS 280; [2003] 6 MLJ 311, Low Hop Bing J (as he then was) correctly held as follows (at p. 321): In Natseven TV Sdn Bhd v. Television New Zealand Ltd [2001] 4 CLJ 722, I had the occasion to consider and determine the burden of proof cast on the plaintiff in an application for interlocutory injunction to restrain the presentation of a winding-up petition, in the following words: I agree with the reasons given by the English and New Zealand Court of Appeal respectively and by Abdul Malik J and hold that for the purpose of obtaining an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from proceeding with the winding-up petition, the burden of proof cast on the plaintiff is only discharged by reference to the standard of proof or test in adducing evidence to establish a prima facie case and that the principle relating to the test of 'serious question to be tried' in American Cynamid Co v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396; [1975] 1 All ER 504 as applied in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor bin Abdullah & Ors [1995] 3 BLJ 254; [1995] 1 MLJ 193 is not applicable as the applications there were not applications to restrain winding-up petitions or proceedings, such as in the instant case before me. Illustration of a prima facie case may be provided by necessary evidence that there is a bona fide dispute by the plaintiff in relation to the statutory demand or that the plaintiff is solvent." (Emphasis added) [19] As made clear by the Court of Appeal in Tan Kok Tong's case in approving Low Hop Bing J (as he then was)'s pronouncements in Molop Corp Sdn Bhd, the Plaintiff here, as the applicant seeking to obtain an injunction to restrain the Defendant from proceeding with the winding up petition, is cast the burden of proof to adduce evidence to establish a prima facie case that there is a bona fide dispute in relation to the statutory demand made by the defendant or that the plaintiff is solvent. [20] In this context, I would thus at the outset state that the Plaintiff's arguments that the Defendant has not shown that the Plaintiff is commercially insolvent is utterly misconceived and seek in effect to reverse the burden of proof, which is impermissible in law. [21] The right to present winding up proceedings without resorting to first obtaining a judgment is clearly recognised by law. I have discussed in United Malaya Stores (supra) that there is no necessity for a creditor to obtain a judgment before serving a statutory demand: "[22] To my knowledge, there are at least four Court of Appeal cases which made clear that for the purposes of s. 466(1)(a), there is no necessity for a creditor to obtain a judgment before serving a statutory demand:

in Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Perdana Merchant Bankers Bhd & Other Appeals [2001] 3 CLJ 248; [2001] 4 MLJ 187, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) explained as follows: But a petition for winding-up is not execution. For a winding-up petition is not based upon any judgment of a court. Normally, it is based on the inability of a company to pay its debts as and when they fall due. Such inability is normally evidenced by the company's inability to satisfy or compound a notice of demand issued pursuant to s. 218 of the Companies Act. But the issuance of such a notice is not a sine qua non for the presentation of a winding-up petition.What is needed is compelling evidence of the company's inability to pay its debts as and when they fall due.

(ii) in Syarikat Mohd Noor Yusof Sdn Bhd v. Polibina Engineering Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2005] 2 CLJ 676; [2006] 1 MLJ 446, Mohd Ghazali Yusoff JCA stated: We are aware that it is not provided under the Act that a petitioner must be armed with a judgment debt prior to the filing of a petition to wind up a company....

(iii) in Megasteel Sdn Bhd v. Perwaja Steel Sdn Bhd [2008] 4 CLJ 352, Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) held as follows: A creditor, generally speaking, does not have to obtain judgment before instituting winding-up proceedings against a company. That is the purpose for which s. 218(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 1950 was enacted.

(iv) in Lafarge Concrete (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Gold Trend Builders Sdn Bhd [2011] 1 LNS 1763; [2012] 6 MLJ 817, Jeffrey Tan JCA pronounced: [6] Before we proceed to answer those questions, we should perhaps say that 'a creditor is not required to obtain a judgment before serving a statutory demand...' (The Law of Company Liquidation (4th Ed), by Andrew R. Keay at p. 83) and 'whether or not judgment had been obtained, an unpaid creditor is, as a general rule, entitled to a winding-up order against a company which is insolvent' (The Law of Company Liquidation (4th Ed), by Andrew R. Keay at p 91). Where there is no judgment, it is not uncommon for companies to argue that the debt is disputed. But 'in order to oppose a winding-up petition, the respondent must raise a bona fide dispute in both a subjective and objective sense. It must be honestly believed to exist and must be based on substantial or reasonable grounds - BMC Construction Sdn Bhd v. Dataran Rentas Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 CLJ 591; [2001] 1 MLJ 356' (Chan & Koh on Malaysian Company Law (2nd Ed) , at para 22.145).” (Emphasis added) [26] The Winding-up Petition had been filed based on an adjudication decision that was enforced and confirmed by the Kuala Lumpur High Court through a Court Order dated 30.6.2022 under Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) which reads as follows:- “28. Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment 1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court. 2) The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable. 3) The order made under subsection (2) may be executed in accordance with the rules on execution of the orders or judgment of the High Court.” [27] The Plaintiff had contended that the debt is bona fide disputed in view of the arbitration proceeding commenced against the Defendant. [28] In principle, a debt that has been admitted, cannot be considered a disputed debt based on which the grant of an injunction to restrain the presentation of a winding-up petition would be justified. Any application to grant the order under such circumstances should be regarded as an abuse of process of the court. (See Ibai Golf & Country Club Bhd v. Laman Kejora Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 246). [29] Once a debt is shown not to be bona fide disputed, the refusal to pay such debt would axiomatically entitle the petitioner to pursue the winding up petition against the respondent debtor (see Karisma Synergy Sdn Bhd v. Gates PCM Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 CLJ 122). [30] An arbitration proceeding or a cross-claim is not a factor justifying the grant of fortuna injunction as was held in the Court of Appeal case of Sime Darby Energy Solution Sdn Bhd v. RZH Setia Jaya Sdn Bhd [2021] 9 CLJ 880 as follows:- “[50] With respect, to our minds, this does not equate to entitling the party ordered to make payment under the AD to an order to restrain the successful party from presenting a winding-up petition as the former has a statutory right to challenge the statutory notice or petition before the winding-up court. Until and unless the AD is set aside, it can in law form the basis for the statutory notice which was the position in the present instance. Whether or not the respondent had a bona fide cross-claim against the appellant on merits to challenge the petition is a matter to be adjudged by the winding-up court. We are not convinced that an unproven cross-claim can be the basis for restraining the filing of a winding-up petition based on a valid and enforceable AD. … [59] In the circumstances, our decision would be that the LJC had erred in principle in failing to consider or correctly apply established principles and criteria for the grant of a FI against the enforcement of a proven judgment debt based on an AD contrary to the object and intention of the CIPAA for expeditious payments of proven construction claims. In our view, the LJC was plainly wrong in failing to strictly apply the principle expressly pronounced in Likas Bay (supra) on the basic premise of the right of the respondent as the losing party in the adjudication proceeding to pursue court action or arbitration that may eventually prevail over or reverse the AD. This is an uncertain event that should not be used to preclude the statutory right of the appellant to pursue a winding-up action.” [31] It is also settled law that relevant consideration be given by this court to the applicant’s conduct and promptitude in moving the court for an injunction. A party seeking an injunction or a stay of execution must act timeously. [32] In the present case, the Adjudication Decision was delivered on 13.12.2021 and an OS for the Enforcement of AD had been filed by the Defendant on 6.1.2022 which was granted by the High Court on 30.6.2022. The Plaintiff had filed OS to set aside the AD (“SP 123”) as well as to stay the AD (“SP128”), SP123 was dismissed by the High Court on 30.6.2022 whilst SP128 was dismissed on 24.11.2022. The Plaintiff did not appeal against the said decisions of the High Court. [33] It was not disputed that the Plaintiff had failed and/or refused to comply with the Enforcement Order which had led the Defendant to issue the Statutory Notice dated 31.1.2023. It was only after receiving the said statutory notice had the Plaintiff commenced the Arbitration Proceeding against the Defendant via originating summons dated 13.3.2023. [34] The Plaintiff, at all material time, had knowledge of the Winding Up Petition commenced against it since 3.4.2023 and had every opportunity to challenge the Winding Up Petition before the winding up court. The matter of a pending arbitration proceeding could be brought to the attention of the court by the Plaintiff during the Winding Up proceeding. However, the Plaintiff had deliberately ignore the entire proceeding and chose not to appear in court on the petition hearing date set for 26.6.2023. In the circumstances, it is in my considered view that the Plaintiff’s conduct is not consistent with their stance that it would suffer irreparable loss and/or damage should an injunction not be granted to restrain enforcement of the Winding Up Order. [35] In any event, even if the Plaintiff were to succeed in the arbitration proceeding, the purported amount of the LAD claimed against the Defendant was only for the total sum of RM1,562,037.10. The amount of which is less than the debt claimed by the Defendant under the Winding Up Petition which was between RM1,900,000.00 to RM2,000,000.00. The sum owed by the Plaintiff was thus still above the minimum statutory winding up threshold under the law, beyond which a winding up may be pursued (see the case of Karisma Synergy Sdn Bhd v. Gates PCM Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [supra]).

(iii) Whether the Plaintiff is commercially solvent [36] In view of my findings of no bona fide disputed debt above, the issue of the Plaintiff’s solvency becomes of little to no relevance in the present case. A refusal by a company, be it solvent or insolvent, to pay a debt to a petitioner would entitle the petitioner to pursue the winding up of the said debtor company. [37] In the instant case, the Plaintiff had failed to show to this court’s satisfaction that it is not insolvent based on its cash flow position. It is wholly insufficient that the assets might be realisable at some future date after the debts have become due and payable (see the Supreme Court decision in Lian Keow Sdn Bhd (in Liquidation) & Anor v. Overseas Credit Finance (M) Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 LNS 44; [1988] 2 MLJ 449). The Plaintiff had failed in toto to show any evidence of its more recent financial position. The Plaintiff’s bank account further reveals a balance of only RM1,768.59. [38] Furthermore, a proposal was advanced by the Defendant, for the Plaintiff to deposit the entire amount of judgment debt to this court or to the Defendant’s solicitor as stakeholder. This proposal was however outrightly rejected by the Plaintiff. This goes on to show that the Plaintiff does not have the financial means to settle the judgment debt owed by it to the Defendant. CONCLUSION [39] Based on the foregoing reasons above, it is in my considered view that the Plaintiff had failed to prove bona fide dispute on the debt as demanded by the Defendant. The Plaintiff had also failed to rebut the presumption of insolvency. This court finds no merit in the Plaintiff’s application for “Fortuna Injunction” and hereby dismiss the Plaintiff’s application accordingly with costs of RM15,000.00 is to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. Dated: 01.02.2024 -signed- (ABDUL WAHAB BIN MOHAMED) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IPOH, PERAK Pihak-pihak: Akijaya Development Sdn Bhd - Perayu No. 87A, Jalan Raja Ekram 30450 Ipoh Perak Tel:

05.2559893 / 2438892 / 012.9270068 Faks: 05.2438896 Emel: lili.akijaya@gmail.com Peguamcara: Surindar Singh a/l Chain Singh Aqilah Harun Tetuan KS Su & Mah – Respondent Peguamcara dan Peguambela No. 79, Jalan Istana 30000 Ipoh Perak

05.2436126 / 2433124 Faks: 05.2537126 Emel: kssumah@gmail.com