Alexander A/L Vareed Charles v Perbadanan Pengurusan Kondominium Marina View Villas (NA-11ANCvC-6-10/2025)

This appeal against the Magistrate Court at Port Dickson’s decision on 1.10.2025 that allowed the Respondent’s application for a summary judgment under Order 14 Rules of Court 2012 (RoC) for RM47,888.39 to be paid within seven days from the date of the said judgment, with costs of RM2,000.00. 12/06/2026 14:53:56 NA-11ANCvC-6-10/2025 Kand. 23

The summary judgment was granted in favour of the recovery of mandatory statutory debts related to a strata property. Specifically, the judgment is for the payment of outstanding maintenance charges, sinking fund contributions, and other related payments (such as insurance and late payment interest) owed by the Appellant to the management corporation under the Strata Management Act 2013 (SMA).

The specific figures and their calculation dates leading up to the summary judgment are as follows :- • RM44,836.80 (as of 30.4.2024): This was the initial figure calculated and served to the Appellant via a formal demand letter (Borang 20) on 3.5.2024; • RM47,888.39 (as of 1.3.2025): This is the final amount awarded in the Summary Judgment granted on 1.10.2025. It represents the total arrears pleaded in the Respondent's Statement of Claim (SoC).

Running Account: The Respondent contends that these figures are based on a "running account" for the unit, with the statement of account showing arrears dating back to 31.08.2004. During this time, the Appellant allegedly made no payments.

The Appellant is the owner of Unit A-01-04 at Marina View Villas. He failed to pay maintenance charges and other dues since becoming the owner. This Court could not find the exact date of the Appellant’s ownership, but according to the Respondent’s Statement of Account, the claim for the arrears for this specific unit began on 31.8.2004. This suggests that the Appellant’s ownership and the resulting statutory liability for maintenance charges date back to at least that time.

On 3.5.2024, the Respondent served a statutory demand notice (Borang 20) under section 78(1) SMA for RM44,836.80. The Appellant acknowledged receiving this notice but denied the debt in general terms without a detailed explanation.

On 8.4.2025, the Respondent filed a Writ and SoC to recover the arrears, which by then had increased to RM47,888.39.

On 17.7.2025, the Respondent applied for summary judgment under Order 14 RoC, arguing that the Appellant had no triable defence.

On 1.10.2025, the Magistrate at the Port Dickson Magistrate’s Court allowed the application. It was found that the Appellant had failed to raise any triable issue or provide evidence to dispute the accuracy of the statement of accounts.

The Appellant contends that several triable issues exist which should preclude the granting of summary judgment and require a full trial for resolution. The primary contention firstly is the Appellant’s contention that the judgment sum is uncertain and inconsistent. The Magistrate’s Court, in its order of RM47,888.39 as of 1.3.2025, is inconsistent with the sum in Borang 20 dated 30.4.2024. The Appellant contends that there was no clear formula or calculation for the latest outstanding amount ordered by the Magistrate’s Court.

The second argument is the failure to fulfil the statutory condition present under section 77(1) DMA. The Respondent had failed to prove that the management corporation lawfully incurred the payments being recovered. This proof, argues the Appellant, is a condition precedent that must be met before a claim can be made. The Respondent, according to the Appellant, had failed or neglected to furnish documentary proof of these incurred costs.

The statute of limitations was raised by the Appellant. It argues that a significant portion of the claim is time-barred under section of the Limitation Act 1953 (LA). The Appellant disputes the Respondent’s classification of the debt as a running account. His logic is that because the he had never made a single payment toward the maintenance charges since 2004, the account cannot be running. Thus, any charges dating back more than six years from the date the writ was filed (8.4.2025) were time-barred.

The Appellant further claims that the Respondent failed to provide satisfactory maintenance services. He contends that this failure constitutes a valid defence that cannot be resolved through summary judgment and requires a full trial with witness testimony.

Another challenge by the Appellate is the Respondent’s locus standi to claim arrears that accrued before the Respondent was officially incorporated on 23.5.2006. He argues that the Respondent bears the burden of proving it has the authority to sue for debts allegedly owed to prior management bodies before that date.

The interest charges are disputed by the Appellant, too. The Appellant claims the Respondent included compounded interest and interest reaching back more than six years, which he argues is prohibited under section 6(3) LA and section 11(a) Civil Law Act 1956 (CLA).

Lastly, the Appellant asserts that he has a meritorious counterclaim against the Respondent. He argues that the issues raised in his counterclaim are closely related to his defence and that granting a summary judgment without considering the counterclaim would be seriously prejudicial.

The Respondent has provided systematic replies specific to each contention. On the inconsistent judgment sum, the Respondent clarifies that the sum of RM47,888.39 (as of 1.3.2025) is clearly stated in the summary judgment and is consistent with its SoC. It explains that the lower figure of RM44,836.80 was simply the balance as of 30.4.2024 when the formal demand notice (Borang 20) was served. Any reference to the lower figure in the Magistrate’s grounds of judgment was a typo, and the Magistrate personally signed the sealed order for the correct, higher amount.

The Respondent argues that there is no legal requirement under RoC to itemise every detail of a statement of account within the SOC itself. It is contended that under Order 18 Rule 7(1), pleadings must only contain material facts in summary form, not the evidence used to prove them. The detailed statement of account was provided as an exhibit in the Affidavit in Support, which argues that it is the appropriate place for such evidence.

The Respondent maintains that the maintenance charges constitute a running account and are therefore not time-barred by the six-year limit in section 6(1) LA. The Court of Appeal precedents of Brightive Sdn Bhd v Pantai Towers Management Corporation & Another Appeal [2018] 4 MLRA 457; [2018] 5 MLJ 634 and Ekuiti Setegap Sdn Bhd v Plaza 393 Management Corporation [2018] 3 MLRA 342; [2018] 1 LNS 406; [2018] 4 MLJ 284 were cited, which establish that the time for a running account only expires six years after the last item or payment. It was further argued that the Appellant’s specific claim of never having made a payment was only raised as an argument from the Bar by his lawyer during the oral arguments and was never stated on oath in an affidavit, imploring this Court to disregard it.

The Respondent replies that a claim of unsatisfactory service is not a valid legal defence for the non-payment of mandatory statutory maintenance charges. It cites cases such as Chang Kwok Wah & Ors v Ong Tee Thong & Ors [2017] MLRHU 1199; [2017] 1 LNS 1399; [2016] MLJU 1825 and Uda Holdings Sdn Bhd v Bumi Gajah Agencies Sdn Bhd [2010] 12 MLRH 90; [2010] MLJU 2154; [2010] 1 LNS 1509 to support the principle that owners are prohibited from using service complaints as an excuse to withhold arrears.

The Respondent asserts its rights to claim all arrears regardless of its incorporation date of 23.5.2006. Reference was made to the Court of Appeal’s decision in 3 Two Square Sdn Bhd v Perbadanan Pengurusan 3 Two Square & Other Appeals [2021] 4 MLRA 257; [2021] 3 MLJ 280; [2021] 1 LNS 116 to support their legal standing to recover sums that accrued before the formal management body was incorporated.

The Respondent argues that the interest and charges are mandatory statutory debts governed by SMA. It cites Badan Pengurusan Bersama Kompleks Pandan Safari Lagoon v Paradise Boulevard Sdn Bhd [2021] MLRHU 1103; [2021] 1 LNS 1224; [2021] MLJU 1464, to emphasize that these are statutory obligations that the Defendant has failed to meet.

The Respondent also argues that the mere filing of a counterclaim does not prevent the courts from granting a summary judgment. It cites multiple authorities, including the Court of Appeal case of United Trade Arena (M) Sdn Bhd v Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad [2016] 3 MLRA 242; [2016] 1 CLJ 970; [2016] 2 MLJ 65, which stated that “notwithstanding the filing of a counterclaim, summary judgment may still be given”. It was contended that the Appellant’s counterclaim does not raise any genuine issues that would require a full trial of the main claim.

Having examined the Appeal Records, this Court is satisfied that the summary judgment entered by the Magistrate was for the sum of RM47,888.39. That amount appears in the sealed Order of Court and constitutes the operative judgment. The figure of RM44,836.80 appearing in the written grounds of judgment is plainly a clerical or typographical error. When the grounds are read as a whole and in the context of the sealed order, it is evident that the learned Magistrate intended to order payment of the updated outstanding sum of RM47,888.39.

This Court further finds that the amount claimed is a certain and ascertainable sum. The sum of RM47,888.39 was specifically pleaded by the Respondent in paragraph 10.1 of the SoC and is supported by the Statement of Account exhibited in the proceedings below. Pursuant to Order 18 rule 7(1) RoC, a material fact, including a specifically pleaded debt, may be relied upon and awarded where the defence fails to disclose any bona fide triable issue. In the present case, no genuine dispute has been raised as to the computation or quantum of the latest outstanding balance.

The principal challenge advanced by the Appellant is that the Respondent’s claim is statute-barred. In determining that issue, it is necessary to consider whether the maintenance charges and sinking fund contributions were maintained in a running account. The authorities, in particular Ekuiti Setegap Sdn Bhd (supra), establish the following principles :

A running account is treated as one continuous account in which periodic charges are debited, and payments or credits are correspondingly entered. The account is viewed as a single and continuing indebtedness rather than a collection of separate and independent claims.

For limitation purposes, the account only becomes statute-barred where more than six years have elapsed between the last item entered into the account and the last payment or credit recorded therein.

In the context of strata management, maintenance charges and sinking fund contributions constitute a continuing statutory obligation imposed upon proprietors. So long as charges continue to accrue and the account remains active, the indebtedness retains its character as a running account. [28] Applying those principles to the present case, the Statement of Account demonstrates that arrears began accumulating on 31.8.2004 and continued thereafter. The documentary evidence further shows that maintenance charges and related contributions were continuously imposed on a monthly basis up to the commencement of the action in 2025. The account remained open and active throughout that period. In accordance with the authorities of the Court of Appeal, the continuous imposition of fresh charges preserved the character of the account as a running account. Consequently, the limitation period had not operated to extinguish the earlier arrears. The Appellant’s reliance on limitation is therefore misconceived and does not raise any bona fide triable issue. The Magistrate was correct in holding that the running account principle applied to the facts of this case. [29] Equally untenable is the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent lacks entitlement to recover arrears which accrued before its incorporation as the management corporation. The rights and obligations of the Respondent arise from the statutory framework established under the SMA, in particular:

section 59(1), which imposes upon the management corporation the responsibility of determining and collecting charges for the maintenance and management of the building and common property; and

section 77(1), which provides for the recovery of sums lawfully incurred by the management corporation from proprietors. [30] The Court of Appeal in 3 Two Square Sdn Bhd (supra) authoritatively recognised that a management corporation is entitled to recover arrears accrued before its incorporation. Such entitlement does not arise by way of a conventional assignment of debt. Rather, it arises by operation of the statutory scheme under the SMA whereby the rights, obligations, and management responsibilities of preceding management entities are vested in the subsequently established management corporation. [31] The Certificate of Registration exhibited in the Appeal Records confirms the Respondent’s status as the duly constituted management corporation for the development. Maintenance charges and sinking fund contributions constitute statutory debts under the SMA. Accordingly, the Appellant’s liability to pay such charges arises by virtue of proprietorship of the parcel and is owed to the body lawfully entrusted with the management of the development, namely the Respondent. The date of incorporation of the Respondent does not extinguish or affect that liability. [32] The Magistrate was therefore correct in holding that the Respondent possessed the requisite locus standi to recover all outstanding arrears reflected in the running account. Once it is established that the Respondent’s claim is neither statute-barred nor defeated by any issue of standing, the Appellant’s remaining contentions concerning compounded interest and ancillary charges likewise fail to disclose any bona fide triable issue. In the circumstances of this case, neither section 6 LA nor section 11(a) CLA assists the Appellant. [33] This Court has also considered the Appellant’s contention that the Respondent failed to provide satisfactory maintenance and management services. The Appellant submits that such allegations warrant a full trial at which oral evidence may be adduced concerning the Respondent’s alleged shortcomings in the maintenance of the development. [34] With respect, that contention cannot avail the Appellant. The obligation to pay maintenance charges and sinking fund contributions under the SMA is a statutory obligation imposed upon proprietors. Dissatisfaction with the quality of services rendered by the management body does not entitle a proprietor to withhold payment of those charges. The authorities, including Chang Kwok Wah & Ors (supra) and UDA Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor (supra), make clear that a proprietor cannot rely on allegations of inadequate maintenance as a defence to a claim for recovery of maintenance charges. Any grievance regarding the performance of management functions must be pursued through the remedies provided under the SMA and not by withholding payment of statutory charges. Accordingly, this contention likewise fails to raise any bona fide triable issue warranting a trial. This Court’s Order [35] For the reasons set out above, this Court finds that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate the existence of any bona fide triable issue which would justify the matter proceeding to a full trial. The Magistrate properly exercised his discretion in entering summary judgment in favour of the Respondent. [36] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs of RM8,000.00, subject to allocatur. The decision of the Magistrate’s Court is affirmed. DATED 12 JUNE 2026 ROZ MAWAR ROZAIN JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SEREMBAN NEGERI SEMBILAN For the Appellant : David S/O Alexander Charles Nur Ashikin Alex & Partners For the Respondent :