that the police failed to investigate the defence’s version which has been brought to the attention of the police. [16] At the conclusion of the trial, this Court is under a duty to consider all the evidence and determine whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving its case against the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. This is provided under section 182A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The emphasis is on the phrase “all the evidence”. (See: Prasit Punyang v. PP [2014] 7 CLJ 392). [17] In considering all the evidence adduced before this Court at the conclusion of the trial as envisaged by section 182A of the Code, it is incumbent on this Court to evaluate the entire evidence including that of the prosecution. (See: PP v. Tan Chai Hing [2018] 6 CLJ 436). Was the accused arrested at the hut or beside his home? [18] According to the prosecution’s case, the accused was arrested at the hut. PW3 said in evidence that he and the raiding party maintained their observation of the accused’s house from an approximated distance of S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w between 20 to 25 meters before moving in to effect the arrest. [19] In the brief observation, PW3 said he saw a male Malay in a sitting position at the hut. No vehicle was seen entering or exiting the place and no one else was seen there. PW3 then immediately ordered the police team to move in. [20] The police team then approached the hut and arrested the accused there. When the hut was searched, PW3 found the black plastic box (Exhibit P18) on the floor. Upon inspection, PW3 found the black plastic box (Exhibit P18) contained the impugned dangerous drugs which was the subject of the present charge against the accused. [21] When the prosecution lined up the evidence to illustrate how the accused was arrested at the hut, how the accused was caught in very close proximity of the black plastic box (Exhibit P18) containing the impugned dangerous drugs, how the accused was seated facing the black plastic box and how the impugned dangerous drugs was discovered when the box was inspected, the learned counsel challenged that narrative and suggested that at the material time when the raiding party effected the arrest, the accused was instead trimming the lawn using the grass cutting machine and that the accused was not at the hut as described. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [22] The learned counsel posited that when the raiding party stormed in, the accused was arrested beside his house while he was still trimming the lawn. As a result, the accused had to put the grass cutting machine down on the floor beside his house. [23] The learned counsel argued that the pictures, Exhibit P9(2) and P9(3), even showed there was a grass cutting machine on the floor beside the house and reiterated the fact that a police report (Exhibit D27) was even lodged to support that defence narrative. [24] The police report was lodged about two years after the arrest. It was Batu Kikir Report No. 1750/24 (Exhibit D27). The police report was lodged by the accused’s wife, Rohani binti Ibrahim (DW2). [25] A perusal of the police report showed that DW2 made the police report for the accused. In the police report, DW2 reported what was written by the accused. The accused had earlier written on a piece of paper his version of the arrest incident. When DW2 subsequently visited the accused at prison, the accused told DW2 to take that piece of paper and have a police report lodged based on what was written. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [26] In crux, the police report purported to support the accused’s defence that he was not arrested at the hut but was instead arrested beside his house while attending to the lawn. [27] The fact of the matter was this. The police report was essentially that of the accused, not DW2. It was lodged some two years after the arrest. Specifically, the police report was lodged on 05.10.2024 whereas the accused was arrested on 14.09.2022. That was a good two years and twenty-two days apart. [28] Why did it take such a long time? Could it be because the accused was deprived from doing so? But that was not the complaint. According to the accused, within that two years, he had no knowledge of the arrest report. He has not seen it and as such he did not know and did not have the means to know that according to the police, he was allegedly arrested at the hut instead of beside his own house while trimming grass. [29] The question which arose was this; Is the accused’s explanation in respect of his belated challenge as to the location of his arrest probable in the circumstances? [30] The accused is a retired police officer, a police sergeant to be exact. That in itself speaks volume as far as policing S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w experience is concerned. While in service, the accused was an assistant investigating officer. Nothing less. [31] So, all these things about lodging a police report, making official complaints and the importance of doing it at the first available opportunity should not and cannot be alien, strange or came as a surprise to the accused. The accused must have sufficient knowledge of all these matters like the back of his hand. [32] The record of proceedings showed that the accused was first charged before the High Court on 18.04.2023. On that date, the charge was produced, read and explained to him. [33] The subsequent court appearance was on 25.05.2023. On this second appearance before the High Court, the accused was already represented by the learned counsel. The learned counsel acknowledged receipt from the learned DPP of documents under section 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code. This must, presumably, include the arrest report. [34] At the very least, the charge sheet must have already been made available and furnished to the defence. The charge was in fact read and explained to the accused on the date of first appearance. It was read and explained in S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w the Malay language. Nothing seemed foreign to the accused. [35] Without saying more, I must, in the circumstances, disagree with the defence. I found the accused’s explanation for his belated police report was miserably unacceptable. On the facts, there was not an ounce of probability on the excuse offered by the accused. [36] To this end, I found that the purported explanation in the form of the police report was a recent invention and does not serve to aid the accused’s defence. In the circumstances of the present case, it was an afterthought of the accused to lodge the police report through the aid of DW2 after more than two years since his arrest. [37] For clarity, as far as the police report itself which was produced and later tendered and marked as Exhibit D27, I had no qualms in accepting it as admissible but on the same breadth, I accorded it no probative value for reasons as aforesaid. [38] It matters not that the police report was earlier allegedly prevented from being introduced in evidence before my predecessor the learned judge during the prosecution’s case as complained by the learned counsel. The fact remains that the contents of the police report was an S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w afterthought and no credible weight should be attached to it in light of the circumstances of the present case. [39] The accused in fact had another opportunity to narrate his version of the incident. He could do this by telling the recording officer what actually transpired when his statement was recorded in the course of the police investigation. Unfortunately, there was no evidence that the accused did in fact seize this golden opportunity when he had it before him. [40] Even if the accused did, this Court did not have the advantage of the cautioned statement as a means to support the defence and accord corroboration in respect of consistency of the defence narrative. Credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses [41] It is trite that the accused must put his defence across at the first available opportunity during the course of the prosecution’s case. This is aimed at preventing the accused from springing a defence in surprise and to avoid the legal consequences of being deemed to accept the narration of the prosecution’s case. [42] In addressing my mind to the crux of the defence, I made these findings. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [43] First of all, the contents of the police report carried no probative value. It was two years too late. [44] Secondly, the fact that a grass cutting machine was pictured on the floor beside the house did not, in my considered view, support the probability of the narrative painted by the defence. At best, the presence of the grass cutting machine beside the house serves as neutral evidence but did not go to the extent of giving the defence narrative any probability when viewed against the totality and inherent probability of the prosecution’s case. When the facts and circumstances are considered in their entirety, there was no sufficient improbability in the evidence for this Court to displace the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. [45] Thirdly, the prosecution’s witnesses which consisted of the police personnel are entitled to credit unless demonstrated otherwise. It was not the accused’s case that the police raiding party held a grudge against him or harboured any ulterior motive and had wanted to fix him up. Afterall, the charge against the accused carries a heavy penalty and in the absence of cogent reasons, no court will readily find in favour of a fix-up theory. [46] In the absence of any rhyme or reason at all to perpetuate malice against the accused, the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses must remain intact and S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w unimpeachable. Afterall, they are law enforcement officers and in the absence of any proved impropriety they must be accorded due credit when they act in the performance of their duty under the law. [47] The defence argued that the evidence of the accused’s wife (DW2) and daughter (DW3) supported the narrative of the defence, namely that the accused was not arrested at the hut but instead was arrested beside the house while handling the grass cutting machine. [48] Respectfully, I found the evidence of DW2 and DW3 suffered from the same fate as that of the accused in respect of its belated nature. In fact, it worked far greatly against DW2 and DW3 since both of them were not arrested and were at full liberty to secure legal advise to pursue support for such a defence in favour of the accused promptly and effectively. Their relatively advantageous position compared with the accused placed them in a far greater duty to act with reasonable promptitude and not wait in idle instead until two years later. [49] In the circumstances of the case and coupled with the fact that both DW2 and DW3 were interested witnesses by reason of their familial attachment to the accused, I attached no credit to their evidence and accorded them no probative value. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [50] Be that as it may, this Court is nevertheless under a duty to consider whether despite its belatedness, such a defence when pitched against the entire evidence was capable of raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. (See: Muhammad Faizal Dzulkifli v. PP [2017] 3 CLJ 424). And since the presumption under section 37(d) of the Act was invoked when the accused was called to enter his defence, the accused must rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities to earn an acquittal. Whether the accused had rebutted the presumption of possession and knowledge [51] When a prima facie case of trafficking in dangerous drugs is found against the accused, Her Ladyship the learned judge found as a fact that the accused had in his custody or under his control the black plastic box (Exhibit P18) containing the impugned dangerous drugs. [52] On the basis of this finding of facts, the statutory presumption of possession of the impugned dangerous drugs as well as the statutory presumption that the accused has knowledge of the nature of the impugned dangerous drugs were invoked. This is borne by section 37(d) of the Act. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [53] These are rebuttable statutory presumptions which may be addressed by the accused in evidence to be proved on the balance of probabilities. This begged the crucial question; Has the accused succeeded in discharging this burden? [54] Possession under section 37(d) of the Act is a question of law. However, the question of whether the impugned dangerous drugs was in the custody or under the control of the accused which attracted the relevant statutory presumption is a question of fact which must be established by evidence led by the prosecution. [55] Generally, in order to earn acquittal at the close of defence, the accused has the burden of raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. However, where the prosecution’s case is also based on a statutory presumption, the accused needs to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities. [56] Rebutting a presumption on the balance of probabilities simply means establishing certain facts leading to probabilities which by reasonable conclusion support the defence’s contention and are probable in light of the circumstances of the case when considered in its entirety. If the accused is successful in achieving this, the accused is said to have succeeded in rebutting the presumption on the balance of probabilities. On the other hand, if the facts S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w as proved by the evidence led by the defence give rise to a set of inferences from which the degree of probabilities in favour of the defence and the prosecution are equal, the defence who bears the burden to rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities, must fail. (See: JJ Power Groups Enterprise & Ors v. PP [2025] 7 CLJ 378, at paragraph [13]). [57] The question of access to the hut now became critical. It cannot be disputed that the locality of the hut is largely accessible. Although the hut sat relatively close to the accused’s home, the hut was also easily accessible from many directions as there were no perimeter fence bordering the property. The land adjacent to the property and by the same extension, the hut, is an oil palm plantation. Towards the further end of the hut is the house of one of the accused’s siblings. No one knows what lies farther ahead as there was simply no evidence to clarify this despite the whole vicinity is one big unfenced area. [58] Is it probable for anyone to access the area and the hut from the surrounding land? The answer is a resounding yes. Is it probable for anyone to gain such access without the accused or his family members noticing? Is it probable for just anyone to freely enter upon or trespass into someone else’s property? There was no evidence led in this regard but on the facts and evidence led thus far, the probability cannot be overruled. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [59] If that was the situational backdrop, has the accused rebutted the presumption of possession and knowledge on the balance of probabilities? In PP v. Abdul Rahman Akif [2007] 4 CLJ 337, the Federal Court referred to the case of Chan Pean Leon v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 22 MLJ 237 and emphasized the rule that mere custody and control is insufficient to establish possession for the purpose of the Act as knowledge is a constituent element of possession. [60] The mere fact of physical proximity of the accused and the impugned dangerous drugs alone would not give rise to an inference that the accused intended to deal with it as if it belonged to the accused. An item however close to a person could just be miles away unless knowledge of the possession is proved. (See: Romi Amora Amir v. PP [2011] 1 CLJ 870). [61] It was thus crucial for the prosecution to adduce some evidence that at the material time, the accused was doing or has done something with the black plastic box containing the impugned dangerous drugs that evinced the intention that the accused intended to deal with it. This was pertinent in view of the fact that the hut where the black plastic box containing the impugned dangerous drugs was found was openly accessible as described earlier. S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w [62] Even more significant was the fact that there was no fingerprint lifted on the black plastic box containing the impugned dangerous drugs. Had there been the accused’s fingerprints on the black plastic box, there may be some nexus between the accused and the black plastic box. [63] In Roslan Hanapi v. PP [2015] 6 CLJ 464, the accused and two others were arrested in a motorcycle garage located behind an unnumbered house. The police raiding party found a bag containing heroin underneath a table near the spot where the accused and the two others were sitting. The Court of Appeal emphasized, among others, that mere proximity to the bag containing the drugs cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be equated with custody or control. In finding the presumption under section 37(d) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 had no application, the Court of Appeal went further to rule that it is for the prosecution to further show that the accused either had physical care of the bag or had charge or dominion over the bag. The Court of Appeal observed and considered as relevant the fact that the garage was accessible to the family members of the other accused and even to the public. [64] To earn an acquittal, the Court may not be convinced of the truth of the defence story. Raising a reasonable doubt S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w in the guilt of the accused will suffice. (See: Gunalan Ramachandran & Ors v. PP [2006] 1 CLJ 857). [65] Turning to the present case, I found the fact that the black plastic box containing the impugned dangerous drugs which was found on the floor of the hut raised a serious cause for consideration. This was so in light of the incontrovertible fact that the hut was located in an unfenced area and highly accessible to just about anyone. [66] Based on the facts, I found that the accused has succeeded, on the balance of probabilities, in rebutting the presumption of possession and knowledge under section 37(d) of the Act. I further found that the accused has succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. [67] In the circumstances and on the premise of these reasons, I acquitted and discharged the accused of the charge of trafficking in the impugned dangerous drugs. Dated 27 February 2026. AHMAD SHAHRIR MOHD SALLEH JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SEREMBAN S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w For the prosecution: Rasyidah Murni binti Adzmi Deputy Public Prosecutor State of Negeri Sembilan. For the accused: Subramaniam Govindan Nair Devika R Suppiah (Messrs. Maniam Nair & Co.) No. 5, Ground Floor, Magistrate’s Square, Jalan S2 D38, City Centre, 70300 Seremban, Negeri Sembilan S/N xkTE/6Jrykqq3EQ0mrtt3w