Ang Beng Tee v 1.LEE Yit Hoe (BA-23NCVC-496-08/2017)

1.LEE YIT HOE (Sebagai Pentadbir bagi harta pusaka Teoh

Poo Choo (f), simati)

GAN CHIN HUAT (Dan tiap-tiap nama lain yang tidak dikenali yang menduduki atau yang memasuki hartanah yang dikenali sebagai 11825/46440 bahagian tanah yang tak dipecahkan yang terkandung dibawah Geran No. 38734 Lot 2725 MukimTelok Panglima Garang (Geran Lama CT No. 13040 Lot 2725, Mukim Telok Panglima Garang). …………DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT 2

This is an application by the First Defendant under Order 18 Rule 19

(1)(a) and / or (b) and/ or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) dated 20 November 2017 (enclosure 17) to strike out the Plaintiff’s Writ of Summon and Statement of Claim.

The Defendant’s claimed that the Plaintiff’s claim is frivolous and vexatious that amounts to an abuse of Court’s process;

The cause papers for this application are as follows:

The First Defendant Notice of Application dated 20

The First Defendant Affidavit in Support affirmed by

The Plaintiff Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Ang Beng Tee dated 18 December 2017;

The First Defendant Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Lee Yit Hoe dated 26 December 2017;

Writ Summon and Statement of Claim dated 23

Statement of Defence and the First Defendant Amended Counter Claim (1) dated 16 October 2017;

Reply to Statement of Defence and Plaintiff’s Defence to First Defendant Counter Claim dated 12 October 2017; 3

Reply to Plaintiff’s Defence to First Defendant Counter Claim dated 31 October 2017.

To simplify the above affidavits, after the Deed of Assignment was signed the stamp duty duly paid, both Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (ALH) and Ang Kim Chong (AKC) was supposed to sign the transfer form and to transfer their respective shares to Teoh Poo Choo (TPC) as agreed. Before (ALH) had signed the transfer form, (ALH) had passed away. Later (TPC) had also passed away in 1977. The (AKC) portion/ share (145/3096) has been transferred to (TPC) nominee at the end of 2015. As such, (ALH) held for (TPC) share as beneficial owner of the said share. The First Defendant was appointed as Administrator of (TPC) estate by the order of the High court Shah Alam (Petition No. 31-259-2007). The First Defendant was served with the Summon and the Statement of Claim from the Plaintiff requesting for the returned of the said land alleging that the said land was charge to (TPC). The Plaintiff had produced some documents in which the first Defendant has no knowledge alleging that the Deed of Assignment has been cancelled and the existence of such mortgage between (ALH) and (TPC) together with some payment to the Plaintiff.

Having gone through the pleadings and affidavits filed by the respective parties, I have concluded the facts below: 4

The Plaintiff is the Executor (De Bonis Non) for the estate of his grandfather, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased);

Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) is the registered owner of 11825/46440 part of undivided land held under Geran No. 38734 Lot 2725 Mukim Telok Panglima Garang (old geran CT No. 13040 Lot 2725 Mukim Telok Panglima Garang (hereinafter referred to as “the said land”);

On 3 February 1975, a Deed of Assignment was entered into between Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) together with Ang Kim Chong (co owner of the said land) of the one part and Teoh Poo Choo (f) (now deceased and the First Defendant was appointed as the Executor of the estate of Teoh Poo Choo(f), the deceased) and Lee Tan Kok (Second Defendant) and Gan Chin Huat (Third Defendant) of the other part for the for the sale and purchase of 2150/4644 part of undivided land owned by Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) held under the said land (hereinafter referred to as “the said Deed of Assignment”); 5

It is a term under paragraph (1) of the Deed of Assignment that the purchase price for the purchase price for the assignment of 2150/4644 undivided shares of the land is RM52,259-97 “……paid by the Assignees to the Assignors (the receipt of which sum the Assignors hereby acknowledge)…..”

It is further a term under Paragraph (3) of the said Deed of Assignment which inter alia read as follows: “3. The Assignors shall forthwith execute a transfer of the said undivided 2150/4644 share of the land held under CT No. 13040 for Lot No. 2725 in the Mukim of Telok Panglima Garang in the District of Kuala Langat in favour of the Assignees in accordance with the undivided shares to each of them as set our below and the Assignees shall be entitled to submit the same for registration: - Teoh Poo Choo (f) an undivided 1400/4644 share; - Lee Tan Kok an undivided 500/4644 share; - Gan Chin Huat an undivided 250/4644 share.

Notwithstanding, based on the records held by the Plaintiff, Teoh Poo Choo (f) (the deceased) together 6 with the Second Defendant and the Third Defendant had paid only an amount of RM42,259-57 under the said Deed of Assignment leaving behind a balance of RM10,000-00;

Based on the breach by Teoh Poo Choo (the deceased), Second Defendant and Third Defendant, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) and Ang Kim Chong (now deceased) (co-owner of the said land) had sent a letter dated 20 February 1975 (17 days after the preparation of the Deed of Assignment) to Messrs. Chong & Huang, the solicitors tasked for the preparation of the said Deed of Assignment, with carbon copies to Teoh Poo Cho (f)(the deceased), Second and Third Defendant, to inform Teoh Poo Choo (f) (the deceased), Second and Third Defendant of the failure to pay the balance purchase price amounting to RM10,000-00 and the Defendants are to forward the said sum within 14 days from the date of the said letter. In the said letter dated 20 February 1975, the solicitors, Messrs. Chong & Huang was instructed to stop any perfection of transfer on the said land;

Further, by letter dated 28 April 1975, the Plaintiff grandfather, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the 7 deceased) addressed to Teoh Poo Choo(f) (the deceased), Second Defendant and Third Defendant informed that the Deed of Assignment shall be “…..terminated and shall become null and void….” And that “…..we have discussed this issue with one Mr. Tee Leong (husband of Teoh Poo Choo)recently that he has request the purchase deposit of RM42,259-57 to be used and converted as rental or lease deposit for the said land from 1.5.1975 and shall expire on the 30.4.2015 for a period of 40 years at $1056.49 per year………..”

The statement as stated in paragraph (11)(12) above is supported by a “Statutory Declaration” affirmed by Ang Kim Chong (now deceased), dated 7 December 2016 (who was the co owner of the said land with Ang Lam Hoon @ AngLum Hong (deceased);

The salient statement at the last 2 paragraphs of the said Statutory Declaration inter alia states as follows, which is reproduced herein for ease of reference: “On about December 2015, a group of persons representing the purchasers together with their solicitor came to my house for the purpose to settle 8 the balance of purchase price of my above said entitlement, due to my old age and healthy, I finally agreed to settle my balance of remaining share with them for a total sum of RM35,000-00 only (being full and final balance sum of my entitlement together with late interest) and I have signed the transfer and all necessary documents in my house upon the acknowledged receipt of payment above-mentioned…” “I do admit that the above said land was leased to the above said purchasers by the late Ang Lam Hoon (after termination of Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 3 February 1975) for a fixed period of 40 years commencing from 1 May 1975 and it has been expired and lapsed on the 30 April 2015 for the purpose of harvesting and cultivation in order to contra the above said land deposit of M42,259-97 as rentals”

On the 10 October 1976, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong passed away and his wife named Gan Peng (f) and his son, Ang Giok Khoo were appointed as Administrators of the estate of Ang Lam Hong @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased)

Gan Pheng (f) and Ang Giok Khoo who were administrators of the estate of Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) passed away on 21 February 2007 and 10 April 2007 respectively;

The Plaintiff, as the grandson of the said Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) and the son of Ang Giok Khoo (the deceased) had filed an application (De Bonis Non) at the Kuala Lumpur High Court and the Plaintiff was appointed as an Administrator (De Bonis Non) on 22 November 2016 vide Kuala Lumpur High Court Originating

Upon the appointment as Administrator (De Bonis Non) for the estate of Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased), the Plaintiff discovered that 2150/4644 undivided share of the said land owned by the grandfather, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) which was leased to Teoh Poo Choo(f)(the deceased), Second Defendant and the Third Defendant has expired on 30 April 2015;

The Plaintiff then visited the 2150/4644 undivided share of the said land and discovered that the Defendant and/ or person unknown to the Plaintiff has trespassed/ remained in the said land and had 10 utilized, cultivated and harvested the said land without the permission of the Plaintiff who is Administrator (De Bonis non) for the estate of Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased);

The Plaintiff then sent a notice dated 10 December 2016 to the First Defendant who is the administrator of the estate of Teoh Poo Choo (f) (the deceased) and to the Second Defendant and to the Third Defendant to give a vacant possession of the 2150/4644 undivided share of the said land owned by his grandfather, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) after the expiry of the lease rental on the 30 April 2015 and further demanded that the Defendants prepare an account for the harvested palm fruit obtained on the 2150/4644 undivided share of the said land, from 1 May 2015 until the delivery of the vacant possession of the 2150/4644 undivided share of the said land.

Despite the said notice, the Defendants and/ or the person unknown to the Plaintiff has failed, neglected, refused to comply the said notice and continued trespassing the 2150/4644 undivided share of the said land of his grandfather, Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased) and utilized the said land without any permission of the Plaintiff 11 as the Administrator (De Bonis Non)for the estate of the Ang Lam Hoon @ Ang Lum Hong (the deceased);

Hence the Plaintiff this civil suit. THE LAW OF STRIKING OUT

The principles governing a striking out application are automatically set out in Bandar Builder Sdn. Bhd. & 2 Ors. v. United Malayan

1 MLRA 611 (FC). It is only in plain and obvious cases where it is clear that the claim is unsustainable is the power to summarily strike out a case exercised. Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ delivering the judgment of the Federal Court as follows: “….the principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O.18 r.19….are well settled. It is only in plan and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule………and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it “obviously unsustainable” …….The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defence raised are not arguable……..”

The above case and principles was also followed in the Court of Appeal judgment in Enersafe Sdn. Bhd. v. Megarina Sdn. Bhd. 12

2 CLJ 1021 (CA), Zulkefli Makinuddin JCA (as he then was) had said this: “….(12) We find it is most appropriate here to state the well established principle in that the power of striking out pleadings under O.18 r.19…..as invoked by the appellant in this case is too well known that it can only be exercised when the respondent’s claim on the face of it is obviously bound to fail……”

Similarly, in another Court of Appeal decision of Sivakumar a/l Varatharaju Naidu v. Ganesan a/l Retanam (2011) 6 MLJ 70, Abdul Malik Ishak JCA held that: “…….the summary procedure under Order 18 Rule 19 should only be resorted to when it is conspicuously clear that the Plaintiff’s claim, on the face of it, is obviously unsustainable. The court will always strike out a claim in plain and obvious cases and where the claim in obviously unsustainable. The power to strike out must be exercised by the court sparingly. It is a rule of thumb that if it can be shown that the pleadings do disclose some cause of action or that it has raised some question fit to be decided, then the case should be set down for argument notwithstanding that the chances of success are minimal. The pleadings must be entirely hopeless, baseless or without foundation in law or in equity before they can be struck out…….” 13

This court is always reminded by plethora of cases that the power to strike out summarily without a trial is a drastic power which should be exercised with utmost caution and should only be exercised in plain and obvious cases (see Tractors Malaysia Berhad v. Too Chee Hing (1975) 2 MLJ 1, Bandar Builders Sdn. Bhd. v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd. (1993) 3 MLJ 36) .

Having scrutinized the above, I shall now consider the rival contentions of the parties. ISSUE Status of the Deed of Assignment? Letters issued by Plaintiff?? In considering the above issue, it is a privilege to quote Section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950.

Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document When the terms of contract or of a grant or of any other disposition of property have been reduced by or by consents of the parties to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a documents, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of the contract, grants or other disposition of property or of the matter except the document itself, or 14 secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained

Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to section 91, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms From the Affidavits filed by both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, it revealed to me that the Deed of Assignment was put into writing on 3 February 1975 and has been agreed and signed by all parties. As such the Deed of Assignment is well within the ambit of Section 91 Evidence Act. On the other hand letters that was produced by the Plaintiff are not within the purview of section 91 as the content of such letters has not been agreed by (TPC) or First Defendant and the Plaintiff did not get any approval from (TPC) or First Defendant neither being signed by any of the Defendants. More so the first Defendant (TPC) did not even received such letters from the Plaintiff. In view of Section 91 Evidence Act, the Deed of Assignment should be accepted as evidence and any letters collateral to it to vary such term should not be accepted as the Plaintiff’s letters did not falls in any exception under section 92 of the Evidence Act. In the case of: 15 Amazing Place Sdn. Bhd. v. Couture Homes Sdn. Bhd. & Anor

18 MLRH 55, the court held that: “….however, my considered view on the purported oral representation is this: even assuming for a moment that Wong Shu Fern has the authority to make such a representation (which had been denied by the Defendant), the terms in the agreement signed between the Plaintiff and the First defendant negates any oral representation by the Defendant. It is settled law, that parties are bound by the terms of the contract that they have entered into at arm’s length. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Mulpha Pacific Sdn. Bhd. v. Paramount Corporation Bhd. (2003) 1 MLRA 388; (2003) 4 MLJ 357; (2003) 4 CLJ 294; (2003) 6 AMR 22 is relevant for our purposes herein, where the Court referred to the following in relation to the principles of construction of contract at page 301: In considering the disputes of the panties I must first of all bear in mind the principles of construing a contract. The relevant ones for the purpose of this case are:

Construction of a contract is a question of law;

Where the contract is in writing the intention of the parties must be found within the four walls of the contractual documents; it is not legitimate to have regard to extrinsic evidence (there is, of course, no such evidence in this case);

A contract must be construed as at the date it was made; it is not legitimate to construe it in the light of what happened years or even days later;

The contract must be construed as a whole, and also. So far as practicable, to give effect to every part of it 16 …..the plaintiff had signed the SPA and Deed of Mutual Covenant and this is bound by its terms ……I am also minded to refer to section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 which excludes any extrinsic evidence from being adduced for the purposes of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from the terms of the said tenancy. Further, in the case of Macronet Sdn. Bhd. v. RHB Bank Bhd the judgment of Abdul Aziz Mohamad J states that: “The entire agreement clause was an agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants. In agreeing to the clause, the parties must be presumed to have known of the existence of section 92 and of the exceptions in it and to have intended what the clause intended, that is to exclude any attempt to vary the agreement by an oral agreement or statement, which attempt can only be made through the exceptions in section 92. By agreeing therefore to the entire agreement clause, the plaintiffs agreed not to resort to any of the exceptions in section 92.” Enclosure 10: From the aforesaid, there is no issues to be tried. Clearly the plaintiff has no cause of action against the plaintiff and that the plaintiff’s claim herein is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of court process. Hence the claim by the plaintiff is obviously unsustainable and warrants a striking out under Order 18 rule 19(1) RHC 1980………” 17

Having quoted the above, it is my considered view that the Deed of Assignment is actually a true contract and its validity should not be challenged by the Plaintiff. This is because such terms were agreed upon by the contractual parties (during which ALH and TPC were alive). Having said so, the Deed of Assignment negates all Plaintiff’s allegations and the unproven letters. Moreover due to the parties has passed away,the originality of the letters cannot be proved in this court. In the case of :Koh Siak Poo v. Perkayuan Oks Sdn. Bhd. &Ors (1989) 1 MLRA 531 (SC), HashimYeop A. Sani CJ (Malaya) delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court: “….(13) where the written contract are clear and unambiguous, the court should not go behind the written terms of the contract to introduce or add new terms to it. See also TindokBesar Estate Sdn. Bhd. v. Tinjar Co. (1979) 1 MLRA; (1979) 2 MLJ 229. The respondents did not challenge the validity of the contract on the ground of fraud or want or failure of consideration. What they sought to do was to attempt to establish that when the demand for payment was made to them the appellant had made some fraudulent misrepresentation. In a situation like this the duty of the court is confined to the construction of the written documents and extrinsic evidence is not admissible by virtue of section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act…………..” The fact of this application is rather similar to the case of Amakannu Veerapan & Ors. v. Mayland Development Sdn. Bhd. (2010) 3 18 MLRH 57, in both cases partied did not produced any extrinsic (the letters produced by the Plaintiff) was not even signed and nothing paid on the Stamp duty to prove the validity of the content of such letters. Zabariah Mohd Yusof JC held that: “..(1) Enclosure 15 is the application by the defendant to strike out the claim by the plaintiffs under Order 18 Rule 19(1) Rules of the High Court 1980…... ………………… No issues to be tried

The plaintiff’s entire cause of action is premised on the Tripartite Agreement

A perusal of the Tripartite Agreement shows that:

it does not contain any signature and name of Semantan Estate’s representative;

(ii) it does not contain any signature and name of Sri Hartamas’s representative;

(iii) it does not contain the names and signatures of all the estate workers;

(iv) it does not contain date of the alleged Tripartite Agreement; and

it does not have any evidence of it being stamped under the Stamp Act 1949

Since the plaintiff is alleging that there was a Tripartite Agreement entered between the parties, the burden is on the plaintiff to show: - the existence of the Tripartite Agreement; - that it is a validly executed agreement entered between the parties; 19 - the obligations of parties that ought to be enforced

to date these have not been proven

hence the substratum of the plaintiff’s cause of action is premised on an unsigned and undated agreement. I agree with the submission of the defendant that the action of the plaintiff’s herein stands on speculative piece of evidence. There is thus no reasonable cause of action against the defendant. ………………….

Secondly, there is no admission of liability on the part of the defendant in the said letter ……………..

therefore , based on the aforesaid reasons, encl (15) is allowed with costs……………”

Having said so, to my mind, the Plaintiff’s action would only rely on the letters that was not agreed upon and did not signed by (TPC) and the First Defendant. It is only based on the extrinsic evidence and merely speculative. The Deed of Assignment is valid in law and has not been cancelled by any parties. It is clearly a primary evidence and has answered all the Plaintiff’s allegation in that:

That (TPC) has made every payment and did not owed anything to the Plaintiff in the Sale and Purchase transactions;

That the Deed of Assignment is still valid and has not been cancelled; 20

There was no terms of mortgage or charge in the

No other further discussion between the plaintiff and the First Defendant in the Deed;

The statutory declarationaffirmed by (AKC) cannot negate the Deed of Assignment;

The vacant possession was given to (TPC) ever since 1972 after full payment has been made by (TPC) to (ALH) and there should not be any issue of trespassing on to the land by (TPC). In the case of: Tenaga Nasional Bhd. v. Manfield Development sdn. Bhd. & Anor (2010) 3 MLRA 520 (CA),Zainun Ali JCA delivering the judgment: “…(b) whether the plaintiff’s claim ought to be struck out under the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the following basis:

(I) that there is no concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant in respect of the acquisition of the plaintiff’s shares in NUR;

(ii) the draft SPA for the sale of shares which was unilaterally prepared by the plaintiff was never agreed not accepted by the defendant at any material time; 21

(iii) the plaintiff’s alternative claim for damages is an attempt for unjust enrichment and an abuse of process; [53] Clearly the plaintiff’s claim that there is a contractual contract is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process. ………….. [56] In the circumstance of this appeal we unanimously found that this is a plain and obvious case to allow an application to strike out under order 19 rule 19 RHC 1980. ……………

in my judgment, the above para 29, is merely a self serving assertion. If the plaintiff intend to show in their pleading that prima facie there is a concluded contract between the parties, that, as a matter of the law of pleadings, cannot be done by simply making an assertion ………….the law requires that the plaintiffs must plead material facts that point out, or from which an inference can be made as, to the formation of a concluded contract between the parties…… the affidavits and documentary evidence reveals that the plaintiffs have made averments which are either wholly untrue or mere half truths….. Strictly this letter is of no legal significance in determining as to whether or not there was a concluded contract between the plaintiff’s and the defendant. Strictly, this letter is irrelevant…….”. Similarly in the case of: Raja Zainal Abidin Raja Tachik & Ors. v. British American Life & General Insurance Bhd. (1993) 1 MLRA 372B (SC), delivering judgment of the Supreme Court, Peh Swee Chin SCJ held that: 22 “…the two letter thus fall to be considered. It is well known that the terms of a contract may be contained in more that one document, thus eg, one of two documents may expressly or by necessary implication refer to another document as being subject to the said other document, thereby causing the terms of the other document to be incorporated by reference into the first mentioned document. Such effect, if it is to be given initially to any document, will initially depend on the construction itself of a document such as the first mentioned document. We now consider whether the terms of the 1989 letter ought to be deemed to be incorporated into the 1990 letter by reference by first looking at the 1990 letter. It was written almost 1 year after the letter of 1989…. The Privy Council held that the Federal Court was in error for not examining the evidence and deciding as to whether the action there was bound to fail, though the power to dismiss an action summarily was a drastic power……”

To consider further, I hardly see any evidence produced by the Plaintiff that the letters were actually an agreement between (TPC) and First Defendant in relation to the lease or charge or anything in relation to the non payment made. To my mind the letters that produced by the Plaintiff is inconsistent with the Deed of Assignment which is the principal agreement between (TPC) and (ALH) and (AKC). In the case of: Roti Segar (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. Mahali Zuhdi Mahmud Zahudi & Anor (2013) MLRHU 1, Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal J held that: “….(6) As for the representation allegedly made by the First Defendant but which is denied, I think it is trite by virtue section 23 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 that once the terms of any agreement have been reduced to a document, any oral agreement to contradict the terms of the formal document is not admissible. This is important so that parties cannot resile from their obligations under a contract. The obligations of each party will only be considered within the four corners of the contract as otherwise it might create chaos and disorder in the commercial world.

So even if there was such a representation, once the agreement was signed and agreed upon by the Plaintiff, they cannot now fall back on any representation, discussion, negotiation, or proposal prior to the agreement. I have also noted that in the event of any such breach by the Defendants, the Plaintiff must give notice before accepting the loan monies as required under section 56(3) Contract Act 1950. This was not done……

In the circumstances, and for the reason stated, the claim of the Plaintiff is obviously unsustainable with no prospect of success……………... However, if it is plain and obvious that a claim is wholly and clearly unarguable, the court is compelled and duty bound to strike it our……

On the fact before me, I found that the Plaintiff has put an unpleasant allegations towards (TPC) and First Defendant though the facts and evidences speaks otherwise. The Plaintiff has put an unnecessary and irrelevant fact before the court. His action is clearly to embarrass or annoy the First Defendant. In the absence of any evidence to show that the Plaintiff’s letters reflect the arrangement and agreement between parties during the material time, the Plaintiff still continue to file this suit against the First Defendant. To my mind, the Plaintiff is not sincere and bona fide to the subject 24 suit. As such, I shall conclude it as an abuse of the court process.

In the light of the foregoing and in the upshot, after hearing the submission by both parties, I hold that the Plaintiff is unable to show to the satisfaction of the Court that there is a triable issue. As such, the First Defendant’s application for striking out under Order 18 Rule 19(1)(a), (b) or (d) and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 is hereby allowed with cost of RM 5000.00. Dated 05 February 2018. (DATO’ HJ. MOHAMAD SHARIFF BIN HJ. ABU SAMAH) Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan Counsel For the Plaintiff : Rama Vellu (Messrs. Rama Vellu & Associates.) For the First Defendant: P Y Yap (Messrs. Tee Tai Tzian & Sim.)