Anthony John Dason v 1. ) Wong Kean Yen (WA-B52NCvC-466-10/2024)

1.

WONG KEAN YEN (NO.K/P: 811227-10-5317) LIANG CHONG BENG (NO.K/P: 590109-02-5459) (Rakan Kongsi Dalam Firma Messrs CB Liang, Ng & Co

Dan Bekas Rakan Kongsi Dalam Firma Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co) NG KWEE LAN (NO.K/P: 660311-01-5650) (Rakan Kongsi Dalam Firma Messrs CB Liang, Ng & Co)

NGA HOCK CHEH (NO.K/P: 520529-08-5593) (Rakan Kongsi Dalam Firma Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co)

NGA MEI YEN (NO.K/P: 790928-07-5536) (Rakan Kongsi Dalam Firma Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co) …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (KANDUNGAN 15 NOTIS PERMOHONAN (Pembatalan Tindakan Terhadap Defendan Pertama PERMOHONAN DEFENDAN PERTAMA [1] Defendan Pertama memohon Mahkamah Sesyen di Kuala Lumpur pada hari bulan 2025 pada pukul pagi/petang untuk mendengar permohonan Defendan Pertama menurut inter alia Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c) dan 19(1)(d), Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan/atau bidang kuasa yang sedia ada pada Mahkamah untuk mendapatkan Perintah seperti berikut:- 16/06/2025 11:02:50 WA-B52NCvC-466-10/2024 Kand. 66 S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg

Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 28/10/2024 dibatalkan terhadap Defendan Pertama;

Bahawa Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 28/10/2024 dibatalkan atas alasan bahawa ia mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan;

Bahawa Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif bertarikh 28/10/2024 dibatalkan atas alasan bahawa Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah Yang Mulia; 4. Bahawa kos permohonan ini hendaklah ditanggung oleh Plaintif; dan

Apa-apa perintah lain yang difikirkan adil dan bersesuaian oleh Mahkamah ASAS TUNTUTAN PLAINTIF [2] Melalui surat bertarikh 15.3.2019, Defendan Pertama bersama dengan Tan Mei Yeng dan Leong Peng Woon yang mana kedua-dua mereka ini adalah pemegang saham dan penyumbang dalam Atlaw Housing Sdn Bhd, telah mengarahkan Defendan Kedua dan firma Nga Hock Cheh & Co untuk melibatkan perkhidmatan Plaintif sebagai seorang Peguam bela dan Peguam cara untuk bertindak atas yuran yang dipersetujui sebanyak RM4,500,000.00 untuk mengeluarkan Pelikuidasi yang dilantik iaitu Dato Jayaraj Retnaswamy dan / atau Jayapala Singam s/o Kandiah bagi Syarikat Atlaw Housing Sdn Bhd yang telah digulung oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam melalui Petisyen Gulungan No. MT2-28-16-2007. [3] Antara terma yang dinyatakan ialah:

Yuran dan perbelanjaan Plaintif akan dibayar selepas tugas tersebut diselesaikan;

surat hak milik yang diperoleh daripada Pelikuidasi atau pihak ketiga harus dipegang sebagai Stakeholder dengan kuasa untuk mendaftar lien sehingga yuran dibayar dengan sepenuhnya;

arahan tersebut tidak boleh ditarik balik kerana diberi dengan balasan berharga;

sekiranya mereka memilih untuk mengganti Tetuan Nga Hock Cheh & Co sebagai Peguam cara mereka, yuran yang dinyatakan akan menjadi berbayar dengan segera; S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg

sekiranya Plaintif dan Tetuan Nga Hock Cheh & Co tidak dapat mengeluarkan Pelikuidasi atau tamat likuidasi Syarikat tersebut dalam 12 bulan dari tarikh surat tersebut, yuran tidak perlu dibayar. [4] Mengenai pembahagian yuran , telah dipersetujui bahawa yuran yang diterima secara bahagian (berperingkat) akan dikongsi sama-sama di antara Plaintif dan Tetuan Nga Hock Cheh & Co. [5] Yuran yang dipersetujui sebanyak RM4,500,000.00 harus dikongsi sama-sama di antara Plaintif dan Tetuan Nga Hock Cheh & Co. [6] Melalui surat bertarikh 22.3.2019, daripada Tetuan Nga Hock Cheh & Co kepada Plaintif, Plaintif telah dilantik untuk menjalan urusan untuk mengakhiri likuidasi dan / atau mengeluarkan Pelikuidasi Syarikat tersebut. [7] Pelikuidasi Syarikat tersebut telah dikeluarkan dan penggulungan Syarikat tersebut telah ditamatkan pada 15.7.2019. Plaintif dengan itu telah selesai tugas beliau. Yuran yang dipersetujui sebanyak RM4,500,000.00 harus dan perlu dibayar. [8] Plaintif telah menerima jumlah sebanyak RM1,800,000.00 untuk dikira sebagai bahagian daripada separuh bahagian yuran beliau yang dipersetujui. Baki yuran yang harus dan perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif adalah jumlah sebanyak RM450,000.00. [9] Melalui surat bertarikh 7.6.2022, Peguam cara terdahulu Plaintif telah menuntut daripada Leong Peng Woon, Tan Mei Yeng dan Defendan Pertama untuk membayar baki yuran sebanyak RM450,000.00 yang harus dan perlu dibayar. Tuntutan tersebut tidak dipatuhi. Didapati melalui carian pada 15.5.2024 Leong Peng Woon dan Tan Mei Yeng adalah bankrap yang belum dilepaskan. [10] Melalui surat bertarikh 10.6.2024, Peguam cara Plaintif telah menuntut bayaran sebanyak RM450,000.00 daripada Defendan Pertama sebagai baki yuran yang harus dan perlu dibayar kepada Plaintif. Defendan Pertama telah gagal dan / atau enggan membayarnya. S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg [11] Defendan Kedua, Ketiga, Keempat dan kelima masing-masing adalah seorang Peguam bela dan Peguam cara Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di dalam firma guaman yang berkenaan seperti dinyatakan iaitu rakan kongsi firma guaman CB Liang, Ng & Co dan bekas Rakan Kongsi Dalam Firma Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co. [12] Plaintif menuntut: (1) terhadap Defendan-Defendan secara bersama dan berasingan: (a) Jumlah wang sebanyak RM450,000.00; (b) Faedah ke atas jumlah sebanyak RM450,000.00 pada kadar 5% setahun dari 15.7.2019 sehingga tarikh penghakiman; (c) Faedah ke atas jumlah sebanyak RM450,000.00 pada kadar 5% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian penuh. PEMBELAAN [13] Plaintif mempunyai sijil amalan guaman yang sah dan tertakluk kepada Akta Profesion Undang-Undang di mana untuk tempoh 1.1.2019 sehingga 31.12.2019 plaintif adalah perunding dengan Tetuan Suflan TH Liew & Partners. Sijil Amalan sah untuk tahun 2019 dan kali terakhir dikeluarkan sijil amalan adalah pada tahun 2022 dan plaintif telah meletakkan jawatan sebagai perunding dengan Tetuan Zaid Ibrahim Suflan TH Liew & Partnes pada 1.2.2023. [14] Defendan 3 dan Defendan 4 mengakui surat bertarikh 15.3.2019 telah dikeluarkan oleh Defendan 1 bersama dengan Tan Mei Yeng dan Leong Peng Woon tetapi tidak mempunyai pengetahuan peribadi mengenainya. [15] Ia dikeluarkan untuk mengarahkan D2 untuk mendapatkan khidmat plaintif untuk bertindak bagi pihak pemegang saham atas yuran kontingensi (contingency fee) sebanyak RM4.5 juta dengan tugasan untuk mengeluarkan Pelikuidasi syarikat atas alasan salah laku dan untuk menggantikan Pelikuidasi yang kompeten. S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg [16] Tiada yuran perbelanjaan akan dibayar dan plaintif hanya akan diberikan pampasan dengan yuran kontingensi jika Pelikuidasi dikeluarkan dalam tempoh 12 bulan dari tarikh tersebut. [17] Jika plaintif gagal mengeluarkan Pelikuidasi atau menamatkan penggulungan dalam tempoh 12 bulan dari tarikh surat tersebut, plaintif bebas untuk digantikan tanpa sebarang yuran dan kos. [18] Surat ikatan hak milik dan semua dokumen yang diperolehi dari Pelikuidasi atau pihak ketiga akan dipegang oleh plaintif sebagai stakeholder atau pemegang amanah harta dengan kuasa untuk mendaftar lien sehingga yuran plaintif dibayar dengan sepenuhnya. [19] Terma-terma dalam pelantikan plaintif yang terkandung di dalam surat 15.3.2019 adalah champertous agreement yang menyalahi undang-undang dan bertentangan dengan dasar awam dan tidak sah di bawah seksyen 24 Akta Kontrak. [20] Defendan mengakui bahawa pelikuidasi telah dikeluarkan dengan sewajarnya dan penggulungan ditamatkan pada 15.7.2019. KES DULUAN PEMBATALAN PLIDING [21] Ujian untuk suatu pembatalan telah ditetapkan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes BANDAR BUILDER SDN BHD v. UNITED MALAYAN BANKING CORPORATION BHD [1993] 3 MLJ 36 khususnya muka surat 10 dinyatakan: “The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley MR in Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7, and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable' (see AG of Duchy of Lancaster v L & NW Rly Co 8). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (see Wenlock v Moloney & Ors 9). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in pari materia with our O 33 r 2 of the RHC) (see Hubbuck & Sons Ltd v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd 7). The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable [22] Di dalam kes Lau Siang Kok, Lionel v Lau Chon Kun @ Lau Yu Chak, Datuk Seri Panglima [2013] 2 MLJ 889 Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberikan definisi penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah seperti berikut: ‘an abuse of the process of the court’

In Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v Wee Chong Jin [1998] 1 SLR 374 at 384 in para 22, the Singapore Court of Appeal illuminated as follows: ‘The term ‘abuse of the process of the court’, in O 18 r 19(1)(d) has been given a wide interpretation by the courts. It includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. This term signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent the improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all relevant circumstances of the case’; per Yong Pung How CJ (as he then was);

In Jasa Keramat Sdn Bhd & Anor v Monatech (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 4 MLJ 637, at pp 645–646, this court speaking through Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) opined: ‘Since the circumstances in which the court’s process may be abused are varied and numerous, the categories of such cases are therefore not closed. Whether the institution of an action or its continuation or a step taken therein amounts to an abuse of process depends upon particular and individual circumstances’; and

I share a similar sentiment in my judgment delivered for this court in Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11 (CA) at pp 31–33 paras [82]–[84]). UNDANG-UNDANG BERKAITAN DENGAN YURAN KONTINGENSI [23] Seksyen 112(1)(b) Akta Profesion Guaman (LPA) menegah seseorang peguam cara dan kliennya memasuki suatu perjanjian di mana peguam cara itu diambil atau ditugaskan untuk menjalankan apa-apa guaman atau tindakan S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg atau apa-apa prosiding pertikaian lain, jika ianya memperuntukkan bayaran hanya akan di buat, jika mendapat kemenangan sahaja. [24] Seksyen 112 LPA 1976 berbunyi: - “No advocate and solicitor to purchase interest of client

Except as expressly provided in any written law, or by rules made under this Act, no advocate and solicitor shall:

....; or

enter into any agreement by which he is retained or employed to prosecute any suit or action or other contentious proceeding which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the event of success in such suit, action or proceeding.” [25] Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Chai Chee Chin v Tetuan Zahari Ong & Co [2005] 4 MLRH 422 mendapati bahawa surat pelantikan plaintif melantik defendan sebagai peguam cara (untuk mengendalikan proses pengambilan tanah wajib) mempunyai ‘retainer’ minima fi sebanyak RM1,000.00 walaupun ia mempunyai terma bayaran fi tertakluk sebanyak 10% ke atas jumlah wang pampasan selepas pengambilan tanah wajib, justerunya, tiada ‘Kontingensi’ berlaku dan susunan (arrangement) tersebut tidak bercanggah dengan seksyen 112(1)(b). [26] Dalam kes TITIAN DESA SDN BHD & ANOR v AKBERDIN BIN HJ ABDUL KADER [2016] 5 MLJ 548 , plaintif telah menyaman defendan-defendan untuk yuran guamannya berjumlah RM5,560,000.00 iaitu 8% daripada jumlah penyelesaian RM68,500,000.00 dan jumlah ini dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Atas rayuan, Mahkamah Rayuan mengetepikan Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi dan memutuskan: We also agree with learned counsel for the defendants that in awarding the plaintiff the sum of RM5,480,000 (being a sum equivalent to 8% of the supposedly settlement sum of RM68,500,000), the learned JC was effectively upholding a contingency fee arrangement; which agreement is not permitted in law (see s 112 of the LPA 1976). [27] Seterusnya , saya merujuk kepada kes Mokhtar Ngah & Co. v. Yee Seng Plantations Sdn Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 348, di mana pokok pertikaian adalah S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg mengenai perjanjian saraan sebagai peguam cara/counsel yang mengandungi terma yuran kontingensi. Mahkamah Tinggi menolak permohonan plaintif di mana Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa adalah jelas bahawa plaintif akan menerima habuannya pada kadar satu pertiga, hanya jika kejayaan dicapai oleh defendan terhadap Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Terengganu di dalam kes-kes yang melibatkan kedua-dua konsesi tersebut. Oleh itu, Perjanjian Saraan tersebut adalah Perjanjian Champerty dan bertentangan dengan peruntukan di bawah s. 112(1)(b) Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1976. Diperturunkan di bawah ini petikan yang berkaitan: Perjanjian Saraan (Agreement Of Remuneration) Bertarikh 26 Ogos 1997 (DMN2 – Kandungan 2) [9] Perjanjian Saraan tersebut menyatakan: Re: All Cases/Matters Pertaining to Kerteh Concession Terengganu Appoinment/Engagement of Messrs Mokhtar Ngah & Co. As Solicitors/ Counsel and Irrevocable Agreement of Remuneration Pursuant to the above. Further to our instructions for Messrs. Mokhtar Ngah & Co. to conduct the above matters, please be informed that we irrevocably agree that the rate of remuneration of one third of the agreed/judgment sum/value achieved from the above cases payable immediately after agreement or judgment of the same. Nevertheless we undertake to pay all other fees and disbursements from time to time and further due to magnitude and complexity of these matters and that we further agree to pay any other counsel or counsels to be engaged for the above purposes if necessary Persoalannya yang timbul ialah sama ada Perjanjian Saraan tersebut adalah champerty? [23] Dalam pengamatan saya, prinsip penting yang terurai dari penghakiman tersebut ialah – untuk menjadikan sesuatu perjanjian yang dipersoalkan itu champerty, tidaklah perlu bahawa dalam perjanjian tersebut mesti terdapat satu stipulasi yang nyata (express stipulation) yang menyatakan bahawa bayaran (kepada peguam) akan dibuat hanya jika kejayaan dicapai dalam tindakan yang berkenaan. Stipulasi yang nyata (express stipulation) tersebut adalah tidak perlu jika perjanjian yang dipertikaikan itu memperuntukkan bayaran (kepada peguam) berdasarkan peratus dari amaun yang diperolehi dalam tindakan yang berkenaan. Ini adalah kerana tidaklah dapat dinafikan bahawa perjanjian yang memperuntukkan bayaran (kepada peguam) S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg berdasarkan peratus dari amaun yang diperolehi dalam tindakan yang berkenaan itu adalah pada hakikatnya satu perjanjian yang menetapkan bayaran (kepada peguam) hanya jika kejayaan dicapai dalam tindakan yang berkenaan. [28] Selain dari itu, saya juga merujuk kepada kes Tetuan A. G. Roseli & Paul v. SS Precast Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] CLJU 1295; [2021] 1 LNS 1295 di mana isu pokok adalah mengenai kesahan perjanjian tersebut. Mahkamah mendapati perjanjian tersebut menyalahi Akta Profesion Guaman. Diperturunkan di bawah ini petikan berkaitan: The Validity of the Agreement [10] In this case the legal fees agreed upon as stated in the letter of retainer is as follows:

Our professional fees SHALL be 20% of the amount recovered in this matter payable on an immediate basis upon recovery”

The professional Fee mentioned in paragraph 4 above is STIRCTLY on SUCCESS BASIS and SHALL be paid fully to us at any stage of recovery (i.e. NOD stage, filing of writ of summons stage, interlocutory application hearing stage, mediation, trial, etc) [11] The law which governs the payment of legal fees is the Legal Profession Act 1976. The relevant provision for the purpose of this case is section 112

(1)(b) which stipulates as follows:

Except as expressly provided in any written law, or by rules made under this Act, no advocate and solicitor shall –

enter into any agreement by which he is retained or employed to prosecute any suit or action or other contentious proceeding which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the event of success in such suit, action or proceeding [12] The above provision clearly makes it unlawful for the lawyer to make an agreement with the client which envisages payment of legal fees only on success of the claim. In this case as the 20% legal fees which is payable on success of the suit therefore is unlawful as it breaches the above provision. S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg [15] In short based on the above provisions of law the Court finds that the agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendant as contained in the letter of retainer is unlawful and therefore the agreement is void and unenforceable [29] Di dalam kes Teng Kam Wah v Kim Koo Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor [2020] MLJU 647 Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan terma yang dimasuki tidak menyalahi undang-undang dan bukan yuran kontingensi, seperti berikut: [7] Towards the end of 2016, the Plaintiff began discussion with the 2nd Defendant to secure a fees agreement. After several discussion, the parties have agreed on the terms of the fees agreement and the guarantee. The Plaintiff then executed the Agreement on Fees dated 16.2.2017 (the “Fees Agreement dated 16.2.2017”) with the 1st Defendant, which was signed by the 2nd Defendant, the authorised signatory of the 1st Defendant. Under the Fees Agreement dated 16.2.2017, the legal fee structure read as follows: Fees Agreement dated 16.2.2017, the legal fee structure read as follows: “In consideration of our service above, we propose that the fees payable by you to us shall be based on the total amount of claims in the said acquisition proceedings as made by you and all the other companies associated with or related to you as per the valuation reports submitted by the relevant valuer acting for all the companies (subsequently referred to as “the Total Claims”) as follows:

RM1,200,000.00 if the Total Claims is above RM10,000,000.00

RM1,000,000.00 if the Total Claims is RM10,000,000.00 or less but more than RM8,000,000.00

10% of the Total Claims if the Total Claims is RM8,000,000.00 or less..” [17] However, having considered the Agreement on Fees dated 16.2.2017, there is nothing in the said agreement which stipulates for or contemplates payment only in the event of success of the acquisition proceedings or the legal proceedings. [30] Di dalam kes Messrs Albert Ding, Lee & Partners v Cho Chooi Mei [2020] 10 MLJ 180 Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan perjanjian bayaran yuran plaintif S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg yang melibatkan peratusan dari jumlah yang akan diperolehi oleh defendan adalah tidak sah kerana ia merupakan yuran kontigensi. Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: Whether the second agreement was a contingency fee arrangement [53] It behoves me to comment on the nature of the second agreement, in view of the fact that the plaintiff claimed a percentage of what the defendant was entitled to. This is strictly prohibited by s 112 of the LPA. [54] In my view, the second agreement was in actual fact a contingency fee arrangement. At this juncture, parallels are drawn to the Court of Appeal case of Titian Desa Sdn Bhd & Anor v Akberdin bin Hj Abdul Kader [2016] 5 MLJ 548; [2016] 1 LNS 689, where it was stated that a sum of MYR5.48m (being [2020] 10 MLJ 180 at 199 a sum equivalent to 8% of the supposed settlement sum of MYR68.5m ) that the plaintiff was claiming from the defendant was in fact a contingency fee arrangement which was prohibited by s 112 of the LPA. [55] There is no dearth of literature which provides for the justification against such arrangement of payment. By virtue of s 112 of the LPA, the second agreement is not only against public policy, it is also against the professional ethics of the lawyer. Bearing in mind that the relationship between a lawyer and the client is a highly fiduciary one, it is my view that the plaintiff had misused its position of trust in indulging in a contingency fees contract. [57] In my view, the second agreement is void by virtue of having violated Section 112 of the LPA. [31] Di dalam kes LUA & MANSOR v. TAN AH KIM [2017] 2 CLJ 175, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa jika ada yuran tambahan selain dari yuran asas jika memperolehi kejayaan, ia bukan yuran kontingensi. Dinyatakan seperti berikut: [20] It is also to be noted that the pre-agreed costs by the parties in this case are known as success fees, and not contingency fees because the agreed 15% fees are not contingent upon the defendant winning the case but it were additional fees agreed, in addition to the RM20,000.00 basic fees. This position taken by the plaintiff is in accord with the S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg finding of the disciplinary committee under the LPA. The High Court in Chai Chee Chin & Ors lwn. Tetuan Zahari Ong & Co [2006] 8 CLJ 84 had recognised such success fees. ANALISA DAN PENILAIAN SAMADA KONTRAK YANG DIMASUKI ADALAH KONTRAK BAYARAN ATAS SYARAT PERLU MENANG KES DAHULU BARU DIBAYAR [32] Di dalam kes ini, dokumen teras yang menjadi perkara pokok adalah Surat Lantikan bertarikh 15.3.2018 yang ditujukan kepada Liang Chong Beng yang mengarahkan beliau menggunakan khidmat plaintif untuk mengeluarkan pelikuidator semasa syarikat dan menamatkan penggulungan syarikat Atlaw Housing Sdn Bhd. Diperturunkan di bawah ini surat tersebut. Surat Lantikan Tan Mei Yeng Wong Kean Ven Leong Peng Woon No. 72 Jalan Kedah Dl Jalan Meru 41060 Klang Selangor 15th March 2018 Mr. Liang Chong Beng Messrs. Nga Hock Cheh & Co Surilte 1802,181h Floor, Pleza See Hoy Chan Jalan Raja Chulan 50200 Kuala Lumpur Dear Mr. Liang. By Hand S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg RE: ATLAW HOUSING SON BHD 450043-U (IN LIQUIDATION) (the Company) We are the shareholders and contributories of the above-mentioned company now in liquidation, under Dato Jeyaraj Ramaswamy and/or Jayapala Singam s/o Kandiah (the Liquidators appointed under a compulsory winding up) with a paid-up capital of RM 600,000/-There are two subscriber shareholders with a paid up of RM 1/- each, allotted on Incorporation. The company was wound up in the Shah Alam High Court Winding Up Petition MT2-28-16-2007 presented by Junlian Pilng Sdn Bhd and Dato Jeyaraj appointed the Liquidator around 29th June 2010. After appointment, the Liquidator declared a dividend and paid off in full the debt due to the petitioning creditor from the proceeds of land acquisition of some of the landed assets of the company, leaving all best insignificant liabilities that can be retired in full from the Iiquid assets in his possession, yet leaving a residue. The balance landed assets of the company are significant and more than adequate to establish the company as solvent. Despite this fact, now 10 years on since insolvency, the liquidator has failed to wind up the process of collecting assets and paying off creditors and contributories in priority prescribed by the Companies Act. This letter is to irrevocably instruct you to engage the services of Mr. Anthony John Dason (Advocate and Solicitor), to act on our behalf on a contingency fee of RM4.5 million share with him and others as he may engage, to remove this liquidator for misconduct in his failure for no cause to have completed this liquidation. In a timely manner, and replace him with a competent liquidator of his choosing. All fees and expenses are for his account and will be recompensed on the conclusion of his appointed task. Title deeds and all documents recovered from the current liquidator or third parties are lo be held by you, as stakeholder with the authority to register a lien without challenge by us, the predominant contributories until his fee is discharged in full. These instructions are irrevocable by us or our assigns or successors in title, for valuable consideration received and acknowledged herewith. S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg In the event of our choosing to replace Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co. as our solicitor, with any other solicitor, or ask Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & co. to act in concert with such other solicitor, without Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co’s consent we agree that the fee specified herein shall become immediately due and payable, without any need for taxation and be based on a valuation of all landed and movable assets of the company at a 'present' value assessment, at our cost. In the event if your good selves and Mr. Anthony Dason are unable to remove this Liquidator or end the liquidation within 12 months from the date of this letter, we are at liberty to replace your good selves as solicitors without payment of any fees and cost, any extension period for your good selves and Mr. Anthony Dason acting for us in this case shall be mutually consented by both parties. Sincerely TAN MEI YENG (NRIC No.680308-10-5268) WONG KEAN YEN(NRIC No.811227-10-5317) LEONG PENG WOON (NRIC No. 561103-10-5009) [33] Plaintif melalui satu surat bertarikh 19.3.2019 telah mengesahkan pelantikan ini dan menyatakan bahawa pembahagian yuran adalah secara sama rata di antara plaintif dan Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co atau puan di bahagi tiga jika plaintif melantik peguam cara yang lain. Diperturunkan surat plaintif di bawah ini seperti berikut: Anthony J. Dason 19th March 2019 Messrs Nga Hock Cheh & Co. Advocates & Solicitors Suite 1802, 18th Floor Plaza Sess Hoy Chan Jalan Raja Chulan 502000 Kuala Lumpur S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg (Attn: Mr. CB Liang) Dear Sirs RE: ATLAW HOUSING SDN BHD 459943-U (IN LIQUIDATION) With reference to the above company and the Letter of Appointment I received from Ms. Tan Mei Yeng and Mr Wong Kean Yen, in respect of the above company, I write to inform you that the fee distribution, received in tranches shall be shared equally between us, or in three equal shares if I appoint a third party solicitor to litigate the issues. Yours faithfully, (Signed) ……………… ….. Anthony J. Dason [34] Adalah amat jelas dari kedua-dua dokumen di atas, lantikan plaintif tidak mengandungi apa-apa bayaran awal atau retainer. Bayaran yuran perkhidmatan akan diberikan kepada plaintif hanya selepas plaintif berjaya menyelesaikan tugas seperti dinyatakan di dalam surat tersebut dalam masa setahun. [35] Tiada sebarang bayaran akan di buat jika plaintif gagal melaksanakan tugas tersebut. [36] Plaintif telah menerima syarat dan terma ini dan bertindak di atas terma yang dinyatakan. [37] Tidak ada pertikaian mengenai isu bahawa plaintif adalah seorang peguam bela dan peguam cara yang tertakluk kepada Akta Profesion Guaman ketika kontrak ini dimasuki. [38] Di dalam kes ini, saya mendapati wujud ciri-ciri ‘Kontingensi’ seperti digariskan di bawah undang-undang di mana tiada yuran pelantikan (retainer fee), bayaran yuran tertakluk kepada kejayaan plaintif melaksanakan tugas yang dinyatakan dalam kapasiti sebagai peguam bela dan peguam cara dan di S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg dalam surat pelantikan itu sendiri menyatakan dengan jelas yuran berdasarkan kontingensi. [39] Maka, saya mendapati kontrak yang dimasuki oleh plaintif dalam tuntutan ini adalah satu Kontrak berdasarkan yuran kontingensi antara Plaintif dan Tetuan NHC. Kontrak ini menyalahi peruntukan seksyen 112 (b) Akta Profesion Guaman. KESAN KONTRAK BERLAWANAN DENGAN UNDANG-UNDANG [40] Suatu kontrak yang menyalahi undang-undang adalah terbatal di bawah Seksyen 24 Akta Kontrak, seperti dinyatakan di bawah ini: S.24 The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless-

it is forbidden by a law;

it is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat any law;

it is fraudulent;

it involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or

the court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of the above cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. [41] Di dalam kes MERONG MAHAWANGSA SDN BHD & ANOR v. DATO' SHAZRYL ESKAY ABDULLAH [2015] 8 CLJ 212 FC, Mahkamah Persekutuan dengan penuh ketegasan menjelaskan tentang kesan kontrak yang menyalahi undang-undang di mana Mahkamah tidak akan campur tangan dengan memberi bantuan kepada pihak yang terjejas akibat kontrak berkenaan. Mahkamah Persekutuan menolak tuntutan plaintif sebanyak RM20 juta di atas peranan beliau untuk mempengaruhi pembuat keputusan awam (public decision maker) untuk memberikan awad kontrak kepada defendan. Soalan yang telah diberikan kebenaran oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk ditanyakan adalah seperti berikut: Whether an agreement to provide services to influence the decision of a public decision maker to award a contract is a contract opposed to public policy as defined under section 24(e) of the Contracts Act 1950 and [is] therefore void?. S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg [42] Soalan yang dikemukakan telah dijawab dalam nada positif di perenggan 79 dalam penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan seperti berikut: [79] For the above reasons, we (on 14 May 2015, Mohamed Apandi Ali FCJ, as he then was, now AG, agreed with the draft of this judgment) unanimously answer the leave question, surely obviously, in the affirmative, allow this appeal with costs, affirm, for different reasons, the order of the trial court and set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. [43] Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa kontrak yang dimasuki adalah tidak sah kerana ia bertentangan dengan seksyen 24 Akta Kontrak. Adalah jelas bahawa balasannya tidak sah dan bahawa surat akujanji terbatal. Atas alasan itu, tuntutan sepatutnya telah ditolak. Satu perjanjian, yang mana objeknya adalah menggunakan pengaruh Menteri-menteri Kerajaan untuk mendapatkan keputusan yang berpihak kepadanya, memusnahkan pentadbiran yang wajar dan baik. Ia menunjukkan kecenderungan untuk merasuah atau mempengaruhi penjawat-penjawat awam untuk memberi keputusan berpihak kepada mereka selain daripada berdasarkan merit mereka sendiri. Perjanjian sedemikian bertentangan dengan polisi awam. Ia tidak penting sekiranya orang-orang yang ingin dipengaruhi tidak bersetuju dengan cadangan sedemikian. [44] Selanjutnya Mahkamah menyatakan bahawa bila isu keharaman (illegatility) kontrak ditimbulkan walaupun tidak diplidkan mahkamah perlu menangani dan memutuskan isu tersebut, seperti berikut : [19] “It is perfectly settled, that where the contract which the plaintiff seeks to enforce, be it express or implied, is expressly or by implication forbidden by the common law or statute, no court will lend its assistance to give effect” (Cope v. Rowlands [1836] 2 M&W 149, 157 per Parke B, which was quoted with approval in Tan Chee Hoe & Sons Sdn Bhd v. Code Focus Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 CLJ 141; [2014] 3 MLJ 301 per Ramly Ali FCJ, delivering the judgment of the court). “Under s. 2(g) of the Contracts Act, an unlawful agreement is not enforceable” (Lori Malaysia Bhd v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 997; [1999] 3 MLJ 81 per Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ, delivering the judgment of the court). S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg [26] Therefore, “the question of illegality would not depend on pleading or procedure, or on who first might or should produce the documents. It would be a question of substance, of which, if necessary, the court would of its own motion take cognisance, and to which the court would give effect” (Vita Food Products Inc v. Unus Shipping Co Ltd (in Liquidation) [1939] 1 All ER 513 per Lord Wright). “… when an allegation of illegality is made, and a suggestion is made to the court that the contract is illegal, notwithstanding the fact that the illegality is not pleaded, the court is bound to take cognisance of the fact that the contract may be illegal, and, if it is illegal, the court cannot enforce it” (Marles v. Philip Trant & Sons Ltd (Mackinnon, Third Party) (No 1) [1953] 1 All ER 645 per Lynskey J). “A judge is constrained to decide those issues raised by the pleadings in an action. The judge cannot decide issues not contained in the pleading because the judge has jurisdiction only to deal with those matters that the parties have chosen to bring before him in their pleadings. This rule is subject to exceptions where there is a public interest and the judge on his own initiative considers a matter of which he has become aware during the course of a case, although it is not contained in the pleadings, for example, cases of illegality or of conduct contrary to public policy” (Swann, Evans, Ferguson and Crawshay (a firm) v. Hill and Another, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) per Roch LJ, 8 March 2000) [45] Di dalam satu lain Mahkamah Persekutuan Triple Zest Trading & Suppliers & Ors v. Applied Business Technologies Sdn Bhd [2023] 10 CLJ 187 , isu keharaman kontrak dan kesannya telah diputuskan. Soalan yang dikemukakan adalah seperti dinyatakan di perenggan 35 penghakiman Mahkamah Persekutuan, manakala jawapan yang diberikan adalah di perenggan 58, seperti berikut: [35] Arising from the Court of Appeal decision, the appellants obtained leave to appeal to this court for the determination of the following questions of law:

whether a loan agreement which charges an interest at the rate of 100% within a period of 30 days is legal under the law? S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg

(ii) if the answer to question (i) is illegal, whether the court should still assist the moneylender to recover the principal amount lent?

(iii) whether as long as a person who does not “carries on or advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on the business of moneylending”, he will not be defined as a moneylender despite him lending money at an interest rate of 100% per month?

(iv) whether the Moneylenders Act 1951 only regulates moneylenders and if a person was found to be not a moneylender, he is at liberty to enter into loan agreement charging any interest rate including interest at the rate of 100% per month?

whether a person who is not defined as a moneylender can lend money at any interest rate [58] On the facts and the law applicable, our answers to the leave questions are as follows: Leave Question i – Negative. Leave Question ii – Negative. Leave Question iii – Negative. Leave Question iv – Negative. Leave Question v – Negative. [46] Di dalam kes Triple Zest (supra) bukan sahaja tuntutan plaintif untuk mendapatkan keuntungan dari pinjaman persahabatan yang diberikan kepada defendan ditolak, malah modal pinjaman tersebut sebanyak RM800,000.00 juga gagal diperolehi semula. Sebaliknya plaintif diarahkan membayar kos rayuan sebanyak RM60,000.00 oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan.

[47] Bagi permohonan defendan pertama untuk membatalkan tuntutan di bawah A.18, selaras dengan dapatan saya bahawa kontrak yang dimasuki adalah menyalahi undang-undang dan terbatal, maka plaintif tidak mempunyai sebarang kausa tindakan untuk membuat tuntutan terhadap defendan pertama. Tuntutan yang dikemukakan adalah remeh, menyusahkan dan merupakan salah guna proses mahkamah. S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg [48] Saya juga mendapati bahawa Defendan Pertama bukanlah pihak-pihak yang terlibat secara langsung di dalam pelantikan Plaintif dan tidak pernah memberikan Plaintif sebarang surat pelantikan atas kapasiti peribadi. [49] Surat bertarikh 15/03/2019 iaitu surat pelantikan Plaintif adalah suatu surat dan/atau kontrak yang tidak dibenarkan oleh undang-undang; [50] Maka Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan di dalam kes ini Dibatalkan kerana ianya adalah suatu penyalahgunaan proses. [51] Mahkamah tidak akan membantu pihak yang terjejas di dalam suatu kontrak yang menyalahi undang-undang. [52] Maka, permohonan defendan pertama dibenarkan dengan kos. Bertarikh pada hari ini 12.6.25. Zaman Mohd Noor Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen 1 Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur S/N e/1xsBQqVkGq7IO/n0Fekg