April Camilla Roslani v Noor Azuan Abu Osman (BA-25-98-06/2024)

DAN NOOR AZUAN ABU OSMAN (disaman dalam kapasiti sebagai

NAIB CANSELOR UNIVERSITI MALAYA) UNIVERSITI MALAYA ...RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 6)

On 4.12.2024, the Applicant was granted leave to file an application for judicial review against the Respondents. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

Enclosure 6 is the Applicant’s substantive application for the following orders –

a declaration that the First Respondent’s decision dated 13.3.2024 terminating her appointment as Dean of the 2nd Respondent’s Medical Faculty (Dean) is unlawful and therefore null and void;

(ii) an order of certiorari to quash the Decision;

(iii) an order of mandamus directing the First Respondent to re-appoint the Applicant as Dean within 7 days of this Court order;

(iv) an order directing the Respondents to pay all the Applicant’s fees and allowance she would have been entitled to as Dean;

an order for damages in the sum of RM250,485.00 or such amount as appropriate; and

(vi) an order for general damages to be assessed and costs.

After considering the cause papers and submissions by the parties, this Court dismissed Enclosure 6. The following are the reasons for the decision. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w Background facts

The facts leading to the Decision and this application are largely undisputed. On 3.12.2020, the Applicant was appointed as Dean of the Medical Faculty for a period of 3 years by the former Vice Chancellor.

Subsequently, the First Respondent re-appointed her as Dean for a further 3 years from 3.12.2023 to 31.12.2026 (Exhibit “AR-2” Enclosure 3) without any issue.

At the First Respondent’s meeting on 12.3.2024, attended by the Acting Registrar and the Head of the Legal Unit, the Applicant was informed there were verbal complaints against her. She was not furnished with details of these complaints and no decision was taken at this meeting.

On 14.3.2024, she received letter dated 13.3.2024 from the First Respondent informing her that her tenure as Dean would only continue until 18.3.2024 (Decision) (Exhibit “AR-5” Enclosure 3). Although she wrote to the First Respondent asking for reasons, he failed to respond.

The Applicant challenges the Decision on the grounds that –

the First Respondent violated the rules of natural justice by not affording her any reasons or an opportunity of being heard before revoking her appointment as Dean; S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

(ii) the Decision was unreasonable, irrational and disproportionate;

(iii) the Decision violated her legitimate expectation that with the re-appointment, she would remain the Dean for the 3 years; and

(iv) the Decision was made in bad faith.

The First Respondent was appointed the 2nd Respondent’s Vice Chancellor on 6.11.2023 and therefore not privy to the Applicant’s initial appointment as Dean. He did in fact re-appoint her as Dean under section 24(4) University Malaya Constitution, Universities and University Colleges Act 1971 (UM Constitution).

He confirmed that there were no official complaints nor any investigation by the Integrity Unit against the Applicant. He further confirmed that the verbal complaints were not the basis of the revocation of her appointment.

He admitted issuing the letter dated 13.3.2024 which he stated sets out the reasons for the revocation. The First Respondent asserted that under the UM Constitution, he had the power and discretion to revoke the Applicant’s appointment as Dean. The revocation was reasonable, correct and appropriate. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

He denied the Applicant’s allegations and contended that as the new Vice Chancellor of the 2nd Respondent, he had new plans and objectives for the institution’s future. He needed new individuals who were pragmatic, skilled, visionary, youthful and more competitive to achieve this new vision. He was not bound by the appointment or choice of deans by the 2nd Respondent’s previous administration.

He denied the revocation was actuated by bad faith, abuse of power or personal animosity against the Applicant.

The Respondents averred that the Applicant failed to utilize the inhouse mechanism provided by the Constitution to address her grievances against the Decision.

In any event, the First Respondent denied that the Applicant suffered any losses as the post of Dean was an additional responsibility. The revocation was not a reduction in rank, salary or benefits and the Applicant remained a professor.

The Applicant maintained that the internal mechanism to address grievances did not apply to her situation. Submissions Internal remedy

The Applicant referred to section 33(1) UM Constitution which governs the internal mechanism for dispute resolution and S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w submitted that the Applicant’s grievance was not a dispute that fell within the ambit of that provision. Further, the First Respondent was not an authority as defined in sections 2 and 16 of the same.

The Applicant also relied on Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v. Syarikat Bekerjasama-Sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugur Dengan Tanggungan [199] 3 MLJ 1 at 40 wherein the Federal Court held that although the statute may provide a specialised appeal procedure, this was always subject to the grant of review in certain cases, where the applicant is able to demonstrate excess or abuse of power or breach of the rules of natural justice (Ketua Pengarah Dalam Negeri v. Kind Action (M) Sdn Bhd [2025] 4 CLJ 501 at 529).

The Respondent contended that the Applicant’s failure to abide by the provisions of the UM Constitution and exhaust the internal remedies was fatal (M. Arulandan v. Malaysian Co-Operative Insurance Society Ltd [1987] CLJ Rep 44 at 48, Datuk Pasamanikam & Anor v. Agnes Joseph; R. Narayanan Samy v. Agnes Joseph [1980] 2 MLJ 92 at 95; [1980] CLJU 15).

In revoking her appointment as Dean, the First Respondent was acting as an Authority of the 2nd Respondent as evident from the letter dated 13.3.2024. Therefore, this dispute ought to be referred to the Minister for his resolution or direction. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

The element of illegality although raised is unsubstantiated and cannot be used to circumvent the requirement to exhaust internal dispute remedies. Amenable to judicial review

The Applicant submitted that the Decision made by a public authority is amenable to judicial review (Ahmad Jefri bin Mohd Johari @ Md Johari v. Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 145 at 156, YKK (M) Sdn Bhd v, Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Johor [2021] 6 MLJ 496 at 522, Dr Chandra Muzaffar v. Universiti Malaya [2002] 5 MLJ 369 at 378),

The Applicant accepts that the First Respondent has the power, function and jurisdiction to revoke her appointment as Dean but framed her grievance that he exercised it wrongly and in contravention of her fundamental rights under the Federal Constitution (FC).

However, the Applicant complains that –

she was not afforded any opportunity of being heard before the Decision was made and this is contrary to procedural fairness guaranteed by Articles 5(1) and 8(1) FC (Pihak Berkuasa Tatatertib Majlis Perbandaran Seberang Perai & Anor v. Muziadi bin Mukhtar [2020] 1 MLJ 141 at 168); S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

(ii) she had legitimate expectation that she would remain as Dean until the expiry of the period for which she was appointed (Ambiga a/p Sreenevasan v. Director of Imigration, Sabah, Noor Alam Khan bin A. Wahid Khan & Ors [2018] 1 MLJ 633 at 658);

(iii) the First Respondent’s failure to provide any reasons for his decision and referred to Perbadanan Pengurusan Treslises & Ors v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Ors [2021] 3 MLJ 1 at 38;

(iv) the Decision is on the face of it illogical as the First Respondent had already discussed his new objectives and plans with the Applicant and had entrusted her to deliver his mandate to the other members of the university;

the Applicant has suffered losses of allowances and fees that she was entitled to as Dean; and

(vi) she was adversely affected by the Decision which was unfair and arbitrary.

The Respondent contended that the appointment of a Dean is an administrative decision based on policy considerations which are best left to the 2nd Respondent (Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v. Zaid bin Hj Mohd Noh [1997] 2 S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w CLJ 11 at 25, Dr Amir bin Baharuddin v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 3 MLJ 298 at 301).

The powers of the First Respondent are clearly within his discretionary powers and given the nature of this matter, the Decision should not be made amenable to the judicial process.

The Respondents also referred to an extract from MP Jain’s Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore 2nd Edn (1980) at 449-450 and submitted that an order for mandamus should not be granted in the present case because section 24(7) UM Constitution gave the First Respondent a discretion and not a power or duty.

On the issue of natural justice and legitimate expectation, the clear words of section 24(7) UM Constitution do not entail consultation with the Applicant or being given a right to be heard before the First Respondent decides on the revocation. The wordings are strikingly different from the power the First Respondent exercises in appointing the Dean.

The Respondent submitted that the revocation as Dean is not a denial of job opportunity or dismissal from her post as lecturer (Dr Amir (supra) at 301) and the Applicant cannot claim damages. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w Principles of law

Judicial review in Malaysia functions as a constitutional safeguard to ensure that public authorities act lawfully and within their jurisdiction. Traditionally, the courts’ role has been confined to reviewing the decision making process and not the merits of the decision (Government of Malaysia v. Jagdish Singh [1987] 2 MLJ 185 at 186; [1987] 1 CLJ 451).

R. Rama Chandran v. The Industrial Court of Malaysia and another [1997] 1 MLJ 145 at 187; [1997] 1 CLJ 147) marked a shift, wherein the Federal Court broaden the scope of judicial review to also include the power to examine the substance of the decision. (Kolonel Dr Faiz Azraai bin Abdul Aziz v. Mahkamah Tentera Divisyen Keempat Infantri Malaysia [2023] 4 MLJ 78 at 87).

Guided by this rationale, this Court finds that although the appointment (or as in this matter, revocation of appointment) of university deans is generally regarded as an internal administrative matter within the autonomy of the universities, the matter cannot exclude judicial review where issues of legality, procedural fairness or abuse of discretion arise. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

This Court found guidance in the observations made in Dr Amir (supra) at 300 – “… in considering the application before me, I had to determine the policy of the Constitution and the powers and duties created by it to give effect to that policy. Next, I had to consider whether, on the facts before me the body under review had carried out the policy in the manner prescribed. If it had, I could not interfere with the decision reached whether I agreed with it or not, unless it was so unreasonable that no reasonable body of persons or person could have reached that decision. The court will not substitute its discretion for that of the body under review but only determines whether that body has acted lawfully in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.”

In Dr Amir (supra), the applicant was appointed deputy dean of the university’s School of Social Sciences from 1.11.1976 for a year and continued to be reappointed annually. His last reappointment ended on 31.5.1989 and the vice chancellor had intimated that the applicant would not be reappointed.

The central issue in the application to be whether the vice chancellor’s refusal to exercise his statutory power of reappointment the applicant as dean was amenable to judicial review and answered in the negative. Edgar Joseph Jnr J (as His Lordship then was) held at 301 – S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w “More to the point, the reluctance of courts to interfere in all matters concerning the domestic affairs and internal management of a university stems from their enthusiasm for the jurisdiction of the university visitor (equivalent in this country to that of vice-chancellor) in such matters (see Patel v University of Bradford Senate [1978] 1 WLR 1488 at pp 1499- 1500). The English courts have continued to assert the exclusivity of the university visitor's jurisdiction (Glynn v Keele University [1971] 1 WLR 487), and even to enlarge it (Patel's case [1978] 1 WLR 1488). Thus, in the present case, the question whether the applicant should have been reappointed dean following the expiry of his term, by the vice-chancellor pursuant to the powers conferred by s 18 of the Constitution was exclusively a domestic matter involving academic judgment, to be resolved internally. No economic loss, social stigma, difficulty in securing future employment or dislocation was involved in the vice-chancellor's decision declining to reappoint the applicant dean.” (see Dr Chandra Muzaffar v. University of Malaya [2002] 5 MLJ 369; [2002] 2 AMR 1408; [2002] 2 CLJ 448 at 378; 386)

This modern approach to judicial review reflects a balance between respecting the institutions’ autonomy and safeguarding the rule of law in the exercise of public and administrative powers. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w Analysis and findings Internal remedy

Section 33(1) UM Constitution reads - “Any dispute between the Authorities, or between an officer and an Authority as to the scope and extent of his or its powers, functions or jurisdiction may be referred by either party to the Minister and the Minister may determine the dispute himself or appoint a Dispute Resolution Panel to determine the dispute.”

The opening words of the provision are clear; the dispute must be between the Authorities or between an officer and an Authority. Section 2 UM Constitution defines Authority to mean “any of the Authorities of the University referred to in section 16, and includes any Authority established by statute.”

Section 16(1) UM Constitution provides that the Authorities of the University shall be – “the Board, the Senate, the Management Committee of the University or by whatever name it may be referred to, the Faculties, the Schools, the Centres, the Academies, the Institutes, the Studies Committee, the Selection Committees, the Employee Welfare Committee, the student Welfare Committee and such other bodies as may be prescribed by statute as Authorities of the University.” S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

The Court finds that the First Respondent does not fall within the scope of the definition.

The dispute between the Applicant and the First Respondent is not a dispute under section 33(1) UM Constitution as the prerequisite for referring a dispute to the Minister has not been met.

In these circumstances, the Applicant’s omission to avail herself of the internal remedy for dispute resolution cannot be regarded as fatal.

The First Respondent averred that he was exercising his discretion under section 24(7) UM Constitution when he made the Decision and therefore he was acting as the 2nd Respondent’s Authority.

Section 24(7) clearly refers to the Vice Chancellor as having the power to revoke the appointment; not an Authority. This argument is without merit. Amenable to judicial review

In the context of higher education, there are a plethora of cases where the Courts have consistently refused judicial review remedies to administrative decisions categorised as academic judgments. The rationale for these decisions is that the complaints involve a qualitative assessment of academic S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w performance, professional suitability, and institutional vision; expertise that lies exclusively with university authorities. (see Sivapalan a/l Govindasamy v. Universiti Malaya [2020] 12 MLJ 354 at 383, Profesor Madya Dr Prema a/p Sukumaran v. Profesor Dr Zamri Radzi & Anor [2024] CLJU 599 at para [106]; [2024] MLJU 667, Azlianor Abdul Aziz v. Universiti Teknikal Melaka Malaysia (UTeM) [2025] MLJU 2735 at para [57]; [2025] MLRHU 1902).

This Court finds that the Applicant’s complaints fall outside this category and therefore not subject to the judicial deference typically granted to university authorities without further examination.

In Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka v. Prof Madya Md Noah Jamal [2014] 4 MLJ 451; [2012] MLRAU 562 (Prof Md Noah), the respondent was appointed as the Deputy Dean (Academic) of the Electrical Engineering Faculty for a 3-year term commencing 16.12.2007. His service was terminated before the expiry of the term.

Much like the Applicant in the present case, the respondent applied for judicial review against the decision to terminate and argued that he had legitimate expectation that his services would only end on the expiry of the contract and that he was no afforded an opportunity to make any representation before the termination. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

The issue that arose for determination was whether the position as deputy dean was a contractual appointment or an administrative position. Ab Aziz Ab Rahim JCA delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal held at 460 – “… adalah jelas bahawa pelantikan Dekan dan Timbalan Dekan oleh Naib Canselor untuk sesuatu fakulti, sekolah, pusat, akademi dan institut adalah untuk tujuan pentadbiran bagi perjalanan pengurusan, fungsi, fakulti, sekolah, pusat, akademi atau institut berkenaan. Pelantikan Dekan dan ini adalah berbeza dengan pelantikan pekerja universiti. Pelantikan Dekan dan Timbalan Dekan seperti mana yang diperuntukkan oleh fasal 22(4) Perlembagaan UTMM adalah dibuat oleh Naib Canselor di bawah bidang kuasa yang diberikan kepadanya; …. Sehubungan dengan ini, adalah diperhatikan bahawa tiada sebarang kontrak yang ditandatangani antara responden dengan perayu (ie universiti) ataupun kontrak dengan Naib Canselor untuk pelantikan responden sebagai Timbalan Dekan (Akademik) Fakulti Kejuruteraan Elektrik. Oleh itu kami bersetuju dengan hujah peguam perayu bahawa pelantikan responden sebagai Timbalan Dekan bukanlah suatu pelantikan secara kontrak sebagaimana pelantikan responden ke jawatan Profesor Madya Gred DS53 oleh universiti. Oleh sebab itu, syarat-syarat penamatan perkhidmatan responden sebagai tidak perlu mematuhi prosedur penamatan seorang pekerja universiti yang dilantik secara kontrak. Penamatan perkhidmatan responden oleh Naib Canselor hanyalah perlu S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w mematuhi terma-terma yang dinyatakan di dalam surat pelantikan responden sebagai Timbalan Dekan yang bertarikh 15 Disember 2007. Perenggan pertama surat pelantikan responden sebagai Timbalan Dekan (Akademik) yang bertarikh 15 Disember 2007 itu berbunyi: Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa menurut kuasa yang diperuntukkan di bawah Perkara 22(4) Perlembagaan Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka, Y.Bhg. Datuk Naib Canselor telah bersetuju untuk melantik tuan sebagai Timbalan Dekan (Akademik) di Fakulti Kejuruteraan Elektrik selama satu (1) tahun sebelas (11) [2014] 4 MLJ 451 at 461bulan tiga (3) hari berkuat kuasa mulai 16 Disember 2007 hingga 18 November 2009. Berdasarkan perkara yang sama, Universiti boleh membatalkan pelantikan sebagai Timbalan Dekan (Akademik) pada bila-bila masa dalam tempoh pelantikan itu berkuat kuasa. (Penekanan ditambah.) Sehubungan dengan ini, rujukan perlu dibuat kepada fasal 22(6) dan (7) Perlembagaan UTMM. Kedua-dua peruntukan itu berbunyi:

Dekan, Timbalan Dekan Ketua dan Timbalan Ketua yang dilantik di bawah subseksyen (4) dan (5), mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan, hendaklah dilantik selama tempoh tidak melebihi empat tahun tetapi adalah layak dilantik semula.

Walau apa pun subseksyen (6), Naib Canselor boleh, jika difikirkannya patut, membatalkan mana-mana S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w pelantikan yang dibuat di bawah subseksyen (4) atau (5) pada bila-bila masa dalam tempoh pelantikan itu. Bolehlah diperhatikan bahawa di dalam surat pelantikan responden sebagai Timbalan Dekan (Akademik) Fakulti Kejuruteraan Elektrik, jelas diperuntukkan pelantikan tersebut boleh ditamatkan pada bila-bila masa oleh universiti selaras dengan peruntukan fasal 22(7). Kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan peguam perayu bahawa perkara ini memang disedari oleh responden. Oleh itu, kami berpandangan responden tidak seharusnya membuat rungutan tentang perkara ini.”

On the issue of legitimate expectation, the learned Judge held at 462 - “Seterusnya kami ingin mengatakan secara ringkas mengenai hujah responden bahawa beliau mempunyai legitimate expectation bahawa pelantikannya ke jawatan Timbalan Dekan akan kekal sehingga tamat tempoh perkhidmatan kontraknya sebagai Profesor Gred DS53 dengan universiti. Pertamanya, kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan peguam perayu bahawa responden tidak mempunyai apa-apa legitimate expectation bahawa perkhidmatannya sebagai Timbalan Dekan akan terus kekal sehingga tamat tempoh kontraknya dengan universiti sebagai Profesor DS35 kerana responden sedar akan syarat bahawa pelantikannya sebagai Timbalan Dekan itu boleh ditamatkan pada bila-bila masa sebelum tamat tempoh kontraknya dengan universiti. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w Hakikat ini dinyatakan dengan jelas di dalam surat pelantikannya sebagai Timbalan Dekan yang bertarikh 15 Disember 2007. Peguam perayu telah merujuk kepada kes Gnanasundram v Public Services Commission [1966] 1 MLJ 157; [1966] 1 LNS 219. Dalam kes itu mahkamah telah mengatakan bahawa pemohon dalam kes tersebut telah menerima syarat-syarat kontrak yang dibuatnya dengan pihak kerajaan. Oleh itu, pemohon adalah terikat dengan syarat-syarat tersebut sebagaimana kerajaan terikat dengannya. Begitulah juga dengan keadaan di dalam kes di hadapan kami sekarang. Responden telah menerima pelantikan sebagai Timbalan Dekan dengan menyedari bahawa pelantikan ke jawatan tersebut boleh ditamatkan oleh Naib Canselor pada bila-bila masa. Kami juga bersetuju dengan hujah peguam perayu bahawa daripada segi undang-undang, prinsip legitimate expectation hanya terpakai jika terdapat suatu representasi dibuat oleh pihak yang melantik kepada responden bahawa pelantikannya sebagai Timbalan Dekan akan terus kekal sehingga tamat tempoh kontraknya dengan universiti walau apa keadaan sekalipun. Namun begitu, di dalam kes ini tiada terdapat sebarang representasi sedemikian yang dibuat sama ada oleh Naib Canselor ataupun oleh Universiti kepada responden. Sehubungan dengan ini, kes Dr Chandra Muzaffar …, boleh dibezakan. … Prinsip yang sama juga telah diguna pakai di dalam kes Zakiah binti Ishak v Majlis Daerah Hulu Selangor, Selangor Darul Ehsan [2005] 6 MLJ 517; [2005] 4 S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w CLJ 77. Dalam kes itu Arifin Zakaria HMR (pada ketika itu) mengatakan bahawa: In law for legitimate expectation to arise there must be evidence of a promise or undertaking made by the respondent to that effect. We find no such evidence before the court. On that premise, we find that her claim for breach of legitimate expectation is wholly unsustainable.”

Section 24(7) UM Constitution clearly states – “…, the Vice-Chancellor may, if he deems fit, revoke any appointment made under subsection (4) or (5) at any time during the term of such appointment.”

Although the Applicant’s letter of appointment (Exhibit” AR-2” Enclosure 3) does not inform her that the appointment can be revoked, as a senior member of the Medical Faculty, it is reasonable to expect the Applicant, a senior member of the University, to at least have a working knowledge of the statutory framework and internal governance of the university and the UM Constitution.

Unlike a permanent academic tenure, a deanship is a domestic administrative function that, as established in Prof Md Noah Jamal (supra) can be terminated by the Vice-Chancellor at any time. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

As such this court finds that the Applicant’s complaints that she was not afforded any reasons for the revocation or an opportunity to be heard before the revocation are without merit.

On the issue of legitimate expectation, this Court finds that the mere fact that the First Respondent invited the Applicant to participate in the 2nd Respondent’s internationalization task force or convey his mandate are by no means extraordinary representations given the Applicant’s standing and seniority in the faculty and university. In fact, these invitations are consistent with standard professional engagements for academics.

This Court finds that these invitations however cannot be construed as a guarantee of tenure nor provide sufficient grounds giving rise to a legitimate expectation that the Applicant would hold office until the expiry of the appointment.

On the issue of mala fide, this Court was mindful that the Applicant bears the heavy burden of proof which requires clear and cogent evidence. This Court finds that the allegation is entirely unsubstantiated and without merit. S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w

For the reasons set out above, this Court dismisses Enclosure 6 with costs. Costs is affixed at RM8,000.00 subject to allocator. Dated 29 December 2025 -Sgd-NARKUNAVATHY SUNDARE SON JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN For the Applicant Surendra Ananth Messrs Surendra Ananth For the Respondents Datuk Wira Mohtarudin Baki Jayananda Rao Gayathri Chandrakasan Muhammad Ismail Chan (PDK) Messrs Rao & Kamal S/N q7k8hlwxAEyBi83BpvJN6w