Art J Original Sdn Bhd v 1. ) Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Negeri Kedah (KA-22NCvC-54-10/2021)

KHAW LE NA (practising as a legal firm under the name and style of Le Siew & Co)

RAHIM BIN ISMAIL (NRIC No.:430729-02-5043)

NOR AZAHAR BIN ZAINOL (NRIC No.:540605-02-5399)

MUHAMMAD IZAT MARICAN BIN NOR AZAHAR 29/10/2025 21:29:03 KA-22NCvC-54-10/2021 Kand. 82 S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag (NRIC No.:820421-02-6465) --- DEFENDANTS AND ROSLAN BIN RAHIM (As Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased, Rahim bin Ismail (NRIC No. 430729-02-5043)) --- THIRD PARTY GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (After Trial) Introduction 1. Imagine a purchaser who has completed the conveyancing process and fully paid the consideration sum, had the titled duly transferred under its name. However, sometime later, its ownership in the land was declared to be null and void owing to the Malay Reservation status which was never stated in the title search report obtained prior to the completion of the transfer process. This status was never stated in the search report owing to the failure of the Land Office staff during the process of digitalisation of the title deeds.

This is a civil action by the poor victim for damages owing to the negligence and for declaratory relief. This ground is written owing to the appeal filed by D1, D2, and D4, who are collectively the State Land Authorities (“SLA Defendants”) who are unsatisfied with the decision of this Court at the end of the trial in favour of the Plaintiff who has suffered losses owing to the negligent of the Land Office staff. Brief Facts of the Case 3. The Plaintiff entered into a Sale and Purchase agreement dated 25.11.2013 with Rahim Bin Ismail, who was the owner of all that piece of land held under PM 101, Lot 58, Seksyen 4, Padang Puteh, Bandar Padang Mat Sirat, Daerah Langkawi (“the Land”). D6 had since been deceased. Through a court order dated 9th April, 2025, the SLA Defendants brought the estate of RBI into this suit as third party (3rd Party).

Under the sale and purchase arrangement, the Plaintiff paid the full purchase price of RM1,800,000.00 to D6. This payment included a deposit of RM180,000 and a balance of

The Plaintiff then appointed the firm Le Siew & Co, specifically Khaw Le Na (D5), to handle the conveyancing process.

D5 then conducted an official land search the report of which clearly showed that the Land was not a Malay reserve land. The Plaintiff proceeded with the purchase based on this information and relied on the Land register.

The transfer of the Land to the Plaintiff was registered on 15.10.2014, making the Plaintiff the registered proprietor.

However, the Plaintiff was subsequently served with a writ, Civil Suit No. 21NCVC-1-1/2015 (“the 2015 Suit”) initiated by D7, Nor Azahar Bin Zainol.

After a full trial, the claim was dismissed by the High Court, but dissatisfied with it, D7 appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal delivered an Order on 9.10.2018 (“the COA Order”) which declared that the Land is indeed a Malay S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag reserved land and thus the transfer of the Land to the Plaintiff is void and invalid.

Following the COA Order, the Land was re-transferred back to D6 and later transferred to D7 and D8.

At all material times, the Plaintiff did not know that the Land is a Malay reserved land.

The Plaintiff claims that the losses suffered (loss of title and loss of the purchase price) were owing to the negligence of D1 and D2, premised on the breach of statutory duty and/or duty of care owed to the Plaintiff.

The alleged negligence included the failure of D1 and D2 to ensure the particulars of the Land, specifically the Malay Reserve Land endorsement, were always accurate and could be relied upon by the Plaintiff.

D1 and D2 were allegedly in breach of the National Land Code (“the NLC”) for failing to properly maintain a register of title and records at the Langkawi Land Office.

Crucially, D1 and D2 allegedly failed to transfer all data/information, particularly the Malay reserved status contained in the hardcopy of the title to the computerized/digitalized version.

The Plaintiff emphasizes that it would not have purchased the Land if not for the negligence of D1 and D2 in keeping an inaccurate record in the Computerized Land Registrar System.

The Plaintiff thus files this suit, to seek compensation for the losses suffered as a result of the negligence of the SLA Defendants.

Through this suit, the Plaintiff prays for the following orders against the SLA Defendants: a) Damages for negligence and/or breach of statutory duty and statutory obligations towards the Plaintiff, S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag totalling RM1,800,000.00. This amount represents the loss of the purchase price of the Land; b) Exemplary damages, specified as RM200,000.00; c) Aggravated damages, specified as RM 100,000.00; d) Interest; e) Cost, specified as RM80,000.00; and f) Other and/or further orders/relief) deemed just and proper by the Court.

Before the commencement of the Trial, in view of the failure of the 3rd Party to enter appearance nor participating in the suit, the SLA Defendants had obtained a judgment in default against the 3rd Party. As notified in an earlier pre-trial case management session, the Plaintiff has also withdrawn its claim against D3, D5, D6, D7, & D8. The Plaintiff’s Case 21. The crux of the Plaintiff's submission centred on establishing the SLA Defendants undeniable liability for damages resulting from their breach of statutory duty and negligence, S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag which directly enabled a void land transaction related to the Land's Malay Reserve status.

The Plaintiff argues that the claim is purely a claim in tort for breach of statutory duty and aims to seek compensation for damages suffered owing to the SLA Defendants' wrongdoing. The Defence 23. The main defences raised by the SLA Defendants were three-fold: a) Whether the Plaintiff’s claim is statute-barred by limitation; b) Whether the present claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata; and c) Whether the SLA Defendants were negligent and liable for the Plaintiff’s loss. The Trial 24. The Plaintiff, relied primarily on the testimony of their corporate representative, supported by documentation from two other individuals: S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag a) Lok Kar Eng, the managing director of the Plaintiff’s company; and b) Khaw Le Na (D5), the solicitor appointed by the Plaintiff to handle purchase of the Land. Issues to be determined by the Court 25. The core issue was whether the D1 (Director of Land and Mines for Kedah) and the D2 (Land Administrator of Langkawi) were liable to the Plaintiff for losses suffered. This determination requires the answers to several specific questions: a) Whether D1 and D2 were in breach of the provisions of the NLC for failing to properly maintain a register of title and records at the Langkawi Land Office; b) Whether D1 and D2 failed to transfer all data/information from the hardcopy of the title to the computerized version, specifically neglecting to include the endorsement of Malay Reserve Land; c) Whether D1 and D2 had a duty of care towards the Plaintiff, given that they could foresee that the S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag information and data about the Land would be used by the Plaintiff for the purchase and transfer of the Land; d) Whether the Plaintiff relied on the inaccurate information in the land register and would not have purchased the Land if not for the negligence of the D1 and D2; and e) Whether there was a direct causal link between the SLA Defendants’ breach of statutory obligation and the Plaintiff’s loss, making the negligence the indispensable precondition for the registration of the transaction, which was later declared void.

This Court also had to rule on the validity of the defence raised by the D1: whether the doctrine of “unjust enrichment” provides a valid defence for the SLA Defendants against the Plaintiff’s claim, which was framed in tort for breach of statutory duty. Decision and Findings of the Court 27. Having considered the evidence adduced by all parties and their respective written and oral submissions, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its claim on the S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag balance of probabilities. Therefore, judgment is entered in favour of the Plaintiff against the SLA Defendants. Herein are my reasons. Negligence 28. The crux of the Plaintiff’s case is that the SLA Defendants’ negligence in maintaining land records was the direct cause of its RM1.8 million loss.

The Plaintiff’s cause of action against the SLA Defendants is founded upon the tort of negligence. It is trite law that to succeed, the Plaintiff must establish the four essential elements of negligence, namely, the existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, a causal connection between the breach and the resulting damage, and actual loss suffered. All these would be dealt with separately hereinafter. i. Duty of Care 30. The Plaintiff argues that the SLA Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff and the public at large as the NLC places S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag a clear, non-delegable duty upon the Land Authority to maintain an accurate, reliable land register.

The Plaintiff then cited the Apex Court case of Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Pendaftaran Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor v Poh Yang Hong [2016] 6 MLRA 257, to emphasize that the SLA Defendants’ duty of care is two-fold.

Firstly, there is the statutory duty under the NLC to maintain the register of all lands caused to be registered at the registry, and in particular to ensure that the information contained in the register is correct, true, and accurate and reflects the true and actual description of the title to the land as well as the true identity of the registered proprietor thereof. Secondly, there is the common law duty of care whereupon there can be a claim for negligence for the same alleged wrong.

I find guidance from the judgment in Poh Yang Hoong (supra), where Zulkefli CJM emphasised that a land administrator owes a duty of care to ensure that the land registry is accurately maintained and that the public may rely on the integrity of S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag searches conducted therein. His Lordship, adopting Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 8 MLJ 713, held that administrative shortcomings amounting to negligence and breach of duty cannot absolve the land administrator from liability for damages suffered by an aggrieved party who relied on the registry records: “[35] In the local case of Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 8 MLJ 713; [2012] 3 CLJ 271 the High Court, inter alia, found that the land administrator, as in the present case, owed a duty of care to ensure that when searches are made by members of the public at the land registry they would be acting on accurate information and a properly maintained and accurate register of titles. It was held in Uptown Properties that the conduct of the officers showed a failure to carry out their functions correctly and can hardly be construed to have carried out their duties in good faith. We adopt the reasonings of the learned judge in Uptown Properties and would further state here that S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag administrative shortcomings amounting to negligence and breach of duty cannot absolve the land administrator from a claim of damages suffered by an aggrieved party who relied on the accuracy of the records maintained at the land registry.” [Emphasis added]

Similarly, in the present case, the Plaintiff relied in good faith on the accuracy of the records maintained by D2 in respect of the Land. The subsequent discovery of errors and omissions, which led to the wrongful registration and deprivation of the Plaintiff’s proprietary interest, demonstrates the same failure of statutory officers to discharge their functions with due diligence and care. ii. Breach of Duty of Care 35. The Plaintiff maintains that the SLA Defendants had breached their duty by failing to endorse the Malay Reserved Land status on the title, which was a fact confirmed by the Defendants' own evidence.

The Plaintiff further argued that the breach occurred when the SLA Defendants failed to correctly record the Malay Reserve Land status, leading the official land search conducted by the Plaintiff's solicitor, PW1, to clearly stating that the Land was not a Malay Reserve Land.

The testimony of PW1, provides direct evidence regarding the Plaintiff's reliance on the SLA Defendants’ record (See PW1 Witness Statement, Ecl.45, p.13). Q15 : Do you wish to say further? A : Yes, My Lord. We wish to inform this Court that, if not for the negligence of the First and Second Defendants in keeping an inaccurate record in the Sistem Pendaftar Tanah Berkomputer, the Plaintiff would not have purchased the said land. The Plaintiff relied on the misinformation in land register. [Emphasis added]

PW1 also confirmed during trial that her transaction was based on the land search report (See Bundle B, pp.1&2) and a Certified True Copy (CTC) of the title obtained from the SLA Defendants. This supports the Plaintiff's argument that they relied on the public records maintained by the SLA Defendants.

Significantly, PW1 also testified that D2 did not reject the application for a private caveat, reinforcing the Plaintiff’s belief that the title was free from such Malay reserved restriction.

The fact that the original title document, later produced by the SLA Defendants during cross-examination, bore the Malay Reserved Land endorsement, only highlights the inconsistency between the original record and the information accessible to the public.

Such inconsistency points to a clear administrative lapse within the SLA Defendants. This testimony, which I accept, demonstrates clear reliance on the Land Office’s records and the negligence in their maintenance.

More importantly, the SLA Defendants adduced no witness to rebut the Plaintiff’s evidence. They merely relied on the notes of proceeding from the 2015 Suit, which in fact contained an admission of “negligence in records for not identifying the Land as Malay Reserved Land”. This omission, being an act of administrative negligence, constitutes a breach of the duty of care owed to the Plaintiff. This was admitted by the witnesses in the 2015 Suit. Since, the SLA Defendants now relied on the notes of proceeding from the 2015 Suit, they have admitted to this. Such admission in itself is sufficient to establish the breach of duty of the part of D1 & D2 and vicariously, D4. iii. Causation & Loss 43. The remaining question now concerns causation and loss. I find that the Plaintiff has successfully established a direct causal link between the SLA Defendants’ negligence and the loss suffered. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff relied in good faith on the D2’s record and, acting upon that reliance, proceeded with the purchase of the Land. The misinformation in the register was the factual cause of the Plaintiff’s decision and the legal cause of its financial loss.

The Plaintiff’s loss, quantified at RM1.8 million, represents the price paid for a parcel of the Land later discovered to be Malay Reserved Land, which the Plaintiff, being a non-Malay entity, could not lawfully hold. The loss is therefore a foreseeable and direct consequence of the SLA Defendants’ failure to maintain accurate records.

In line with Poh Yang Hoong (supra) and Uptown Properties (supra), administrative negligence of this nature cannot be shielded under the cloak of good faith. The duty to maintain an accurate and reliable land register is fundamental to the integrity of the land administration system. When such duty is breached, the resulting loss to an innocent purchaser is compensable in damages. Defence of Limitation 46. The SLA Defendants’ submission on the defence of limitation centred on the argument that the Plaintiff's cause of action accrued on the date they gained knowledge of the alleged S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag negligence, making the suit now time-barred under the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA 1948”).

The SLA Defendants rely on Section 2(a) of the PAPA 1948. This Act typically governs the limitation period for actions against public bodies acting in execution of their statutory duties. Briefly, the limitation period to sue public authorities is 36 months and not the usual 72 months.

The SLA Defendants argue that the Plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the Plaintiff first became aware of the negligent act, not when the final loss was incurred by the COA Order.

The SLA Defendants submit that the Plaintiff had knowledge of the negligence on 17.9.2017. This date corresponds to the day the SLA Defendants’ witness from the Land Office, during the 2015 Suit, gave evidence and admitted to the "omission of endorsement" of the Malay Reserved Land status.

The SLA Defendants rely on several cases like Credit Corporation (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sing [1991] 1 MLJ 409 and S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag Jamal Abu Bakar Bawazir v Ismail Husin & Yang Lain [2020] 1 LNS 632 to support their contention that the cause of action accrued when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.

Since the Plaintiff filed the current suit after 17.9.2017, the SLA Defendants contend that the claim was filed outside the permitted limitation period and should be dismissed.

The only case quoted by the SLA Defendants concerning limitation period under PAPA 1948 is the case of Yasak bin Ibrahim (bertindak sebagai pemegang kuasa kepada pewaris-pewaris si mati Shuaib @ Shuib bin Hussain) lwn Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang dan satu lagi [2024] 4 MLJ 656 to support their argument that the Plaintiff must filed this suit without 36 months after the negligence act was known (17.9.2017).

On the other hand, the Plaintiff, also referred to the judicial precedents in Credit Corporation (supra) where the Supreme Court held that the cause of action in negligence accrues only when damage occurs, not merely when the negligent act is committed, as per Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ ruled, at para d-f: “That provision invites the question as to what is the date on which the cause of action accrued. In Cook v Gill Brett J defined ‘a cause of action’ to mean ‘every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed’. This definition was subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal in Read v Brown (1888) 22 QB 128. After reviewing the authorities Yong J in Lim Kean v Choo Koon [1970] 1 MLJ 158 came to the conclusion that the period of limitation does not begin to run ‘until there is a complete cause of action’. In that case he held that the plaintiff's cause of action was not complete until an order is obtained from the Rent Assessment Board fixing the amount of the rent legally recoverable under the Control of Rent Ordinance”. [Emphasis added]

In other words, the Plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise until actual damage has been sustained as a consequence of the SLA Defendant’s negligence. Accordingly, the limitation period does not commence to run prior to the occurrence of such damage. I am with the Plaintiff on this.

Furthermore, I find guiding light in the locus classicus case of Cartledge v E. Jopling & sons Ltd [1962] A.C 758, where Lord Evershed, at pp.773 & 774 elucidated as follows: “My Lords, it cannot, I conceive, be in doubt upon numerous authorities (including that of Darley Main Colliery Co. v Mitchell in your Lordships’ House) cited by my noble and learned friend that the cause of action from such a wrong accrues when the damage - that is, real damage as distinct from purely minimal damage-is suffered…” [Emphasis added]

Based on the foregoing authorities, I find that the cause of action in the present case accrued at the time when the Plaintiff suffered actual damage, namely, when the Plaintiff lost his proprietorship over the Land pursuant to the COA Order.

In the same vein, the Apex Court in the case of Julian Chong Sook Keok & Anor v Lee Kim Noor & Anor [2024] 5 CLJ 519 highlighted that the time in calculating the limitation for a tortious claim runs from the date of actual damage, and not some contingent damage where Mary Lim FCJ delivering judgment of the Court held that: “[62] We agree with the approach taken in these cases; that there must be actual as opposed to only a prospective or contingent loss or damage. In fact, the approach in England has since altered to follow the view in Wardley, see Law Society v. Sephton & Co (A Firm) & Ors [2006] 2 AC 543. The House of Lords in Law Society agreed with the Court of Appeal that the mere possibility of an obligation to pay money in the future is not in itself damage for an actionable cause of action.” [Emphasis added]

In other words, the damage must be unequivocal and real. Hence, the Plaintiff’s actual, quantifiable, and irreversible loss only materialised on 9.10.2018, when the Court of Appeal S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag issued its final order declaring the transfer to the Plaintiff null and void on account of the Land’s Malay Reserved status.

Until that date, the Plaintiff remained the registered proprietor and had not yet sustained any actual loss of the Land or of the purchase price, as such loss was contingent upon the final determination of the Court of Appeal. In another word, the negligent of the land office was only discovered and confirmed on the day the decision was delivered by the Court of Appeal.

This is corroborated by the testimony of PW2, who confirmed during trial, that the Plaintiff's company was the registered proprietor of the Land until the Court of Appeal decision which was given on 9.10.2018.

Since the suit was filed on 05.10.2021, less than three years from the date of actual damage (9.10.2018), the Court finds that the claim was filed well within the statutory limitation period under the PAPA 1948.

After all, a party could not bring a suit for damages for an injury that has not yet occurred. That is to say, prior to the COA Order, the Plaintiff as the registered proprietor of the Land, may not have a clear and actionable claim for damages against the SLA Defendants for the dispossession of the Land. The negligence and tortious act of the SLA Defendants was not established until then.

Hence, it was not only impractical but legally impossible for the Plaintiff to have filed any counterclaim for damages in the 2015 Suit. The cause of action only accrues after the Court of Appeal order dated 9.10.2018.

Regarding the case of Yasak bin Ibrahim (supra) cited by the SLA Defendants, it is my finding that the Court of Appeal bench has made it clear in that case that the correct approach is to ask, “when was the earliest time possible that the action can be brought by the claimant?” The claimant would then have 36 months from then to file the action against the public authorities. As elaborated earlier, in our present case, the earliest possible time for the Plaintiff to file this negligence suit S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag is only when after the Court of Appeal order dated 9.10.2018. Hence, the SLA Defendants’ reliance on Yasak bin Ibrahim (supra) to allege that the Plaintiff in our present case is time-barred is misplaced.

Therefore, the Defendants have, in the Court’s view, failed in their attempt to estop the Plaintiff from bringing this action on the ground of limitation. The plea of limitation by the Defendants fails to displace the Plaintiff’s right to maintain the present proceedings. In any event, the Defendants have not adduced or established any facts capable of founding a limitation period that would preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing this claim. Res Judicata 66. The Defendants in their Defence argue that the doctrine of res judicata should apply because the Plaintiff failed to take the opportunity to bring their claim for damages in the 2015 Suit.

Specifically, the Defendants argument is centred on the concept of cause of action estoppel, maintaining that the negligence claim was so closely connected to the previous suit that it should have been resolved then.

The Defendants assert that the Plaintiff missed the opportunity to defend its rights and/or file a counterclaim against the SLA Defendants during the 2015 action, which challenged the title's validity.

The Plaintiff rebuts the defence of res judicata by distinguishing the cause of action in the current suit from the 2015 Suit. The Plaintiff maintains that the negligence claim was legally separate and only became fully actionable after the previous suit was finalized and fully adjudicated.

I fully concur with the Plaintiff on this. The 2015 Suit focused exclusively on the status of the title and whether the Land was Malay Reserved Land. It was a dispute over the validity of the transfer while the present action is a tortious claim for negligence seeking monetary damages for a financial loss S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag pertinent to the COA Order. The cause of action here is the breach of duty by the SLA Defendants leading to the loss, which is a different issue from the status of the Land itself (which was the dispute in 2015 Suit).

As explained earlier, the financial loss only fully materialized and became actionable on 9.10.2018, when the Court of Appeal declared the transfer void. This date occurred after the previous suit was filed and litigated. Since the previous suit did not and could not address the final, quantifiable damage, the two actions were not identical, and res judicata cannot apply to prevent the negligence claim in this Suit. Unjust Enrichment 72. The SLA Defendants’ counsels in their oral submission added that the Plaintiff’s claim is misconceived on the ground of unjust enrichment. They argued that the Plaintiff ought to have sought recovery of the RM1.8 million from D6, the vendor, rather than from the State Land Authority, as the latter did not derive any benefit or gain from the impugned transfer.

The core of their argument is that awarding the full purchase price to the Plaintiff from the SLA Defendants would be unjust, as the SLA Defendants did not receive that money.

The Defendants explicitly state that the negligent act (the omission of endorsement) was not an action that brought any profit or benefit to the SLA Defendants.

In reply, the Plaintiff argues that this claim is not about unjust enrichment. It is a claim in tort for breach of statutory duty. The purpose of this claim is not to receive benefit from the SLA Defendants but to seek compensation for the damages suffered owing to the SLA Defendants’ wrongdoing.

I find that the Plaintiff’s argument is not baseless. The reason being is that the Plaintiff's claim for RM1,800,000.00 was based on the principle of placing the injured party, which in this case, the Plaintiff, back in the position they would have been had the negligence not occurred.

Above all, the doctrine of unjust enrichment operates as a remedy for a party who has suffered a loss and seeks to recover an unjust gain obtained by another. In the present case, it is the Plaintiff who has suffered both the loss of the Land and the loss of the purchase price.

The Court is of the view that where a registered proprietor is deprived of his land and purchase price as a result of the statutory breach by the SLA, the invocation of “unjust enrichment” by the SLA Defendants is legally untenable.

Hence, the doctrine cannot be used as a shield by the wrongdoer. It is a remedy for the aggrieved. Here, the SLA Defendants are the parties whose negligence caused the loss, while the Plaintiff is the one who has suffered it. Conclusion 80. In summary, owing to the convenient “mistake” or omission on the part of the Land Office staff, the Plaintiff has suffered financial loss. Such loss would not have arisen but for the lackadaisical attitude displayed by the officers concerned. It is S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag therefore only just and proper that the Plaintiff be compensated, at the very least, for the purchase price paid in respect of this mishap. Based on the foregoing, the Court allows the Plaintiff’s claim and hereby orders as follows: a) That the SLA Defendants shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum of RM 1,800,000.00; and b) That costs amounting to RM 10,000.00 shall be paid by the SLA Defendants to the Plaintiff.

It is hoped that this judgment will serve as a wake-up call to all public officers, particularly those entrusted with the administration of land matters, reminding them of their duty to discharge their responsibilities with utmost seriousness, diligence, and vigilance. Regrettably, as observed earlier, even in the aftermath of this decision, the SLA Defendants have exhibited no remorse and have instead elected to pursue an appeal, maintaining their position that they have committed no wrongdoing.

Before parting with this matter, the Court deems it necessary to reiterate that public officers, especially those involved in land S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag administration, bear a solemn duty to uphold the trust reposed in them by the public. The integrity of land governance and the confidence of the citizenry depend upon the faithful and conscientious discharge of such duties. It is therefore hoped that this case will stand as a constant reminder that negligence, indifference, or complacency in public service can occasion grave injustice to innocent parties. Dated: 23.10.2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------- DR. JOHN LEE KIEN HOW @ MOHD JOHAN LEE JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA ALOR SETAR S/N UUgguNDbE0yqKdl8JeDag Solicitor : Athimulan A/L Muruthiah For The Plaintiff Messrs. Athimulan & Co. Advocates And Solicitors Solicitor for the 1st, 2nd, : Nurul Liyana Mohamad Nasir & 3rd and 4th Defendant Norhayati Ibrahim Office of the State Legal Adviser, Kedah Table of Authorities Cases Cartledge v E. Jopling & sons Ltd [1962] A.C 758 Credit Corp (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1911] 1 CLJ (Rep) 69 Jamal Abu Bakar Bawazir v Ismail Husin & Yang Lain [2020] 1 LNS 632 Julian Choong Sook Keok & Anor v Lee Kim Noor & Anor [2024] 5 CLJ 519 Pendaftar Hakmilik, Pejabat Pendaftaran Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur & Anor v Poh Yang Hong [2016] 6 MLRA 257 Yasak bin Ibrahim (bertindak sebagai pemegang kuasa kepada pewaris-pewaris si mati Shuaib @ Shuib bin Hussain) lwn Pejabat Tanah dan Galian Pulau Pinang dan satu lagi [2024] 4