finally, the Scheme will also maximise value to the shareholders by maintaining ASM as a going concern and to ensure that ASM’s businesses remain intact. [15] ASM claims that a creditor would reasonably approve the Scheme as the Scheme would maximise recovery for the Scheme Creditors in a more effective and in a shorter time than in a liquidation of ASM. THE ROLE OF THE COURT [16] Before examining LM’s challenges to the Scheme and Convening Order, I should first examine the role of the Court at the convening stage. [17] In Airasia X Bhd v BOC Aviation Ltd & Ors [2021] MLJU 189, Ong Chee Kwan JC (as he then was) (Ong J) summarised the position relying on the explanation by Hildyard J in Re Stronghold Insurance Co Ltd [2019] 2 BCLC 11 at 18-19, paras [31] to [32]. His Lordship said: “[39] So, at the Convening Stage, the Court is to deal only with the jurisdictional issues and should leave the issues with discretionary or value judgment at the Sanction Stage. Also, the decisions made at this stage do not bind the Court at the Sanction Stage.” S/N 09uTxwusUEuoAvpSK8u5kA [18] It is trite that the merits of the scheme (going to fairness and feasibility) will, generally, not be decided at the convening hearing. As explained by Ong J, this is a matter that goes to the exercise of discretion and should be left to the sanction stage. David Richards J (as he then was) set the standard in Re Telewest Communications plc (No 1); Re Telewest Finance (Jersey) Ltd (No 1) [2005] 1 BCLC 752 at para 14 (which has been continuously followed) and which I gratefully adopt: “[14] In considering the primary position of the opposing bondholders, it is important to keep in mind the function of the court at this stage. This is an application by the companies for leave to convene meetings to consider the schemes. It is emphatically not a hearing to consider the merits and fairness of the schemes. Those aspects are among the principal matters for decision at the later hearing to sanction the schemes, if they are approved by the statutory majorities of creditors. The matters for consideration at this stage concern the jurisdiction of the court to sanction the scheme if it proceeds. There is no point in the court convening meetings to consider the scheme if it can be seen now that it will lack the jurisdiction to sanction it later.” [Emphasis mine] [19] Apart from jurisdictional issues, it is also open to the Court to consider factors which will prevent a Court from sanctioning the scheme, commonly termed ‘roadblocks’. In Re Noble Group Ltd (No 1) [2019] 2 BCLC 505, Snowden J (as he then was) said: “[76] What I do think that a scheme company can legitimately ask at the convening stage is for the Court to indicate whether it is obvious that it has no jurisdiction to sanction the scheme, or whether there are other factors which would unquestionably lead the Court to refuse to exercise its discretion to sanction the scheme. This is often described as the question of whether there is a 'roadblock' in the way of the Company. That was, I think, the real thrust of the points being made by David Richards J in T&N and by Hildyard J in Apcoa (No 1).” S/N 09uTxwusUEuoAvpSK8u5kA [Emphasis mine] [20] Miles J took a more nuanced approach to ‘roadblocks’. In Re CB&I UK Ltd [2023] EWHC 2497 (Ch) 56, he held: “I turn to the question of whether there are any other jurisdictional roadblocks that might stand in the way of a convening order. The question here is whether it is obvious that the court has no jurisdiction to sanction the plan, or whether there are other factors which would unquestionably lead the court to refuse to exercise its discretion to sanction the plan. It appears to me that if there are points which appear to be at least respectably arguable by the Plan Company, the court will not regard those at this stage as amounting to a relevant roadblock.” [Emphasis mine] [21] One such ‘roadblock’ would be if more than 25% of the creditors in any class undeniably refuse to approve the scheme whereby the scheme would be bound to fail. Mohd Arief Emran Arifin J dealt with this point in Damai City Sdn Bhd v Grand Dynamic Builders Sdn Bhd & Ors [2024] MLJU 633 at paras [20] to [23]. And did Atan Mustaffa J in KNM Group Berhad v. Ann Joo Metal Sdn Bhd (2024) OS NO: WA-24NCC-643-11/2023 (8.4.2024) (Broad Grounds) at paras [39] to [55]. [22] More importantly, Atan Mustaffa J in KNM Group Bhd (supra) followed Liza Chan J’s assessment of a virtually identical scheme where the monetisation of assets was critical to the success of the scheme. His Lordship found that, on the facts, the monies to be raised were insufficient to meet the scheme debts. A convening order was refused as the scheme had no realistic prospect of success or was doomed to fail. In that sense, the feasibility of the scheme could, to a limited extent, be examined at the convening S/N 09uTxwusUEuoAvpSK8u5kA stage to determine whether there was no prospect of success. In contrast, if the Scheme’s feasibility is challenged but feasibility remains ‘respectably arguable’ within Miles J’s test in Re CB&I UK Ltd (supra), then it would not be considered a roadblock. [23] However, the general rule remains: once the commercial aspects of the Scheme are voted on by the creditors, feasibility and fairness are discretionary issues to be examined by the Court at sanction see paras 17 and 18 above. But if fairness and feasibility are not ‘respectably arguable’, then it would be unnecessary to put the scheme to the creditors at the scheme meetings. The convening order could be refused on this basis. It is in this context that the earlier decisions which considered feasibility at the convening stage, are best explained. ‘Feasibility’ in this context means that there is sufficient evidence that feasibility is ‘respectably arguable’ to merit the scheme being put to the creditors, see for example, Re Kuala Lumpur Industries [1990] 2 MLJ 180, where VC George J (as he then was) held: “In my view, what must be available to the court when considering a s 176(10) application must be a proposal of a scheme of compromise or arrangement not necessarily ready for presenting to the creditors to be voted upon but with sufficient particulars to enable the court to assess that it is feasible and merits due consideration by the creditors when it is eventually placed before them in detailed form.” [24] The approach which means feasibility has to be shown at the convening stage (albeit at a lower standard), may be said (in contrast to David Richards J’s apparently emphatic prohibition against considering feasibility at para 18 above), to be too strict and ‘anti-scheme’ by being unduly restrictive. However, if this S/N 09uTxwusUEuoAvpSK8u5kA approach is indeed stricter, it is necessary to ensure that only genuine schemes are the subject of a section 368(1) filing. The automatic moratorium that now arises on the mere filing of a section 368(1A) application, must be protected against abuse by proposing frivolous schemes predominately designed to stave off creditors. LM’S CHALLENGES [25] LM opposes the convening application in Encl 1 and ASM’s Scheme itself on the following grounds. I have taken the liberty to reformulate some of the objections taken. [26] First, it is said that there is insufficient financial disclosure for creditors to fully consider the Scheme. This includes a “winding up comparison report” or more commonly termed “liquidation scenario analysis” which will ordinarily show that returns under the Scheme are better than returns in a liquidation. Otherwise, the Scheme would be futile. [27] Secondly, the Scheme is not feasible. As stated above, feasibility is not ordinarily considered at this convening stage. However, feasibility may be in issue if feasibility is not ‘respectably arguable’ and that it has no prospect of success. LM argues that: