on an equitable and a non-discriminatory basis. [42] But in the context of an application for equitable injunctive reliefs, we take the view that the issue of serious issue to be tried is not a stand-alone concept as it is intrinsically and inextricably tied up with the question whether the Plaintiff has a complete cause of action and whether all the relevant and necessary parties are before the Court. [43] In this regard, it should be note, the first prayer that was sought in the Writ was (i) A declaration that the Defendant has breached the contractual agreements; and secondly, (ii) An order for reinstatement of services, compensation for losses incurred due to the unfair pricing and service suspension. [44] In our view, the question of whether the Defendant was in breach, and whether the DTTS should be reinstated, and for compensation for losses due to alleged unfair pricing etc, are all matters which impinge or impact upon the regulatory jurisdiction and function of MCMC. No doubt MCMC only fixed the ceiling price, but ultimately the entire contractual document must be registered in order to be legally valid and binding (s.150 of the Act). Thus, whatever that has been agreed upon per the Agreements, including pricing etc, are deemed to have been implicitly approved by MCMC. 51 | P a g e [45] The injunction (per Enclosure 7) was to restrain the Defendant from implementing the suspension notice dated 19 October 2023. But it is significant to note that the suspension was approved by MCMC (per their letter dated 17 October 2023 to the Defendant). [46] Counsel for the Plaintiff sought to repudiate the suggestion that MCMC was relevant and necessary party. It was argued for the Plaintiff that this was a contractual dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and that the MCMC are not a relevant and necessary party. According to the Plaintiff, the MCMC (via its personnel) may at best come as witnesses in the suit. [47] It is trite that an injunction may be refused if a relevant and necessary party is not before the Court. The case in point is Hong Kong Vegetable Oil Co Ltd v. Malin Sirinaga Wicker & Ors [1978] 2 MLJ 13 where Justice AP Rajah (at p.15-16 of the judgment) laid down the principle in the following words: “Therefore, in the instant case I was of the view that I had first to decide whether there is in fact and in law a serious question to be tried and again in my view implicit in ‘a serious question to be tried’ is the question whether the action is properly conceived and whether all the proper, necessary and/or interested parties are before the court so that any order made by the court can properly and effectively be implemented. In my judgment, if these elements or any of them are not present then, because of non-compliance with this principle alone, the motion should stand dismissed. I therefore proceeded to consider the allied questions of whether the Singapore Suit is properly conceived and/or all the proper, necessary and/or interested parties are before the court.” 52 | P a g e [48] At p.16 the Judge said: “In my judgment, the London company should have been the plaintiffs in the Singapore Suit or at the very least it should have been co-plaintiffs with the Hong Kong company, the plaintiffs in the Singapore Suit. And if the London company had been unwilling to be joined as plaintiffs then they should have been made defendants. Having come to this conclusion I was of the opinion that the Singapore Suit was misconceived and that therefore the plaintiffs did not comply with principle (1) as enunciated by Sir John Pennycuick.” [49] Finally, at p. 17 the Judge concluded: “Due to these defects in the action. I was not satisfied that there was a serious question to be tried. To my mind 'a serious question' can only arise if the proper, necessary and/or interested parties, in the first instance, are before the Court.” [50] The decision of the House of Lords in London Passenger Transport Board v. Moscrop [1942] AC 332 (HL) is also relevant and instructive in this regard. It was a case concerning declaratory relief. The principle that was enunciated therein is equally applicable to an application for equitable reliefs. At p.345 Viscount Maugham enunciated that save in very exceptional circumstances, declaratory relief will be refused if the relevant, necessary and affected parties are not before the Court. He said: I also think it desirable to mention the point as to parties in cases where a declaration is sought. The present appellants were not directly prejudiced by the declaration and it might even have been thought to be an advantage to them to submit to the declaration, but, on the other hand, the persons really interested were not before the court, for not a single member of the Transport Union was, nor was that union itself, joined as a defendant in the action. It is true that in their absence they were not strictly bound by the declaration, but the courts have always recognized that persons interested are or may be indirectly prejudiced by a declaration made by the court in their absence, and that, except in very special circumstances, all persons interested should be made parties, whether by representation orders or otherwise, before a declaration by its terms affecting their rights is made. 53 | P a g e In the Chancery Division, in which this case started, the rule would seem to be almost invariable, and the well-established practice in actions by shareholders and debenture holders may be mentioned as instances of the rule. With the greatest respect for the Court of Appeal, I think that the amended declaration pronounced by that court, even if the section were applicable, ought not to have been made. [Emphasis Added] [51] In Abdul Rahim bin Aki v Krubong Industrial Park (Melaka) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1995] 3 MLJ 417 CA [1995] 3 MLJ 417,[1995] 4 CLJ 551, [1995] 3 AMR 305 (CA) Justice Gopal Sri Ram speaking for the Court of Appeal referred to the above-mentioned passage from the Moscrop case and said relevantly at p. 424 (MLJ), “These words though spoken in the context of declaratory relief are of general application.” [52] Thus, it is clear that the principle that was enunciated in the Moscrop case is equally applicable to a case such as the present one where the Plaintiff is seeking equitable reliefs against the Defendant in circumstances where the injunctive reliefs sought will affect MCMC’s regulatory role, function and powers. [53] As stated earlier, MCMC had already rejected the Plaintiff’s allegations against the Defendant as “unsubstantiated” and had gone ahead and given their approval to the Defendant to “suspend” the DTTS. The Plaintiff’s complaints against the Defendant which were escalated by the Plaintiff to MCMC are the very subject matter of the suit and now the appeal before the Appeal Tribunal. Thus, any which way that one looks at the situation, MCMC’s involvement in the factual matrix is quite inescapable. 54 | P a g e [54] It is obvious enough that the injunction, if granted, on terms as prayed for in Enclosure 7, will result in MCMC’s decision (per their letter dated 12 October 2023) and the approval for suspension (per their letter dated 17 October 2023) being cast aside or put in suspended animation. The injunction will effectively be a suspension or dilution of MCMC’s function as regulator under the Act. On that analysis, MCMC is in our view, an affected party and they should be given an opportunity of being heard in respect of the suit and in particular, Enclosure 7. We do not for a moment think that such an injunction can or should be granted without the presence of MCMC, a statutory regulator, whose decision is directly under curial scrutiny in the suit. They should therefore be heard. [55] Counsel for the Plaintiff said that MCMC can be added at this stage. Counsel for the Defendant said that the Plaintiff cannot just make an oral application and that a formal application should be made to add MCMC as a party. We agree. Indeed, it should have been obvious from the beginning that MCMC was a relevant and necessary party and they should have been added as a party when the suit was filed. Of course, we foresee all kinds of objections that MCMC might have taken if they were named as a party but that is the nature of the invidious situation that the Plaintiff finds itself in. [56] The answer to this conundrum lies in s.120, s.121 of the Act and the Conditions in the Access Agreement, the combined effect of which is that the party which is not in breach, must pursue the remedies as per the Act, but (per Condition 8.8 of the Access Agreement) with the absolute right to apply to court for interlocutory reliefs. When the domestic remedy is exhausted the affected party may then pursue court proceedings but only via Judicial Review (s.121 of the Act). 55 | P a g e [57] For completeness, we should add that MCMC as the regulator has the obligation to ensure that there is no anti-competitive conduct by a licensee. Here, the Plaintiff’s complaint is exactly that – the Defendant is in a dominant position and is engaged in anti-competitive conduct. In this regard, s.133 of the Act reads as follows: “A licensee shall not engage in any conduct which has the purpose of substantially lessening competition in a communications market.” [58] It is also relevant to note that Section 139 of the Act empowers the MCMC to direct a licensee who is in a dominant position to cease the anti-competitive conduct. The section reads as follows: