Azman bin Hanafiah v PENDAFTAR HAKMILIK NEGERI PERAK (AA-25-1-01/2025)

The Federal Court in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd (supra) stated: 160 “[12] ...Leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case of granting the reliefs sought at the substantive hearing may be resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though, i.e. unless the matter for judicial review 165 is amenable to judicial review no success may be envisaged”. [10]. I find that the applicant’s complaint is not about an administrative decision of the Registrar, but about non- 170 enforcement of a consent judgment. Enforcement of judgments falls within the civil jurisdiction, not within judicial review. Issue (b): Limitation under Order 53 [11]. Order 53 rule 3(6) stipulates: “An application for leave shall be made promptly and in any 175 event within three months from the date when the grounds of the application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant.” [12]. Order 53 rule 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 is a mandatory provision that an application for judicial review must be made 180 promptly, within three months from the date when the grounds for the application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant. The word “shall” reflects a strict and jurisdictional requirement. [13]. The authorities firmly establish that the three-month limit is not 185 a mere technicality but a substantive precondition to jurisdiction. In Ahmad Jefri Mohd Jahri @ Md Johari v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 145; [2010] 5 CLJ 865; [2010] 1 MLRA 524, the Federal Court emphasised that the stringent conditions in Order 53 190 exist to protect public authorities from groundless applications and to secure finality in public administration. Likewise, in Ravindran v Malaysian Examination Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168; [1984] 1 MLRA 231, leave was refused where the application was out of time by a delay of 13 days, 195 demonstrating the courts’ strict adherence to the statutory limit. [14]. The Court of Appeal in Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2006] 1 CLJ 927; [2006] 5 MLJ 60; [2006] 4 AMR 89; [2005] 2 MLRA 698, reaffirmed that the High Court should refuse leave in limine where an 200 application is filed out of time. Similarly, in Abdul Rahman Abdullah Munir & Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2008] 6 MLJ 704; [2008] 6 CLJ 805; [2008] 2 MLRA 390; [2008] 5 AMR 573, the Court of Appeal held that jurisdiction under Order 53 may only be exercised upon strict 205 compliance with the time limit. The Federal Court in Menteri Besar Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur v Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd [2010] 5 CLJ 123; [2010] 4 MLJ 360; [2010] 1 MLRA 325; [2010] 5 AMR 220, further clarified that the prescribed time frame is rigid and goes to the jurisdiction of 210 the court. In Tang Kwor Ham (supra), the Court of Appeal stated: “The High Court should not go into the merits of the case at the leave stage. Its role is only to see if the application for leave is frivolous. If, for example, the applicant is a busybody, 215 or the application is made out of time or against a person or body that is immunised from being impleaded in legal proceedings then the High Court would be justified in refusing leave in limine...” 220 [15]. In the present case, the transfers and registrations were made in 2020, while the consent judgment was entered in September

However, this application was only filed in January 2025, well outside the prescribed three-month period. The applicant has sought to justify the delay on grounds of continuing 225 prejudice and enforcement difficulties. However, consistent with the authorities, delay attributable to subsequent events or third-party non-compliance does not warrant the court to reset the statutory clock. [16]. The applicant has not demonstrated any exceptional or legally 230 sufficient reasons to warrant an extension of time. To the contrary, the authorities referred to the above mandates that compliance with Order 53 rule 3(6) is fundamental, jurisdictional, and admits of no discretionary relaxation save in the most exceptional circumstances absent here. 235 [17]. Accordingly, I find that the present application is time-barred. As the Court of Appeal observed in Tang Kwor Ham (supra), where an application is filed out of time, the court is entitled to dismiss it at the threshold without examining the merits. Issue (b): Academic nature of the proceedings 240 [18]. The respondent argues that the application is academic because the 30-year lease expired on 6 July 2023, and the Land reverted to the State Authority on 8 May 2024. [19]. The principle that courts do not decide academic issues is well settled. In Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors 245 v. Karpal Singh Ram Singh [1992] 1 CLJ 212; [1992] 1 MLJ 147; [1991] 1 MLRA 591, the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial power is exercised to resolve live controversies, not theoretical disputes. “As regards the first preliminary objection it is our view that 250 the matter had indeed by the time the originating summons came before the learned Judge, become academic. There was no living issue before the learned Judge. There was no longer any lawful recipient of any benefit of any declaration sought in the originating summons. Cases cited by the 255 learned Judge (Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Jervis [1944] AC 112 HL, Loknath Padhan v. Birendra Kumar AIR [1974] SC 505 and Mohamed Noor bin Othman & Ors. v. Haji Mohamed Ismail bin Haji Ibrahim & Ors. [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 224 constitute ample authorities for the Court not to 260 act in vain. The respondent had by then no real interest in the declarations. It will be a complete waste of judicial time if the Court were to deal with the merits of the application in the originating summons solely to determine the question of costs” 265 [20]. Here, even if this court were to quash the registration and order the Land restored to the applicant, the order would be futile, as the Land has ceased to exist as a registrable interest. There is no subsisting leasehold estate to be vested in the applicant. 270 [21]. In the circumstances, the present proceedings have been overtaken by subsequent events. The lease has expired, the Land has reverted to the State Authority, and no practical relief can be granted. Judicial intervention in such circumstances would serve no purpose and amount to an exercise in futility 275 [22]. I therefore accept the respondent’s submission that the application has been rendered academic by the expiry of the lease. 280 Conclusion [23]. The applicant’s judicial review is unsustainable as there is no public law decision amenable to review, the application is time-barred under Order 53 rule 3(6), and the matter has been 285 rendered academic by the expiry of the lease. Judicial intervention would therefore be futile. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. In light of the protracted history and substantial resources already expended in related civil proceedings, I make no order as to costs. 290 Dated : 17 August 2025 [MOSES SUSAYAN] 295 JUDGE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT IPOH, PERAK 300 305 For the Applicant : Nordin Rauf Advocates and Solicitors [Messrs Nordin Rauf & Co] Bandar Baru Bangi, Selangor 310 For the AGC : Norazlinawati binti Mohd Arshad State Civil Director Civil Unit [Perak Legal Advisor Officers] 315 Ipoh, Perak For the Putative : Mohd Fitri bin Sadarudin Respondent Senior Federal Counsel 320 Advisory Unit [Perak Legal Advisor Offices] Ipoh, Perak 325 (Notice: This Grounds of Decision is subject to official editorial revision) Headnotes: Judicial review application to quash registration of land and compel 330 re-registration dismissed. No reviewable “decision” under O.53 r.2(4) ROC 2012 as Registrar acted pursuant to court orders ─ proper remedy lies in civil enforcement of consent judgment. ─ Application time-barred under O.53 r.3(6), being filed well beyond the three-month statutory limit; strict compliance is jurisdictional ─ Further, 335 lease expired and land reverted to State Authority, rendering proceedings academic. ─ Court declines to act in vain and in futility. Application dismissed with no order as to costs.