Where a pension or other benefit ceases under subsection (1), the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may grant an alimentary allowance equivalent to the whole or any part of such moneys to which the pensioner would have been entitled by way of pension or other benefit as he thinks proper to the pensioner’s wife or children for their maintenance and benefit and, after the expiration of his sentence, to such pensioner himself [14] The Applicant argues that as he had yet to receive any pension, s. 21(1) does not apply to him. This argument is misconceived. To my mind, the phrase “any person to whom a pension or other benefit has been granted under this Act” would include the Applicant who has yet to be paid his pension, and not merely limited to one who is already receiving pension. The disentitlement applies equally. Any other construction would lead to an absurdity. It would be akin to saying that a person who has been convicted soon before he retired or soon thereafter (as in this case), and whose pension has not yet been processed for payment, is nonetheless entitled to pension, as he has not yet been granted the pension. Disciplinary proceedings not completed [15] The Applicant relies heavily on the fact that the disciplinary proceedings which had commenced following the charges brought against him, was not concluded. He made much of the fact that his letters to JPA in 2024 received responses that the disciplinary proceedings were not concluded. [16] Whilst I admit that the responses of JPA were wanting in some aspects as the letters did not answer to the Applicant’s situation, I am of the view that nothing turns on it. The Applicant had been suspended from 26.1.2012 following his conviction for the 2nd Criminal Proceedings. The letter of Gantung Kerja dated 21.3.2012 which took effect on 26.1.2012 was very clear in its terms. He was informed that as a result of the suspension, he was not entitled to any emoluments. Having retired a day earlier, there was no outstanding or arrears of salary to speak of. [17] The affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents explained that on 26.1.2015 when the Applicant was sentenced for the 2nd Criminal proceedings, he had already retired. The Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) Regulations 1993 which also applies to police officers, no longer applied to him. Consequently, the relevant disciplinary authority no longer had any jurisdiction over him. [18] I agree with the stand taken by the Respondents. It is my view that the fact of the Applicant’s retirement had superseded the disciplinary proceedings. [19] The fact of conviction has also rendered the disciplinary proceedings unnecessary. With his conviction, he lost all entitlement to pensions. There was therefore no purpose to be served by completing the disciplinary proceedings. [20] It would appear that the letters from JPA informing him that the disciplinary proceedings had not been concluded were merely to convey what was informed by the Police Department. Nothing turns on the letters as the disentitlement to pension and arrears of salary had already taken effect. Condonation [21] The issue of condonation arises from the representation of JPA that the disciplinary proceedings had not been concluded. The Applicant contends that in view of the delay to complete the disciplinary proceedings, the Respondents had condoned his disciplinary breach. [22] The stand of the Applicant ignores the glaring fact that the non-completion of the disciplinary proceedings is now irrelevant. The fact that he was not punished with dismissal is immaterial in the light of his conviction in the criminal proceedings. With his conviction, he lost all he would otherwise have been eligible to under the Pensions Act. Condonation is therefore a non-issue. [23] The Applicant relies on the Court of Appeal decision in M Sentivelu A/L R Marimuthu v Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor [2005] 5 MLJ 393 to contend that although the relevant regulations do not prescribe a time limit, a disciplinary hearing in respect of charges of misconduct brought long after the event may not be upheld as being procedurally fair. The longer the delay, the more difficult it would be for the disciplining body to justify the proceedings against the employee. [24] However, the decision of the Court of Appeal has been overturned by the Federal Court in Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor v Vickneswary a/p RM Santhivelu (substituting M Senthivelu a/l R Marimuthu, deceased) [2008] 6 MLJ 1. Although the issue of delay in commencing disciplinary action was not dealt as it was an unpleaded issue, on the issue of condonation, the Federal Court had this to say, On the question of condonation raised by the respondent and referring to the case of Azman bin Abdullah v Ketua Polis Negara [1997] 1 MLJ 263, I hold, in this present case, that there was no condonation. Condonation in the context of employment contract is an act by the employer to excuse or forgive him for the wrongful act committed by the employee. Condonation can be in the active form ie by the act of telling the person that he has been forgiven for the wrongful act done or by a passive act of not taking any action. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed) Vol 16 at p 439 para 648 describe condonation as follows: An employer who with full knowledge of his employee’s misconduct elects to continue him in service cannot subsequently dismiss him for the offence which he has condoned. In our case, the second appellant cannot be said to have condoned the acts of the deceased because the deceased, as admitted by him in his letter, was interdicted (‘ditahan kerja’). [25] Similarly, I find the issue of condonation does not arise as he was interdicted with effect from 16.11.2007, and also suspended from 26.1.2012. As action had been taken against him, the Respondents cannot be said to have condoned the acts of the Applicant. Relief of mandamus [26] The law in respect of when mandamus can issue is trite. The Court of Appeal in Menteri Besar Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur v Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd [2010] 4 MLJ 360 held, In MP Jain’s Administrative Law of Malaysia and Singapore (2nd Ed, 1980) the learned author said, at pp 449 and 450: … Mandamus can be granted only when a legal duty is imposed on an authority and the applicant has a legal right to compel the performance of the public duty prescribed by law, and to keep the subordinate bodies and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. Mandamus is thus a very wide remedy which is available against a public officer to see that he does his duty. What can be enforced through mandamus is a duty of a public nature the performance of which is imperative and not optional or discretionary with the concerned authority. Thus, if an officer has a power rather than a duty, and he does not use his power, mandamus cannot be issued. [27] There is no duty, both public and statutory, to grant the Applicant the relief of mandamus sought for. Firstly, from the clear wordings of s. 3(1) of the Pensions Act, pension is not an absolute right. Pensions may granted by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong only upon fulfilment of certain conditions as stipulated in the Pensions Act. [28] This is clear from the wordings of s. 3 and 9 as follows,