Azmir Mirza Bin Mahmud v Pendakwa Raya (CB-42JSKS-4-08/2023)

Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen setelah perbicaraan penuh yang telah mensabitkan Perayu/Tertuduh dengan pertuduhan dan menjatuhkan hukuman penjara 12 tahun dari tarikh sabitan 24.07.2023 dan 6 kali sebatan. Perayu telah dituduh dengan pertuduhan seperti yang berikut: “Bahawa kamu, pada 31/07/2010 jam lebih kurang 1100 hrs bertempat di belakang rumah tidak bernombor beralamat di Kg. Ulu Jelu, dalam Daerah Raub, di dalam Negeri Pahang, telah merogol penama Hidayatul Aishah binti Che Hassan (No. KPT: 960425-06-5554) yang berumur di bawah 16 tahun pada waktu kejadian tanpa kerelaannya dan dengan itu, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah

Pihak pendakwaan telah memanggil 12 orang saksi sebelum menutup kes pendakwaan. Ia terdiri daripada pengadu, pegawai polis, pegawai perubatan dan ahli kimia DNA serta pegawai penyiasat.

Pengadu dalam keterangannya menyatakan bahawa pada 31.07.2010 di mana pada masa itu pengadu berumur 14 tahun 03 bulan rumahnya telah didatangi oleh seorang lelaki yang memegang satu besi dan menuju ke arah pengadu. Pengadu terkejut dan bertanya siapakah dia. Ini adalah disebabkan lelaki itu tidak pernah dikenalinya sebelum ini. Pengadu menyatakan lelaki itu telah menggeledah rumahnya. Dia telah mengambil handphone dan kamera. Kemudian lelaki itu membawanya ke bilik air dapur. Kemudian lelaki itu mengacukan pisau kepadanya. Setelah itu lelaki itu membawa SP 1 ke belakang rumah yang ada semak samun dan rimbunan pokok buluh. Lelaki itu meminta SP 1 menanggalkan baju dan seluar dan kemudian lelaki itu menanggalkan pakaiannya.

Pada masa itu SP 1 menyatakan dia masih berpakaian dan tangan diikat kebelakang. Selepas itu lelaki itu menanggalkan pakaian SP 1 dan cuba masukkan kemaluan lelaki itu ke kemaluan SP 1. SP 1 menyatakan dia nampak kemaluan lelaki itu sebab dia telah tanggalkan seluar masa itu.

SP 1 berasa sakit dan lelaki itu cuba masukkan jari ke kemaluan SP 1 sambil menolak-nolak jari ke dalam kemaluan SP

Setelah itu SP 1 menyatakan bahawa lelaki itu menolak jari ke dalam kemaluannya lebih kurang 1 – 2 minit. Kemudian lelaki itu cuba memasukkan kemaluannya ke dalam kemaluan SP 1. SP 1 merayu disebabkan sakit. Setelah itu lelaki itu ambil handphone dan buka kamera serta cuba merakam. Kemudian lelaki melayu itu memakai semula pakaiannya dan bertanya sama ada SP 1 inginkan wang ataupun tidak.

SP 1 menyatakan bahawa kemaluan lelaki itu hanya dapat masuk sikit saja sebab sakit dan mungkin disebabkan SP 1 kecil dan susah untuk dimasukkan. Setelah itu SP 1 berasa sedih, sakit, kecewa serta marah. Setelah lelaki itu keluar SP 1 lari ke rumah mencari adik dan rumah jiran. SP 1 menyatakan dalam keterangannya bahawa semasa lelaki itu cuba masukkan kemaluannya ke dalam kemaluan SP 1, dia nampak pisau yang dipegang oleh lelaki tersebut.

10 tahun kemudian Perayu telah ditangkap oleh pihak polis dan dikemukakan dengan pertuduhan seperti di perenggan 1 di atas.

SP 1 dalam keterangannya juga menyatakan bahawa kawad cam ada dijalankan pada kali pertama pada tahun kejadian dan kawad cam dijalankan kemudian iaitu setelah Perayu ditangkap.

Keterangan pendakwaan juga menunjukkan kawad cam telah dijalankan yang dikendalikan oleh SP 8. SP 8 dalam keterangannya telah memperincikan proses kawad cam dijalankan. SP 8 semasa pemeriksaan balas tidak bersetuju bahawa hanya Tertuduh sahaja bertukar tempat dalam proses kawad cam tersebut. Laporan kawad cam telah dikemukakan sebagai eksibit P19. Dalam P19 dicatatkan di Butiran 15 bahawa SP 1 telah dapat dapat mengecam Perayu melalui paras rupa dan bentuk badan orang yang dicam.

Selain daripada itu keterangan pendakwaan juga menunjukkan bahawa Tertuduh telah dapat ditangkap dan berpandukan kepada DNA yang ditemui sepadan dengan DNA yang ditemui di tempat kejadian. Ahli kimia dalam keterangannya telah mengesahkan bahawa DNA yang terdapat pada rambut yang ditemui di tempat kejadian adalah sepadan dengan DNA Perayu. Penelitian kepada laporan DNA tersebut tidak dapat menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya kesan air mani pada mana-mana badan pengadu atau Perayu yang dapat dikaitkan dengan DNA Perayu. DNA yang diperolehi itu adalah daripada bulu yang ditemui di tempat kejadian.

Hakim bicara melalui alasan penghakiman bertarikh 17.12.2024 telah menyatakan bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes prima facie di akhir kes pendakwaan dan telah membuat dapatan-dapatan berkaitan dengan pengecaman dengan menyatakan seperti berikut: “12. Isu kredibiliti SP 1 dalam pengecaman OKT juga timbul kerana bicara kes ini hanya bermula selepas hampir sedekad kejadian itu dikatakan berlaku.

Namun begitu, Mahkamah ini berpendapat SP 1 telah berjaya mengecam OKT secara positif, meskipun telah dicabar hebat oleh pihak pembelaan. Keterangan SP 1 didapati adalah credible dan konsisten keterangan sokongan yang lain.”

Pengecaman Tertuduh dalam satu perbicaraan jenayah boleh dilakukan. Ia boleh terjadi melalui kawad cam atau pengecaman di Mahkamah. Ia boleh terima masuk di bawah seksyen 9 Akta Keterangan 1950. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Dorai Pandian Munian & Anor v. PP [2012] 10 CLJ 22 seperti yang berikut: [31] The holding of an identification parade is a part of the investigation process carried out by the investigating authority. The evidence of the identification parade is relevant and admissible under s. 9 of the Evidence Act 1950, and can be used to corroborate the substantive evidence given by the witnesses in court on identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the alleged crime. It is well settled that the substantive evidence is the evidence of identification in court. In the circumstances of this case, we do not think that the defects relating to the identification parade including the opportunities for PW10 to see both the accused on 24 April 1999 (before the identification parade on 26 April 1999), as submitted by learned counsel, justifies the rejection of the identification evidence given by PW10 in court. In Ong Poh Cheng v. PP [1998] 4 CLJ 1, at p. 6, Shaik Daud Ismail JCA delivering the judgment of this court said: It does not follow, as a matter of course, that just because the learned judge rejected the identification at the identification parade, he must of necessity also reject the dock identification of the appellant. He rejected it not because there was no identification of the appellant as the robber, but because there were defects in the conduct of the parade (the appellant was in fact identified). In the light of this we find that his rejection of the evidence of the identification at the identification parade was in no way fatal to the dock identification of the appellant as the robber.”

Ia boleh digunakan bagi membuktikan fakta terhadap Tertuduh seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah seksyen 3 Akta Keterangan

Ini telah dinyatakan oleh YAA Raja Azlan Shah dalam kes KS Roberts v Public Prosecutor [1970] 2 MLJ 137 seperti yang berikut: “Identification is a fact or circumstance which must be proved against an accused person before it can be relied upon and used against him. A fact or circumstance is held to be proved only when it fulfils the definition of the word “proved” given in section 3 of the Evidence Ordinance. The evidence of identification is as much subject to this definition as any other kind of evidence but it would appear to me that in assessing the evidence of identification the trial court does not apply the tests provided in this section. It is true that an absolute certainty is not required but the court has to test the evidence with prudence and accept it only when it is so highly probable that its truth can safely be accepted. The test excludes from its orbit blind faith of a true believer, because prudence and credulity do not go together.

Malahan jika pengecaman tersebut hanya melibatkan seorang saksi sahaja Mahkamah perlu berhati-hati pengecaman tersebut. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Whyatt CJ dalam kes Leong Ah Seng v Reg [1956] 1 MLJ 225 seperti yang berikut: “A further point of criticism of the prosecution's case was that the identification depended solely upon one person, namely the complainant, and was made when the accused was surrounded by a group of people and obviously at that moment, regarded by every one in the vicinity as being responsible for the theft. An identification made in such circumstances cannot be regarded as very satisfactory or reliable.”

Apa yang jelas daripada duluan kehakiman di atas Mahkamah ketika pihak pendakwaan bersandarkan kepada pengecaman Tertuduh oleh mangsa hendaklah berhati-hati dan tidak dengan sewenang-wenangnya menolak atau menerima pengecaman tersebut. Pada hemat Mahkamah dalam kes ini pengecaman telah dibuat melalui kawad cam. Ia telah dilakukan oleh SP 8. Namun fakta yang tidak dinafikan ialah kawad cam itu dibuat 12 tahun selepas kejadian. Mahkamah mendapati Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menimbangkan perkara tersebut dan memutuskan kawad cam itu adalah teratur dan boleh dijadikan asas untuk pengecaman Tertuduh dan mengaitkan Tertuduh dengan kejadian yang menimpa SP 1.

Keterangan yang dapat dilihat berkenaan dengan kawad cam ia telah dijalankan setelah 10 tahun selepas kejadian. Walaupun kawad cam yang pertama telah dijalankan semasa siasatan dibuat ketika laporan polis pertama dibuat oleh SP 1. Namun tiada sebarang pengesahan atau laporan berkenaan dengan hasil kawad cam tersebut.

Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa tempoh masa satu kawad cam akan mempengaruhi kualiti kawad cam tersebut. Ini dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Jaferi bin Ipee v Public Prosecutor [2013] 3 MLJ 467 apabila kawad cam dilakukan dua minggu selepas kejadian seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan 12 seperti yang berikut: “[12] We note that in this appeal, PW6 positively identified the appellant twice, at two separate identification parades. We also note that eventhough PW6 was subjected to severe cross-examination (from pp 48–50 of the appeal records) on the identification parade, her evidence remained unshaken. It is also note worthy to state that the identification parades took place on 5 August 2003, about two weeks after PW6’s ordeal at her house. It was held within a reasonable period when the memory of the identifier is still vivid and fresh.”

Begitu juga sekiranya terdapat pengecaman kawad cam itu dilakukan dalam tempoh yang singkat ia akan membolehkan kualitinya lebih tinggi. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Duis Akim & Ors v Public Prosecutor [2014] 1 MLJ 49. Dalam kes Duis Akim & Ors (supra) kawad cam dilakukan beberapa bulan selepas kejadian dan ia telah disahkan sebagai kawad cam yang boleh diterima oleh Mahkamah.

Namun demikian sekiranya terdapat keterangan lain yang boleh dijadikan sandaran untuk pengenalan Tertuduh kelemahan kualiti kawad cam tidak akan menjejaskan kes pendakwaan. Ini dapat dilihat dalam kes Mohd Nahar bin Abu Bakar v Public Prosecutor [2014] 2 MLJ 373 seperti yang berikut: “[51] Identification can be by way of circumstantial evidence. (See ST Shinde v State of Maharashtra AIR 1974 SC 791, Dato Mokhtar bin Hashim & Anor v PP [1983] 2 MLJ 232). The assailant was not a total stranger to SP15. To that extent, the identification parade was less importance that if the assailant had been unknown persons whom the eye-witness had to identify. (See Jadunath Singh v State of UP AIR 1971 SC 363).”

Mahkamah ini berpendapat mutu kawad cam yang telah dijalankan 12 tahun selepas kejadian adalah amat rendah untuk SP 1 mengecam Perayu. Sela masa yang panjang tersebut tidak dapat menolak hakikat bahawa berlaku perubahan yang menjejaskan kesahihan dan ketepatan pengecaman Perayu oleh SP 1. Hakim bicara tidak menyatakan pertimbangannya terhadap kualiti pengecaman oleh SP 1, sebaliknya tanpa asas yang kukuh memutuskan bahawa pengecaman Perayu oleh SP 1 adalah diterima oleh Mahkamah. Ia pada hemat Mahkamah memerlukan campur tangan oleh Mahkamah ini.

Peguam Perayu dalam kes ini telah membangkitkan isu bahawa umur Perayu telah tidak dibuktikan oleh Pendakwa Raya dan bersandarkan kepada kes Jamaluddin Hashim v PP [1999] 3 CLJ 640. Peguam berhujah pembuktian umur adalah tertakluk kepada seksyen 32 (2) Akta Kelahiran dan Kematian 1957 dan seksyen 33 Akta yang sama.

Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Jamaluddin Hashim (supra). Namun ia telah dinyatakan sebaliknya dalam kes Mohd Salleh MK Mohd Yusof v. PP [2005] 2 CLJ 655 seperti yang berikut: “In contending that an identity card is no acceptable proof of a person's date of birth, Encik Karpal Singh relied on the decision of the High Court in Jamaluddin Hashim v. PP [1999] 3 CLJ 640 where, on appeal, the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the rape of a woman allegedly under sixteen years of age were set aside on the ground that the identity card of the woman concerned, on which the prosecution had relied for the required proof, could not in law be used to prove her age or date of birth. The prosecution's appeal to this court (Rayuan Jenayah No. K-09-28-99) was dismissed, which means that this court agreed with the High Court's judgement in that case as to proof of age by identity card. Reading the High Court judgement in that case, it is apparent that the identity card of the woman in that case was one issued under the National Registration Regulations 1990, the First Schedule to which prescribes the form of an identity card and the particulars that it must contain, which do not include the holder's date of birth. Accordingly the identity card of the woman in that case did not bear an entry described as the woman's date of birth. It must have contained a number which the First Schedule prescribes as the identity card number. It had been common knowledge that the first six digits of that number were meant to represent the date of birth of the holder but the judge did not take them into account, presumably because in law, that is according to the First Schedule, the whole number was the identity card number and the date of birth was not required to be given. So he found that the date of birth was not given in the identity card. It is only by an amendment in 2001 [PU(A) 232/01], after Jamaluddin, that it is stated as a matter of law that the first six digits represent the date of birth. That is to be seen in para. (2A) of reg. 5 of the 1990 Regulations. But the identity card of F in this case was an old-form identity card issued on 28 October 1987, before the National Registration Regulations 1990 came into being. It was issued under the National Registration Regulations 1960, which were repealed by the 1990 Regulations and which did require the date of birth to be included in identity cards issued under them. See reg. 5(2) and the Form of Identity Card in the First Schedule. Accordingly the card did give the date of birth of F. If the identity card in the case of Jamaluddin had been of the same kind, the decision in the case might well have gone a different way. In any case, if it was, in that event, to be submitted that the identity card could not be accepted as proof of date of birth, the submission would have to be supported by reasons entirely different from those that were actually given by the judge. The decision in Jamaluddin was therefore an entirely wrong basis on which to argue against the acceptability of the identity card in this case as proof of the date of birth of F. Encik Karpal Singh did not seem to realize the difference between the identity card in Jamaluddin and that in this case. Neither did we, when we heard the appeal. Neither presumably did the DPP. Had Encik Karpal Singh realized it and still wished to urge us not to accept the identity card in this case as prima facie proof of date of birth, he would have had to come up with reasons different from those furnished by the case of Jamaluddin, which reasons we reject as inapplicable to the present case. The question would have been whether an identity card issued under the 1960 regulations and bearing the date of birth as required by the regulations furnishes legal proof of the date of birth of the person concerned. That question has not been argued before us and we refrain from answering it. We would treat the question as not having been raised before us in this appeal and we would therefore regard the admissibility of F's identity card as proof of her age, which as we said was not an issue in the courts below, as not an issue before us.”

Oleh itu Mahkamah ini berpendapat bersandarkan kepada kes Mohd Salleh MK Mohd Yusof (supra) kewujudan nombor-nombor digit di dalam kad pengenalan boleh dijadikan asas kepada penentuan umur SP 1. Ia adalah sejajar dengan pindaan kepada Peraturan-Peraturan Pendaftaran Negara (Pindaan) 2001 [P.U(A) 232/2001] yang memperuntukkan seperti yang berikut: Peraturan 5 Peraturan-Peraturan ibu dipinda-

dalam subperaturan (1), dengan menggantikan perkataan "ibujari" dengan perkataan "cap jari";

dalam subperaturan (2)-

dengan memotong perkataan "hendaklah dalam bentuk yang ditetapkan dalam Jadual Pertama dan"; dan

(ii) dengan menggantikan perkataan "Jadual itu" dengan perkataan "Jadual Pertama atau Jadual 1A, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan,";

dengan memasukkan selepas subperaturan (2), subperaturan yang berikut: "(2A) Suatu kad pengenalan yang dikeluarkan kepada seseorang yang dikehendaki mendaftar di bawah peraturan 4 hendaklah mengandungi butir-butir tarikh kelahirannya yang hendaklah dicetak sebagai enam angka pertama dalam nombor kad pengenalan itu yang mana-

dua angka pertama menunjukkan tahun kelahiran;

dua angka yang berikutnya menunjukkan bulan kelahiran; dan

dua angka yang terakhir menunjukkan tarikh kelahiran sebenar, orang itu melainkan jika ditentukan selainnya oleh Ketua Pengarah disebabkan hal keadaan luar biasa yang tertentu dan dalam hal sedemikian, nombor itu hendaklah ditandakan dengan asterik (*) di hujung nombor kad pengenalan itu, dan asterik (*) ini bukanlah membentuk sebahagian daripada nombor kad pengenalan.";

dengan menggantikan subperaturan (3) dengan subperaturan yang berikut: "(3) Ketua Pengarah hendaklah menyebabkan dimasukkan ke dalam kad pengenalan-

dalam hal seseorang yang menjadi warganegara Malaysia, perkataan "WARGANEGARA";

dalam hal seseorang yang bukan warganegara Malaysia tetapi bermastautin secara tetap di Malaysia, suatu jalur atau apa-apa bentuk lain berwarna merah dengan perkataan "PEMASTAUTIN TETAP";

dalam hal-

seseorang yang memasuki Malaysia secara sah melalui suatu pas imigresen atau permit yang sah dan dibenarkan menetap di Malaysia bagi tempoh dua belas bulan dan ke atas; atau

(ii) seseorang yang dilahirkan di Malaysia tetapi taraf kewarganegaraannya tidak dapat ditentukan, suatu jalur atau apa-apa bentuk lain berwarna hijau dengan perkataan "PEMASTAUTIN SEMENTARA"; dan

dalam hal seseorang yang didaftarkan di bawah Akta Pencegahan Jenayah 1959 [Akta 297], suatu jalur atau apaapa kod yang sesuai sebagaimana yang diluluskan oleh Ketua Pengarah, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan.";

dengan menggantikan subperaturan (4) dengan subperaturan yang berikut: "(4) Jika nama seseorang yang dikehendaki mendaftar di bawah Peraturan-Peraturan ini dieja-

dalam kad pengenalan dengan aksara abjad yang melebihi 40 aksara; atau

dalam kad pelbagai guna Kerajaan dengan aksara abjad yang melebihi 80 aksara, pegawai pendaftaran boleh memendekkan nama itu mengikut apa-apa cara sebagaimana yang diarahkan oleh Ketua Pengarah tanpa, setakat mana yang praktik, menyentuh pengenalan orang itu dan pegawai pendaftaran bolehlah mengeluarkan kepada orang itu suatu perakuan yang menyatakan bahawa namanya sebagaimana yang tercetak atas kad pengenalan itu atau sebagaimana yang terkandung dalam cip, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan, dan nama penuhnya sebagaimana yang tercatat dalam daftar merujuk kepada orang yang sama.

Jika dalam mana-mana dokumen asal Sijil Kelahiran, Sijil Kewarganegaraan atau Sijil Anak Angkat seseorang kanak-kanak yang telah mencapai umur dua belas tahun tetapi belum mencapai umur lapan belas tahun, terdapat catatan yang tidak merujuk secara jelas perhubungan antara kanak-kanak itu dengan salah seorang ibu atau bapanya atau kedua-duanya, satu asterik (*) hendaklah dicetak di pangkal nama asal kanak-kanak itu di bahagian hadapan kad pengenalannya."; dan

dalam subperaturan (5)-

dalam teks bahasa kebangsaan, dengan memasukkan selepas perkataan "sementara" perkataan "dalam"; dan

(ii) dengan memasukkan selepas perkataan "Jadual Kedua" perkataan "atau Borang KPPK09 dalam Jadual 2A, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan,".

Oleh itu Mahkamah ini tidak dapat bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Perayu bahawa umur SP 1 tidak dapat dibuktikan di Mahkamah. Malahan berpandukan kepada nombor kad pengenalan berdasarkan digit yang dinyatakan di dalamnya adalah boleh digunakan bagi menentukan tarikh lahir SP 1 dan umur SP 1 semasa kejadian tersebut. Mahkamah ini berpuas hati bahawa umur SP 1 telah dibuktikan di Mahkamah Sesyen semasa perbicaraan. Penilaian keterangan SP 1 oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen

Adalah didapati bahawa Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa keterangan SP 1 adalah luar biasa meyakinkan (unusually convincing). Ini dinyatakan di perenggan 18 (iv) alasan penghakiman seperti yang berikut: “iv. Dakwaan bahawa keterangan SP1 tidak ‘unusually convincing” dan terdapat percanggahan yang material yang menjadikan SP1 bukanlah saksi yang credible. - Mahkamah berpendapat bagi kes kesalahan seksual, keterangan sokongan tidak diperlukan jika keterangan saksi mangsa adalah ‘unusually convincing’ dan hanyalah menjadi amalan untuk mengemukakan keterangan sokongan itu. Dirujuk kes PP v. Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359, Mahmad Bidin lwn. PP [2016]2 CLJ 123. - Atas dasar ini, mahkamah ini tidak bergantung semata-mata dengan keterangan mangsa, tetapi turut meneliti keterangan sokongan lain seperti laporan perubatan serta keterangan saksi lain iaitu SP3 dan SP4, yang didapati menyokong keterangan SP1.”

Mahkamah ini mendapati daripada alasan penghakiman tersebut Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah berpendapat bahawa keterangan SP 1 luar biasa meyakinkan dengan merujuk kepada kredibiliti SP 1 itu adalah meyakinkan dan tidak memerlukan keterangan sokongan.

Jika diteliti kepada penggunaan istilah luar biasa meyakinkan yang dinyatakan dalam kes Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan [2013] 8 CLJ 359 adalah berdasarkan kepada kedudukan undang-undang ketika itu di Singapura dan India. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 22 hingga 23 seperti yang berikut: “[22] Walau apa pun jua, pada pandangan kami, sekiranya keterangan pengadu adalah "unusually convincing", sabitan dalam kes-kes seksual boleh dibuat tanpa keterangan sokongan. Kami bersetuju dengan proposisi undang-undang yang dinyatakan di dalam kes Kwan Peng Hong v. PP [2000] 4 SLR 96 (Mahkamah Tinggi), apabila Yong Pung How CJ berkata di ms. 104: But I also took great care to make clear that it is dangerous to convict on the words of the complainant alone unless her evidence is unusually compelling or convincing (Tang Kin Seng v. PP [197] 1 SLR 46 at 58, Teo Keng Pong v. PP [1996] 3 SLR 32 (at 340 and Soh Yang Tick v. PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 50). In short, the court is to be extremely cautious is relying on the sole evidence of the complainant for a conviction. The phrase 'unusually compelling or convincing' simply means that the complainant's evidence was so convincing that the prosecution's case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence. [23] Nampaknya mahkamah-mahkamah di India juga telah mengambil pendekatan yang sama, iaitu sekiranya keterangan pengadu dalam kes-kes seksual adalah kredible, dan meyakinkan, ia adalah mencukupi untuk mensabitkan tertuduh tanpa keterangan sokongan. Dalam kes tersohor Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2010] 8 SCC 191, Mahkamah Agung India, setelah menyemak semula kes-kes yang berkaitan dengan keterangan mangsa rogol, membuat pemerhatian yang berikut:

In State of Maharashtra vs. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658, this Court held that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person's lust and, therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court observed as under: A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the Court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult and of full understanding the court is entitled to base a conviction on her evidence unless the same is shown to be infirm and not trustworthy. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.

In State of UP vs. Pappu @ Yunus & Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248, this Court held that even in a case where it is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a ground to absolve the accused from the charge of rape. It has to be established that there was consent by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the court to absolve the accused. This Court further held that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get assurance of her testimony. The Court held as under: It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. There is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. She stands at a higher pedestal than an injured witness. In the latter case, there is injury on the physical form, while in the former it is both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of corroboration as understood in the context of an accomplice, would do.

In State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh & Ors AIR 1996 SC 1393, this Court held that in cases involving sexual harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit thereof. The Court observed as under: The court overlooked the situation in which a poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the company of three desperate young men who were threatening her and preventing her from raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating officer did not conduct the investigation properly or was negligent in not being able to trace out the driver or the car, how can that become a ground to discredit the testimony of the prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control over the investigating agency and the negligence of an investigating officer could not affect the credibility of the statement of the prosecutrix... The courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case... Seeking corroboration of her statement before replying upon the same as a rule, in such cases, amounts to adding insult to injury... Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. xxx The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.

In State of Orissa vs. Thakara Besra & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1963, this Court held that rape is not mere a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence.

In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Raghubir Singh (1993) 2 SCC 622, this Court held that there is no legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which militate against her veracity.

A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Wahid Khan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9, placing reliance on earlier judgment in Rameshwar vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1952 SC 54.

Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. (penekanan ditambah).”

Jika ditelusuri istilah luar biasa meyakinkan dalam keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah seperti di atas ia telah dirumuskan dengan menarik dalam kes Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor [1996] 3 SLR 329 di mana istilah luar biasa meyakinkan telah dinyatakan oleh YAA Yong Pung How CJ seperti yang berikut: “I would add that there is nothing magical about the words ‘unusually convincing.’ They are but another way of saying that the witness’s testimony was so convincing that the prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence.”

Jika diteliti kes Khoo Kwoon Hain v Public Prosecutor [1995] 2 SLR 767 setelah Mahkamah meneliti keterangan yang diberikan oleh pengadu dalam kes tersebut dan dapat dilihat bagaimana ianya dilakukan dan akhirnya diputuskan bahawa keterangan sedemikian tidak luar biasa menyakinkan. Keterangan saksi dapat dilihat seperti yang berikut: “The main plank of the prosecution’s case was the evidence of the complainant. She testified that on 14 September, she started work at 12 noon. The appellant was her supervisor. Another supervisor was one Lena. At about 4.45pm, while the complainant was working at the dining area of Sardi’s, the appellant allegedly called her over to the bar counter. The complainant alleged that the appellant then asked her if she had a friend who worked as a call-girl. The complainant said ‘no’. Whereupon the appellant hugged the complainant from behind. While doing so, he allegedly touched the complainant’s body, breasts and buttocks. The complainant said that she told him to let go. She asked him why he did that. When she wanted to leave, he touched her breast again. The complainant said that she felt the appellant’s private part on her buttocks. Thereafter, the complainant went to her locker to change as it was nearly time for her break. When she came out of the toilet, she saw the appellant entering the corridor to go to the men’s toilet. The appellant allegedly hugged the complainant tightly again. She was surprised and covered her face with the apron she was holding. The appellant pressed his private part against hers. He also kissed her on the right ear and neck. The complainant testified that she told the appellant to release her and that if he did not, she would scream. This alleged second incident could not be seen from the dining area as there was a common door which was closed. The complainant told the court that when she asked the appellant to let her go, the appellant said, ‘Why should I there is nobody around.’ She pushed him and asked him a second time to release her. She finally managed to push him away. She went straight to the kitchen and put her things in her locker. She then went off for her break. About an hour later, the complainant returned from her break. She did not see the appellant again that evening. She continued her work. The complainant said that during the first incident, she did not know where Lena was. After that, she saw that Lena was at the cashier’s counter. Before finishing her work, she told one ‘aunty’ who was working in the kitchen that the appellant touched her. She did not tell anybody else until she went home. The next day, the complainant told her sister, Zaiton, as she could not sleep that night. This was at about 2pm. The complainant told Zaiton that she had something to tell her regarding the complainant’s work. She did not tell Zaiton what happened over the telephone but did that when she went over to Zaiton’s shop. Zaiton then took the complainant to the police post at Bukit Batok to make a police report. After that, the complainant did not go back to work at Sardi’s. Cross-examined, the complainant said that it did not occur to her during the first incident to scream. This was because there was nobody around. She maintained that though there were people working in the kitchen, there was nobody in the dining area. When she saw Lena, she did not complain to her as she did not know Lena well. She was also confused and was afraid that Lena would not believe her as she did not see what had happened. When pressed further, she said that she would not know whether Lena saw the incident. She merely assumed that it was the case as there was nobody around. The complainant said that she was the only waitress left, as at about 4.30pm the rest had gone out for their break. She could not remember who was working that day. During the second incident, she did not scream as she was in a confined area. According to her, it was useless for her to scream. She did not go back into the toilet because she was afraid that he would follow her in. So she tried to walk past him. Even though she knew that there was nobody there, she threatened to scream as she wanted to scare the appellant so that he would let go. On both occasions she raised her voice so that she was speaking louder than normal. In her opinion, her voice would not carry from the bar counter to the cashier’s counter as there was piped in music. The distance was about eight metres. After the second incident, she ran out of the toilet area. The appellant allegedly called her back but she went into the kitchen. There were two persons in the kitchen but she did not tell them about the incidents. This was because there was nothing they could do. She told ‘aunty’ later because she knew her better. However, the complainant did not know her name and could only guess her age as around 40. During the break, she walked around. She was still fearful of the appellant. At the time, she was confused and did not think of calling anyone. She went back to work as she felt that she needed to return to work. At that time, she did not know if the appellant was still there. She worked for about two more hours. She did not tell anyone else at the restaurant. She did not know why she told ‘aunty’ about the incident. When the complainant went home, she did not tell her parents as they might worry. They were sleeping at the time. The next day, she worked up at about noon. Nobody was in the house then.” Seterusnya YAA Hakim Yong Pung How CJ menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Finally, I should say that I have examined the notes of evidence in this case very carefully. With respect to the district judge, I am not satisfied that the complainant’s evidence in this case is unusually convincing. There were inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, some more material than others. Some of these include the complainant’s explanation for not screaming, which showed that this was a result of a conscious decision after assessing the circumstances. This showed she was not confused, as evidenced by her alleged ability to issue a bluff by threatening to scream even though, according to her, there was nobody there. Her behaviour in returning to work after the alleged incident also required some explanation. Her reasons for telling ‘aunty’ and not the others were also suspect. It is also not improbable that she decided not to return to work much earlier than she said she did, because the next day she woke up at noon. In any event, she appeared to have slept very soundly. There was also no reason for the complainant to assume that Lena did not see the alleged incident and would not believe her, unless it never happened at all.”

Pada hemat Mahkamah, ini adalah seri teladan bagaimana keterangan itu dikatakan luar biasa menyakinkan perlu dianaliasa sebelum memutuskan keterangan seseorang saksi itu adalah luar biasa menyakinkan. Ia memerlukan proses penelitian keterangan dengan terperinci dan teliti sebelum memutuskan bahawa seseorang saksi itu keterangannya luar biasa meyakinkan.

Seterusnya dalam kes Kwan Peng Hong v Public Prosecutor [2000] 4 SLR 96 dinyatakan seperti yang berikut berkenaan dengan keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan: “[33] Secondly, I made clear in Tang Kin Seng that in Singapore there is no legal requirement for a judge to warn himself expressly of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence. But I also took great care to make clear that it is dangerous to convict on the words of the complainant alone unless her evidence is unusually compelling or convincing (Tang Kin Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 58, Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 3 SLR 329 at 340 and Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 50). In short, the court is to be extremely cautious in relying on the sole evidence of the complainant for a conviction. The phrase ‘unusually compelling or convincing’ simply means that the complainant’s evidence was so convincing that the prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of that evidence. [34] Thirdly, what is important is for the trial judge to analyse the evidence for the prosecution and for the defence with a view to deciding whether a conviction based solely on the complainant’s evidence is not unsafe. If it is not unsafe to so convict, the trial judge need not go further, except to explain clearly the reasoning behind the findings of fact. [35] Fourthly, if it is unsafe to convict, the trial judge should identify which aspect of the evidence is not so convincing. The trial judge should then look for supporting evidence and ask whether in taking the weak evidence, together with the supporting evidence, the trial judge is convinced that the prosecution case is proven beyond reasonable doubt. [36] Finally, in analysing the evidence, the trial judge must weigh it carefully, always bearing in mind the relevant aspects of human nature and behaviour. But it would be wrong to be bogged down by technicalities, especially when they have no logical bearing to the case in hand. Our approach is clear. We have left behind a technical and inflexible approach to corroboration and its definition (Tang Kin Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 60-63 and Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 52). [37] Instead, our approach is liberal, ensuring that the trial judge has the necessary flexibility in treating relevant evidence as corroborative. This is in line with the approach of other jurisdictions. What is important is the substance and the relevance of the evidence, and whether it is supportive or confirmative of the other weak evidence. Essential qualities of corroborative evidence are its independence, admissibility and whether it implicates the accused in a material particular. [38] Even if the evidence is capable of corroboration, whether it does supply corroboration still depends on all the circumstances of the case. The trial judge must pay particular consideration to the extent to which the evidence that is capable of corroboration does provide the corroborative evidence to satisfactorilyPage 106 dispel any doubt on the guilt of the accused. This flexible approach to corroboration ensures that proper weight is given to the right evidence and no undue weight is assigned to some evidence merely because it is called ‘corroboration’. [39] As I said in Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR 767 at 776, Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 at 53 and Tan Pin Seng v PP [1998] 1 SLR 418, although s 159 EA ensures that the complainant’s former statement was capable of being corroborated, it was not independent evidence and thus had little additional evidential value. I also said in Tang Kin Seng [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 65 that the evidential value of a prompt complaint did not render her complaint more credible. The fear that her reaction or distress might have been simulated or feigned has to be borne in mind. Here, the trial judge was aware that the complaint was not an independent piece of evidence and was essentially self-serving.”

Penjelasan yang lebih jelas berkenaan dengan frasa luar biasa meyakinkan dalam konteks di Singapura dinyatakan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik [2008] 5 SLR 601. Mahkamah Rayuan di Singapura menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “[37] The rule as to corroboration in so far as sexual offences are concerned was laid down in the local context in the Singapore High Court decision of Khoo Kwoon Hain v PP [1995] 2 SLR 767 (“Khoo Kwoon Hain”), where Yong Pung How CJ held that while there was no rule of law in this country that in sexual offences, the evidence of the complainant must be corroborated, it was nonetheless unsafe to convict in cases of this kind unless the evidence of the complainant was “unusually convincing” (Khoo Kwoon Hain at 777, [50]; see also Tang Kin Seng v PP [1997] 1 SLR 46 (“Tang Kin Seng ”) at [43] (where the phrase “unusually compelling” was used); Soh Yang Tick v PP [1998] 2 SLR 42 (“Soh Yang Tick”) at [33]; Kwan Peng Hong v PP [2000] 4 SLR 96 (“Kwan Peng Hong”) at [33] (where the phrase “unusually compelling or convincing” was used); and Chng Yew Chin v PP [2006] 4 SLR 124 (“Chng Yew Chin”) at [33]). Further, in Tang Kin Seng, Yong CJ clarified (at [43]) that this did not amount to a legal requirement for a judge to warn himself expressly of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in a case involving a sexual offence (see also Kwan Peng Hong at [33]). [38] As to what “unusually convincing” means, Yong CJ, in Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 3 SLR 329, clarified ( at 340 [73]) that this simply meant that the witness’s testimony must be “so convincing that the prosecution’s case was proven beyond reasonable doubt, solely on the basis of the evidence” (see also Lee Kwang Peng v PP [1997] 3 SLR 278 (“Lee Kwang Peng”) at [69]–[70] and Kwan Peng Hong ([37]; supra) at [33]). Rajah J in Chng Yew Chin ([ 37] supra) also adopted this meaning, holding thus (at [ 33]): In this context, dicta in case law abound cautioning judges to scrutinise the evidence before them with a fine-tooth comb, given both the ease with which allegations of sexual assault may be fabricated and the concomitant difficulty of rebutting such allegations: Ng Kwee Piow v Regina [1960] MLJ 278. Therefore, it is necessary that the testimony of such complainants be “unusually convincing”, which is to say, it must be sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Teo Keng Pong v PP [1996] 3 SLR 329 at 340, [73]. [emphasis added] [39] Given that the standard of proof required in a criminal case is already that of “beyond a reasonable doubt” (see [34]–[35] above), the expression “unusually compelling” must mean something more than a mere restatement of the requisite standard of proof. Indeed, Prof Michael Hor notes, in “Corroboration: Rules and Discretion in the Search for Truth” [2000] SJLS 509 at 531, that the expression must clearly mean something apart from the standard of proof. If, in fact, one scrutinises closely the observations of Rajah J in Chng Yew Chin ([37]; supra) quoted in the preceding paragraph, it will be seen that the true emphasis is not on the standard of proof in the abstract, but, rather, on the sufficiency of the complainant’s testimony. By its very nature, the inquiry is a factual one. It is also a question of judgment on the part of the trial judge that is inextricably linked to the high standard of proof, ie, “beyond a reasonable doubt”. In our view, therefore, the “extra something” implied by the word “unusually” must refer to the need for the trial judge to be aware of the dangers of convicting solely on the complainant’s testimony as well as of the importance of convicting only on testimony that, when weighed against the overall backdrop of the available facts and circumstances, contains that ring of truth which leaves the court satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists in favour of the accused. Since a mandatory warning from the judge to himself is not required, the implication is that the appellate courts will scrutinise the trial judge’s grounds of decision to see whether the trial judge was indeed aware of the danger of convicting on the bare word of the complainant as well as whether the quality of the testimony itself was consistent with the high standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [40] In the present case, a definitive ruling on the meaning of the expression “unusually compelling” is not strictly necessary since the trial judge implicitly found that corroboration was required. In Mohammed Liton (No 1) ([4]; supra), the trial judge held (at [36]) that: However, from the testimonies, and given the small measure of corroboration in the cautioned statements of the accused, I am satisfied that, in so far as the sexual offences were concerned, the Prosecution has proved that the accused had raped the complainant and also sodomised her. [emphasis added] In our view, this was an implicit finding by the trial judge that corroboration was necessary, presumably because the complainant’s evidence was not “unusually compelling”. In this respect, the Singapore High Court has held that an appellate court will not readily overturn a trial court’s finding that corroboration was not required: see Chen Jian Wei v PP [2002] 2 SLR 255 at [34], where Yong CJ observed that a trial judge who had had the benefit of observing the demeanour and conduct of a child witness would be in a far better position than an appellate court to decide if corroboration was required in the circumstances of the case (although he decided, based on the actual facts of that particular case, that the trial judge erred in not requiring corroboration of the child witness’s testimony). The same considerations must apply when the trial judge has found that corroboration was required. Accordingly, we were of the view that, in this case, corroboration was required in respect of the complainant’s evidence before conviction of the respondent in respect of the acquitted charges could be secured. Indeed, both the appellant and the respondent proceeded in their submissions on the basis that corroboration was required.”

Apa yang jelas daripada penelitian kepada pemakaian istilah luar biasa meyakinkan adalah merujuk kepada keterangan yang berhubung kait dengan beban pembuktian pihak pendakwaan dalam satu kes jenayah di mana keterangan seseorang saksi itu boleh disandarkan untuk satu sabitan dalam kesalahan jenayah tanpa memerlukan keterangan sokongan. Hakim bicara perlu meneliti secara mendalam keterangan saksi tersebut sebelum memutuskan bahawa saksi itu adalah luar biasa meyakinkan bagi mensabitkan Tertuduh dengan bersandarkan kepada keterangan saksi itu semata-mata. Oleh itu penelitian yang terperinci berkenaan dengan keterangan saksi tersebut perlu dilakukan oleh hakim bicara. Oleh itu jika dilihat kepada kes Mohamad Malek Ridhzuan Che Hassan (supra) adalah didapati bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan telah meneliti secara mendalam keterangan saksi yang dikatakan memberi keterangan yang luar biasa meyakinkan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 16 hingga 19 seperti yang berikut: “[16] Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa kes pihak pendakwaan adalah bertunjang kepada keterangan SP4. Justeru, adalah perlu keterangan SP4 diteliti secara mendalam dan terperinci. Di ms. 54 - 57, Jilid II, rekod rayuan, SP4 telah memberi keterangan mengenai apa yang sebenarnya berlaku seperti berikut: S: Lepas itu? J: Lepas saya kulum kemaluan dia, lepas tu dia masukkan kemaluan dia kepada kemaluan saya. S: Macam mana tahu yang kemaluan Malek masuk dalam kemaluan kamu? J: Saya nampak. S: Masa dia nak masukkan kemaluan dia, macam mana kaki kamu? J: Dia kangkangkan kaki saya. Saya baring masa tu. Ada 2 bantal. Malek ada di hadapan saya di tepi kaki saya. Dia duduk di tengah-tengah kaki saya. S: Kamu baring menghadap mana? J: Betul-betul ikut katil. S: Mata kamu hadap ke mana? J: Tengok tepi. S: Kamu baring macam mana? J: Terlentang. S: Kamu terlentang, Malek di mana? J: Di tengah saya dan dia kangkang. S: Lepas dia kangkang, dia masukkan kemaluan? J: Ya. S: Macam mana tahu dia masukkan kemaluan? J: Saya tengok. S: Rasa? J: Sakit, rasa keras lembik. Sakit. S: Kamu baring. Malek? J: Cangkung. S: Tangan Malek? J: Dia pegang betis saya. S: Di mana tangan kamu? J: Saya pegang bantal. S: Berapa lama dia masukkan kemaluan dia dalam kemaluan kamu? J: 2 minit. S: Lepas tu? J: Dia pegang kemaluan dia. S: Masa dia masukkan kemaluan dia ke dalam kemaluan kamu, apa dia lakukan? J: Dia masuk keluar, masuk keluar. S: Berapa kali? J: 2 kali. S: Apa jadi J: Lepas masuk keluar, masuk keluar, dia keluarkan kemaluan dia dan dia goncang kemaluan dia dan keluarkan air mani. Selepas dia goncang, air mani dia keluar dan lekat di perut saya. Dia keluarkan air mani dekat perut saya. [17] Seterusnya di ms. 60, Jilid 2, rekod rayuan, SP4 menceritakan mengenai peristiwa hubungan seks kali kedua antara beliau dan responden seperti berikut: S: Apa berlaku seterusnya? J: Lepas Malek paksa, saya terima untuk lakukan hubungan seks. Malek suruh saya hisap kemaluan dia. Saya hisap kemaluan dia. S: Kenapa hisap? J: Nak bagi keras. Lepas tu dia masukkan kemaluan dia dalam pepet saya. Saya rasa sakit. Semasa ini tangan dia di perut saya. Saya nampak kemaluan Malek masuk dalam kemaluan saya. Selepas itu dia kocakkan kemaluan dia sampai keluar air mani di perut saya. Selepas itu saya dan Malek tidur, sehingga pukul 5 pagi. Kami bangun pada jam 12 tengahari, saya dan Malek keluar dari Hotel, balik ke Kajang dan kami pergi karaoke hingga lebih kurang jam 3.30 pm. Habis karaoke, Malek nak hantar saya balik. [18] Semasa disoal balas pula, SP4 secara tegas dan tidak teragak-agak menafikan bahawa terdapat kemasukan jari telujuk dan jari hantu responden ke dalam farajnya (vagina). SP4 menyatakan di ms. 96, Jilid II, rekod rayuan seperti berikut: Put: Pagi 23.4.2008 semasa di bilik hotel, Malek tak buat seks dengan kamu? J: Tak setuju. Put: Pagi 23.4.2008 pada 1 pagi dan 3 pagi, Malek tak masukkan kemaluan dia dalam kemaluan kamu? J: Tak setuju. Put: Malek hanya masukkan jari telunjuk dan jari hantu dalam kemaluan kamu? J: Tak setuju. Put: 23.4.208 pada pagi, kamu tak hisap kemaluan Malek? J: Tak setuju. [19] Di peringkat pemeriksaan semula juga, SP4 tetap menegaskan bahawa responden dan beliau telah melakukan hubungan seks di mana responden memasukkan kemaluannya ke dalam faraj (vagina) SP4. SP4 menyatakan: S: Peguam cadangkan pada 23hb, kamu tak buat hubungan seks, kamu tak setuju dengan cadangan peguam. Sila jelaskan. J: Saya dan Malek ada buat hubungan seks pada 23hb sebanyak 2 kali iaitu pada jam 1 pagi dan jam 3 pagi. S: Kenapa tak setuju cadangan peguambela yang Malek masukkan jari. J: Saya nampak dia masukkan kemaluan dia dalam kemaluan saya. S: Kenapa tak setuju dengan cadangan peguambela yang kamu takut dengan kakak, oleh itu kamu reka cerita dirogol oleh Malek. Jelaskan. J: Memang saya buat hubungan seks dengan dia.”

Begitu juga sekiranya dilihat dalam kes Mohammed Liton Mohammed Syeed Mallik (supra). Keterangan pengadu adalah seperti yang berikut dan disahkan oleh Mahkamah sebagai luar biasa meyakinkan: “[18] According to the complainant, the respondent then pulled out a knife, and said, “You think I Bangla man, I come empty hand?” The complainant was scared, and went towards the main door of the flat after filling up the forms. The respondent ran after her, grabbed her, pushed her back into the room and forced her to sit on the floor. At some point during this altercation, the complainant tried to take the knife, but was unable to do so. The respondent then tied the complainant’s hands behind her back with a piece of red cloth, and used another piece of cloth to gag her. After tying up the complainant, the respondent asked the complainant to lie on her back and proceeded to remove her pants, shoes and socks. He then raped her, while telling her that he wanted to ejaculate within her so that she would become pregnant and her husband would reject her. However, the complainant managed to move her leg so that the respondent ejaculated on her stomach instead. At around this time, the respondent told her, “Today, you and I finish” and asked her to chant an Arabic phrase that is usually used when someone has passed away. The complainant was frightened as she believed that the respondent wanted to kill her. The respondent also tried to kiss the complainant at some point during the rape, but was unable to do so as the complainant was gagged. He thus removed the gag, and she let him kiss her. The complainant then heard the respondent saying “backside”. He turned her around and sodomised her. According to the complainant, she had never had anal sex with the respondent before, although he had requested it. The complainant stated that she felt a sharp pain and the sodomy continued for about a minute. The respondent ejaculated on the complainant’s body, after which he used a piece of tissue to wipe off his semen and clean her anus. The complainant observed that there was blood on the tissue. [19] Having raped and sodomised the complainant, the respondent then took a knife to make a cut in her brown blouse, which he accessed from the top of the Giant T-shirt. He tore open the brown blouse, but there was no damage to the Giant T-shirt. He also made cuts in the complainant’s bra. The respondent removed the cloth that was being used to tie up the complainant’s hands, and then removed all her clothes in order to take pictures of her using the camera in his mobile telephone. The respondent told the complainant that he wanted to take photographs of her so that he could show them to all the Malay men at her workplace. [20] Although the complainant’s hands were free, she was still scared, and thus complied when the respondent made her lie down and put his hands on her throat so that she could not talk. The respondent raped the complainant a second time, and then sodomised her once again. At some point, the respondent asked the complainant why the sex was not as good as usual. The complainant testified that her answer to him was, “maybe because I [am] scared and [you are] angry”. The complainant also revealed for the first time in cross-examination that she had consensual sex with the respondent after the two incidents of rape and the two incidents of sodomy. She did so because she thought that if she gave him sexual intercourse willingly, he would let her go. He also pulled her hair to indicate that he wanted her to perform fellatio on him, which she duly did. [21] Following the episodes of rape and sodomy, the respondent watched a pornographic video on the television, and then took the complainant’s gold earring studs from her. He told the complainant that if his sister, who lived in Bangladesh, could not use gold, she too could not use gold. The respondent also told her that she could not think of going back to work. At around this time, the complainant began to feel nauseous. The respondent went to the kitchen in the flat to prepare some food, which he tried to feed the complainant. The complainant could not eat, and spat the food out. The respondent then asked her if she wanted to make a telephone call to anybody because he was going to kill her. When the complainant turned on her mobile telephone, she received calls and text messages from her colleagues, including a message from one P P Jayaprabu a/l Palakastin (“Jayaprabu”). The respondent asked the complainant to inform Jayaprabu that she would not be returning to work. However, the complainant sent Jayaprabu the following text message in the Malay language instead: Tolong aku Jaya. Suruh tukang sapu panggil sembilan sembilan dtg umah tukang sapu. Aku kene culik. Tolon. According to the complainant, “Tolong aku Jaya” could be translated into “Help me, Jaya”, while “suruh tukang sapu” meant “the cleaner to call police to come to the cleaner’s house”. “Aku kene culik” meant “I was taken hostage”, while the last word “Tolon” meant “help”. Jayaprabu confirmed in court at the first trial that he had received this text message, which was also retrieved from his mobile telephone. Forensic examination revealed that Jayaprabu had received the message at 6.05pm on 23 December

The complainant testified that Jayaprabu had sent her a text message to confirm that she had been referring to the cleaner’s house. Jayaprabu confirmed in court that he had sent a text message to the complainant with the following Malay text: Panggil 77 to panggil polis kepeda 77 house This can be translated into “call 77 to call police to 77 house”. The victim replied with the word “ye”, which Jayaprabu understood to mean “yes”. [22] The respondent saw the text message sent by Jayaprabu, and realised that the complainant had called for help. He asked her to get dressed, telling her that he wanted to take her to Boon Lay. She complied, putting on her panties, black jacket and pants. Although the complainant had her mobile telephone with her, she could not find her wallet and gold earring studs. The respondent threw the torn blouse and bra into the rubbish bin in the kitchen, and he had the Giant T-shirt in his hand. They left the flat together. The complainant had the impression that it was about 4.00 or 5.00pm by then, as it was already getting dark. Upon reaching the ground level, the complainant ran away from the respondent and sought help from passers-by. The passers-by offered to bring her to the nearest police station, but she chose to wait for Jayaprabu instead. By this time, the respondent had fled. Subsequently, the complainant’s colleagues arrived, as did the police. The complainant was then taken to a hospital for a medical checkup. [23] While the complainant was being interviewed by the police, the respondent contacted her to tell her not to cancel his visa so that he could return to Bangladesh. The complainant told the respondent that she needed her identity card and bank card. She informed the investigation officer, Amos Tang (“IO Tang”), who then instructed her to arrange a meeting with the respondent on the pretext of getting her identity card and bank card back from him. This meeting was arranged to take place on 25 December 2005 at Mustafa Centre. On the morning of 25 December 2005, before the meeting at Mustafa Centre, the complainant received several text messages from the respondent asking for forgiveness and pleading with her not to go to the police. Later on the same day, the respondent was arrested when he arrived at the appointed place and time. The respondent’s version of events [24] According to the respondent, when the complainant arrived at the flat on 23 December 2005, she gave him her identity card, bank card and her earring studs. He kept these items in his wallet. The complainant was feeling very hot inside the flat, and therefore took off her jacket and the Giant T-shirt. She placed these articles of clothing on the bed. She then sat cross-legged on the floor, and the respondent took out the visa application forms from his bag and gave them to her. At that time, the complainant had her mobile telephone with her, but it was switched off. While the complainant was filling up the application forms, the pair had an argument. The respondent asked the complainant if she was really going to Bangladesh with him. He wanted to make sure that she would make the trip this time. Upon hearing this, the complainant slapped the respondent on his face, and told him that she had not cheated or lied to him. It was her mother who had taken her passport away. The respondent then told her: You don’t know my problem because last time, you know my problem, now you don’t know problem because your heart inside rubbish jam already. The complainant replied that it was the respondent who did not understand her problems, and that his heart was also full of “rubbish jam”. She said that he should wash his heart. She then grabbed a knife which was nearby and attempted to cut the shirt that he was wearing. The respondent did not allow her to do so, and snatched the knife away from her. The respondent then cut open the complainant’s brown blouse so that she could wash her heart. He made the cut from top to bottom, and accidentally cut her bra in the process. [25] According to the respondent, the complainant then tried to take the knife from him. He resisted by grabbing her hands with his, and then tying her hands behind her back. When the complainant agreed that she would not take the knife, the respondent untied her. After this incident, the complainant watched some television. She told the respondent, “I got to go home early. It is late. So please come and have our intercourse.” The respondent and the complainant then had sexual intercourse on the carpeted floor, with him on top, and he ejaculated on her belly, as had been their practice. The complainant complained that the carpet surface was very rough. The respondent laid a towel on the floor, and the pair had sexual intercourse two further times that afternoon. The complainant also performed fellatio on the respondent. The respondent testified that the entire sexual encounter lasted for about two hours. [26] The complainant then wanted to leave the flat, and put on her jacket, pants, socks and shoes. She threw the cut blouse and bra into the rubbish bin in the kitchen of the flat and carried the Giant T-shirt in her hand. The respondent and the complainant left the flat together. When they reached the ground floor, the complainant told the respondent that she had to leave quickly. The respondent thus left the complainant and hailed a taxi from the nearby coffee shop as he wanted to go to Mustafa Centre. The respondent testified that on 25 December 2005, he went to meet the complainant at Mustafa Centre because the latter wanted her identity card, bank card and earring studs to be returned to her. He was arrested there. He also testified in cross-examination at the first trial that he had been informed by his friend on the night of 23 December 2005 that the complainant had made a police report against him and that the police had gone to the flat. [27] Other than the complainant and the respondent, the only other material witness at the first trial was Jayaprabu, who worked as a cashier at Giant and was the complainant’s colleague. In addition to the evidence from Jayaprabu already noted above (at [21]), Jayaprabu also testified that upon receiving the complainant’s text message asking for help, he went to his store manager, Tan Wee Boon, to discuss the matter. Jayaprabu, Tan Wee Boon and two other colleagues then took a taxi to the flat. Jayaprabu testified that when they arrived, the complainant was crying and looked very lost.”

Keterangan dalam kes Teo Keng Pong (supra) adalah seperti yang berikut: “PW1 testified that the first incident took place during the third lesson, on 29 March 1995. The appellant placed his right hand on her thigh. He moved it up and down for about one minute. PW1 did not say anything even though she felt uneasy. She did not know that the appellant intended to outrage her modesty. After the incident, they continued with the lesson. On 31 March, the appellant did the same thing. On 5 April, the appellant caressed PW1’s thigh. He also asked her whether she was tired. She replied that she was not. He pressed his hands against her back and rubbed her shoulders. On 7 and 12 April, the appellant stroked PW1’s thigh again. PW1 did not protest on any of the occasions. On 19 April, PW1 went to the appellant’s home for tuition wearing a tee-shirt with a logo over her left breast. The appellant caressed her thigh on that occasion again. On the pretext of examining the logo, he pressed his hands against her left breast. PW1 was shocked and frightened. However, she did not raise any objection as there was nobody within sight. According to her, this was the first time she realised that the appellant had the intention to outrage her modesty. On that day, she did not tell anyone about the incident as she thought that the appellant would not repeat what he did. Nevertheless, PW1 told Madam Teo that she did not wish to go for tuition. Mdm Teo insisted that she had to go. On 21 April, the appellant caressed PW1’s thigh and squeezed her left breast. He then kissed her on the left cheek and tried to make her turn her face to the other side so that he could kiss her on the right cheek. PW1 resisted. The appellant turned PW1’s head towards him and kissed her on the lips. After that, he squeezed her right breast. The appellant told PW1, ‘Don’t tell anybody. Don’t tell Daddy and don’t tell Aunty (Mdm Teo).’ He said that otherwise, they would be angry with him. PW1 kept still because she was afraid of the Pomeranian underneath the appellant’s chair. When the appellant squeezed her right breast, she shook off his hands. She told him that she had to go to the bank to get some money. The appellant offered to send her there. She refused and rushed out of the flat. PW1 left the appellant’s flat crying. She went to the Post Office Savings Bank at the Tampines Bus Interchange and withdrew $100. She bought a $50 phone card. She then went to the flat of her friend, Chew, which was nearby. At the void deck, she telephoned Chew from the public phone to let him know that she was going up to his flat.”

Sementara dalam kes Kwan Peng Hong v Public Prosecutor [2000] 4 SLR 96 keterangan adalah seperti yang berikut: “[5] The complainant was a student. The appellant was then a treasury officer with a bank. They had not met before the incident. On that day, the complainant boarded a double-decker bus (‘the bus’). She took a right window seat on the upper deck. During the journey, the complainant was listening to her portable radio with earphones. She felt two touches before she became more alert. She confronted the appellant on the third touch. [6] The complainant described the first touch as a ‘soft touch’. It was over the side of her right armpit towards the breast area. There was no movement and it lasted approximately four to five seconds. Thinking that it was an insect or the wire of the portable radio, she shuffled a little and adjusted herself. [7] The second touch happened some five to ten minutes later. Again, it was a soft touch, lasted about five seconds, and with no movement. She turned her head towards the area touched and saw a shadow from behind ‘pulling back’. She said the touch felt like it was by a hand. As she now suspected that it was the passenger seated behind her, she became more alert. [8] Within five minutes, the same touch came again, with the same sensation, at the same place. It did not last very long. When she felt it, the complainant immediately turned her head around. She saw a hand pulling back from the gap between her seat and the window, and that it belonged to the passenger sitting behind her, the appellant. She said the appellant was then leaning slightly forward, and when he pulled his hand back, he moved backwards leaning towards his seat. [9] She immediately stood up and asked him what he was trying to do. The appellant replied that he ‘just got excited’. The appellant however subsequently denied saying this. Shocked by the reply, she sat down and loudly told the appellant not to touch her again. She felt scared and angry. A male passenger across the aisle then told her to lodge a police report. The prosecution was unable to produce this male witness. [10] The appellant’s testimony was that during the bus journey, his mind was preoccupied with two things, namely, the currency exchange position that he had just created earlier in the morning, and the briefing which he was to give his colleagues later that morning. He said he was seated in a slouched position, with his knees propped up against the back of the complainant’s seat. He said he was holding his pager throughout the bus journey, with his hands resting on his laps, monitoring the foreign currency rates and various stock indexes. [11] The appellant said that, when he was confronted by the complainant, he thought that she was annoyed with him as he had propped his knees against her seat, or that his knees had clipped her hair in the process. He thus apologized to her. However, the appellant could not recall whether his knees had indeed clipped her hair. The complainant denied ever feeling that her hair had been clipped. [12] I found the trial judge’s reasoning on this much more convincing. If indeed the complainant’s hair was clipped or the appellant’s propping up his knees behind her chair had made her uncomfortable, the feeling of discomfort would have been on a completely different area of the body, certainly not the side of the right breast.”

Penelitian kepada nota keterangan ketika SP 1 memberikan keterangan berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut, SP 1 menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Kejadian berlaku pada 31/7/2010. Ia berlaku di rumah saya di Kampung Ulu Jelu, Dong Raub Pahang. Rmah ini ayah, emak dan adik duduk sekarang. Pada waktu itu saya berumur 14 tahun 3 bulan. Rumah itu rumah padan dan dapur sahaja simen. Ruang tamu semua papan. Ia rumah kampung biasa sahaja; tidak bertingkat. Ia rumah sebuah. 12 tahun lepas, rumah ayah saya paling hujung kampung. Tidak ada rumah sesiapa dah. Di hadapan rumah rumah ada kebun getah dan belakang ada kebun ayah tanam sawit dan getah. Kejadian berlaku sekitar tengah, 11 lebih. 12 tahun lepas emak, ayah, saya, kakak dan adik tinggal di rumah itu. Pada hari kejadian, ada saya dan adik sahaja di rumah. Emak dan ayah pergi menorah dan kakak pergi kelas tuisyen. Saya ada 7 adik-beradik. Seoarang berada di Johor. Seorang bekerja di Sungai Buloh. Seorang guru di Negeri Sembilan. Saya anak ke-6. Seorang kakak lagi kursus di Muadzam Shah pada masa itu. Adik-beradik 6 perempuan 1 lelaki. Adik ialah lelaki umur sekitar 8 tahun ketika itu. Pada 31/7, adik di luar rumah sedang main dan saya dalam bilik; kemas rumah dan iron baju. Tiba-tiba saya terpandang ke luar ada 1 lelaki sedang pegang 1 besi dan menuju ke arah saya. Saya terkejut dan tanya dia siapa dan apa nak masuk rumah saya. Lelaki itu saya tidak pernah tengok dan tidak kenal sebelum itu. Dia tanya mana emak ayah simpan barang-barang berharga dan duit. Saya cakap emak tidak ada duit dan barang-barang berharga. Kemudian sebab saya bising, dia ambil pisau dekat depan dan ikat tangan saya ke belakang dengan charger telefon dan sumbat kain ke dalam mulut. Dan selepas itu, dia tolak saya untuk geledah bilik-bilik lain. Kemudian dia bawa saya untuk geledah rumah. Dia ambil pisau dan acu ke perut saya dan suruh saya diam dan cakap, kalau saya bising dia akan bunuh saya. Selepas dapat handphone dan kamera, dia bawa saya ke bilik air di dapur. Di situ, ada 1 pintu keluar ke belakang rumah. Dia buka pintu itu dan suruh saya keluar. Selepas itu dia acu pisau dan suruh saya ke belakang rumah ikut dia dengan arahan; nak mati ke nak selamat. Kemudian dia bawa saya ke belakang rumah yang ada semak-samun dan ada 1 rimbunan pokok buluh. Dia suruh saya tanggalkan baju, seluar dan kemudian dia tanggalkan pakaian dia. Dia pakai seluar dan baju biasa. Saya pakai baju putih lengan panjang dan seluar biasa. Saya masih berpakaian dan tangan diikat ke belakang semasa dibawa ke belakang rumah. Kain di mulut telah dibuang semasa itu. Dia yang ambil daripada mulut saya. Selepas dia tanya nak mati ke selamat, saya kata nak selamat. Selepas dia tanggalkan pakaian dia, dia cuba masukkan kemaluan dia ke kemaluan saya. Semasa itu terang, waktu tengahari. Saya nampak kemaluan dia sebab dia telah tanggalkan seluar masa itu. Saya berasa sakit dan dia cuba masukkan jari ke kemaluan saya sambil menolak-nolak jari dia ke dalam kemaluan saya. Saya merayu kepada dia kata taknak sebab rasa sangat sakit. Dia menolak jari ke dalam kemaluan saya lebih kurang 1 - 2 minit. Kemudian dia cuba masukkan kemaluan dia ke dalam kemaluan saya. Saya merayu taknak sebab sakit. Kemudian dia ambil handphone buka kamera, cuba rakam. Kemudian dia pakai pakaian dia dan tanya saya nak duit tak. Kemaluan dia hanya dapat masuk sikit sebab sakit dan mungkin kerana saya kecil, susah nak masuk. Semasa itu saya rasa sakit, rasa sedih, kecewa dan marah. Selepas dia beredar, saya cepat lari ke rumah cari adik dan pergi ke rumah jiran; kakak sepupu; saya tidak ada ... Semasa dia masukkan jari dan kemaluan, tangan saya dah free sebab dia dah suruh saya tanggalkan pakaian sebelum itu. Dia yang buka ikatan itu. Saya yang tanggalkan sendiri pakaian saya. Saya ada menjerit semasa diacukan pisau. Semasa dia cuba masukkan kemaluan, saya ada nampak pisau itu; dia pegang semasa itu. Semasa dia masukkan jari; saya ada jerit jangan dan taknak. Kawasan rumah saya tanah persendirian dan tidak ada orang lain di situ kecuali orang yang hendak ke kebun di belakang itu. la tanah ayah saya. Ketika dia cuba masukkan kemaluan, kami face to face. Saya baring dan muka dia sangat dekat ke muka saya. Dia mengangkang, jatuhkan lutut dia ke tanah. Tangan dia di tanah di kiri dan kanan macam nak merangkak. Saya dalam keadaan takut dan dengan ugutan nak selamat atau mati, saya hanya mampu diamkan diri dan berselawat sahaja. Pisau itu diletakkan di tanah semasa itu. Lelaki itu tanya nak duit? Saya cakap, saya taknak duit dan nak selamat dan saya beritahu dia lebih baik beredar segera sebelum emak ayah saya balik. Kemudian, saya pakai pakaian saya, ambil adik dan pergi ke rumah kakak sepupu saya. Dia pakai pakaian dia, ambil handphone dan beredar. Pada masa saya, saya pakai pakaian.”

Keterangan dalam kes-kes rujukan di atas diperturunkan dalam kes ini bagi menunjukkan apakah keadaan apabila sesuatu keterangan saksi itu luar biasa meyakinkan. Ia membawa maksud keterangan-keterangan tersebut boleh disandarkan untuk mensabitkan Tertuduh tanpa keterangan-keterangan lain. Ia adalah keterangan yang boleh digunakan bagi melunaskan tanggungjawab pendakwaan untuk membuktikan satu kes jenayah melampaui keraguan munasabah. Penelitian secara terperinci dalam keterangan-keterangan saksi yang dikatakan luar biasa meyakinkan adalah penting disebabkan keterangan-keterangan sokongan tidak diperlukan untuk menyokong keterangan saksi tersebut. Oleh yang demikian keterangan saksi yang dikatakan luar biasa meyakinkan itu hendaklah terperinci berkenaan dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh Tertuduh. Mahkamah tidak boleh memutuskan bahawa keterangan seseorang saksi itu adalah luar biasa meyakinkan semata-mata disebabkan keterangan saksi tersebut tidak dapat dicabar semasa pemeriksaan balas dan memutuskan bahawa saksi itu adalah seorang yang kredible.

Ini bermakna Mahkamah yang mendengar perbicaraan tidak boleh mengambil pendekatan mudah dengan memutuskan bahawa keterangan seseorang saksi itu adalah luar biasa meyakinkan dengan hanya mempercayai keterangan saksi tersebut. Ini adalah penting disebabkan sabitan terhadap Tertuduh boleh hanya berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi tersebut. Penelitian kepada autoriti-autoriti yang dinyatakan di atas berkenaan dengan luar biasa meyakinkan menunjukkan keterangan yang terperinci berkenaan dengan kesalahan yang dilakukan perlu dikemukakan. Setelah Mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa perincian keterangan berkenaan dengan kesalahan itu dapat diberikan oleh saksi, maka bolehlah saksi itu dinyatakan sebagai memberikan keterangan yang luar biasa menyakinkan dan mensabitkan Tertuduh dengan keterangan saksi yang luar biasa menyakinkan tanpa perlu kepada keterangan sokongan.

Pada hemat Mahkamah dalam kes ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menyatakan dengan jelas apakah asas yang menyebabkan SP 1 dikatakan memberi keterangan yang luar biasa meyakinkan. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa SP 1 telah memberikan keterangan yang jelas berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut. Di samping itu SP 1 telah berjaya mengecam meskipun telah dicabar hebat oleh pihak pembelaan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 7 dan 13 alasan penghakiman seperti yang berikut: “7. Seterusnya, elemen hubungan seksual dengan perempuan, mangsa di dalam kes ini, telah berjaya dibuktikan melalui keterangan SP1 sendiri. SP1 sendiri telah memberikan keterangan dapat melihat dengan jelas posisi dan tindakan OKT membuka seluarnya dan memasukkan kemaluan ke dalam kemaluan SP1. Walaupun dicabar oleh pihak pembelaan, keterangan ini adalah dan konsisten di sepanjang keterangan SP1. Percanggahan kecil seperti masa di dalam P5 dengan catatan laporan perubatan menyatakan jam 12 tengahari, keadaan persekitaran dan kedudukan tanah tempat kejadian, adalah percanggahan kecil yang tidak memudaratkan kes pendakwaan. …

Namun begitu, mahkamah ini berpendapat SP1 telah berjaya mengecam OKT secara positif, meskipun telah dicabar hebat oleh pihak pembelaan. Keterangan SP1 didapati adalah credible dan konsisten keterangan sokongan yang lain.”

Apa yang lebih menarik ialah setelah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat bahawa SP 1 adalah memberi keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan dan telah meneliti keterangan-keterangan sokongan lain iaitu laporan perubatan serta keterangan SP 3 bagi menyokong keterangan SP 1. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 18 (iv) alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Jika Mahkamah berpendapat bahawa SP 1 adalah memberi keterangan yang luar biasa meyakinkan tidak timbul lagi keperluan untuk keterangan sokongan. Ini adalah disebabkan apabila seseorang saksi memberikan keterangan yang luar biasa meyakinkan, Tertuduh boleh disabitkan berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi tersebut tanpa memerlukan keterangan sokongan. Inilah yang menjadi asas kepada prinsip keterangan luar biasa meyakinkan yang diberikan oleh seorang saksi untuk mengatasi masalah keperluan untuk memberikan keterangan sokongan.

Mahkamah ini berpendapat Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah terkhilaf apabila memutuskan SP 1 sebagai luar biasa meyakinkan keterangannya dan mengambil kira keterangan-keterangan sokongan yang lain. Selain daripada itu keterangan SP 3 dan SP 4 adalah mengulangi apa yang diberikan oleh SP 1 berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut. Ini bermakna ia bukannya keterangan bebas berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan kes R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 yang telah menjelaskan apakah yang dimaksudkan dengan keterangan sokongan. Sebaliknya SP 3 dan SP 4 mengulangi kembali keterangan yang berpunca daripada keterangan SP 1 itu sendiri berkenaan dengan kejadian tersebut. Ia pada hemat Mahkamah sesuatu yang tidak dapat dipertahankan dan memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini.

Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah bersandarkan kepada keterangan DNA yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan. Namun ia hanyalah berkaitan DNA bulu yang ditemui di tempat kejadian. Ia tidak menafikan bahawa kehadiran DNA tersebut boleh mencadangkan kehadiran Perayu di tempat kejadian. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah adalah konsisten dengan keterangan Perayu sendiri semasa pembelaan yang menyatakan bahawa dia pergi ke tempat kejadian tersebut yang bertujuan untuk melakukan samun di rumah tersebut. Namun ia tidak dapat digunakan bagi menunjukkan elemen-elemen kesalahan rogol seperti yang dipertuduhkan terhadap Perayu. Ia hanyalah menunjukkan kehadiran Perayu. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia tidak dapat membuktikan kesalahan yang dipertuduhkan terhadap Perayu.

Mahkamah juga meneliti alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang menyatakan bahawa terdapatnya penetrasi dan koyakan yang dapat dilihat melalui keterangan SP 4 iaitu pegawai perubatan. Ini dapat dilihat di perenggan 9 alasan penghakiman seperti yang berikut: “9. Memandangkan bukti “penetrasi” adalah mencukupi bagi tujuan kesalahan rogol di bawah S.375, laporan perubatan di ekshibit P7 dan diagram (ekshibit P8(A-B) yang disediakan oleh doktor perubatan (SP4) telah memberikan keterangan fakta bagi tujuan ini. Dinyatakan di dalam ekshibit P7 bahawa terdapat “complete fresh tear di hymen pada jam 5 dan partial fresh tear di hymen pada jam 9. Terdapat juga lebam di jam 6 dan 7.” Pemeriksaan yang membawa kepada penemuan-penemuan ini dilakukan pada jam 3 pagi, 01.08.2020, di Hospital Temerloh.”

Pada hemat Mahkamah ini keterangan sedemikian menunjukkan bahawa terdapatnya penetrasi yang menjadi salah satu elemen kesalahan rogol di bawah seksyen 375 Kanun Keseksaan. Namun persoalan yang tidak dapat dijawab adakah penetrasi tersebut dilakukan oleh Perayu. Ini adalah disebabkan kawad cam yang dilakukan 10 tahun selepas kejadian serta prosedur kawad cam yang pada hemat Mahkamah yang tidak dapat mengesahkan secara muktamad dan pasti bahawa Perayu adalah lelaki yang datang ke rumah mangsa pada hari kejadian dan telah melakukan penetrasi seperti yang dinyatakan di perenggan 9 alasan penghakiman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tersebut.

Penelitian kepada keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak pendakwaan dan pihak pembelaan pada hemat Mahkamah ini telah tidak dinilai dengan sewajarnya oleh hakim bicara. Ia pada hemat Mahkamah ini tergolong di dalam kesilapan yang ketara dan kegagalan membuat penilaian kehakiman terhadap keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan di hadapan hakim bicara. Adalah menjadi tanggungjawab hakim bicara dan Pendakwa Raya untuk memastikan bahawa keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan adalah mengikut jalur undang-undang keterangan. Jika ini tidak dilakukan mangsa kepada kesalahan seksual seperti dalam kes ini tidak mendapat keadilan disebabkan kegagalan membuktikan kes terhadap Tertuduh.

Pada masa yang sama peguam juga akan mengemukakan pembelaan-pembelaan yang dibenarkan oleh undang-undang. Hakim bicara adalah mempunyai tanggungjawab dan amanah untuk memastikan keterangan-keterangan pendakwaan dan pembelaan Tertuduh diteliti dengan sewajarnya mengikut kehendak undang-undang bagi memastikan keadilan dapat dilaksanakan dan terlihat ia dilaksanakan.

Akhirnya, dalam kes ini Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah tidak selamat untuk mengekalkan sabitan dan hukuman yang telah diputuskan oleh hakim bicara. Oleh itu rayuan dibenarkan. Sabitan dan hukuman Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen diketepikan. Bertarikh: 08 hb. Ogos 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR Peguam Bagi Pihak Perayu - Rajan Ayappan dan Ravindra Kumar Tetuan Ayappan & Partners Sentul, Pahang Darul Makmur Peguam Bagi Pihak Responden - TPR Nur Syafiqah binti Noorinda Unit Pendakwaan, Pejabat Penasihat Undang-undang Negeri Pahang Temerloh, Pahang Darul Makmur