Subsection
(3). The second part of section 304, Penal Code covers cases falling within the third part of section 299 not falling within section 300, clause (4). Thus, if death is an imminent result, it falls under s. 300. If on the other hand, that death is a likely result, it falls under s. 299. It would be safe to conclude that all cases under s. 300 would fall under s. 299 as well, but this is not necessarily so vice versa." (Tekanan diberikan) [Rujuk juga: Public Prosecutor v. Megat Sharizat Megat Shahrur [2011] 8 CLJ 893; Poh Weng Nam v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 4 CLJ 1096; dan, Mohd Fazli Azri Jamil v. Public Prosecutor [2013] 1 LNS 1237] 14 [12] Dalam rayuan semasa ini, YA Hakim bicara telah membuat penemuan fakta yang amat komprehensif mengenai sebab kematian dan bencana tubuh yang dikenakan ke atas si mati. Ditemui: “b) The deceased had died as a result of the injuries sustained [44] In order to prove this element, the prosecution relied on the evidence of PW6 and PW10. PW10 conducted a post mortem on the deceased on 10th September 2012 and found that the cause of the death of the deceased was "ligature strangulation" as a result of an object around the neck of the deceased being pulled. PW10 testified that as a result of external examination, there were two bruises to the neck of the deceased each of which were slightly to the right and to the left. These can be seen from injuries no.12 and13. of the post mortem report exhibit P20. The injuries were wide and there were friction marks as if it was the result of being pulled as shown in photograph no.12 in exhibit P16. PW10 further testified that internal examination revealed that there were bruises to both the left and right sternocleidomastoid (the muscle that controls the turning movement of the head) and the sternohyoid which is a muscle which is located along the length of the front of the human neck and connected by tendons to the hyoid bone at the top end, and connected to the sternum at the lower end. Based on the toxicology report P46, PW10 testified that the alcohol content in the blood and urine of the deceased was very high. This he said, would result in a person being very drunk to the point that he would be unconscious or semi-conscious. This in turn would act as a resistance so that greater force would have to be exerted to the neck area in order for ligature strangulation to occur. PW10 testified also that in his view, great force was used until the "Adam's apple" of the deceased was crushed. He also said that this action must have been continuous because there were many bruises to the neck of the deceased. According to PW10, the gold chain exhibit P53A and the "Hennessey" lanyard, P68, could have caused the strangulation. However, he added, it must have been caught against another object such as the collar of a shirt because there were no imprints of such objects on the neck of the accused. There were presence of other injuries to the deceased but PW10 testified that although these could have caused the death of the deceased, the fatal wound was the "ligature strangulation". The prosecution also submitted that the evidence of PW10 was corroborated by the evidence of PW6 who saw the deceased being dragged out of the car by the Second accused and repeatedly assaulted by the Third accused.” 15 Kami bersetuju dengan penemuan fakta di atas. Bagaimanapun berdasarkan nas autoriti yang dinyatakan dan daripada keterangan yang dibentangkan lanjut dalam penghakiman YA Hakim bicara, kami berpendapat YA Hakim bicara telah terkhilaf apabila memutuskan perbuatan perayu kedua menarik keluar si mati dari dalam kereta dengan alat yang menjerut (di sini rantai emas yang dipakai si mati) telah dilakukan dengan niat untuk menyebabkan kematian dan mencukupi pada lazimnya untuk menyebabkan kematian. Pada hemat kami, dan ini dipersetujui oleh semua pihak, bahawa semua perayu (dengan niat bersama yang akan disentuh selepas ini) telah merancang dan melakukan rompakan ke atas si mati. Berdasarkan keterangan ikut keadaan yang ditemui dengan betul oleh YA Hakim bicara, jerutan di leher si mati diakibatkan oleh tindakan perayu kedua mengheret si mati keluar dari dalam kereta dan memandangkan keadaan si mati yang tidak sedarkan diri disebabkan kemabukan yang tinggi dan tubuh badan yang besar, heretan tersebut terpaksa dilakukan menggunakan rantai leher di leher si mati (menurut SP10) dengan kekuatan yang kuat dan berulang kali. Dalam keadaan tersebut, pada pandangan kami, tindakan tersebut tidak dalam semua kemungkinan mesti menyebabkan kematian (pada tahap tertinggi sepertimana yang diputuskan dalam kes Tham Kai Yau v. Public Prosecutor, supra) tetapi hanya mungkin menyebabkan kematian. Kami juga mendapati bahawa kematian si mati telah diakibatkan secara langsung dan ketara daripada perbuatan heretan di leher tersebut. Dengan itu, kami berpendapat kesalahan yang telah dilakukan merupakan kesalahan mematikan si mati secara salah di bawah s 299 yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 304 (a) Kanun Keseksaan. 16 [13] Mengenai isu niat bersama, kesemua peguam bela menghujahkan bahawa tiada keterangan telah dibuktikan untuk menunjukkan adanya niat bersama antara semua perayu untuk membunuh si mati. Ditegaskan pendakwaan telah gagal untuk membuktikan siapakah sebenarnya yang menjerut leher atau yang menyebabkan ligature strangulation ke atas si mati. SP6 juga dikatakan tidak nampak atau tahu bagaimana jerutan itu berlaku dan dilakukan. Peguam bela perayu pertama juga mengatakan perayu pertama tidak mengetahui berkenaan perancangan dan tindakan yang dilakukan oleh perayu kedua. Oleh itu dia tidak seharusnya dipertanggungkan bersekali atas perbuatan perayu kedua. Dihujahkan YA Hakim bicara telah terkhilaf apabila memutuskan elemen niat bersama di bawah s 34 Kanun Keseksaan telah dibuktikan oleh pendakwaan. [14] Mengenai isu ini, kami bersetuju dengan penghujahan Timbalan Pendakwa Raya dan keputusan YA Hakim bicara mengenai perundangan yang mengawal. Berdasarkan Namasiyam & Ors v. PP (1987) 2 MLJ 336, Krishna Rao a/l Gurumurthi v. PP (2009) 3 MLJ 643, dan PP v. Azilah Bin Hadri & Anor (2015) MLJU 1, kewujudan niat bersama merupakan persoalan fakta yang biasanya dibuktikan secara inferens daripada keadaan sesuatu kes itu. Mengenai perancangan awal, keterangan langsung mengenai rancangan untuk melakukan sesuatu kesalahan tidak diperlukan dalam setiap kes kerana niat bersama boleh terjadi pada ketika kejadian (on the spot or spur of the moment) dan without any long interval of time between it and the doing of the act commonly intended. Kini, perundangan telah juga mantap bahawa dalam pemakaian prinsip ini tiadanya keperluan untuk membuktikan siapakah sebenarnya atau 17 akhirnya yang menyebabkan kematian si mati (rujuk juga Ong Chee Hoe v. PP (1999) 4 SLR 688). Prinsip di atas kini telah diperkukuhkan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Ferose Bin Tamure Mohamad Khan v. PP (2016) 9 CLJ 769, yang dengan jelas menyatakan: “[65] With respect, we are also not persuaded by the two Singapore Court of Appeal authorities cited and argued before us. Despite the lengthy explanation on the issue of common intention in particular in Daniel Vijay, we still hold the view which had been widely accepted by our courts that in a criminal prosecution where s. 34 of the Penal Code is invoked, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to prove that there existed between the participants a common intention to commit the crime actually committed. As long as there is a common intention to commit a criminal act, which resulted in the commission of a crime actually committed, s. can operate against all persons involved in the commission of the actual crime. [66] The existence of a common intention is a question of fact in each case to be proved mainly as a matter of inference from the circumstances of the case. Direct evidence as proof is difficult to procure because the common intention is essentially a state of mind. Invariably inferences have to rely upon arising from such acts or conduct of the accused, the manner in which the accused arrived at the scene, the nature of injury caused by one or some of them or such other relevant circumstances available. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether there is a common intention to commit the offence for which the accused could be convicted. The facts and circumstances of each case might vary. As such, each case should be decided based on the facts involved. ……… [74] The Federal Court further held that the Court of Appeal was wrong in looking for a direct link to who actually amongst the respondents committed the act or acts of killing the deceased. The Court of Appeal's approach according to the Federal Court was not quite in tandem with the settled law that is when s. 34 of the Code is invoked, there is no requirement for the prosecution to prove who exactly ultimately caused the deceased's death. The Singapore case of Ong Chee Hoe v. PP [1999] 4 SLR 688 was cited with approval.” (Tekanan diberikan) 18 [15] Pada hemat kami, prinsip-prinsip di atas memusnahkan penghujahan peguam bela perayu-perayu. Terdapat keterangan daripada SP6 dan SP7 bahawa kesemua perayu merancang untuk merompak si mati. SP6 juga secara jelas, dan ini diterima oleh YA Hakim bicara, bahawa kesemua perayu memukul dan memijak si mati, yang ketika itu tidak bermaya dek dalam keadaan mabuk. Si mati kemudiannya diheret keluar dari dalam kereta. Pengakuan perayu pertama kepada SP6 yang dia juga telah memukul si mati, telah diterima masuk dengan betul oleh YA Hakim bicara. Hakikat ini tidak dicabar, dan dicatatkan lanjut bahawa kesemua peguam bela bersetuju bahawa adanya niat bersama antara mereka untuk melakukan rompakan tetapi bukan untuk membunuh. Selaras dengan keputusan kes Ferose Bin Tamure Mohamad Khan v. PP, supra, dan fakta yang dibangkitkan daripada keterangan khususnya daripada SP6 dan SP7, persoalan siapa yang sebenarnya telah menjerut leher si mati adalah tidak relevan kerana niat untuk menyebabkan bencana tubuh telah terjadi at the spur of the moment dan masing-masing terlibat dengan perlakuan jenayah ke atas si mati. Keterangan SP10 jelas menunjukkan bencana tubuh tersebut berkemungkinan boleh menyebabkan kematian. Walaupun kami bersetuju dengan dapatan YA Hakim bicara tentang terbuktinya niat bersama untuk melakukan bencana tubuh sedemikian ke atas si mati, namun kesalahan yang sebenarnya dilakukan, sepertimana telah kami rumuskan terlebih awal dalam penghakiman ini, terjumlah kepada kesalahan mematikan secara salah ke atas si mati yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 304 (a) Kanun Keseksaan. [16] Selain isu-isu di atas, peguam bela perayu-perayu telah juga membangkitkan beberapa isu yang berkaitan dengan pindaan mengenai 19 masa kejadian dalam pertuduhan, kedudukan SP6 sebagai rakan sejenayah, dan percanggahan dalam keterangan mereka. Setelah meneliti keterangan dalam rekod, kami berpuas hati dan menerima huraian dan dapatan YA Hakim bicara. Mengenai masa kejadian, kami mendapati, dalam keadaan kes ini, bahawa tidak ada kemungkinan ada orang lain yang menyebabkan bencana tubuh berkenaan ke atas si mati. Dalam hal ini kami bersetuju dengan dapatan yang berikut: “Time of death not proven [67] The defence also submitted that the evidence led by the prosecution does not prove the time of death of the deceased which according to the charge is stated to be at around 5.00 a.m. According to the defence, the pathologist, PW10, had never given evidence as to the approximate time of the deceased's death. They submit that when PW6 last saw the deceased, he was still alive and that there was no evidence from PW6 as to when the deceased had died. PW7 in his testimony had related the date and time when they had begun their journey from Kulai to Genting Highlands ie, 8th September 2012 at around midnight, until they reached Downtown Cheras ie, 9th September 2012 at around 2 a.m. This evidence is consistent with that of PW6. At some point later, PW7 had exited the Nissan Serena and temporarily parted company with the accused persons, PW6, and Puteri. PW6 also testified that while they were at the place of incident, it was around early in the morning and still dark. Later that day at around 7.50 a.m PW15 saw the deceased lying by the side of the road and around 9.45a.m PW20 arrived and discovered the deceased. The chronology of events that occurred are therefore consistent with the evidence as given by the prosecution witnesses. The accused have also not been prejudiced in any way. It was never at all suggested that the accused persons were never at all in the company of PW6 and up to point of his temporary departure, PW7. In any event, the accused persons have not led any evidence of alibi or that they were never at the place of incident at the time in issue. I find therefore that this does not prejudice the prosecution case in any way.” 20 [17] Mengenai pembelaan kesemua perayu, YA Hakim bicara telah membuat analisis yang amat teliti dan telah menjawab isu-isu yang ditimbulkan oleh peguam-peguam bela perayu dengan jelas. Mengenai isu bangkit marah, kami bersetuju pembelaan itu merupakan satu pemikiran semula sepertimana yang diputuskan oleh YA Hakim bicara: “[81] The accused testified in their defence that the deceased had uttered the words, "pukimak Melayu" (offensive words) whilst in the BMW. This remark by the deceased was allegedly made with reference to his accusation that the accused had stolen his hand phone. As a result, an argument ensued between the deceased and the Second accused which lasted for about 3 to 4 minutes. According to the accused, the deceased also swore at them in the Chinese language which they of course did not understand. After this, according to the accused, the deceased then fell asleep. With regard to the alleged utterance of the offensive words by the deceased, it is to be noted that this allegation had surfaced for the first time during the defence case. While PW6 was giving evidence, this allegation was never suggested or put to him. It will be recalled that PW6 was in the BMW car and within earshot when these offensive words were alleged to have been uttered. It is therefore reasonable to make the finding which I do, that the allegation that the deceased had uttered the offensive words as alleged is a mere afterthought on the part of the accused persons in order to justify their conduct in assaulting the deceased.” [18] Mengenai isu-isu lain yang ditimbulkan oleh peguam bela-peguam bela perayu, kami bersependapat dengan dapatan YA Hakim bicara, kecuali kesalahan yang dilakukan iaitu kesalahan mematikan si mati dengan salah di bawah s 299/304 Kanun Keseksaan, bahawa kesemua perayu telah gagal menimbulkan keraguan yang munasabah ke atas kes pendakwaan. Kami mendapati YA Hakim bicara tidak terkhilaf di situ. Dengan itu, kami mengetepikan sabitan dan hukuman YA Hakim bicara di bawah s 302 Kanun Keseksaan dan menggantikannya dengan sabitan di 21 bawah s 304 (a) bagi kesalahan mematikan si mati dengan salah. Setelah mengambil kira penghujahan kedua-dua pihak mengenai hukuman, dan menyedari tentang seriusnya kesalahan ini yang telah menyebabkan kematian seorang insan dalam keadaan yang menyedihkan serta kehendak kepentingan awam, kami berpendapat pemenjaraan selama 20 tahun adalah memadai ke atas semua perayu. Akhir kalam, hukuman pemenjaraan ini berkuat kuasa dari tarikh perayu-perayu ditangkap. t.t ABDUL KARIM ABDUL JALIL Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan Tarikh: 10 April 2018 22 Bagi pihak Perayu-Perayu: Bagi pihak Perayu Pertama: Ridha Abdah Subri Tetuan Ridha & Rai Bagi pihak Perayu Kedua: Dato’ Rajpal Singh a/l Mukhtiar (Tiew Poh Nee bersamanya) Tetuan Rajpal, Firah & Vishnu Bagi pihak Perayu Ketiga: Hasnan Hamzah Tetuan Hasnah Hamzah Bagi pihak Responden: Wong Poi Yoke Timbalan Pendakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara