Badan Pengurusan Bersama D'Pines Ampang v TAY KAY HIANG (BA-22NCvC-443-11/2022)

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Schedule By-Laws. The Plaintiff says the disputed works affected the external façade, common property, building services, and the uniform appearance of D'Pines Condominium. 10. The disputed works pleaded by the Plaintiff include glass enclosures, awnings, CCTV, lighting, swing gates, motion detector alarms, a water tank, a water filter in the riser room, and works relating to the L-shaped area or pond area. The Plaintiff pleads that these works were unauthorised and were done without the prior written approval required under the strata management regime. 11. The Plaintiff further states that the Defendants relied on several documents to justify their position. These include Borang 1A dated 6.5.2016, the Defendants' letter to the Developer dated 6.5.2016, MPAJ's letter dated 6.9.2016, the Renovation Works Security Clearance Form dated 16.5.2016, KASDA Consultancy Sdn Bhd's letter dated 11.9.2017, the Developer's letter dated 22.10.2017, MPAJ's letter dated 18.2.2021, and the alleged JMB approval via Borang 1A dated 20.1.2021. These documents were also identified in the Plaintiff and Developer's submissions as the documents relied upon by the Defendants in their Defence and Counterclaim. 12. The Plaintiff asserts that those documents do not amount to prior written approval by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's case is that an application, acknowledgement, local authority letter, or "no objection" letter from the Developer or architect cannot replace the prior written approval of the JMB. 13. The Defendants deny that the works were unlawful. Their pleaded position is that the 2016 renovations were carried out when the development was still under the Developer's Management. 14. They say they submitted the relevant forms, dealt with the Developer and MPAJ, paid the necessary deposit or clearance, and obtained the necessary approval or permission. Their Defence and Counterclaim refer to the letter to the Developer dated 6.5.2016, MPAJ's letter dated 6.9.2016, the KASDA letter dated 11.9.2017, and the Developer's letter dated 22.10.2017. 15. The Defendants also assert that the swing gates were installed because of privacy and security concerns. They contend that the layout of the townhouse and the surrounding area exposed them to the movement of other residents or users near their unit. They rely on the KASDA letter and the Developer's letter to support their position in relation to the swing gates. 16. The Plaintiff pleads that the swing gates were installed on common property and that the Defendants were required to remove them. The Plaintiff also relies on the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022 in Claim No. TPS/B-0166-1/2022. 17. The Defendants, in their Defence and Counterclaim, dispute the Plaintiff's entitlement to the reliefs sought. They also counterclaim against the Plaintiff and the Developer. Their counterclaim concerns, among others, the Developer's alleged failure to construct a planter box near their townhouse, the alleged design flaw, the alleged wrongful refusal to approve works in the L-shaped area, and the alleged unreasonable or bad-faith conduct of the JMB. 18. The Developer, Sri Seltra Sdn Bhd, denies the Counterclaim. Its pleaded position is that there was no duty, under contract, statute, or tort, to construct the planter box. The Developer's position is also that any obligation alleged by the Defendants must be found within the Sale and Purchase Agreement and approved building plans. The Developer denies that it gave any binding approval for the Defendants' disputed works. 19. The pleadings, therefore, show that the factual dispute centres on three broad matters. First, whether the Defendants obtained prior written approval for the disputed works. Second, whether the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022 binds the Defendants and may be enforced by the Plaintiff. Third, whether the Defendants have proved their Counterclaim relating to the planter box, L-shaped area, and alleged bad faith or selective enforcement. Analysis and Findings 20. In a strata development, a purchaser does not buy the freedom to create an ideal façade of his or her own choosing without regard to the wider scheme. A parcel owner holds rights over the parcel, but those rights exist within the framework of the Strata Management Act 2013, the Third Schedule By-Laws and the House Rules. 21. That is the context of the present dispute. The Defendants say they had approval, or at least acted on the basis of approval, for the disputed renovations and installations. The Plaintiff says there was no prior written approval from the JMB, and that the disputed works affected common property, the external appearance and the uniformity of the development. 22. I will address the parties' submissions in the course of my analysis. This avoids unnecessary repetition and allows each submission to be considered directly against the issues raised, the pleaded facts, the documents and the evidence given at trial. Whether prior written approval of the JMB was required 23. The Plaintiff submits that the starting point is the strata management framework. The Plaintiff says the JMB is established under section 17 of the Strata Management Act 2013 and is responsible for the management and control of the common property. It submits that the Defendants, as proprietors in the same strata scheme, are bound by the Strata Management Act 2013, the Third Schedule By-Laws and the House Rules. 24. The Plaintiff relies on the House Rules and the Third Schedule By-Laws. The relevant parts are not limited to one provision. They form a scheme of control over external appearance, common property, nuisance, building services and uniformity. 25. Clause 4.4 of the House Rules requires the exterior façade of the condominium to maintain a uniform appearance and restricts projections, shades, awnings, and grilles unless approved by the management. 26. Clause 16.1 prohibits renovation works that involve changes to the exterior of the condominium without prior written consent from the management. 27. The Plaintiff also relies on paragraph 11 of the Third Schedule By-Laws. It prohibits a proprietor from changing the appearance, colour code, and façade of any part of the exterior of his parcel without prior written approval of the management corporation and, where necessary, the appropriate authority. 28. The Plaintiff further relies on paragraphs 22(1), 22(2) and 22(4), which deal with encroachment on common property and the prohibition against damaging or defacing common property except with prior written approval. Paragraph 29(2) prohibits fittings, fixtures, alterations or changes to the exterior of a parcel which affect or change the appearance of the common property or building façade or encroach into common property, unless prior written approval is obtained. 29. The Defendants do not seriously dispute that approval is required for works affecting common property or the exterior. Their answer is different. They say they obtained approval, or at least complied with the process in place at the time. 30. For convenience, I refer to the renovation works which the Defendants say were applied for or carried out in 2016, based on Borang 1A dated 6.5.2016, the letter to the Developer dated 6.5.2016, the Renovation Works Security Clearance Form dated 16.5.2016, and MPAJ's letter dated 6.9.2016, as 'the 2016 renovation works'. 31. In my view, the Plaintiff is correct on the legal framework. The House Rules and the Third Schedule By-Laws regulate what a proprietor may do, even within or around his parcel, where the works affect the exterior, façade, uniformity, common property or building services. The Defendants' unit is described as a townhouse, but it remains part of a strata development. That feature does not exempt the Defendants from the statutory by-laws and House Rules. 32. The Federal Court decision in Innab Salil & Ors v Verve Suites Mont' Kiara Management Corporation [2020] 12 MLJ 16 is relevant. The Federal Court recognised that the Strata Management Act 2013 is social legislation intended to regulate strata living for the benefit of the community. The Court accepted that valid house rules may regulate individual proprietors for the wider interest of the strata community. This supports the Plaintiff's submission that the rights of one proprietor must be exercised within the common regulatory scheme of the development. 33. In Nadia Management Corporation v Yap Kuee Hong [2015] 1 MLRH 476, the Court recognised the need for regulation in a strata community, including regulation affecting the external appearance of the building. That principle supports the Plaintiff’s position that the Defendants’ rights as parcel owners are subject to the House Rules and the Third Schedule By-Laws. 34. I therefore find that prior written approval of the JMB was required for any disputed work or installation affecting common property, building services, the external appearance, façade, or the uniformity of D'Pines Condominium. Whether the documents relied on by the Defendants amounted to prior written approval 35. The Defendants rely on several documents. These include Borang 1A dated 6.5.2016, the letter to the Developer dated 6.5.2016, MPAJ's letter dated 6.9.2016, the Renovation Works Security Clearance Form dated 16.5.2016, the KASDA letter dated 11.9.2017, the Developer's letter dated 22.10.2017, and other subsequent correspondence. 36. The Defendants submit that these documents must be viewed in context. They say they took vacant possession and then applied for renovation through the process available at the time. They say the Developer was still managing the development, the Developer placed its stamp on the relevant document, they paid the required deposit or clearance, and MPAJ issued its letter. They say they were not acting as defiant proprietors. They contend that they followed the process and acted in good faith. 37. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendants confuse an application with approval. The Plaintiff accepts that there were forms, letters and dealings with MPAJ and the Developer. However, the Plaintiff says none of those documents constitutes prior written approval by the JMB for the disputed external works. 38. The Plaintiff’s oral submission was that none of the documents relied on by the Defendants amounted to prior written approval from the JMB. Borang 1A was only an application. The Developer’s stamp on that form was, at most, an acknowledgment or confirmation of receipt. MPAJ’s letter was an approval or response from the local authority, not an approval by the JMB. Likewise, the KASDA letter and the Developer’s letter were, at their highest, “no objection” or support letters. They did not amount to prior written approval from the JMB under the House Rules and the Third

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Schedule By-Laws. 39. I accept that the Developer was involved in the management process in May 2016. PW1 accepted in cross-examination that as of 16.5.2016, the development was still within the Developer’s maintenance period. However, that does not mean that every document generated during that process amounted to approval for all the disputed external works later complained of (PW1 is Toh Beng Wai, the Developer's witness. He is the Project Coordinator of Sri Seltra Sdn Bhd, the Developer. He gave evidence mainly on the Developer's position). 40. Borang 1A was an application. The Developer's stamp did not state that the disputed external works were approved. The Renovation Works Security Clearance Form, on the evidence and submissions, was an administrative security document. It regulated contractor access, deposit and clearance. It did not itself approve the substantive renovation works. 41. MPAJ's letter dated 6.9.2016 was a local authority document. It did not replace the requirement for approval under the strata regime. Approval by a local authority and approval by the management body are not the same. One concerns regulatory control by the authority. The other concerns the internal statutory governance of a strata scheme. 42. The KASDA letter dated 11.9.2017 and the Developer's letter dated 22.10.2017 are also insufficient. PW1 Toh Beng Wai stated that the Developer never issued written permission to the Defendants to install fixtures or carry out renovation works at Unit A-3A-18. He stated that the Developer merely referred the swing gate request to KASDA for professional comment. The Developer's "no objection" did not amount to binding or valid written approval, and the Defendants still had to obtain approval from the JMB. PW1 also stated that after the JMB was established on 28.8.2016, the Developer was no longer in a position to give permission for renovation works and maintenance. 43. I accept PW1's evidence on this point. It is consistent with the law and with the documents. A "no objection" from the Developer is not the same as approval from the JMB. A professional comment by KASDA is not approval by the JMB. A proprietor cannot convert a supporting letter into a statutory approval from the competent management body. 44. The Plaintiff's submission on the difference between "pengesahan" and "kelulusan" is also correct. A confirmation or acknowledgement of receipt is not approval. An application or request for consideration does not amount to approval. Silence by the Developer cannot, in law, be construed as approval by the JMB. 45. The general principle is that where a statutory or regulatory framework requires a particular form of approval, the requirement must be satisfied in substance. The Court cannot dilute the requirement by treating an application or acknowledgement as approval. This approach is consistent with the principle in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v Mohd Noor Abdullah & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 193, where the Federal Court emphasised compliance with prescribed legal requirements, and with Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 293, where the Federal Court stressed the need for clear proof where legal rights and obligations are asserted. 46. The distinction between an administrative process and approval is material. In Ken Property Sdn Bhd v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Ken Damansara II Condominium [2016] 5 MLRA 150, the Court of Appeal treated administrative dealings concerning renovation deposits as distinct from formal approval for the renovation works. Similarly, the Renovation Works Security Clearance Form and the handling of deposits in this case do not, without more, amount to prior written approval. 47. I therefore find that the documents relied on by the Defendants do not constitute prior written approval by the JMB. Whether the disputed renovations, installations and structures breached the House Rules and Third Schedule By-Laws 48. The Plaintiff says the disputed works included glass enclosures, awnings, CCTV, lighting, swing gates, motion detector alarms, the water tank, the water filter in the riser room, and works connected to the L-shaped area or pond area. It says these affected the common property, building services, façade or external uniformity, and were done without approval. 49. The Defendants say this characterisation is too broad. They say some of the works were internal. They also say the JMB cannot treat every improvement or safety measure as illegal. They rely on the nature of the townhouse, privacy concerns, security concerns, water quality concerns and the fact that some works were removed or not completed. 50. I accept that not every internal renovation should be treated alike. Purely internal works within the parcel, which do not affect façade, common property, building services or uniformity, stand on a different footing. However, the Plaintiff's claim is not directed at ordinary internal works. It is directed at works which the Plaintiff says affected the external part of the parcel or common property. 51. On the swing gates, the issue is clear. The Plaintiff's position is that they were erected on common property without approval. The Defendants say they were justified by privacy and security concerns. That justification does not answer the requirement for approval. 52. The Tribunal history also supports the Plaintiff's position. PW2 is Lee Chock Hoong, the JMB's witness. He was the Treasurer of the JMB when the suit was filed and gave evidence mainly on the JMB's position. PW2 stated that Claim No. TPS/B-3485-10/2021 concerned the 1st Defendant's attempt to invalidate the JMB's instructions to remove the swing gates installed at common property, and the Tribunal dismissed that claim. 53. The swing gates have since been removed. That affects the form of relief, but it does not retrospectively make the installation lawful. 54. On the motion detector alarm, the Defendants say it was installed after the swing gates were removed and was later removed. Again, that does not prove approval. 55. The Plaintiff says it caused a disturbance and was installed without approval. Clause 5.0 of the House Rules prohibits anything in the unit or common property that may cause disturbance, inconvenience, injury or damage to other residents, and prohibits machinery or apparatus causing excessive noise or vibration that can be heard or felt outside the unit. 56. On the water filter, the Plaintiff says it was installed in the riser room without approval. The Defendants say the riser room served their unit and that other owners had also installed water filters in the riser rooms. However, the subsequent general notice issued by the Plaintiff requiring owners to remove such water filters does not support the Defendants’ case on approval. On the contrary, it shows that the Plaintiff did not accept such installations as lawful or approved. In any event, the existence of similar installations by other owners does not prove that the Defendants had obtained prior written approval for their own installation. 57. On the L-shaped area, the Defendants say it is their accessory parcel. Even if that is accepted, it does not mean that any external work may be carried out without approval. The Plaintiff's written submission states that the pond or L-shaped area forms part of the external features of the townhouse, and that any works capable of affecting the exterior façade, outlook or appearance require JMB approval. I accept that submission. 58. The Defendants also rely on their belief that their unit is a townhouse and, therefore, different from a usual condominium parcel. I do not accept that this affects the legal conclusion. A townhouse within a strata scheme remains subject to the strata rules. The Plaintiff's reply submission correctly states that the Defendants cannot distinguish a townhouse from a condominium parcel to avoid the Third Schedule By-Laws and House Rules. 59. I therefore find that the disputed renovations, installations and structures, to the extent that they affected common property, building services, the exterior, façade or uniformity, were carried out without prior written approval and were in breach of the House Rules and Third Schedule By-Laws. Whether the Plaintiff was entitled to enforce the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022 and rely on the finality of the Tribunal awards 60. The Plaintiff relies on the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022 in Claim No. TPS/B-0166-1/2022. The Plaintiff also relies on the Tribunal history involving Claim No. TPS/B-3485-10/2021 and Claim No. TPS/B-1809-5/2022. 61. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendants cannot relitigate matters already determined by the Tribunal. It submits that section 120 of the Strata Management Act 2013 makes the Tribunal award final and binding unless set aside. The Plaintiff also submits that the Defendants did not challenge the relevant Tribunal awards by judicial review. The Plaintiff and Developer say the attempt to raise the swing gate and planter box issues is a "second bite of the cherry". 62. The Defendants submit that the swing gates were already removed and that there was therefore nothing left to enforce. Counsel for the Defendants submitted that there was nothing to enforce because the swing gates had already been removed and RM500 had been paid. 63. I accept part of the Defendants' submission. Since the swing gates have been removed, there is no need for a physical order now directing the removal of the swing gates. 64. However, I do not accept that the Tribunal Award has become irrelevant. The Defendants still rely on the same alleged approvals and the same design issue to resist the Plaintiff's claim and to support their Counterclaim. The Plaintiff is entitled to ask this Court to recognise the binding effect of the Tribunal Award and to prevent relitigation of the same matters. 65. Section 120 of the Strata Management Act 2013 gives finality to Tribunal awards. The proper route to challenge an award is through the mechanism provided by law. The Defendants did not set aside the award. They cannot avoid the effect of the award by bringing the same dispute again in this action. 66. The principle of finality is also supported by Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, where the Federal Court recognised the doctrine of res judicata and issue estoppel, and by Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529, where the House of Lords explained that it is an abuse of process to relitigate matters which have been finally determined by a competent tribunal. 67. In the strata context, Imbi Plaza Management Corporation v Pauson Corporation Sdn Bhd & Anor [2022] MLRHU 2159 and Lone Pine Residence Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Pengurusan Strata & Anor [2024] MLRHU 727 support the effect of section 120 and the the finality of Tribunal awards. 68. I therefore find that the Plaintiff is entitled to rely on and enforce the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022. The Defendants are bound by it and cannot relitigate matters already determined by the Tribunal. Whether the Defendants proved their Counterclaim on the planter box and alleged design flaw 69. The Defendants' Counterclaim is largely based on the Developer's alleged failure to construct a planter box or barrier near their townhouse. They say a line in the plan indicates that a planter box or wall should have been constructed. They say the absence of that structure led to a loss of privacy and security, and that this prompted the installation of the swing gates. 70. The Developer denies any duty. PW1 states that D'Pines Condominium was designed by a qualified architect, that the plans were approved by the relevant authorities, including MPAJ and Jabatan Bomba, and that the development was completed with a Certificate of Completion and Compliance. He states that the planter box demanded by the Defendants was not part of the approved building plan. He also states that the Developer is not contractually obliged under the Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) to construct the planter box. 71. The Plaintiff and Developer further submit that there is no legal, statutory, tortious or contractual duty on the Developer to construct the planter box. They also submit that the JMB has no duty to compel the Developer to do so. The Plaintiff and Developer state that nothing in the Strata Management Act 2013 empowers or obliges the JMB to compel the Developer to remedy an alleged design flaw and undertake new construction post-completion for the private benefit of one proprietor. 72. I accept the Plaintiff and Developer's submissions. 73. The Defendants did not identify a clause in the SPA that required the Developer to construct a planter box. They did not call an architect or engineer to prove that the line on the plan must indicate a planter box or a wall. They did not prove that the absence of such a structure amounts to a design defect. 74. The Defendants' case rests on their interpretation of the plan and their dissatisfaction with the unit's privacy condition. That is insufficient. The Court cannot impose a contractual, statutory, or tortious duty on the Developer based solely on inference. 75. The general principle is that a party who asserts a fact must prove it. Findings must be based on evidence, not assumptions. This is consistent with Syarikat Perumahan Pegawai Kerajaan Sdn Bhd v Dato' Zainal Abidin bin Abdullah & Ors [1997] 1 MLJ 383, where the Federal Court emphasised the need for proof, and Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan v Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd [2017] 3 MLJ 561, where the Federal Court cautioned against findings based on speculation or assumption. 76. In Jade Homes Sdn Bhd v Sivananthan Krishnan [2021] 5 MLRA 362, the Federal Court emphasised the importance of the approved building plans and the SPA in determining a developer’s obligations. Applying that principle here, the Court cannot impose a duty on the Developer to construct a planter box unless such obligation is established from the SPA, approved plans, statute or other recognised legal basis. 77. I therefore find that the Defendants have not proven their Counterclaim on the planter box or alleged design flaw. They have also not proven that the JMB owed a duty to compel the Developer to construct the planter box. Whether the Plaintiff acted in bad faith, selectively or unreasonably 78. The Defendants allege that the JMB acted in bad faith, selectively and unreasonably. They rely on how the JMB handled their applications, the water filter issue, the L-shaped area, and the alleged existence of similar works or installations by other owners. 79. The Plaintiff denies this. The Plaintiff submits that its decisions were based on the House Rules, the Third Schedule By-Laws, common property, façade, uniformity, and the proper management of the development. The Plaintiff also says that disagreement with the Defendants' interpretation of documents is not a conspiracy or evidence of bad faith. 80. I accept the Plaintiff's position. 81. The burden to prove mala fide or bad faith is high. It is not enough to prove that the JMB rejected an application. It is not enough to show that the Defendants felt unfairly treated. There must be clear evidence of improper purpose, dishonesty, abuse of power or deliberate unequal treatment. 82. The Plaintiff gave reasons connected to strata management. These included protection of common property, exterior façade, structural uniformity, building services and the rights of other residents. Whether the Defendants agree with those reasons is not decisive. The reasons are connected to the JMB's statutory role. 83. The allegation of selective enforcement in relation to water filters is also not proven. The general notice to other owners does not show that the Plaintiff approved similar installations. It shows that the Plaintiff treated such installations as requiring removal. 84. The law requires clear proof of bad faith. In Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Alam Maritim (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 421, the Federal Court emphasised that mala fide must be distinctly alleged and strictly proved. On the evidence before me, that threshold is not met. 85. I therefore find that the Defendants have not proven bad faith, conspiracy, selective enforcement or unreasonable conduct by the JMB sufficient to defeat the Plaintiff's claim or sustain the Counterclaim. Whether the parties are entitled to the reliefs sought 86. The Plaintiff seeks declarations in paragraph 29(a), (b), (c) and (h) of the Statement of Claim, a mandatory injunction in paragraph 29(e), an injunction in paragraph 29(d), damages in paragraph 29(f) and (g), costs and further relief. The Defendants seek relief in their Counterclaim. 87. Based on my findings, the Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief and entitled to a declaration that the Defendants are bound by the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022. 88. The Plaintiff is also entitled to injunctive relief. Since the swing gates have been removed, the injunction should focus on preventing future unauthorised works and enforcing compliance with the Tribunal Award. The Defendants must not carry out further renovations or installations affecting common property or the exterior of the parcel without prior written approval of the JMB. 89. On damages, I have found that a breach is established. However, the amount of damages cannot be determined on the present record. The appropriate order is that damages, if any, be assessed separately. 90. The Defendants' Counterclaim must be dismissed. They have not proven the alleged design flaw, the Developer's duty to construct a planter box, the JMB's duty to compel the Developer, or the JMB's bad faith. 91. Before concluding, I add this. A parcel owner enjoys ownership of the parcel. However, that ownership is regulated by the Strata Management Act 2013, the Third Schedule By-Laws and the House Rules. Each parcel forms part of a shared development. Uniformity, safety, common property, building services and the rights of other residents must be protected. 92. At the same time, the JMB carries a practical duty to manage the scheme clearly and fairly. It must give owners clear instructions on how to submit applications for approval, what documents are required, who has the authority to approve, and whether approval is granted or refused. Proper strata management requires both sides to observe the rules. Owners must not assume approval from silence or informal correspondence. The JMB, on its part, must administer the approval process in a clear, consistent and transparent manner. Conclusion and Final Order 93. For the reasons stated above, I allowed the Plaintiff's claim and dismissed the Defendants' Counterclaim. 94. I made the following orders: (1) Declarations are granted in terms of paragraph 29(a), (b), (c) and (h) of the Statement of Claim, limited to the effect that the disputed renovations and installations were carried out without prior written approval of the Plaintiff and in breach of the applicable House Rules and Third Schedule By-Laws, and that the Defendants are bound by the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022. (2) A mandatory injunction is granted in terms of paragraph 29(e) of the Statement of Claim to enforce compliance with the Tribunal Award dated 18.4.2022. (3) An injunction is granted in terms of paragraph 29(d) of the Statement of Claim restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their servants, agents or contractors, from carrying out further renovations or installations affecting the common property or exterior of the parcel without prior written approval of the Plaintiff. (4) On the prayers for damages in paragraph 29(f) and (g) of the Statement of Claim, damages, if any, are to be assessed separately. The Plaintiff shall file and serve a notice of assessment within 30 days from the date of this judgment. If the Plaintiff fails to file and serve the notice within the stipulated period, the Plaintiff shall be deemed to have abandoned its claim for damages. (5) The Defendants' Counterclaim is dismissed. (6) Costs are awarded to the Plaintiff and the Developer in the total sum of RM30,000, subject to the allocator. Dated this: 18 May 2026 ~signed~ (NOOR HAYATI BINTI HAJI MAT) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA SHAH ALAM, SELANGOR Representative: For the Plaintiff : Saraswathy Shirke Deo together with Joanna Ooi Jing Zhi Messrs Jeffrey Tan & Chng For the Defendants : Patrick Samuel Sebastian Messrs The Law Office of Patrick Samuel