For the putative 1st respondent to convene a new AGM in accordance with the SMA and the 2015 Regulations. [23] The claims were dismissed by the Tribunal. Hence this application for leave for judicial review. [24] At this stage, I will not deliberate on the merits of the application. [25] However, it is quite obvious that since the claims were dismissed by the Tribunal, then by necessary implication, until and unless such decisions are quashed or otherwise set aside, the office bearers of the MC would have a direct interest. My reason is this. Since the validity of the 1st AGM, where the proposed interveners are either the office bearers or the parcel owners of Icon Residence is now subject to this application for leave for judicial review, it stands to reason that the proposed interveners must have a direct interest and therefore are proper persons within the meaning of O 53 r 8(1) of the ROC; see Majlis Agama Islam Selangor v Bong Boon Chuen [2009] 6 MLJ 307 FC. [26] I therefore allow the application in Encl 11 with costs in the cause. The Preliminary Objection [27] As alluded to earlier, before me, learned counsel for the proposed interveners attracted my attention to the applicant’s application for leave for judicial review is not competent. In short, the applicant’s application is not properly brought before the Court. His reasons are these. [28] First, learned counsel referred me to s 121(1) of the SMA. It provides as follows: A party to the proceedings of the Tribunal may, upon notice to the other party and to the Tribunal, apply to the High Court challenging an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious irregularity affecting the awards. [29] According to learned counsel, s 121(1) of the SMA has to be read together with O 5 r 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC”), which states as follows: Proceedings by which an application is to be made to the Court or a Judge thereof under any written law shall be begun by originating summons. [30] Learned counsel then referred me to the judgment of the Federal Court in State Government of Negeri Sembilan & Ors v Muhammad Juzaili bin Mohd Khamis & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 736 FC. [31] I cannot with respect, find any relevance of the ratio in Muhammad Juzaili with the instant case. In Muhammad Juzaili, the appellants raised a preliminary issue arguing that since the net effect of the Court of Appeal’s ruling was that the Negeri Sembilan State Legislature had no power to enact s 66 of the relevant Enactment, the respondents had to – but did not – comply with cll (3) and (4) of Art 4 of the Federal Constitution and a proceeding to declare s 66 invalid on the ground the State Legislature had no power to enact it could, under Art 4(4), only be commenced with leave of a judge of the Federal Court. [32] It was submitted that under Art 128(1) of the Federal Constitution, only the Federal Court had jurisdiction to determine whether a law made by Parliament or a State Legislature was invalid on the ground it related to a matter with respect to which the relevant legislature had no power to make law. [33] Consequently, the appellants contended that the High Court should have rejected the respondents’ application on the ground it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. [34] The Federal Court held that the judicial review action by the respondents was incompetent by reason of substantive procedural non-compliance with Art 4(3) and (4) of the Federal Constitution. [35] In the instant case, there is nothing in the SMA, in particular, s 121(1) thereof, which says that the challenge against the award of the Tribunal should be by way of an appeal. It is only if the Parent Act provides that that challenge is by way of an appeal would the mode of commencement via an OS becomes relevant. In my view, in the absence of the word “appeal” in s 121(1) of the SMA, the applicant was correct in challenging the Award by way of judicial review under O 53 of the ROC. [36] In need only to quote the judgment of Vazeer Alam J (as the learned FCJ then was) in Badan Pengurusan Bersama Makhota Parade v Pesuruhjaya Bangunan Majlis Bandaraya Melaka Bersejarah [2016] CLJU 1080, which concerns the interpretation of the SMA. In that case, the plaintiff commenced an action by way of an OS seeking inter alia the following: Satu deklarasi bahawa segala prosiding, penubuhan dan perlantikan ahli-ahli jawatankuasa Badan Pengurusan Bersama Mahkota Parade (MBMB/COB/KOMP/00216) pada Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan Ke-4 pada 26.1.2016 yang diadakan di Hotel Novotel, Melaka, adalah sah sehinggalah tempoh tamat pada mesyuarat agung tahunan ("AGM") yang berikutnya; atau sehingga aduan/tuntutan mengenai keesahan mesyuarat agung tahunan ("AGM") yang diadakan pada 26.1.2016 itu dibawa oleh mana-mana pihak yang dibenarkan di bawah Seksyen 107 Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 (Akta 757) kepada dan diputuskan oleh Tribunal Pengurusan Strata. [37] The learned Judge held as follows: Now I move on to the mode of originating process. The Plaintiff's primary relief is for a declaration that the AGM held on 26.1.2016 and the election of the Committee Members of the Defendant at the AGM is valid and that the Management Committee elected at the AGM is to serve its term until the next AGM or until the Tribunal determines the validity of the AGM. Now, this declaratory relief, if granted, would in effect be a setting aside of the Defendant's decision that the AGM is invalid. Further, the injunctive relief sought to prohibit the Defendant from ordering the reconvening of the AGM is also a direct challenge to his directive to reconvene the AGM. It was further held that the law is well settled that when a person aggrieved by the decision of a public body concerning an infringed right protected under public law, then any legal challenge to that decision shall be by way of judicial review and as a general rule, applications for relief against such decision must be made in accordance to the procedure prescribed in O 53 of the ROC. [38] I am conscious that the challenge in Makhota Parade is about the decision made by the COB of the Melaka City Council. But then, the COB, just like the Tribunal, is a public body. Therefore, the principle as enunciated by the Federal Court in Ahmad Jefri bin Mohd Jahri v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor [2010] 5 CLJ 865 FC applies. [39] It is therefore, my considered view that the applicant was correct in challenging the Award of the Tribunal by way of a judicial review. [40] The preliminary objection is therefore dismissed with costs in the cause. The leave application [41] The AG has no objection to the application for leave. [42] Save and except for the preliminary objection by the proposed interveners, it has not been shown to me that this application is frivolous. That is sufficient to warrant the grant of leave in view of the low threshold required under the law. The application for a stay [43] In his affidavit in AIS-3, Encik Seow affirmed the following to justify the grant of a stay of the Award pending the final disposal of this application for judicial review: