Badan Pengurusan Bersama Royal Strand & Lovell v Country Garden Danga Bay Sdn Bhd (JA-22NCvC-17-02/2023)

This judgment concerns the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 25

The Plaintiff seeks to join three individual parcel proprietors of the Royal Strand & Lovell development as co-plaintiffs in this action. 02/07/2026 17:09:16 JA-22NCvC-17-02/2023 Kand. 65 2 3. The proposed parties are the three parcel proprietors named in Enclosure 25, namely the person described in the supporting affidavit as Soh Hup Ping, Ho Chee Kian and Jiang Fang (“the proposed Plaintiffs”).

The application also seeks leave to amend the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 3 February 2023 in the terms exhibited to the supporting affidavit.

The Defendant opposes the application. Its principal objections are that:

(a) the Plaintiff had ceased to exist and had no locus standi when Enclosure 25 was filed;

(b) all rights relating to the common property had vested in the Management Corporation;

(c) the proposed Plaintiffs, as individual parcel proprietors, possessed no independent right to pursue a claim concerning common property;

(d) their presence was neither necessary nor proper for the determination of the action;

(e) no common question existed between the existing claim and the proposed Plaintiffs’ alleged interests;

(f) the proposed joinder was barred or affected by an earlier order dismissing an application by certain parcel proprietors to intervene in related proceedings; and

(g) the amendments would complicate and delay the proceedings.

The application was initially heard on 22 April 2026. During the hearing, the Court directed the parties to address the anterior question whether the Plaintiff remained in existence and possessed locus standi when Enclosure 25 was filed on 17 October 2025.

Additional written submissions were thereafter filed by both parties.

Having considered the affidavits, the documentary exhibits, the written and additional submissions and the authorities cited, this Court allowed Enclosure 25. The underlying action

The Plaintiff was established as the Joint Management Body (“JMB”) for the strata development known as Royal Strand & Lovell Condominium (“the development”). The Defendant is the developer of the development. 4 10. The development was completed and vacant possession was delivered to the purchasers. The Plaintiff subsequently assumed responsibility for the management and maintenance of the common property.

The present suit was commenced by the Plaintiff on 3 February

The principal complaint in the Statement of Claim concerns alleged defects, deficiencies and incomplete works affecting the common property of the development.

The alleged defects include damage to the walls and ceilings, defective external paintwork, water seepage and leakage, defects to the flat roof, poor-quality materials, incomplete works, discrepancies between the common facilities and the contractual layout, and unsafe electrical works.

The Plaintiff seeks substantive relief against the Defendant in its capacity as developer, including appropriate remedial works, expert inspection and damages arising from the alleged defects. The Defendant denies liability. The merits of those competing claims are not determined in Enclosure 25. The management dispute

The present application must be considered against the unusual management history of the development. 5 15. A meeting described as the first annual general meeting of the Management Corporation (“MC”) was purportedly convened on 2 July 2023. The Plaintiff challenged the validity and legal effect of that meeting in separate proceedings.

On 4 July 2023, an interim injunction was obtained restraining, among other matters, the implementation of the resolutions passed at the meeting and the entry of the Defendant or its representatives into the Plaintiff’s management office.

The Defendant subsequently applied to set aside the injunction. That application was dismissed on 9 September 2024. An appeal against the dismissal remained unresolved at the material time.

The result was that the validity and operative effect of the meeting of 2 July 2023, and the authority of the committee allegedly elected at that meeting, remained actively disputed.

The evidence also showed that the purported MC did not immediately and effectively assume the physical management of the development following the meeting. In proceedings commenced by the purported MC and certain parcel proprietors, the Commissioner of Buildings (“COB”) was appointed to intervene in the management of the development. 6 20. The COB thereafter appointed an external management entity, LDS International Asset Management Sdn Bhd, to manage the premises pending the resolution of the disputes. The intervention of the COB was material. It demonstrated that there was no ordinary and undisputed transition of management from the JMB to a fully operative MC immediately following the meeting of 2 July 2023.

The litigation concerning management was ultimately resolved through a consent judgment recorded on 15 August 2025. The consent judgment provided for the management and maintenance of the common property to be handed over in accordance with the Strata Management Act 2013 and the relevant regulations.

The parties subsequently discontinued the related proceedings and the interlocutory appeal. Enclosure 25 was filed on 17 October 2025, approximately two months after the consent judgment. The proposed Plaintiffs

The proposed Plaintiffs are parcel proprietors in the development.

The supporting affidavit identifies their respective parcels and exhibits the relevant sale and purchase agreements and, where available, strata titles. 7 25. It is averred that they were actively involved in the identification, documentation and pursuit of the alleged defects forming the subject matter of this action. They were therefore not strangers who first developed an interest in the litigation after it was commenced. Written confirmations signifying their consent to be joined as plaintiffs were exhibited to the supporting affidavit.

The application therefore satisfies the requirement under O 15 r 6(4) that a person shall not be added as a plaintiff without his or her consent. The principal reason for the application is the change in the management structure following the consent judgment.

The Plaintiff contends that the committee of the MC includes persons linked to the Defendant and that there is a genuine conflict between the MC’s responsibility to protect the interests of the parcel proprietors and its relationship with the Defendant. It is further alleged that the MC has neither adopted nor taken steps to continue the present action.

The proposed Plaintiffs are therefore sought to be joined to ensure continuity of the proceedings and to prevent the substantive claim from becoming ineffective merely because of the disputed transition in management. Relief sought in Enclosure 25

Enclosure 25 seeks the following principal orders:

(a) that the three proposed parcel proprietors be joined as co-plaintiffs;

(b) that the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim be amended in the terms of the proposed amendments exhibited to the supporting affidavit;

(c) that costs of the application be costs in the cause; and

(d) such further or consequential relief as the Court considers appropriate.

The proposed amendments do not seek to introduce a distinct development, a different category of defects or unrelated conduct by the Defendant.

They principally add the identities and capacities of the proposed Plaintiffs and regularise the continuation of the existing claim. Issues for determination

The issues arising for determination are:

(a) whether the Plaintiff possessed locus standi to file and maintain Enclosure 25 on 17 October 2025;

(b) whether the proposed Plaintiffs fall within O 15 r 6(2)(b);

(c) whether there are common questions of law or fact connecting them with the existing action;

(d) whether individual parcel proprietors may be joined notwithstanding the statutory position of the MC in relation to common property;

(e) whether the earlier order in the related proceedings precludes the present joinder;

(f) whether the amendments change the character of the action or cause prejudice to the Defendant; and

(g) the appropriate order as to costs. Order 15 rule 6

Order 15 r 6(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 empowers the Court, at any stage of the proceedings and on such terms as it thinks just, to add:

(a) a person who ought to have been joined as a party;

(b) a person whose presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon; or

(c) a person between whom and an existing party there exists a question or issue arising out of or connected with the relief claimed which it would be just and convenient to determine in the same proceedings. 10 34. The jurisdiction is wide but must be exercised judicially.

Its essential object is not merely to enlarge the number of parties. It is to place before the Court the persons whose presence will facilitate a comprehensive, effective and just resolution of the dispute.

In Hong Leong Bank Bhd v Staghorn Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2008] 2 CLJ 121, the Federal Court considered the purpose and limits of O 15 r 6. The Federal Court explained that the entire language of O 15 r 6(2)(b) demonstrates that joinder is intended to achieve a “comprehensive and global resolution” of an existing cause or matter. Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ, in delivering the decision of the Federal Court, held: “[114] Now the issue of jurisdiction under O. 15 r. 6 does not hang upon the words “At any stage of the proceedings” alone. It is not those words only that indicate that an order for the addition of a party in a cause of matter under r. 6(2)(b) is to be made only in a cause or matter that is extant and alive. The entire wording of para. (b) also so indicates, and with greater force. It shows that the addition of a party is intended to achieve a comprehensive and global resolution of the cause or matter. The wording looks to the future outcome of the cause or matter. The addition of the party to be added is a contribution to the future outcome. It follows from the entire wording of para. (b), even without the words “At any stage of the proceedings”, that the addition of a party can only be made in a cause or matter that has not been concluded and brought to an end. The wording of para. (b) would not enable a person to come in and be added as a party to undo what has already been done or decided in a cause or matter. It seemed to me therefore that when this court excluded the issue of jurisdiction under O. 15 r. 6 from the consideration of the Court of Appeal, while asking it to consider the question of the exercise of the court’s discretion, this court could not have intended that the question of discretion be considered within the terms of O. r. 6(2)(b). Once the question of jurisdiction under O. 15 r. 6(2)(b) is excluded, there will be nothing left in the wording of r. 6(2)(b) to be considered in relation to the question of the exercise of the court’s discretion. It was as if this court was saying that the question whether Staghorn, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, ought or ought not to be allowed to come in to have the order for sale and the auction sale set aside ought not to be considered within the confines of O. 15 r. 6(2)(b), which would amount to saying that Staghorn’s application to “intervene” ought not be considered strictly as an application to be added as a party under O. 15 r. 6(2)(b), but simply as an application at large to be allowed to come in to undo what had already been done in the originating summons proceedings, that is to say, to have the order for sale that had been made and perfected and the auction sale that had been completed, set aside”. 12 37. The Federal Court stressed that the provision looks towards the future determination of the action. The addition of the proposed party must contribute to the proper outcome of the existing proceedings, and referred to the statutory expression that the presence of the proposed party must be necessary so that all matters in dispute may be “effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon”.

The Federal Court reiterated that the provision should be applied to an ongoing case where the proposed party’s participation would assist in bringing the case to an overall satisfactory and just conclusion. “[138] In this case, only two authorities had been cited as having a bearing on the question, namely, Pegang Mining and Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank. Pegang Mining concerned the application of O. 16 r. 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1957, the precursor of the present O. 15 r. 6(2)(b), sub-para.

(i). It applied the court rule as to the addition of an additional party, as I believe it should be applied, to an ongoing case in order to enable the additional party to participate in the process of bringing the case to an overall satisfactory and just conclusion.”.

These principles support a practical rather than formalistic approach. The inquiry is whether the presence of the proposed party will permit the Court to determine the true controversy comprehensively, avoid inconsistent results and prevent unnecessary multiplicity.

The principle in Tajjul Ariffin bin Mustafa v Heng Cheng Hong [1993] 2 MLJ 143 as relied upon in the submissions, is consistent with that approach.

All persons who are necessary or proper for the effective adjudication of the dispute should, where the requirements of the Rules are met, be before the Court. The Court must examine the substance of the controversy and not merely the form in which the original proceedings were commenced. Order 92 rule 4

Order 92 r 4 preserves the Court’s inherent power to make orders necessary to prevent injustice or an abuse of process. The inherent power does not authorise the Court to disregard an express statutory provision.

It does, however, permit the Court to supplement the procedural framework where necessary to ensure that an existing action is not rendered ineffective through a procedural gap or an unusual factual development. 14 44. In the present case, O 92 r 4 operates consistently with, and not in substitution for, O 15 r 6. The Plaintiff’s locus standi

The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff had been statutorily dissolved by the time Enclosure 25 was filed. Its case is founded on s 27(1) of the Strata Management Act 2013, which provides that a JMB shall dissolve three months from the date of the first annual general meeting of the MC.

The Defendant contends that the meeting of 2 July 2023 was the first annual general meeting and that the Plaintiff therefore dissolved on 1 October 2023. On that footing, the Plaintiff could neither maintain the present suit nor file Enclosure 25 in October 2025.

The Defendant also relies upon s 28 of the Act, under which the JMB’s rights, powers, remedies and liabilities, including those connected with pending proceedings, vest in the MC upon the expiry of the statutory period. The statutory provisions are mandatory. The Court does not minimise their effect.

The central question, however, is whether the meeting of 2 July 2023 can, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, be treated as an undisputed and fully operative first annual general meeting from which the dissolution period necessarily ran. The statutory authorities relied upon by the Defendant

The Defendant relies on Ideal City Development Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Pengurusan Strata Putrajaya, Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor [2025] 5 CLJ 20 where the following passage from the judgment of Mohd Nazlan Ghazali JCA (as he then was) was highlighted, as follows: - “[68] Section 27 of the SMA 2013 in turn makes it mandatory for the JMB to undertake the similar transfer and hand-over arrangement (like imposed in s. 15 on the developer vis-à-vis the JMB) on largely the same items in respect of balances of moneys, records, approvals and other documents to the Management Corporation (MC), not more than one month from the date of the first annual general meeting of the MC. Under s. 27(1), the JMB itself must dissolve within three months from the date of the first annual general meeting of the MC”.

That statement affirms the mandatory statutory sequence where there has been a legally effective first annual general meeting and an operative transition between management bodies. 16 51. Ideal City (supra) concerned an individual parcel owner’s attempt to obtain documents directly from the developer after the establishment of the JMB.

The Court of Appeal emphasised that documents required under s 15 were to be handed by the developer to the JMB and that the individual proprietor could not circumvent the representative management body: “[66] Regard must accordingly be had to s. 15 of the SMA 2013, pursuant to which, when read together with Form 4 of the Regulation 11, Strata Management (Maintenance and Management) Regulations 2015, in fact compel a developer to furnish all the documents identified therein including all bank statements and approved plans to the JMB, non-compliance with which is a criminal offence under s. 15(4). But s. 15 does not mention, and we say neither does it envisage, such furnishing of documents could be made to any individual parcel owners. … [77] It is therefore in this case for the JMB, not the appellant developer to consider and decide whether or not to disclose the documents sought to the second respondent as the control and custody of the same are vested in the JMB, not the appellant and since JMB, not the appellant is the representative of the parcel owners of Infinity Tower. On top of that, we reiterate that the documents sought by the second respondent in fact contains information of all the parcel owners in Infinity Tower. The appellant would not be in a position to decide to disclose such documents to an individual parcel owner when the rightful authority to make such a decision is either the JMB or all other owners in Infinity Tower at a general meeting’ [78] Thus, by granting the said order that would allow individual parcel owner to obtain bank statements and approved plan which were already vested in the JMB, the Tribunal had acted ultra vires s. 105 of the SMA 2013”.

That context is materially different from the present application.

The proposed Plaintiffs are not seeking confidential management records from the developer in substitution for a functioning JMB or MC. They seek to participate in an existing defects action whose continuation is jeopardised by an unresolved and unusual management transition.

Ideal City (supra) also recognises that the Strata Management Act 2013 is social legislation concerned with the proper management of strata living and community interests. The Court of Appeal referred to the purposive interpretation required by s 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 and to the community-based object of the strata legislation. [42] The long title of the SMA 2013 is stated to provide for the proper maintenance and management of buildings and common property, and for related matters, whilst its preamble reads that it is expedient for the purposes only of ensuring uniformity of law and policy with respect to local maintenance and management of buildings and common property within Peninsular Malaysia and the Federal Territory of Labuan. [43] We would in this regard draw attention to the landmark case of Innab Salil & Ors v. Verve Suites Mont’ Kiara Management Corporation [2020] 10 CLJ 285; [2020] 6 MLRA 244 where the Federal Court ruled in favour of a management corporation and held that a particular set of house rules which prohibit short-term rentals by parcel owners passed by the owners at an extraordinary meeting was valid in law and did not infringe the SMA 2013. This decision gives clear recognition and effect to the notion that the key objective of the SMA 2013 is to promote the interests of community living within a strata scheme. Her Ladyship Tengku Maimun CJ made this clear in Innab Salil in the following terms: [26] The SMA 2013 is without doubt, a social l egislation. It was passed to facilitate the affairs of strata living for the good of the community or owners of the strata title. Being social in nature, the provisions of the SMA 2013 which safeguard community interests ought to receive a liberal interpretation and not a restricted or rigid one. Accordingly, where two different interpretations are possible, it is the one which favours the interest of the community over the interest of the individual that is to be preferred. This is in line with the aforementioned decisions in Ang Ming Lee and Hoh Kiang Ngan. [44] The Strata Management Act 2013 (the SMA 2013), the Strata Management (Maintenance and Management) Regulations 2015 (“the SRA”) and Strata Titles Act 1985 (“the STA 1985”) regulate the management and maintenance of strata scheme developments. The SMA 2013 in particular, governs and regulates the provisions on the timeline of the management of the stratified properties, and the handing over of management between the developer, the JMB and the MC.”.

That purposive approach does not allow the Court to rewrite s 27. It does, however, require the Court to examine whether the statutory event relied upon was, in the circumstances, legally and practically operative.

The Defendant also relies upon Foo Loke Ying & Anor v Television Broadcasts Ltd & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 35, where the Supreme Court observed that a court is not at liberty to treat words used by Parliament as surplusage and that effect should, where possible, be given to every word of an enactment.

This Court accepts that principle without qualification. 20 59. The issue is not whether the words “shall dissolve three months from the date of the first annual general meeting” should be disregarded.

The issue is whether, in the peculiar facts of this dispute, the meeting of 2 July 2023 possessed the necessary legal and operative character to trigger the ordinary statutory consequences relied upon by the Defendant.

In Palm Spring Joint Management Body & Anor v Muafakat Kekal Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 665, the Federal Court explained the interim nature of a JMB. The Court held that the JMB under the former statutory regime was an interim body created to perform management functions pending the establishment of the MC. “[30] Therefore, under Act 663, the JMB is only an interim body established for the purpose of carrying out the functions of MC pending the establishment of MC and once the MC is established, the JMB is automatically dissolved. This is expressly provided in s. 15 of Act 663 which reads:

Dissolution of Joint Management Body

That principle remains important.

Palm Spring (supra), however, concerned a JMB purportedly established after the MC had already lawfully come into existence. The issue was whether that later JMB was validly constituted.

The present case concerns an existing and valid JMB, a disputed meeting, operative injunctive relief restraining the meeting’s resolutions and a subsequent consent judgment regulating the eventual transition.

The Court is therefore not sanctioning the indefinite coexistence of two fully operative management bodies. 22 67. The Court is determining the legal position during a period in which the authority and operation of the purported MC were subject to immediate and continuing judicial challenge.

The Defendant further relies on Park Access Sdn Bhd & Ors v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Prima Avenue dan DPCC Fasa 1 (Blok G, H, I) and other appeals [2018] 1 LNS 711 in which the Court of Appeal observed that the statutory scheme did not confer upon a JMB a right, after the MC had been established, to institute proceedings to recover common property or proprietary rights vested in the MC. The Court also described the JMB as a caretaker body intended to facilitate the transition to the MC. Those propositions are not disputed as general statements of law.

The material distinction is that the JMB in Park Access (supra) instituted proceedings after an operative MC had already been established and had assumed the statutory proprietary position.

The present suit was commenced by the Plaintiff on 3 February 2023, before the disputed meeting of 2 July 2023.

Further, the resolutions of that meeting were restrained by injunction, the attempted setting aside of the injunction was unsuccessful, and management was ultimately undertaken through COB intervention rather than through an ordinary handover to the purported MC.

The present factual setting does not therefore mirror the ordinary statutory transition considered in Park Access (supra).

Both parties place reliance on PJ Centrestage JMB v Cherish Springs Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2020] 1 LNS 525. That decision carefully considered the relationship between a JMB and an MC during the period between the establishment of the MC and the dissolution of the JMB.

The High Court in PJ Centrestage JMB (supra) adopted a purposive approach and considered the prejudice that might be caused to parcel purchasers and proprietors if proceedings properly commenced by a JMB were summarily terminated before an effective transition: “[25] The question that arises is whether the Plaintiff can -

(a) “purchasers” (defined in s. 2 SMA) of “parcels” (defined in s. 4 STA) before strata titles are issued for the parcels (Purchasers); and

(b) “parcel owners” (as understood in s. 2 SMA) (Parcel Owners). The Purpose (JMB) is clear from the following question and answer in Dewan Rakyat, Parliament on 8.11.2016 (Parliamentary Proceedings) - “SOALAN:- Y.B. Tuan Ng Wei Aik [Tanjong] minta MENTERI KESEJAHTERAAN BANDAR, PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN menyatakan sama ada pindaan terhadap Akta Pengurusan Strata 2013 akan dilakukan bagi membolehkan Badan Pengurusan Bersama (JMB) ditubuhkan atau terus wujud walaupun Perbadanan Pengurusan

(a) as the 1 st AGM (MC) has not been convened, a “management committee” cannot be elected under s. 56(1) SMA. Hence, even though the MC has been established pursuant to s. 17(3) STA, there is no management committee to perform MC’s duties and conduct MC’s business on behalf of MC as provided in s. 56(1) SMA. This is unjust to Purchasers and Parcel Owners because for all practical purposes, before the 1 st AGM (MC) is held, MC cannot file any suit in the interest of the Purchasers and Parcel Owners;

(b) even if the management committee is elected at the 1 st AGM (MC), the management committee needs a reasonable period of time to consider relevant documents to reach an informed decision on whether a suit should be instituted in the interest of the Purchasers and Parcel Owners. In other words, there will be an inevitable delay before the management committee can file a suit on behalf of the MC in the interest of the Purchasers and Parcel Owners (Inevitable Delay); and

(c) if I have struck out the 2 Suits, there may be irreparable prejudice to the Purchasers and Parcel Owners because the MC may be subsequently timebarred by limitation under s. 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 from filing a suit based on the same material facts which arise in the 2 Suits. Such a prejudice is real in view of the Inevitable Delay.”. 29 75. The Court noted the possibility of delay in constituting and activating the MC, and the risk that substantive claims might become time-barred and held that the JMB could maintain the action until its dissolution. The Court described the JMB, during the interim period, as maintaining proceedings concerning common property for the ultimate benefit of the MC: “[29] I will now discuss the relationship between a JMB and MC for the period between the establishment of the MC (upon the opening of a book of the strata register regarding the subdivided building) and the dissolution of the JMB [on the expiry of the three-month period from the date of the 1 st AGM

(a) if the Court’s Decision concerns common property, the Court’s decision shall bind the MC [as the owner of the common property under s. 17B(1) STA];

(b) if the Court’s Decision provides for monetary relief (damages and/or compensation) and/or costs for the JMB, by reason of s. 27(2)(b)(iii) SMA the MC shall be entitled to such a monetary relief and/or costs; and

(c) if the Court’s Decision awards monetary remedies and/or costs against the JMB, as provided in s. 27(2)(b)(iii) SMA, the judgment creditor in question may enforce the Court’s Decision (regarding monetary relief and/or costs) against the MC…”

The Court addressed the options available once the MC’s first annual general meeting had been held and a management committee elected. Those options included an application by the MC to be joined in the pending action or, depending upon the MC’s informed decision, an application by the JMB to discontinue.

The Defendant relies upon the latter part of the judgment to contend that the Plaintiff should have discontinued this action. The Plaintiff relies upon paras [26] – [29] in PJ Centrestage (supra) to submit that the action could be maintained during the statutory transition and that the Court should avoid an interpretation which leaves the parcel proprietors without an effective claimant. The present decision does not establish that a dissolved JMB may maintain litigation indefinitely contrary to ss 27 and 28.

The significance of PJ Centrestage (supra) lies in its recognition that the statutory transition must be examined purposively and in a manner which protects pending rights while management responsibilities are genuinely in transition. Whether the meeting of 2 July 2023 triggered dissolution

The Defendant’s argument assumes that the meeting of 2 July 2023 immediately and conclusively acquired the full legal effect of the first annual general meeting contemplated under s 27.

The evidence does not support so straightforward a conclusion. The meeting and its resolutions were challenged almost immediately, and an operative injunction restrained the implementation of the resolutions.

The Defendant’s attempt to set aside the injunction failed, and the appeal remained pending. Management did not pass to an uncontested and fully operative MC committee. The COB instead intervened and appointed an external manager. 32 82. Those circumstances materially distinguish this case from one in which:

(a) a valid first annual general meeting is held;

(b) a management committee is lawfully elected;

(c) management and records are handed over;

(d) the MC assumes control without judicial restraint; and

(e) the statutory period then expires without dispute.

The Court is not treating the injunction as amending s 27. The injunction and related proceedings are relevant because they affect the legal and practical character of the event relied upon by the Defendant as the statutory trigger.

Until the disputes were resolved, it could not be stated with certainty that there was a legally effective and operative MC capable of fully assuming the management role contemplated by the statutory scheme. The consent judgment of 15 August 2025

The consent judgment of 15 August 2025 constituted the first lawful and structured resolution of the disputed transition. Through that judgment, the parties agreed upon the handover of management and maintenance responsibilities.

The related proceedings and appeal were thereafter discontinued. The consent judgment thus marked the practical and legal point at which the transition ceased to be subject to the prior operative contest.

The Plaintiff contends that, in those circumstances, the operative statutory period should be considered by reference to the consent judgment. In the particular circumstances of this interlocutory application, that contention is not frivolous or legally unsustainable.

Enclosure 25 was filed on 17 October 2025, less than three months from 15 August 2025. Accordingly, even upon the Plaintiff’s asserted computation of the statutory transition, it remained in existence when Enclosure 25 was filed.

The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiff possessed sufficient locus standi at the material time to apply for joinder and consequential amendment. This finding is confined to the peculiar procedural and factual history before the Court. 34 90. It does not establish a general principle that parties may, through consent, amend or disapply the mandatory provisions of the Strata Management Act 2013.

It reflects the fact that the validity, authority and operation of the purported MC had been subject to operative judicial restraint and that the consent judgment provided the first structured basis for the disputed handover. Whether locus may be raised

The Court accepts that locus standi is a threshold matter and may be raised even if it has not been specifically pleaded. The decisions relied upon by the Defendant establish that a court should not determine the merits of an application made by an entity which plainly lacks legal capacity.

The Court has therefore determined the locus issue before considering the merits of joinder. Having done so, the Court rejects the Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff lacked capacity when Enclosure 25 was filed. The proposed Plaintiffs’ legal and proprietary interests

The proposed Plaintiffs are registered or beneficial parcel proprietors within the same development. Their interests are not remote or merely intellectual. The value, condition, safety and utility of their parcels are directly affected by the condition of the common property. The alleged defects concern facilities and structures which serve the development and its parcel proprietors collectively.

Although the statutory management and proprietary framework places control of the common property in the JMB or MC at the relevant stage, parcel proprietors retain a real and substantial beneficial interest in its condition and proper maintenance.

The proposed Plaintiffs also participated in identifying and documenting the defects and in pursuing the complaints against the Defendant. They possess direct knowledge relevant to the history and substance of the action. Their proposed participation is therefore connected with the existing controversy and not based upon curiosity or an attempt to introduce an unrelated dispute. The Defendant’s reliance on Ideal City

The Defendant submits that Ideal City (supra) establishes that an individual parcel proprietor may not bypass the statutory management body.

That proposition must be understood in its context. Ideal City (supra) concerned the statutory custody and disclosure of management records and a claim brought directly against the developer after those records had been handed to the JMB.

The present case concerns an existing defects action commenced for the collective benefit of parcel proprietors and a serious question whether the succeeding management body will continue it.

The proposed Plaintiffs do not seek to exercise ordinary day-to-day management powers in substitution for the MC. Their joinder is intended to preserve the existing judicial determination of alleged developer liability where the representative management body is said to be compromised or inactive.

The two situations are not equivalent. Conflict of interest and practical justice

A compelling feature of the application is the asserted conflict of interest. The evidence indicates that persons connected with the Defendant occupy or occupied positions within the committee of the

The Plaintiff asserts that the chairman of the MC was a director of the Defendant at the time of the disputed meeting and that members of the committee were employees or persons associated with the Defendant.

The action is directed against the Defendant as developer, and that the MC has not taken steps to adopt or continue the action.

There is therefore a real concern that requiring the MC alone to determine whether the action should proceed would place control of litigation against the Defendant in the hands of persons linked to the Defendant.

At this stage, the Court is not making a final finding of impropriety against the MC or any committee member. The evidence nevertheless discloses a sufficiently real risk of conflict to justify procedural protection. The Court cannot ignore the practical consequence of dismissing the application.

Such a dismissal may leave the existing action without an effective claimant, notwithstanding that serious allegations concerning common property defects remain untried. It may also permit the action to be abandoned without an independent consideration of the collective interests of the parcel proprietors.

That would not serve the purpose of O 15 r 6 or the broader administration of justice. Common questions of law and fact

The Defendant submits that the proposed Plaintiffs have no claim sharing common questions with the existing action. This Court disagrees.

The existing and proposed claims concern:

(a) the same development;

(b) the same common property;

(c) the same alleged design, construction and workmanship defects;

(d) the same Defendant in its capacity as developer;

(e) the same documentary and expert evidence;

(f) the same issues of breach, duty, causation and remedial responsibility; and

(g) substantially the same relief.

The factual and legal issues are not merely similar. They are substantially identical. Separate proceedings by the parcel proprietors would duplicate evidence, increase costs and create a risk of inconsistent findings.

Their joinder therefore advances the objective identified in Hong Leong Bank v Staghorn Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals [2008] 2 CLJ 121 of achieving a comprehensive and global resolution. Necessary and proper parties

The proposed Plaintiffs are proper parties because there exist questions between them and the Defendant which arise out of and are directly connected with the relief claimed in the existing action. Their presence is also necessary in the practical circumstances of this case.

This Court is satisfied that their joinder will:

(a) secure continuity of the existing proceedings;

(b) ensure that the alleged defects can be adjudicated on their merits;

(c) avoid the commencement of parallel proceedings;

(d) ensure that persons directly affected by the common-property defects are before the Court;

(e) address the risk that the action may otherwise become ineffective through the management conflict; and

(f) enable the Court to make orders which resolve the controversy comprehensively.

“Necessary” under O 15 r 6 should not be interpreted as requiring proof that no order of any kind could technically be made without the proposed party. The question is whether the proposed party’s presence is necessary for an effectual, complete and just adjudication of all matters in dispute.

That requirement is, in this Court’s opinion, satisfied here. The earlier intervention proceedings

The Defendant relies upon the dismissal on 15 November 2023 of an application by certain parcel proprietors to intervene in Suit No JA-24NCvC-707-07/2023. It submits that the present application is barred by res judicata or issue estoppel.

In Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal Teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189, the Supreme Court explained that res judicata prevents parties and their privies from relitigating a matter which has already been adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The doctrine serves the public interest in finality and protects a party from being vexed twice in respect of the same adjudicated matter. The present application does not seek to relitigate the same cause or issue determined in Suit 707. Suit 707 concerned the validity of the meeting of 2 July 2023, the management dispute and injunctive relief relating to the operation of the MC.

The present action concerns alleged defects and the Defendant’s liability as developer. Enclosure 25 is an application to join parcel proprietors as plaintiffs in that defects action following a subsequent change in circumstances, including the consent judgment of 15 August 2025.

The legal and factual setting is therefore materially different. The earlier order does not amount to a final adjudication that the proposed Plaintiffs can never possess a sufficient interest to be joined in any proceedings concerning the development. The necessary identity of cause, issue and circumstances for res judicata or issue estoppel has not been demonstrated. Whether the proposed Plaintiffs may obtain relief

The Defendant submits that only the MC can obtain relief relating to common property and that any judgment must ultimately be for the benefit of the MC. The Court is not presently determining the precise form in which substantive relief may ultimately be framed. Those questions will depend on the pleadings, evidence, applicable statutory provisions and findings made at trial.

The fact that any remedial or monetary relief relating to common property may need to be applied for the collective benefit of the development does not mean that the proposed Plaintiffs have no sufficient interest to participate in the action.

Joinder does not confer upon them title to the common property. It permits them to participate in the determination of the Defendant’s alleged liability and ensures that the claim does not fail through the absence or inactivity of an effective representative claimant.

The question of the ultimate recipient, administration or application of any relief remains open for determination at the proper stage. Whether they could merely be witnesses

The Defendant argues that the proposed Plaintiffs need not be joined because they may be called as witnesses.

The Court disagrees. Their relevance is not confined to their evidential knowledge. They possess a direct interest in the continuation and outcome of the action. Further, a witness cannot control proceedings, give instructions, make submissions, appeal or seek appropriate relief.

Where the existing claimant’s continued status is disputed and the succeeding management body may be conflicted, calling the parcel proprietors merely as witnesses does not provide an adequate procedural solution. Delay

The application was filed on 17 October 2025.

The material needs for joinder crystallised following the consent judgment of 15 August 2025 and the resulting transition of management.

The interval of approximately two months is not inordinate, and there is no evidence that the application was deliberately withheld or filed to derail an imminent trial. The application was therefore made within a reasonable period after the circumstances said to necessitate joinder arose. Proposed amendments

The proposed amendments principally:

(a) add the proposed Plaintiffs to the cause title;

(b) plead their status as parcel proprietors;

(c) explain their interest in the subject matter; and

(d) regularise the continuation of the existing defects claim.

The amendments do not replace the essential factual foundation of the action.

The Defendant remains confronted with the same central allegation that, as developer, it is responsible for defects and deficiencies affecting the common property.

The amendments do not introduce a different development, unrelated transactions or a separate course of allegedly wrongful conduct. Nor do they transform the action from a claim concerning common-property defects into a series of claims for unrelated defects within individual parcels.

The character of the action remains substantially unchanged. Prejudice

The Defendant will suffer no irremediable prejudice from the joinder and amendments. It retains the right to:

(a) amend its Defence if necessary;

(b) plead any statutory or substantive objections;

(c) challenge the standing and entitlement of each plaintiff;

(d) contest the alleged conflict of interest;

(e) challenge the expert and factual evidence;

(f) cross-examine the relevant witnesses; and

(g) raise limitation or other defences where legally available.

The Defendant’s exposure to the existing allegations is not enlarged merely because the persons for whose practical benefit the action was commenced are formally added. Any additional procedural inconvenience is outweighed by the benefit of determining the dispute in one action.

Procedural inconvenience does not amount to legal prejudice where the Defendant retains a full and fair opportunity to meet the case. Inherent and substantive justice

Procedural rules are intended to facilitate adjudication rather than defeat substantive rights. It is trite that principle cannot override clear statutory restrictions.

In the present case, however, the Court is not conferring substantive rights contrary to the strata legislation. It is regulating the parties to an existing action so that serious allegations may be determined fairly and completely.

To refuse joinder would risk:

(a) rendering the present action ineffective;

(b) leaving the alleged defects without adjudication;

(c) permitting a real conflict of interest to determine whether the claim survives;

(d) compelling duplicative proceedings; and

(e) exposing the parcel proprietors to limitation or other procedural prejudice.

This is a case where the Court must exercise its discretion to ensure that justice is not defeated by procedural technicalities. Overall conclusion

This Court finds that the Plaintiff possessed sufficient locus standi when Enclosure 25 was filed.

The Court’s conclusion rests on the unusual factual and procedural circumstances surrounding the disputed meeting, the operative injunction, the COB’s intervention and the consent judgment which structured the eventual management transition.

The Court further finds that the proposed Plaintiffs:

(a) are parcel proprietors directly affected by the alleged defects;

(b) possess substantial and genuine interests in the subject matter;

(c) were actively involved in identifying and pursuing the defects;

(d) share common and substantially identical questions of fact and law with the existing Plaintiff;

(e) are proper parties within O 15 r 6(2)(b)(ii);

(f) are, in the practical circumstances, necessary for the effectual and complete determination of the action; and

(g) have signified their consent to joinder.

The asserted conflict involving the MC provides an additional and compelling reason to ensure that the action is not left solely under the control of a body which may be unwilling or unable to pursue the claim independently.

To refuse the application would risk rendering the entire action ineffective and depriving the parcel owners of a proper forum to ventilate their grievances.

The proposed amendments do not alter the essential nature of the suit and cause no prejudice which cannot be adequately addressed through the ordinary litigation process. The Defendant’s objections based on locus standi, absence of common questions, lack of individual proprietary title, res judicata, unnecessary joinder, delay and prejudice are therefore rejected.

Nothing in this judgment determines the merits of the underlying defects claim. Nor does the joinder amount to a final determination that each proposed Plaintiff is personally entitled to every relief claimed.

Those matters remain for trial. Orders

For the foregoing reasons, this Court orders as follows:

(a) the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 25 is allowed;

(b) the three individual parcel proprietors named in Enclosure 25 are joined as co-plaintiffs in this action;

(c) the Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 3 February 2023 in the terms of the proposed amended Writ and proposed amended Statement of Claim exhibited to the supporting affidavit; and

(d) the costs of Enclosure 25 shall be costs in the cause. Dated: 29 June 2026 -sgd- …………………………………………. (BUDIMAN LUTFI BIN MOHAMED) JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT, JOHOR BAHRU Solicitors for the Plaintiff: N.G Vinod together with Lim Wilson Messrs Law Chambers of Vin Sa & Ian Johor Bahru Solicitors for the Defendant Leonard Yeoh together with Chen Mei Yan Messrs Tay & Partners Kuala Lumpur