whether, having regard to the nature of the offence, the interdiction of the officer would cause the statutory body to suffer loss. [20] Regulation 46(5)(c) explains the reduction in the applicant's salary. In substance, it provides that an officer who is interdicted shall be permitted to receive one-half of his emoluments during the period of interdiction. F. THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON [21] The applicant advances four heads of challenge, in the familiar taxonomy: procedural impropriety, illegality, irrationality and mala fide. The procedural impropriety ground is the load-bearing one. It is that the first respondent failed to take into account the mandatory considerations in Regulation 46(4)(a) to (d), and that this failure is the more telling because no "show cause" or representation procedure precedes an interdiction under Regulation 46, so that the statutory considerations are the principal safeguard against an arbitrary interdiction. The illegality and irrationality grounds are pleaded as the consequences of the same alleged default; the mala fide ground is pleaded in support. G. THE TEST AT THE LEAVE STAGE [22] The right to apply for judicial review, and the requirement of leave, are governed by Order 53 of the RC 2012, the material terms of which are set out above. The function of the leave requirement is well settled and was not in contest before me. [23] The applicable principles are conveniently collected in the authorities to which the applicant referred. In Chin Mee Keong & Ors v Pesuruhjaya Sukan [2007] 6 MLJ 193, the Court of Appeal adopted the guidance of the Supreme Court in Tuan Hj Sarip Hamid & Anor v Patco Malaysia Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ 442, which in turn approved the English Court of Appeal's formulation in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Rukshanda Begum (1990) COD 107. In short: leave should be granted where there is a point fit for further investigation on a full inter partes basis; leave should be refused where there is no arguable case; and where the court is uncertain, the proper course is to invite the putative respondent to make representations at an inter partes leave hearing that is not to approach the scale of the substantive review. [24] To the same effect is YAM Tunku Dato' Seri Nadzaruddin Ibni Tuanku Ja'afar v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2003] 5 MLJ 128, cited with approval in Chin Mee Keong, where it was emphasised, on the authority of Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, that the court at the leave stage does not enter upon the matter in any depth; if a quick perusal of the available material discloses what might, on fuller consideration, turn out to be an arguable case for the relief claimed, leave ought to be granted in the exercise of a judicial discretion. That discretion is distinct from the discretion exercised at the substantive hearing, when all the evidence is in and the matter has been fully argued. [25] The threshold is, accordingly, a low one. It is not the office of the Court at this stage to conduct a mini-trial, to resolve contested questions of fact, or to construe the disputed regulation definitively. The questions are confined to three: whether the respondents are public authorities amenable to review; whether the applicant is a person adversely affected; and whether the application discloses an arguable case fit for further consideration and is not frivolous or vexatious. H. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES AMENABLE TO REVIEW [26] On amenability, the applicant relied upon the decision of the Federal Court in Members of the Commission of Enquiry on Video Clip Recording of Images of A Person Purported to be an Advocate and Solicitor Speaking on Telephone on Matters of Appointment of Judges v Tun Dato' Seri Ahmad Fairuz bin Dato' Sheikh Abdul Halim [2011] 6 MLJ 490. There the Federal Court, adopting the reasoning of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935, held that for a decision to be amenable to review there must be a decision (or a refusal to decide) by a decision-maker which affects the aggrieved party by altering his rights or obligations, or by depriving him of a benefit he had been permitted to enjoy. [27] Two propositions emerge that bear on the present application, and they pull in the applicant's favour. First, that the second respondent is a public authority is not seriously open to argument. It is a statutory body corporate established under federal law (Act 30, read with P.U.(A) 43/2007 and P.U.(A) 45/2007), exercising powers conferred by written law, including the regulation of the terms of service and discipline of its employees (Constitution of UTeM, section 4(1)(r) and (v)). It falls squarely within the definition of "public authority" in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution, education being a Federal subject under Item 13(a) of List I of the Ninth Schedule. The first respondent, as a disciplinary committee constituted under Act 605 and exercising the statutory disciplinary power, is equally a public authority for this purpose. [28] Secondly, and importantly, the very feature that proved fatal to the application in Ahmad Fairuz is absent here. In that case the Commission, though a public authority, was held not to be a decision-making body: its report comprised mere findings and recommendations which bound no one. The interdiction order in the present case is of a wholly different character. It is an operative and binding determination which, on its own terms, excludes the applicant from his office and halves his emoluments. It is, at the least, strongly arguable that such an order is a decision affecting the applicant's rights and depriving him of a benefit within the principle in Ahmad Fairuz and Council of Civil Service Unions, and is therefore amenable to certiorari. [29] The respondents may, at the substantive stage, contend that an interdiction is an interlocutory administrative step taken pending the disposal of criminal and disciplinary proceedings, and not a final disciplinary punishment, and that its juridical character differs accordingly. That is a respectable argument, but it is not one that disposes of the matter at the threshold; if anything, it identifies a question of law fit for argument inter partes. For the purposes of leave, it is sufficient that the order is arguably a reviewable decision. I so hold. I. WHETHER THE APPLICANT IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED [30] The requirement in Order 53 rule 2(4) is plainly satisfied. The interdiction order deprives the applicant of one-half of his monthly emoluments for an indefinite period and excludes him from the discharge of his office, with the attendant prejudice to his standing and prospects. A more direct and immediate impact upon a person's rights and benefits is difficult to imagine. The applicant is, without question, a person adversely affected by the decision of a public authority within the meaning of the rule. J. WHETHER THERE IS AN ARGUABLE CASE FIT FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION [31] I turn to the heart of the matter. The applicant's central complaint is that the impugned letter, on its face, records only that the first respondent considered the criminal charge, and discloses no consideration of the matters which Regulation 46(4)(a) to (d) requires to be weighed. That contention is reinforced, the applicant says, by the second respondent's own official statement of 8 December 2025, which declared the charge to be unconnected with the governance and financial affairs of the University. If that be so, then on the applicant's case at least two of the statutory considerations — limb (a), whether the offence is directly connected with the officer's duties, and limb (d), whether the interdiction would cause the statutory body to suffer loss — point away from interdiction, yet appear, on the face of the letter, not to have been addressed. In my judgment this raises a serious question fit for fuller investigation. It is at least arguable that, where a statute prescribes mandatory considerations as the precondition of an interdiction made without any prior show-cause procedure, a decision that recites only the bare fact of the charge has failed to take into account relevant and mandatory considerations, and is on that account amenable to review for procedural impropriety or illegality. Whether the recital in the letter is exhaustive of the first respondent's deliberations, and whether Regulation 46(4) in truth governs an interdiction made under Regulation 46(1)(a) or operates only in some other category of case, are precisely the kinds of question of fact and of construction respectively that ought to be resolved on full argument inter partes, and not foreclosed at the leave stage. [33] I should be candid as to the remaining grounds. The grounds of irrationality and mala fide, as presently pleaded, are thinly particularised; little is advanced beyond assertion to support a charge of bad faith, and a court would in due course expect those grounds to be made good by something more concrete. But it is not the law that every ground must independently survive scrutiny at the leave stage. Where, as here, one ground - procedural impropriety - plainly crosses the threshold, leave is not to be refused merely because other grounds are weaker; nor is it the function of the Court at this stage to dissect the grounds one by one. It will be for the applicant to make good such of his grounds as he can at the substantive hearing, and for the respondents to answer them on affidavit. [34] Applying the guidance in Sarip Hamid, Chin Mee Keong and Nadzaruddin, I am satisfied that a quick perusal of the material discloses a case that may, on further consideration, turn out to be arguable in the applicant's favour. The application is neither frivolous nor vexatious. The threshold for leave is met. K. THE POSITION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHAMBERS [35] By the letter of the State Legal Advisor of Melaka dated 8 June 2026 (Enclosure 8), written for and on behalf of the Attorney General, the Attorney General's Chambers conveyed that it had no objection to this application at the leave stage. That the public law guardian sees no objection is a matter the Court properly takes into account, and it confirms the conclusion already reached. It is, however, no substitute for the Court's own satisfaction. Leave is a judicial discretion, not a concession to be granted for the asking; the absence of objection neither relieves the applicant of the need to demonstrate an arguable case nor binds the Court. Here the threshold is independently met, and the want of objection simply removes any contrary consideration. L. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [36] For the reasons given, the respondents are arguably public authorities amenable to judicial review; the applicant is a person adversely affected; and the application discloses an arguable case fit for further consideration, principally on the ground of procedural impropriety attending the alleged non-consideration of the mandatory matters in Regulation 46(4)(a) to (d). Nothing in these grounds is to be read as a concluded view on the lawfulness of the interdiction order, which abides the substantive hearing. [37] Accordingly, I make the following orders: