Balakrishnan A/L Muniandy v 1. ) Timbalan Menteri dalam Negeri, Malaysia (JB-25-5-04/2025)

KERAJAAN MALAYSIA ...RESPONDENTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an application for judicial review by the Applicant seeking, inter alia, an order of certiorari to quash the Restriction Order dated 14.03.2025 issued by the First Respondent pursuant to Section 6(3) of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985 ("the 1985 Act"), as well as claims for general damages and exemplary damages under Order 53 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC 2012"). [2] Leave to commence judicial review proceedings was granted on 16.06.2025. [3] Upon the exchange of affidavits and written submissions, the matter came before me for hearing. [4] The Applicant's challenge is directed principally at the legality of the Restriction Order itself, in particular whether the First Respondent acted ultra vires the 1985 Act by imposing a condition stating that the Applicant "may be fitted with an electronic monitoring device", whereas Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act provides that a restricted person "shall be attached with an electronic monitoring device". Brief Background [5] The material facts are largely not in dispute. The Applicant was arrested on 30.01.2025 under Section 3(1) of the 1985 Act. Further periods of detention were thereafter authorised in accordance with the relevant statutory mechanism. [6] On 14.03.2025, the First Respondent, having considered the completed investigation report and the investigating officer's report, decided that it was unnecessary to detain the Applicant, but necessary to subject him to control and supervision. Accordingly, a Restriction Order under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act was issued against the Applicant for a period of two years commencing 14.03.2025. [7] The Restriction Order imposed several restrictions and conditions, including the condition at paragraph (i) which reads: "(i) dia boleh dipasang dengan suatu peranti pengawasan elektronik." [8] The Applicant challenges the validity of the order on several grounds. However, having considered the record and the parties' submissions, I find that the issue which is truly dispositive of this application is whether the condition at paragraph (i) is lawful. Issues for Determination [9] In my view, the issues that properly arise for determination are as follows:

Whether the Applicant's challenge falls within the permissible scope of judicial review under Section 11C(1) of the 1985 Act.

Whether the First Respondent has power under section 6(3) of the 1985 Act read with s 6(6) of the 1985 Act to alter the content of a statutory condition enacted by Parliament.

Whether the use of the word "may" in paragraph (i) of the Restriction Order renders the order ultra vires, void, or defective on its face.

Whether the failure to state the expiry date of the restriction on the face of the order is fatal; and

If the foregoing is answered in the Applicant's favour, what relief is appropriate.

Whether the remaining issues require determination. Applicable Law Judicial review jurisdiction [10] It is not in dispute that the High Court's judicial review jurisdiction is grounded in Section 25 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 read with paragraph 1 of the Schedule. This principle has long been recognised, inter alia, in Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd v Zaid bin Hj Mohd Noh [1997] 1 MLJ 789 and reaffirmed in Koperal Zainal Mohd Ali & Ors V. Selvi Narayan (Pentadbir Bersama Estet Dan Tanggungan Chandran Perumal, Si Mati) & Anor [2021] 6 CLJ 157. [11] However, in the context of the 1985 Act, Section 11C(1) of the 1985 Act provides as follows: 11C Judicial review of act or decision of Yang di-Pertuan Agong and Minister

There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision.

The exception in regard to any question on compliance with any procedural requirement in subsection (1) shall not apply where the grounds are as described in section 6A. [12] Accordingly, the court does not sit as an appellate tribunal over the Minister's subjective satisfaction. Nevertheless, the question whether an act or decision was truly made "in accordance with this Act" remains justiciable. Where a decision-maker acts outside the limits of the statutory power conferred, or misconstrues the scope of that power, the protection in Section 11C(1) of the 1985 Act cannot be invoked to shield an act which is, in substance, unauthorised by the Act itself. [13] The principle that a tribunal or decision-maker has no jurisdiction to commit an error of law is stated in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama-sama Serbaguna Sungai Gelugor Dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 and Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd v Transport Workers' Union [1995] 2 MLJ 317. [14]In R Rama Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia [1997] 1 MLJ 145, the Federal Court accepted that judicial review may arise on grounds of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. This can be seen as follows :- In this context, it is useful to note how Lord Diplock (at pp 410-411) defined the three grounds of review, to wit, (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. This is how he put it: By 'illegality' as a ground for Judicial Review I mean that the decision maker must understand directly the law that regulates his decision making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exerciseable. By 'irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness' (see Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the courts' exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though undefinable mistake of law by the decision maker. 'Irrationality' by now can stand on its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by Judicial Review. I have described the third head as 'procedural impropriety' rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failing to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to Judicial Review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. Lord Diplock also mentioned 'proportionality' as a possible fourth ground of review which called for development. [15] I accept that Section 11C(1) of the 1985 Act restricts judicial review as to the merits of the Minister's subjective satisfaction. However, it does not bar the court from examining whether a Restriction Order, on its face, contains a condition not authorised by the Act. That is a question of legality, not merely administrative merits. Section 6 of the 1985 Act [16]Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act stipulates that :-

If the Minister is satisfied that for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) it is necessary that control and supervision should be exercised over any person or that restrictions and conditions should be imposed upon that person in respect of his activities, freedom of movement or places of residence or employment, but for that purpose it is unnecessary to detain him, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as a "restriction order") imposing upon that person (hereinafter referred to as a "restricted person") all or any of the following restrictions and conditions:

that he shall be subject to the supervision of the police for any period not exceeding two years;

that he shall reside within the limits of any State or any Federal Territory or any area thereof specified in the restriction order;

that he shall not transfer his residence to any other area without the written authority of the Chief Police Officer or the State of Federal Territory concerned;

that except in so far as may be otherwise provided by the restriction order, he shall not leave the area within which he resides without the written authority of the Chief Police Officer of the State of Federal Territory concerned;

that he shall at all times keep the Officer in Charge of the Police District in which he resides notified of the house or place in which he resides;

that he shall at such time or times as may be specified in the restriction order present himself at the nearest police station;

that he shall remain within doors, or within such area as may be defined in the restriction order, between such hours as may be specified in the restriction order, unless he obtains special permission to the contrary from the Officer in Charge of the Police District;

that except in so far as may be otherwise provided by the restriction order, he shall not enter any area specified in the restriction order; (ha) that he shall use only equipment and facilities of communication which are declared to and approved by the Chief Police Officer of the State or Federal Territory of the area in which he is required to reside as may be provided in the restriction order; [（ha) Ins. Act A1510:s.6] (hb) that except so far as may be otherwise provided by the restriction order, he shall not access the internet; [(hb) Ins. Act A1510:s.6] (hc) that he shall be attached with an electronic monitoring device; [(hc) Ins. Act A1510:s.6]

that he shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour;

that he shall enter into a bond, with or without sureties as the Minister may direct and in such amount as may be specified in the restriction order, for his due compliance with the restrictions and conditions imposed on him by the restriction order. [17] Basically, it empowers the Minister, if satisfied that it is necessary to impose control and supervision but not necessary to order detention, to make a restriction order imposing "all or any of the following restrictions and conditions". [18] Among the listed conditions is Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act: "That he shall be attached with an electronic monitoring device." [19] Section 6(6) of the 1985 Act provides:

The Minister may, from time to time, by notice in writing served on a person who is the subject of a restriction order, vary, cancel or add to any restrictions or conditions imposed upon that person by that order, and the restrictions or conditions so varied and any additional restrictions or conditions so imposed shall, unless sooner cancelled, continue in force for the unexpired portion of the period specified under subsection (4) or under subsection (1) of section 11A. [20] The issue is whether, at the initial stage of issuing a Restriction Order under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act, the Minister may take a statutory condition enacted by Parliament and alter its content specifically, by substituting the mandatory word "shall" with the permissive word "may". Analysis Issue 1: Whether this challenge is barred by Section 11C(1) of the 1985 Act [21] I reject the Respondents' preliminary objection that the issue is non-justiciable on the basis that it concerns the Minister's discretion. It is true that the choice whether to impose one, some, or all the conditions under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act is a matter of discretion. However, the issue here is not whether the Minister ought to have selected electronic monitoring; rather, it is whether, having selected the condition in Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act, the Minister may alter its normative content. [22] In my view, such a challenge goes to legality—namely, whether the decision was made within the limits of the statutory power. If the condition imposed is no longer one authorised by Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act, the act cannot be said to have been done "in accordance with this Act". In such circumstances, Section 11C(1) of the 1985 Act does not operate as a bar. [23] This approach accords with the general principle that the court may review whether the decision-maker correctly understood the law governing the exercise of the power and gave effect to it: R Rama Chandran (supra). Issue 2: Whether the Minister may alter a statutory condition under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act [24] The Respondents submit that the phrase "all or any of the following restrictions and conditions" in Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act, read together with Section 6(6) of the 1985 Act, confers a wide discretion on the Minister not only to select conditions, but also to modify, adapt, or reformulate them. With respect, I am unable to accept that submission. [25] On a plain and ordinary reading, Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act confers power on the Minister to select any condition from the list enacted by Parliament. It does not confer power to re-legislate those conditions. The words "all or any" denote selection from within the list, not the creation of a new list. [26] Had Parliament intended to empower the Minister to craft conditions at large, unconstrained by the form or content set out in paragraphs (a) to (j), it could have used clear language to that effect. The 1985 Act contains no such language. [27] Nor do I agree that Section 6(6) of the 1985 Act may be relied upon to expand Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act so as to permit the Minister to alter the statutory language at the point of making the Restriction Order. By its terms, Section 6(6) of the 1985 Act operates after a Restriction Order is in existence. It allows the Minister, "from time to time", to vary, cancel, or add to restrictions or conditions already imposed by that order. It is not a licence to rewrite the conditions enacted by Parliament at the outset. [28] The doctrine of harmonious construction cannot be used to manufacture a power not expressed by the statute. As emphasised by the Federal Court in Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914, the court ought not to create procedural requirements not provided for. The same principle applies here: the court ought not to create substantive powers not provided for. [29] Where personal liberty and freedom of movement are affected, the court's approach must be strict. In Poh Chin Kay v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia [1990] 2 MLJ 297, the Supreme Court cautioned that powers of detention without trial cannot be exercised by inference; the power must be clear and unambiguous. In my judgment, the same strictness applies to powers that impose serious restrictions on movement. [30] Furthermore, in Suresh Munadas v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & 3 Ors [2008] CLJU 626, YA Tan Sri Datuk Nallini Pathmanathan (then high court judge) held that the Minister's power is strictly confined to the implementation of statutory provisions as expressly provided under the Act, and the Minister cannot act outside the scope of powers conferred by the statute. The Court expressly stated as follows:- "The principle is clear. Where the body or person empowered under the statute acts outside the scope of powers granted by the statute then its or his act is ultra vires and amounts to a nullity, allowing judicial review to lie." [31] I therefore hold that under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act, the Minister's power is to select whether to impose conditions from among those listed. Once a particular statutory condition is selected, it must be imposed in the form prescribed by the Act, and not in a form unilaterally modified. Issue 3: Effect of using "may" in place of "shall" [32] I turn now to paragraph (i) of the Restriction Order, which provides: "dia boleh dipasang dengan suatu peranti pengawasan elektronik." [33] I find an apparent inconsistency between that condition and Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act, which states: "That he shall be attached with an electronic monitoring device." [34] The distinction between "shall" and "may" is not merely cosmetic. It goes to the nature of the obligation itself. In statutory language, "shall" ordinarily connotes a mandatory requirement, whereas "may" is permissive or discretionary, depending on context. [35] By using the word "may", the Restriction Order converts a statutory mandatory condition into an optional (or, at the very least, uncertain) condition. This gives rise to several legal consequences: (a) it creates a condition different from that authorised by Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act; (b) it introduces uncertainty as to who has the final choice or authority to enforce the condition. [36] I agree with the Applicant's submission that if the Minister elects to impose the condition under Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act, that condition must be imposed as a statutory obligation. If the Minister does not wish to impose it, he is at liberty not to select it. What he cannot do is to select the condition and simultaneously alter it into a form not recognised by the Act. [37] The Respondents contend that the use of "may" accords with the discretionary nature of Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act. I reject that contention. The Minister's discretion lies in the decision whether to impose the condition at all. Once he chooses to include it, the content of the condition is not a matter for unilateral alteration. [38] I also take note of the First Respondent's affidavit which, on its face, asserts his belief that he possesses the discretion to "amend or add" any condition under Section 6(3)(a) to (j) of the 1985 Act as he sees fit. If this is indeed the case, it only serves to reinforce my conclusion that the First Respondent acted under a misapprehension of law regarding the scope of his statutory powers. [39] In administrative law, where a decision-maker proceeds on a misunderstanding of the limits of his statutory power, the decision is tainted by illegality. That proposition is elementary. [40] I therefore find that the condition at paragraph (i) is inconsistent with Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act, and that the Restriction Order is, on its face, defective. [41] The next question is whether the defect is severable, or whether it vitiates the Restriction Order as a whole. On the facts of this case, I am of the view that it vitiates the entire order for the following reasons. [42] First, a restriction order under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act is a single act arising from the Minister's subjective satisfaction and comprising a set of conditions selected by him as a regulatory package. The court cannot speculate whether the Minister would have issued the same order in the same form without paragraph (i), or with a different formulation of paragraph (i). [43] Second, this is not merely a case of striking out an ancillary clause. It concerns the manner in which the Minister understood and exercised the power in Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act itself. Where the order is shown to have been made upon a misconstruction of the statutory power, its legality is undermined. [44] Third, where restrictions on liberty are in issue, the court should adopt a strict approach to the validity of the order. As stated by the Supreme Court in Ng Hong Choon v Timbalan Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri [1994] 4 CLJ 47, in matters affecting personal liberty, an applicant is entitled to the benefit of a technical defect which goes to the validity of the order. This can be seen as follows :- In a matter so fundamental and important as the liberty of the subject, strict compliance with statutory requirements must be observed in depriving a person of his liberty. The material provisions of the law authorising detention without trial must be strictly construed and safeguards which the law deliberately provides for the protection of any citizen must be liberally interpreted. Where the detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by the law the detention is bad and the person detained is entitled to be released forthwith. [45] Fourth, having considered the legislative purpose of preventive statutes of this nature, I note that the 1985 Act - to which courts often look by analogy in preventive regimes - was enacted, as stated in its preamble :- "An Act to provide for the preventive detention of persons associated with any activity relating to or involving the trafficking in dangerous drugs." [46] In my judgment, where the Act employs mandatory language such as "shall be attached", any order which substitutes that requirement with permissive language such as "may" is fatally defective. It converts a statutory duty into a discretionary power, thereby undermining Parliament's intention to impose effective preventive control and supervision. Such a departure is not merely a matter of form, but goes to the legality of the decision itself, rendering it ultra vires and contrary to the statutory scheme. [47] For these reasons, I hold that the Restriction Order dated 14.03.2025 is ultra vires Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act and is therefore void and of no effect. Issue 4: Effect of the failure to state the expiry date on the face of the Restriction Order [48] Further, I am of the view that even though the Restriction Order states that the restriction is for two years commencing 14.03.2025, the failure to state the expiry date expressly renders the order uncertain. An order restricting an individual's liberty must be clear, precise, and free from doubt as to its duration. [49] Where an order merely states that the person is restricted for "two (2) years from 14 March 2025" without specifying the end date, the person subject to the order is left to calculate the expiry, potentially by reference to interpretive principles. That is unsatisfactory in a regime affecting liberty. [50] In this regard, I refer to Habib Hasan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia & Ors [2004] 8 CLJ 207, where the High Court emphasised the importance of stating, with precision, the commencement and expiry dates of an order affecting the applicant, in the following terms: Walau bagaimanapun, Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa satu kesilapan yang serius dan parah (fatal) didapati di Perintah yang dikeluarkan oleh majistret pada 1 Julai 2003 yang gagal menyatakan bilakah tarikh pemohon akan mula menjalani rawatan dan pemulihan di Pusat Pemulihan Sg. Petani, bilakah tarikh rawatan dan pemulihan diakhiri dan bilakah tarikh pengawasan oleh pegawai polis dimulakan. Oleh kerana ada timbul sedikit sekatan (restraint) terhadap pemohon di atas perintah tersebut walaupun perintah tersebut adalah hanya untuk tujuan pemohon menjalani rawatan dan pemulihan, mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa adalah wajar dan perlu tarikhnya dicatit dengan tepat bilakah rawatan dan pemulihan dimulakan dan bilakah tarikhnya diakhiri dan bilakah tarikh pengawasan oleh pegawai polis dimulakan. Mahkamah ini berpendapat bahawa kegagalan untuk mencatatkan tarikh-tarikh tersebut di perintah tersebut adalah satu kesilapan yang material dan serius dan tidak boleh diketepikan (set aside) sebagai satu perkara yang remeh atau kesilapan teknikal atau boleh dibaiki (curable). Kesilapan untuk mencatat tarikh-tarikh tersebut adalah satu perkara yang menyentuh sehingga ke akar umbi perintah tersebut dan akibatnya membawa tidak sah kepada perintah tersebut. Walaupun pemohon boleh dikatakan seorang penagih dadah, ia masih berhak untuk dilindungi di bawah undang-undang yang sama seperti orang-orang lain di bawah art. 8 Perlembagaan Malaysia dan beliau harus tahu bilakah rawatan dan pemulihan dimulakan dan bilakah ia diakhiri dan tarikh-tarikh ini harus dimaklumkan kepada Pusat Pemulihan berkenaan. [51] In Seah Ah Chiew v Public Prosecutor [2006] 1 LNS 105, the Court also emphasised the importance of clearly specifying the commencement and expiry dates of a supervision order, as follows :-

This court is of the view that the Supervision order which was issued by the learned Magistrate on 1.8.2005 should contain both the dates, being the date of commencement and the date of completion of the Supervision for reasons first, the conditions contained in the said Supervision order has a restraining effect on the offender, in the instant case, against the accused as her liberty is restricted and secondly, the said Supervision order which does not contain the dates for the period of two years would result in practical difficulties for the officer to enforce the order and for the accused to strictly comply, and thirdly, it leaves it open to debate, challenge and several interpretation. [52] In my view, such an omission introduces uncertainty in the implementation of the order and leaves room for inconsistent interpretation or enforcement. In the context of an order affecting liberty, even a seemingly minor difference in duration matters: the law requires the limit of the restriction to be determined with precision and without ambiguity. The Applicant's rights under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution are better safeguarded where the expiry date is stated clearly and accurately. [53] I therefore hold that the failure to state the expiry date clearly is a substantive and fatal defect which affects the validity of the order. Issue 5: Other issues [54] In light of my finding on the principal issue and my conclusion that the Restriction Order is unlawful, it is unnecessary for me to make definitive findings on every other issue raised. [55] For completeness, I would state briefly that I am not inclined to accept the Applicant's contention that the failure to furnish reasons and a statement of facts constitutes a mandatory non-compliance in the context of a restriction order under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act. On the face of the statute, Section 9 of the 1985 Act and Article 151 of the Federal Constitution are more directly applicable to detention orders under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act, rather than restriction orders under Section 6(3) of the 1985 Act. [56] Similarly, issues concerning the timeline for the Applicant's arrival at the place of restriction and the absence of a stated expiry date raise matters that are not trivial. However, as I have quashed the Restriction Order on the ground of ultra vires, it is unnecessary for me to decide whether those issues, standing alone, would have sufficed to invalidate the order. Issue 6: Whether the claims for general and exemplary damages should be allowed [57] I turn to the claims for general damages and exemplary damages. [58] In my judgment, the Applicant's claim under this head cannot succeed. [59] The fact that the Applicant succeeds in obtaining an order of certiorari does not, without more, entitle him to damages. The quashing of an administrative decision and the entitlement to compensation are distinct matters; one does not necessarily follow from the other. [60] Here, the Restriction Order is quashed because of a legal defect in the manner the statutory power was exercised. It is not quashed on the basis that the Applicant was uninvolved in the activities investigated, nor on the basis that the authorities acted without any foundation, nor upon proof of mala fides, oppression, or arbitrariness. [61] My finding is narrow but firm: the Minister imposed a condition in a form not authorised by the Act. That is sufficient to invalidate the order. It does not, without more, establish an entitlement to damages. [62] General damages require more than an administrative decision later quashed on a point of legal invalidity. There must be a demonstrable basis that the invalidity itself constitutes a compensable wrong. On the facts before me, such a basis has not been shown. [63] The position regarding exemplary damages is clearer. Exemplary damages are not awarded for every error in administrative law. They are reserved for more serious situations, such as conduct that is oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional in a significant sense. No such findings have been made in the present case. There is no evidence of mala fides, improper motive, or oppressive abuse of power. [64] The court must be cautious not to equate ultra vires with oppressiveness. Not every ultra vires act warrants exemplary damages. Otherwise, every invalid administrative decision would automatically open the door to punitive awards. That is not the law. [65] I accordingly dismiss the Applicant's claims for general damages and exemplary damages. [66] In view of the conclusion reached above, it is unnecessary for me to determine the remaining arguments advanced by the parties. The findings I have made are sufficient to dispose of this application.

An order of certiorari is granted to quash the Restriction Order dated 14.03.2025 issued by the First Respondent against the Applicant pursuant to Section 6(3) of the Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985.

It is declared that the Restriction Order is ultra vires Section 6(3)(hc) of the 1985 Act and is void and of no effect.

The Applicant's claims for general damages and exemplary/aggravated damages under Order 53 rule 5 of the Rules of Court 2012 are dismissed.

All consequences and further steps arising solely from the quashed Restriction Order shall cease forthwith; and

There shall be no order as to costs. Conclusion [67] Before I conclude, I emphasise that this judgment does not in any way address or assess the merits of the investigative material which led to the authority's subjective satisfaction. This decision turns solely on a more fundamental principle: where Parliament has prescribed the form and content of powers that may be used to restrict a person's liberty, the Executive must act strictly within those limits and not exceed them. [68] In matters affecting personal liberty and freedom of movement, compliance with the law is not a mere formality; it is a condition precedent to the validity of State action. [69] The Applicant's application is allowed, confined solely to the findings detailed in paragraph. DATED 7th APRIL 2026 YA DATUK ZAMRI BIN BAKAR JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER HIGH COURT (1) MUAR JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM Counsel for Applicant: MERSS ZAFRI & PARTNERS Counsel for Respondents: LEGAL ADVISOR'S OFFICE