Bangsar Heights Pavilion Sdn. Bhd. v Brumasi Holdings Sdn. Bhd. (JA-28PW-9-02/2025)

Lampiran

Lampiran 1. Kedudukan Undang-Undang [26] Seksyen 471 (1) Akta Syarikat 2016 menyatakan seperti berikut:- “(1) When a winding up order has been made or an interim liquidator has been appointed, no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except by leave of the Court and in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes. (2) The application for leave under subsection (1) shall be made in the Court granting the winding up order and shall be served on the liquidator. (3) The office copy of the order for leave under subsection (1) shall be lodged by the applicant referred to in subsection 470(1) with the Registrar and with the Official Receiver within fourteen days from the making of the order.” [27] Seksyen 471 (1) Akta Syarikat 2016 yang menyentuh tentang kebenaran juga mirip dengan peruntukan Seksyen 226 (3) Akta Syarikat 1965 yang telah dimansuhkan sebelum ini iaitu:- “(3) When a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed no action or proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except- (a) by leave of the Court; and (b) in accordance with such terms as the Court imposes. [28] Jelas berdasarkan peruntukan di atas yang P perlu membuktikan yang tuntutan mereka ke atas R tidak boleh dikendalikan (dealt with) oleh Mahkamah Penggulungan dan kedua yang P mempunyai tuntutan prima facie ke atas R. Rujuk Shencourt Sdn Bhd v Perumahan NCK Sdn Bhd [2008] 3 CLJ 582 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- “[12] It is clear, based on the above cited case authority, leave to proceed would only be granted when the plaintiff's claim cannot be adequately dealt with in winding up of the defendant's company or when the plaintiff is seeking a remedy which cannot be given in the winding up of the defendant's company.” [29] Rujuk Mosbert Berhad (In Liquidation) v Stella D’Cruz [1985] CLJU 47 di mana Mahkamah Agung (ketika itu) memutuskan seperti berikut:- “Notwithstanding that the giving of leave to commence legal proceedings against the appellant on the ex parte application of the respondent constituted an irregularity we are further satisfied that no substantial injustice had been caused to the appellant in any way [see section 355(1) of the Act], and we find that there is no merit in this ground of appeal. In re Cuthbert Lead Smelting Co Ltd (1886) WN 84 it was held that if the applicant could obtain all the relief in the winding up leave would be refused. In short, the Court will always give an applicant leave if his claim cannot be dealt with adequately in the winding up or if the remedy he seeks cannot be given to him in a winding up proceedings.” [30] Rujuk juga kes Dubbon Bhd (In Liquidation) v Wisma Cosway Management Corp [2020] 6 CLJ 589 (Mahkamah Persekutuan):- "[41] As such the High Court judge was correct in applying the test he did, premised on the well known principles cited, inter alia, in Mosbert Berhad (in liquidation) v. Stella D' Cruz [1985] CLJU 47; [1985] 2 MLJ 446 and more recently by the Court of Appeal in Ganda Setia Cemerlang Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Maika Holdings Bhd (in liquidation) [2018] 2 CLJ 401; [2017] 6 MLJ 661;. The test is that set out in the old English decision of Re Cuthbert Lead Smelting Co Ltd [1886] WN 84 which held that if the party applying for leave could obtain all the relief in the winding up, leave would be refused. If that party's claim cannot however be adequately dealt with in the winding up or if the remedy sought cannot be granted in the winding up proceedings then leave would be granted. (Emphasis added.)" [31] Rujuk juga Re Coastal Constructions Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [1994] 13 ACSR 329:- “... there was a necessity to examine the amount and seriousness of the claim, the degree of complexity of the legal and factual issues involved and lastly, the stage which the proceedings have reached. It must not be forgotten that the applicant too must establish that he or she has a prima facie case meaning that the applicant must show that there is a real dispute between the parties. (Zempilas v. JN Taylor Holdings Ltd (In Prov Liq) [1991] 3 ACRS 755 (SC SA); Vagrand Pty Ltd (In Liq) v. Fielding [1993] 41 FCR 550 [113 ALR 128]).” [32] Berkenaan apa yang terjumlah kepada tuntutan Prima Facie di bawah Seksyen 471 Akta Syarikat 2016, ianya merujuk kepada satu pertikaian yang nyata, benar dan serius serta mempunyai kes prima facie tanpa perlu untuk merit tuntutan tersebut diputuskan Mahkamah ini terlebih dahulu. Rujuk kes Ganda Setia Cemerlang Sdn Bhd v Maika Holdings [2018] 2 CLJ 401 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan menyatakan seperti berikut:- [43] Again, here, we are reminded of what is required in establishing a prima facie case. In Mesuntung Properties, it was clearly explained that in the context of s. 226(3), what needs to be shown is that there is a serious dispute between the parties that warrants a trial to determine the truth. The court does not delve into the merits of the dispute but examines the complaints, to see if these complaints are genuine or are they baseless and devoid of any substance. If the answer is in the affirmative, resources of the respondent ought not to be wasted defending a baseless or frivolous claim. ……. [47] It is not for this court to evaluate to see the truth of these warring contentions and to determine the real position of the squatters or even the matter of location or relocation of a temple on the subject land; that is for the civil court to hear and determine. The same goes for the responsibility to apply for sub-division of the bigger plot; whether the respondent, who retains a portion of the bigger plot, though held on trust, can still make such an application. For the purposes of s. 263(2), the appellants need to show that their dispute is real, genuine and serious and that they have a prima facie case. We have no doubt that in that regard; the appellants have amply satisfied those considerations. The allegation of breaches of agreement by the respondent is not baseless or without substance. They cannot be said to be frivolous and an attempt to waste the respondent's funds or even to score an advantage over the creditors of the respondent. Permohonan P [33] Berdasarkan otoriti-otoriti yang dikemukakan di atas, Mahkamah memutuskan yang tuntutan melibatkan P dan R jelas tidak boleh melalui proses di Mahkamah Penggulungan memandangkan ianya melibatkan isu perlanggaran Penghakiman Persetujuan dalam Guaman 171 serta isu berkenaan Surat Kuasa Wakil Tersebut yang mana-mana keduanya setakat ini masih berkuatkuasa dan terpakai. [34] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan P yang tuntutan-tuntutan melibatkan P dan D berkisarkan campur tangan salah serta perbuatan-perbuatan salah oleh R1 dan R2 dalam kapasiti mereka masing-masing. [35] Dalam erti kata lain, tuntutan melibatkan P dan D bukan berkenaan urusan penggulungan syarikat untuk dikendalikan oleh Mahkamah Penggulungan tetapi sebaliknya untuk dibicarakan di Mahkamah Sivil. [36] Mahkamah selanjutnya memutuskan yang P mempunyai satu kes prima facie ke atas R seperti dihujahkan mereka serta dinyatakan dalam afidavit mereka yang mana jelas terdapatnya dakwaan bahawa R telah bertindak bertentangan dengan penghakiman persetujuan dalam guaman 171. [37] Tambahan pula, penghakiman persetujuan dalam guaman 171 masih sah berkuatkuasa serta mengikat pihak-pihak termasuklah R dalam kes ini. Surat Kuasa Wakil tersebut juga kekal sah sama seperti penghakiman persetujuan dalam guaman 171. Rujuk Hartecon JV Sdn Bhd & Anor v Hartela Contractors Ltd [1997] 2 CLJ 104 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan seperti berikut:- "We cannot over-emphasise the proposition that once a judge makes a ruling, substantive or procedural, final or interlocutory, it must be adhered to and may not be reopened willy-nilly." [38] R1 juga telah melepaskan segala hak mereka di bawah perjanjian tersebut dan telah mengakui perkara tersebut. [39] Niat R juga jelas di sini yang mana notis-notis mereka masing-masing bertarikh Januari dan Jun 2025 menunjukkan mereka mahu membatalkan surat kuasa wakil tersebut secara unilateral sedangkan perbuatan sedemikian boleh terjumlah kepada perlanggaran penghakiman persetujuan dalam guaman 171. [40] Maka, mengambil kira perkara-perkara di atas, jelas tindakan R2 mengeluarkan notis-notis pada Januari dan Jun 2025 boleh terjumlah kepada satu perbuatan salah dan bercanggah dengan penghakiman persetujuan dalam Guaman 171. Terdapat pertelingkahan yang serius di sini antara P dan D yang memerlukan ianya untuk dibicarakan. Rujuk Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Mesuntung Property Sdn Bhd v Kimlin Housing Development Sdn Bhd [2014] 7 CLJ 202 yang menyatakan seperti berikut:- “As to what amounts to prima facie in the context of s. 226(3) of the Companies Act, in our view is simply whether there is a serious dispute between the litigants which warrant a trial to determine the truth of the combating allegations.” [41] Mahkamah dengan ini berpendapat yang P telahpun berjaya menunjukkan yang mereka mempunyai tuntutan bermerit ke atas R dan bukannya tuntutan berdasarkan spekulasi semata-mata seperti ditunjukkan P dalam Afidavit mereka. Rujuk semula keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Shencourt yang menyatakan seperti berikut:- The plaintiff's counter claim is based on estimated costs. It is purely a speculative claim which most probably would not succeed. In authorizing proceedings, especially if they may or will involve some drain upon the assets of the company, the court must satisfy itself as to the probable success of the claim or counter claim, (see: Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. Provincial Insurance (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2000] 1 CLJ 759). Penutup [42] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan di atas, Mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan P dalam Lampiran 1 bagi relif (a) sahaja dengan kos sebanyak RM 5,000.00 untuk dibayar oleh R kepada P. [43] Mahkamah ini tidak membenarkan relif-relif lain selain (a) kerana relif-relif tersebut adalah terkeluar dan melampaui skop s.471 (1) Akta Syarikat 2016. Bertarikh: 23.2.2026 ………………………………………… (NOOR HISHAM BIN ISMAIL) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi, Johor Bahru Peguam Pemohon : Tetuan Taqrir Akramin & Co Blok D2-U6-9 No 1, Jalan Dutamas 1 Mont Kiara, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Peguam Responden : Tetuan Nazri Azmi Islinda No G-17, First Floor Podium C, Plaza Pekeliling Jalan Kampar Off Jalan Tun Razak 50400 Kuala Lumpur