BANK PEMBANGUNAN MALAYSIA BERHAD v Sidqi Ahmad Said Bin Ahmad (WA-22NCC-264-06/2022)

SIDQI AHMAD SAID BIN AHMAD

SHAILEN A/L POPATLAL

WAN ALIAS BIN WAN NGAH

ROSLINA BINTI IBRAHIM (NRIC NO.: 640723-05-5896)

ABDUL WAHID BIN ABDUL GHANI

MOHD RADZI BIN MOHAMED

MUHAMMAD SHAZHAKIM BIN SHAZARUL HISHAM

SHAZA ARINA BINTI SHAZARUL HISHAM

MUSTAFA ALI ZAMINALI SAYED

WONG CHEE KEONG

ABD. HADI BIN ABD. MAJID

TUNKU MAZLINA BINTI TUNKU ABD AZIZ

RANJEET SINGH SIDHU

NOORUSA’ADAH BINTI OTHMAN

PANEAGLE HOLDINGS BERHAD (COMPANY NO.: 199601028840

PANEAGLE SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO.: 199401021754

VCB INVESTMENT BERHAD (COMPANY NO.: 201001024441

OPEN FIBRE SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO.: 200701025088

PRIMAWIN LIMITED (COMPANY NO.: 1017308)

CHINA FINANCE LIMITED

HADRON EQUITIES LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ARAB EMIRATES CAPITAL LIMITED)

ORIENT TELECOMS SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO.: 201801000440

SILVER RIDGE HOLDINGS BHD. (COMPANY NO.: 200401029277

BVS TRINITY SDN. BHD. (COMPANY NO.: 199901017411

VCB MALAYSIA BHD. (COMPANY NO.: 199901018565

ZAVARCO PLC

NO.: 07687158) SILVER RIDGE SDN BHD (COMPANY NO.: 199201020641

IZLIN BINTI ISMAIL (NRIC NO.: 720526-02-5030) (as joint administrators of the estate of MOHD ZAFER MOHD HASHIM

MUHAMMAD RADZI BIN MOHD ZAFER (NRIC NO.: 970814-87-5015) (as joint administrators of the estate of MOHD ZAFER MOHD HASHIM

ZAKARIA BIN SAAD (NRIC NO.: 570818-07-5565) ...DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT [1] Before the court is an application by several defendants to disqualify the Plaintiff's solicitors from continuing to act in a civil suit concerning allegations of fraud and conspiracy relating to a loan disbursement. The defendants contend that the Plaintiff's solicitors should be disqualified on various grounds, including that they are material witnesses regarding certain "No Further Action" letters issued by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, that they failed to report alleged admissions of bribery to the authorities, and that they engaged in improper conduct surrounding consent judgments entered with two defendants. The underlying suit involves claims by the Plaintiff to recover substantial losses arising from an allegedly fraudulent scheme involving multiple corporate and individual defendants in connection with a project financing. The Plaintiff's solicitors are alleged to have concealed material information from the court and breached their professional obligations, though they deny all such allegations. This disqualification application raises important issues concerning the grounds upon which the court may exercise its discretion to disqualify solicitors, the relationship between civil and criminal proceedings, and the scope of lawyers' professional duties to the court and in relation to alleged criminal conduct. Background facts [2] The Plaintiff, Bank Pembangunan Malaysia Berhad commenced this suit on 22.6.2022 against multiple defendants concerning allegations of fraud in relation to a loan granted by the Plaintiff to finance the development of a coastal fibre optic network around Peninsular Malaysia (“the Project”). [3] The loan sum of RM400 million was disbursed to a company called Aries Telecoms (M) Berhad (“Aries”). The Plaintiff alleges that this loan sum, which was meant to partly finance the Project, was not used for its intended purpose but was instead unlawfully siphoned out to various defendants. [4] The Plaintiff's former President and Group Managing Director, the late Dato’ Mohd Zafer Mohd Hashim (“Dato' Zafer”), was alleged to have abused his position and power within the Plaintiff to conspire with other defendants in relation to the loan disbursements. [5] In January 2022, the Plaintiff contends that it discovered through Ranjeet Singh Sidhu, the 13th Defendant (“D13”) that sometime before 4.7.2012, D13, who was acting on behalf of Aries, had allegedly made payments to Dato' Zafer through Noorusa'adah Binti Othman, the 14th Defendant (“D14”) as intermediary, using monies from the loan sum to facilitate the loan disbursements to Aries. [6] The Plaintiff also contends that it discovered that Shailen A/L Popatlal, the 2nd Defendant (“D2”) was allegedly involved in the scheme by virtue of being Aries' shadow director and being in control of and/or having owned Primawin Limited, China Finance Limited and Hadron Equities Limited (formerly known as Emirates Capital Limited), the 19th, 20th and 21st Defendants respectively. [7] On 20.1.2022, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (“MACC”) issued “No Further Action” letters (“NFA”) to D2 and Roslina Binti Ibrahim, the 4th Defendant (“D4”). On 26.9.2022, the MACC issued an NFA letter regarding Dato' Zafer. [8] On 16.6.2022, the Plaintiff filed its claim against the defendants named in this action, seeking to recover the loss and damage it had suffered premised on fraud perpetrated by a web of individuals using various corporate vehicles to defraud the Plaintiff, into disbursing sums meant to partly finance the development of the Project which was never completed, which as at 14.6.2022 amounted to RM564,991,617.25. [9] On 22.7.2022, the court granted Mareva injunctions against D13 and D14 in Enclosure 113 freezing their assets up to RM8 million each, and required them to disclose information about their assets within 14 days, with exceptions allowing them to spend up to RM10,000 per month each for living expenses and legal fees (“Mareva Order”). [10] On 16.8.2022, D13 filed affidavits (Enclosures 138-141) making certain admissions regarding the alleged scheme. D14 filed her first Affidavit in Reply on 12.7.2022 and a Supplementary Affidavit on 3.10.2022. [11] On 9.2.2023, the Plaintiff and D14 entered into a Consent Order (“Consent Order”) which was recorded before the court. Under this Order, D14 agreed to pay RM2.5 million to the Plaintiff plus any additional amounts that might be determined at trial as having been received by D14 from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff agreed to discontinue its action against D14 without liberty to file afresh, subject to the payment terms. [12] On 8.11.2023, D4 and several other defendants (the 7th to 9th, 11th, 17th, 22nd, 24th and 25th Defendants, collectively referred to as “the Said Defendants”) filed an application (Enclosure 516) seeking to disqualify the Plaintiff's solicitors, Messrs Lim Chee Wee Partnership (“LCWP”), from acting for the Plaintiff in the proceedings. D2 filed a similar application (Enclosure 515) on the same date. [13] Subsequently, the Plaintiff and D13 agreed to enter into a consent judgment. When they sought to record this before the court on 19.1.2024, some defendants, including the Said Defendants, objected. The court directed submissions on whether these defendants had standing to oppose the recording of the consent judgment. On 6.3.2004, after considering submissions of parties, a consent judgment was recorded between the Plaintiff and D13 (“Consent Judgment”) where D13 agreed to pay the Plaintiff RM500,000 in five monthly installments of RM100,000 each, after which the Plaintiff will discontinue its action against D13 while reserving rights to seek additional payments for any further sums D13 may have received, and the Mareva injunction against D13 will be lifted. [14] The Consent Order between the Plaintiff and D14, together with the Consent Judgment between the Plaintiff and D13, will collectively be referred to as the “Consent Judgments.” Enclosure 516 [15] The Said Defendants filed an application in Enclosure 516 seeking primarily to disqualify LCWP as advocates and solicitors acting for the Plaintiff in the proceedings. Alternatively, they sought orders for LCWP to disclose to the court the discussions and/or agreements between the Plaintiff and D13 and/or D14 which led to the Consent Judgment dated 9.2.2023 and/or Mareva Order dated 22.7.2022. As a further alternative, they sought an order that LCWP not utilise the averments by D13 and/or D14 regarding allegations of corruption made in their affidavits (Enclosures 181 and 138) in favour of the Plaintiff, and for all parties to accept as undisputed facts the NFA letters issued by the public prosecutor against Dato' Zafer, D2 and D4, consequently accepting that the alleged acceptance of bribery by Dato' Zafer never occurred. [16] The grounds advanced included allegations that LCWP was a material witness regarding: the circumstances leading to the Consent Judgment between the Plaintiff and D14; D13's alleged bribe admission and reduced Mareva limit; and the concealment of the NFA letters regarding Dato' Zafer, D2 and D4. The Said Defendants also alleged that LCWP committed an offence under Section 202 of the Penal Code for failing to report D1, D13 and D14's affidavits to the MACC. They further claimed LCWP had breached an earlier undertaking to the court not to use the Consent Judgment including D14's admissions in subsequent submissions against other defendants. Additional grounds included allegations of professional misconduct, impugning of professional conduct, difficulty in maintaining professional independence, and conflicts of interest that the Said Defendants argued made LCWP unfit to continue representing the Plaintiff. Parties’ submissions [17] The Plaintiff submitted that the Said Defendants' application should be dismissed as it was without merit and filed merely as a belated excuse and/or afterthought to delay, prejudice and/or embarrass the fair trial of the proceedings. The Plaintiff argued that there had not been any appeal against or application to set aside the Consent Order with D14, that LCWP had not breached any provisions under the Penal Code or Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 (“MACC Act”), and that neither the Plaintiff nor LCWP had knowledge of the NFA letters. The Plaintiff emphasised that D13's and D14's affidavits were filed by their own solicitors, not by LCWP, and that the Plaintiff had always disclosed D13's role as a cooperating witness. Regarding the Mareva injunctions, the Plaintiff pointed out that it had sought the same RM8 million limit against D13, Dato' Zafer and D14, with even lower amounts sought against other defendants. [18] The Said Defendants submitted that LCWP should be disqualified as they were material witnesses regarding alleged undisclosed arrangements with D13 and D14, arguing that D14 would not have changed her position in her second affidavit without such arrangements. They contended that LCWP had concealed the NFA letters from the court and had committed offences under Section 202 of the Penal Code and Sections 25 and 48 of the MACC Act by failing to report D13's and D14's affidavits to the MACC. They also alleged that LCWP had breached professional ethics rules and an undertaking to the court regarding the use of D14's admissions. The Said Defendants emphasised that Dato' Lim's position as a former MACC Operations Review Panel member meant he must have had knowledge of the MACC investigations and NFA decisions. Analysis and findings of the court LCWP as a material witness in respect of MACC's investigations into some of the Defendants and LCWP's alleged knowledge of the NFA letters [19] The Said Defendants contended that LCWP should be disqualified as they are purportedly a material witness to testify on the circumstances surrounding the NFA letters issued by the MACC to the late Dato' Zafer, D4 and D2. They alleged that LCWP and/or the Plaintiff had concealed the NFA letters from this court. [20] On the other hand, the Plaintiff submitted that the NFA letters are immaterial and irrelevant to the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants. The Plaintiff highlighted that this court had already decided that the NFA letters do not preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing its civil claim against the Defendants in the Broad Grounds of Decision dated 19.1.2024. These Broad grounds were in relation to Enclosure 449, an application by D2 under Order 33 of the Rules of High Court 2012 to, inter alia, determine the question of whether civil courts have jurisdiction to determine or declare the commission of criminal offenses (e.g., bribery), that the mere fact that no prosecution was pursued by the MACC in respect of the alleged bribery does not preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing its civil claim on the same facts. The Plaintiff further submitted that they and/or LCWP have no knowledge of the NFA letters purportedly issued to Dato' Zafer, D4 and D2. In any event, the Plaintiff contended that the Said Defendants have failed to produce the NFA letters before this court. [21] Having considered the parties' submissions and the evidence before me, I find that the Said Defendants' contention that LCWP should be disqualified as they are purportedly a material witness in respect of the MACC's investigations and the NFA letters is wholly untenable and without any merit. [22] First, as I have made clear in my Broad Grounds of Decision dated 19.1.2024 at para 123, the fact that no prosecution was initiated or that the MACC concluded NFA against the Defendants does not bar the Plaintiff from pursuing its civil remedies against the Defendants. This was further made clear by the Court of Appeal in Subramaniam a/l Muniandy v Letchumi a/p Thasan & Ors [2021] MLJU 281 at para 59, where it was held that when the authorities decide that NFA will be taken in respect of a case, this would only mean that nobody will have to face a criminal charge in court but it does not in any way prevent a civil suit from being filed (see also Petrotrade Inc and others v Smith and others [2000] All ER (D) 264). It is trite that the standard of proof in civil and criminal proceedings differ. Accordingly, the NFA letters are irrelevant and immaterial to the present civil claim filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendants. [23] Second, I accept the Plaintiff's contention that neither the Plaintiff and/or LCWP have knowledge of the NFA letters. Importantly, the Said Defendants have failed to produce the NFA letters to show that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had purportedly concealed the same from this court. The NFA letter dated 20.1.2022 purportedly issued to D4 was only exhibited through the Said Defendants' Affidavit in Reply affirmed on 12.12.2023 [see Enclosure 530], which was more than 1 year and 6 months after the letter was purportedly issued by the MACC. No reason was provided by the Said Defendants as to why they had only produced this letter now. If indeed the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had knowledge of this NFA letter and had concealed the same from this court, the Said Defendants would have produced this letter much earlier in these proceedings. Thus, the Said Defendants' bare allegation that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had concealed the NFA letters is baseless and unsupported by evidence. [24] Third, it is settled law that in an application to disqualify solicitors, there must be a real risk that the solicitors would be a witness in respect of a material and disputed question of fact (see Rule 28 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978). However, the Said Defendants have failed to show how LCWP is a material witness to any of the facts in issue in the present suit. The subject matter of the present suit concerns the fraudulent and conspiracy acts committed by the Defendants against the Plaintiff. The issue of whether any of the Defendants were charged or prosecuted by the MACC is irrelevant to the present civil claim. There is therefore no necessity for LCWP to be called as a witness to testify on the NFA letters or any other matters relating to the MACC investigations as they have no bearing on the present suit. [25] For the reasons above, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to establish any grounds, much less strong grounds, warranting the disqualification of LCWP from continuing to act for the Plaintiff in the present proceedings. As the Court of Appeal emphasised in Quah Poh Keat v Ranjet Singh [2009] 4 MLJ 293, a strong case needs to be established to justify the removal of solicitors acting for a party. This high threshold has not been met by the Said Defendants. Dato' Lim’s former position as a member of MACC's Operations Review Panel and knowledge about MACC's investigations [26] The next issue raised by the the Said Defendants is whether Dato' Lim’s former position as a member of the MACC’s Operations Review Panel is relevant such that he must have known about the status of MACC's investigations into the Defendants. [27] The Said Defendants contended that Dato' Lim, a partner in LCWP, was a former Operations Review Panel member of the MACC and therefore must have known of the status of the MACC's investigations into the Defendants. As evidence of Dato' Lim's former position in the MACC, the Said Defendants exhibited his firm website profile. [28] The Plaintiff submitted that Dato' Lim's former position in the MACC is irrelevant and immaterial to the present suit. The Plaintiff highlighted that the Said Defendants have not provided any evidence to show why Dato' Lim's former position on the Operations Review Panel of the MACC is related and/or relevant to the present suit before this court. The Plaintiff relied on the Court of Appeal's decision in Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abdul Razak v Public Prosecutor [2019] 5 MLJ 623 to support its position. [29] Having considered the evidence and the submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any nexus between Dato' Lim's former position in the MACC and the present suit. The mere fact that Dato' Lim was a former member of the Operations Review Panel of the MACC does not in itself mean that he has knowledge of the MACC investigations into the Defendants in relation to the present dispute before this court. [30] Crucially, as correctly submitted by the Plaintiff, the Said Defendants have failed to show how Dato' Lim's former position is relevant to the issues raised in the present suit. I am guided by the Court of Appeal's decision in Dato' Sri Mohd Najib bin Hj Abdul Razak v Public Prosecutor [supra], where it was made clear that the involvement of the private prosecutor, Dato' Sri Gopal Sri Ram, who was a former Federal Court judge, in the investigations of the MACC in respect of the criminal charges that were brought against the accused in that case was irrelevant. The Court of Appeal clarified that the investigative powers are vested in the relevant agencies and the allegations of conflict of interest against Dato' Sri Gopal Sri Ram were unsubstantiated. [31] Similarly, in our present case, I find that Dato' Lim's former position in the MACC has no bearing to the present dispute between the Plaintiff and the Defendants before this court. There is no evidence to show what Dato' Lim's role was when he was a member of the Operations Review Panel, much less whether his role was in any way related to the MACC's investigations against the Defendants. In any event, the Said Defendants have failed to show how these investigations are even relevant to the present suit, which concerns the Plaintiff's civil claim against the Defendants for the fraudulent and conspiracy acts committed by the Defendants against the Plaintiff and has nothing to do with the MACC investigations. [32] For these reasons, I find that Dato' Lim's former position in the MACC is irrelevant and the Said Defendants' contention that Dato' Lim must have known of the status of the MACC's investigations is baseless and unsupported by evidence. The mere fact that Dato' Lim was a former member of the Operations Review Panel in the MACC is woefully inadequate to establish any grounds for the disqualification of LCWP. LCWP’s non-disclosure of NFA decisions from the court [33] The next issue raised by the Said Defendants is whether LCWP had breached their professional obligations by allegedly hiding or concealing the NFA decisions issued by the MACC to some of the Defendants from this court. [34] The Said Defendants contended that LCWP had breached their professional obligations by concealing the NFA decisions from this court. To support this contention, the Said Defendants alleged that despite having knowledge of the NFA decisions, LCWP had failed to inform this court of the same when the Plaintiff filed this suit in June 2022 and when the Plaintiff applied for the Mareva injunctions against the Defendants. [35] The Plaintiff submitted that neither the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had concealed the NFA decisions as alleged by the Said Defendants. The Plaintiff averred that neither the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had knowledge of the NFA letters purportedly issued by the MACC to the late Dato' Zafer, D2 and D4. In fact, the Plaintiff highlighted that the NFA letters exhibited by the Said Defendants themselves showed that the letters were only issued to the Defendants' own solicitors and were neither addressed to nor copied to the Plaintiff and/or LCWP. Despite having knowledge of the NFA letters, the Said Defendants had only exhibited the NFA letters now through this application when they could have done so as early as 20.1.2022, which was the date stated on the NFA letter purportedly issued to D2 and D4. The Plaintiff further submitted that in any event, the NFA decisions are irrelevant and immaterial to the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants in this suit as this court had already decided that the NFA decisions do not preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing its claim against the Defendants [see para 123 of the Broad Grounds of Decision dated 19.1.2024]. [36] Having considered the evidence and the submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any evidence that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had breached their professional obligations by concealing the NFA decisions from this court. [37] First, I accept the Plaintiff's contention that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP have no knowledge of the NFA letters. I agree that the NFA letters exhibited by the Said Defendants themselves clearly showed that the letters were only issued to the solicitors of the Said Defendants and were not copied to the Plaintiff or LCWP. There is no reason for me to doubt or disbelieve the Plaintiff's averment, which was affirmed by way of an affidavit, that neither the Plaintiff and/or LCWP have knowledge of the NFA letters. [38] Despite alleging that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had concealed the NFA letters, the Said Defendants have failed to produce any evidence to show the same. The Said Defendants were aware of the existence of the NFA letters as early as 20.1.2022, as this was the date on the NFA letter exhibited by the Said Defendants as purportedly issued to D4. However, the Said Defendants had waited for more than 1 year and 10 months before exhibiting this letter through this application that was only filed on 8.11.2023. No explanation was provided by the Said Defendants as to why they had failed to produce this letter earlier. If it is true that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had indeed concealed the NFA letters, the Said Defendants would have produced these letters much earlier to alert the court of the Plaintiff's and/or LCWP's alleged concealment. The Said Defendants' failure to do so leads me to conclude that the Said Defendants' allegations are baseless and without any merit. [39] Second, even if the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had knowledge of the NFA decisions, this does not mean that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had breached their professional obligations. As I have held in my Broad Grounds of Decision dated 19.1.2024, it is trite that the fact that the MACC had concluded NFA against the Defendants does not preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing its civil remedies against the Defendants [see paragraph 123 of the Broad Grounds of Decision in PBOA]. This principle was made clear by the Court of Appeal in Subramaniam a/l Muniandy v Letchumi a/p Thasan & Ors [supra], where it was held that a decision by an authority that NFA will be taken in respect of a case does not in any way prevent a civil suit from being filed on the same subject matter. Accordingly, I find that the NFA decisions by the MACC are not relevant to the Plaintiff's civil claim against the Defendants, which is premised on the fraudulent and conspiracy acts committed by the Defendants against the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is entitled to pursue its claim against the Defendants through this civil suit irrespective of whether any criminal charges were brought against the Defendants. [40] For these reasons, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any evidence that LCWP had breached their professional obligations by concealing the NFA decisions from this court. The Said Defendants' allegations are not supported by evidence and are without basis. Failure to report to MACC the admissions made by D13 and D14 regarding the alleged bribery [41] The next issue that arises for consideration is the Said Defendants’s contention that the Plaintiff's solicitors, LCWP, should be disqualified from acting for the Plaintiff in the present suit on the basis that LCWP had allegedly breached provisions under the Penal Code and the MACC Act by failing to report to the MACC the admissions purportedly made by D13 and D14 regarding the alleged bribery committed by the Defendants. [42] The Said Defendants submitted that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had breached section 25 and section 48 of the MACC Act as well as section 202 of the Penal Code by failing to report D13's and D14's affidavits, which purportedly contained their admissions to the alleged bribery, to the MACC. The Said Defendants contended that as these provisions are penal sanctions, LCWP should be disqualified from continuing to act for the Plaintiff in the present suit. [43] Section 25 of the MACC Act reads: “Section 25: Duty to report bribery transactions

Any person who-

(a) refuses any officer of the Commission access to any premises, or fails to submit to a search by a person authorised to search him under this Act;

(b) assaults, obstructs, hinders, or delays any officer of the Commission in the execution of his duty under this Act;

(c) fails to comply with any lawful demand, notice, order, or requirement of an officer of the Commission in the execution of his duty under this Act;

(d) omits, refuses, or neglects to give to an officer of the Commission any information which may reasonably be required of him and which he is empowered to give;

(e) fails to produce to, or conceals or attempts to conceal from, an officer of the Commission any book, document, or article in relation to which such officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been or is being committed, or which is liable to seizure under this Act;

(f) rescues or endeavours to rescue, or causes to be rescued, anything which has been duly seized;

(g) destroys anything to prevent the seizure thereof or the securing of the thing; or

(h) interferes with, puts fear into, threatens, or abducts, or attempts to interfere with, put fear into, threaten, or abduct any person involved in an investigation under this Act, commits an offence.” [45] Section 202 of the Penal Code reads: “Intentional Omission to Provide Information About an Offence

Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.” [46] The Plaintiff argued that the Said Defendants' contention is misconceived, untenable and without any basis. The Plaintiff submitted that neither the Plaintiff and/or LCWP are in breach of any provisions under the Penal Code or the MACC Act. First, the Plaintiff highlighted that D13 had in his affidavit in Enclosure 138 averred that he had already made a report to the MACC on 22.3.2021 regarding the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the Defendants against the Plaintiff in relation to the loan granted by the Plaintiff to Aries. Second, the Plaintiff submitted that LCWP had through its letters dated 22.9.2023 and 5.10.2023 to the Said Defendants [see Enclosure 518, Pages 28 and 31] made clear that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP are statutorily not at liberty to disclose whether any report was made to the MACC, as section 29(4) of the MACC Act prohibits such disclosure. It reads: “(4) A report made under subsection (1) shall be kept secret and shall not be disclosed by any person to any person other than officers of the Commission and the Public Prosecutor until an accused person has been charged in court for an offence under this Act or any other written law in consequence of such report, unless the disclosure is made with the consent of the Public Prosecutor or an officer of the Commission of the rank of Commissioner and above.” [47] The Plaintiff contended that the Said Defendants had therefore filed this application without even attempting to ascertain whether a report was indeed made by the Plaintiff and/or LCWP to the MACC. Third, the Plaintiff submitted that in any event, since the Penal Code and the MACC Act are penal sanctions, the right to enforce these provisions lies with the Attorney General and not the Said Defendants. The issue of whether any breach of these provisions had occurred is a matter to be determined by the criminal courts and not in the present civil suit. [48] Having considered the evidence and the submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any basis for LCWP's disqualification on the purported ground that LCWP had breached provisions under the Penal Code and the MACC Act. [49] There is no evidence before me to show that LCWP and/or the Plaintiff had failed to report D13's and D14's affidavits to the MACC. In fact, the evidence shows otherwise. D13 had expressly averred in his affidavit affirmed on 16.8.2022 that he had already made a report to the MACC on 22.3.2021 regarding the alleged fraudulent scheme committed by the Defendants against the Plaintiff [see Enclosure 138, Paragraph 76]. There is no reason for me to doubt the contents of D13's affidavit. [50] I also accept LCWP's explanation vide its letters to the Said Defendants that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP are not at liberty to disclose whether any other report was made to the MACC as the Plaintiff and/or LCWP are statutorily prohibited by section 29(4) of the MACC Act from making such disclosure. Section 29(4) provides that any report made thereunder shall be kept secret and shall not be disclosed except with the consent of the Public Prosecutor or an officer of the MACC of the rank of Commissioner and above. As the Said Defendants did not produce any evidence from the MACC to show that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had failed to make a report to the MACC, I find that the Said Defendants' contention that LCWP had breached the Penal Code and MACC Act is a mere allegation that is unsupported by evidence. [51] In any event, I find that the issue of whether the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had breached any provisions under the Penal Code and MACC Act is not a matter to be determined by this court in the present civil proceedings. The Penal Code and MACC Act are penal sanctions. It is trite that the right to enforce penal sanctions lies solely with the Public Prosecutor, as provided under Article 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. In Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 MLJ 12, the Supreme Court made clear that where a statute creates a criminal offence, no private individual can bring an action to enforce the criminal law and it should be left to the Public Prosecutor to decide whether to bring any action. [52] Accordingly, the Said Defendants have no locus to enforce the penal provisions under the Penal Code and MACC Act in the present civil proceedings. The Said Defendants are not empowered to make a determination on whether LCWP had committed any criminal offence under these statutes as this falls solely under the purview of the Public Prosecutor. The Said Defendants' attempt to invoke these penal provisions to disqualify LCWP is therefore misplaced and must be rejected by this court. [53] The Said Defendants relied on the case of Yahya Mohd Khalid v MISC Berhad [2020] MLJU 77 to support their argument that LCWP should be disqualified for failing to report the alleged bribery offences committed by some of the Defendants to the MACC. However, I find that Yahya's case is distinguishable on the facts and does not assist the Said Defendants' contention. [54] In Yahya's case, the central issue was whether the corporate veil should be lifted to make the director personally liable for the company's debts. The Court of Appeal affirmed the lifting of the corporate veil on the basis of the director's fraud and misuse of company funds for personal gain. Importantly, it was evident in Yahya's case that a police report had been lodged against the director alleging criminal misconduct and cheating. There was no issue of failure to report by the lawyers. [55] In contrast, here, the Plaintiff and LCWP contend that they are statutorily prohibited from disclosing whether a report has been made to the MACC. There is also evidence that D13 had already made a report to the MACC. The Said Defendants are merely speculating without clear evidence that no report was made. [56] Further, the Court of Appeal's observations in Yahya's case on a judge's duty to report crimes in civil cases were obiter remarks and not the substantive basis for the court's decision to lift the corporate veil, which turned on the director's fraud. [57] Given these material differences in facts, I find that Yahya Mohd Khalid v MISC Berhad does not support the Said Defendants' argument for LCWP's disqualification for failure to report. The Said Defendants have not shown any clear evidence of failure to report, unlike the express police report in Yahya's case. Yahya's case is therefore distinguishable and inapplicable. [58] For the foregoing reasons, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show that LCWP had breached any provisions under the Penal Code or MACC Act to warrant their disqualification from acting for the Plaintiff. The Said Defendants have not produced any evidence to show that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP had failed to report to the MACC on the admissions allegedly made by D13 and D14. The issue of whether any offence was committed by LCWP under the Penal Code or MACC Act is, in any event, not one to be determined by this court in the present proceedings, as the right to do so lies with the Public Prosecutor. Consent Order entered with D14 raising potential conflict issues for LCWP [59] The next issue raised by the Said Defendants is whether LCWP should be disqualified on the basis that LCWP is a material witness or has breached etiquette in relation to the Consent Order entered between the Plaintiff and D14 in Enclosure 338, thereby raising potential conflict of interest issues. [60] The Said Defendants submitted that LCWP should be disqualified as there are questions surrounding the circumstances leading to the Consent Order between the Plaintiff and D14. The Said Defendants alleged that D14 had fundamentally changed her position in her second affidavit in Enclosure 181 affirmed on 3.10.2022 to implicate the other Defendants of the bribery allegation after the Consent Order was entered into between the Plaintiff and D14. The Said Defendants contended that LCWP are material witnesses to the alleged “undisclosed negotiations/arrangements” between the Plaintiff and D14 which led to D14 purportedly changing her position in her affidavit. [61] The Plaintiff argued that the Said Defendants' contention is untenable and baseless. The Plaintiff submitted that to date, there has not been any appeal filed by the Defendants against the Consent Order, nor any application to set aside the Consent Order. The Plaintiff relied on the Court of Appeal's decision in Lee Heng Moy & Ors v Pacific Trustees Bhd & Ors [2016] 6 CLJ 368 and the Federal Court's decision in Tong Lee Hwa & Anor v Chin Ah Kwi & Another Appeal [1971] 2 MLJ 75 to submit that an order of the court remains valid, effective and binding on the parties involved until and unless the order is set aside. The Plaintiff further submitted that the Said Defendants are therefore now estopped from raising any objections to the Consent Order, especially when the Said Defendants did not raise any objections during the hearing on 9.2.2023 when the Consent Order was recorded before this court and in the presence of all parties, including the Said Defendants. The Plaintiff also clarified that D14's affidavits in Enclosure 37 and Enclosure 181 were filed by D14 and/or her solicitors alone and not by the Plaintiff or LCWP. [62] Having considered the evidence and submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any basis for the disqualification of LCWP as the Plaintiff's solicitors. First, I agree with the Plaintiff that the Said Defendants are estopped from raising any objection to the Consent Order that was duly recorded before this court on 9.2.2023 and in the presence of the Said Defendants. Despite having the opportunity to do so, the Said Defendants did not raise any objection to the recording of the Consent Order during the hearing on 9.2.2023. Neither did the Said Defendants file any appeal against the Consent Order, nor take out any application to set aside the Consent Order, even until now. Following the legal principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Lee Heng Moy and the Federal Court in Tong Lee Hwa, the Consent Order remains valid and binding on the Plaintiff and D14 as the parties to the Consent Order. The Said Defendants, who are not parties to the Consent Order, have no locus to now challenge the validity of the Consent Order through this application. [63] Second, even if the Said Defendants are entitled to raise objections to the Consent Order, there is no evidence before me which shows that LCWP were involved in any alleged “undisclosed negotiations/arrangements” between the Plaintiff and D14 which led to the Consent Order and to D14 purportedly changing her position in her affidavit in Enclosure 181. The Said Defendants' contention remains a bare allegation that is unsupported by any cogent evidence. The Said Defendants have failed to show how LCWP is a material witness to the alleged “undisclosed negotiations/arrangements”, when the evidence clearly shows that D14's affidavits in Enclosure 37 and 181 were filed by D14's solicitors and not the Plaintiff or LCWP. I find that the circumstances and terms of the Consent Order between the Plaintiff and D14 are not in dispute and have no bearing to the present application. The terms of the Consent Order are clear. LCWP therefore has no testimony to give in relation to the Consent Order that would make them a material witness to any of the facts in issue in the present suit between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. [64] Third, the Said Defendants have not shown how LCWP have breached any etiquette or are in a position of conflict merely because the Plaintiff had entered into the Consent Order with D14. It is trite that parties to a suit are entitled to resolve their dispute and to enter into a consent judgment at any stage of the proceedings. The fact that D14 had affirmed an affidavit after entering into the Consent Order does not in itself suggest any impropriety or conflict of interest on the part of LCWP that would justify LCWP's disqualification. If the Said Defendants believe that D14's affidavit contains false evidence, the appropriate recourse would be for the Said Defendants to challenge D14's evidence at trial, rather than to disqualify the Plaintiff's solicitors. There is no rule of law or etiquette that prohibits LCWP from continuing to act for the Plaintiff merely because the Plaintiff had entered into a consent judgment with one of the Defendants. [65] For these reasons, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to establish any grounds for the disqualification of LCWP in relation to the Consent Order entered between the Plaintiff and D14. Mareva injunction sought against D13 for only RM8 million [66] The next issue raised by the the Said Defendants is whether the Plaintiff's solicitors, LCWP, should be disqualified on the basis that LCWP is a material witness or has breached etiquette in relation to the Mareva injunction sought by the Plaintiff against D13 for the sum of only RM8 million, which the Said Defendants allege is a significantly lower sum compared to the Mareva injunctions sought against the other Defendants. [67] The Said Defendants submitted that there are questions surrounding the circumstances leading to the Plaintiff only seeking a Mareva injunction against D13 for RM8 million. The Said Defendants alleged that LCWP and/or the Plaintiff had purportedly entered into an undisclosed arrangement with D13 in relation to him being a cooperating witness against the other Defendants in exchange for the lower Mareva limit. The Said Defendants contended that LCWP should therefore be disqualified as they are material witnesses to this purported arrangement. [68] The Plaintiff argued that the Said Defendants' contention is baseless, misconceived and without merit. First, the Plaintiff submitted that the Mareva injunctions in Enclosure 109 against D13 and the other Defendants have been dismissed by this court. Second, contrary to the Said Defendants' allegation, the Plaintiff submitted that it had not only sought a Mareva injunction against D13 for RM8 million but had also sought the same amount against the late Dato' Zafer and D14. The Plaintiff also sought to freeze sums lower than RM8 million against the 19th and 25th Defendants. Third, the Plaintiff highlighted that it had from the outset disclosed on affidavit that D13 would be a cooperating witness [see Enclosure 16, Paragraph 10]. There is therefore no concealment of D13's role by the Plaintiff or LCWP. Fourth, the Plaintiff submitted that the Said Defendants' allegation that there is an alleged “undisclosed arrangement” between the Plaintiff, LCWP and D13 is a bare allegation unsupported by evidence. D13's position on the events that had transpired have been clearly set out in his affidavits filed in this suit. [69] Having considered the evidence and the submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any basis for the disqualification of LCWP as the Plaintiff's solicitors in relation to the Mareva injunction sought against D13. [70] The Said Defendants' contention that the Mareva limit of RM8 million sought against D13 is significantly lower compared to the other Defendants is plainly incorrect and contrary to the evidence. Based on the Plaintiff's Amended Mareva Application in Enclosure 106, it is clear that the Plaintiff had sought to freeze the same sum of RM8 million against not just D13 but also against the late Dato' Zafer and D14. In fact, the Plaintiff had sought to freeze an even lower sum against the 19th and 25th Defendants. The Said Defendants' comparison is therefore misplaced and not supported by the evidence before this court. [71] I also find no merit in the Said Defendants' allegation that there was an “undisclosed arrangement” between the Plaintiff, LCWP and D13 in relation to the Mareva limit against D13 and D13's position as a cooperating witness. These allegations are not supported by any credible evidence and remain bare assertions. The Said Defendants have not shown how LCWP could be a material witness to this purported “undisclosed arrangement”, when the evidence before this court shows that the Plaintiff had disclosed as early as 29.6.2022 on affidavit that D13 would be a cooperating witness in this suit [see Enclosure 16, Paragraph 10]. Further, in relation to the Said Defendants' argument that LCWP would need to answer whether D13 will affirm an affidavit to implicate the other Defendants, I agree with the Plaintiff that LCWP are not in a position to answer on behalf of D13 since LCWP are not D13's solicitors. D13's position on the events that had transpired in the fraudulent scheme and the wrongdoings committed by the Defendants have already been clearly set out in his affidavit in Enclosure 138. I therefore find the Said Defendants' allegations against LCWP to be wholly speculative and unmeritorious. [72] Accordingly, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to establish any grounds for the disqualification of LCWP in relation to the Mareva injunction sought against D13. As stated above, the amount of the Mareva limit sought against D13 is the same as that sought against Dato' Zafer and D14. The Plaintiff had also disclosed from the outset that D13 is a cooperating witness. The Said Defendants have failed to show how LCWP could be a witness to any material fact in issue in this suit that would warrant LCWP's disqualification. The Said Defendants' allegations of an “undisclosed arrangement” remain bare assertions unsupported by evidence. Breach of undertaking to the court by referring to admissions made by D14 in affidavits [73] The next issue raised by the Said Defendants is whether LCWP, had breached an undertaking given to this court that it would not refer to or use the admissions made by D14 in her affidavits in its subsequent legal submissions against the other Defendants in the present suit. [74] The Said Defendants submitted that during the hearing on 9.2.2023 which led to the court recording a Consent Order between the Plaintiff and D14, LCWP had given an undertaking to the court that the Consent Order, including D14's purported admission of her facilitation of the alleged bribery, would not be used by LCWP in its subsequent legal submissions against the other Defendants. The Said Defendants contended that LCWP's subsequent usage of D14's purported admission is a breach of this undertaking and therefore LCWP should be disqualified from acting for the Plaintiff. [75] The Plaintiff argued that the Said Defendants' contention is misconceived and untenable. The Plaintiff's argument is two-fold. First, the Plaintiff clarified that the undertaking given by LCWP was that the Plaintiff and/or LCWP would not refer to the terms of the Consent Order and/or the fact that a Consent Order was entered into with D14. Contrary to the Said Defendants' allegation, LCWP did not give any undertaking that it would not refer to the admissions made by D14 in her affidavits. Second, the Plaintiff submitted that in any event, the Plaintiff and/or LCWP have not breached the undertaking given. The Plaintiff and/or LCWP have never referred to the terms of the Consent Order or the fact that a Consent Order was entered with D14 to support or bolster the Plaintiff's claim against the other Defendants in this suit. [76] Having considered the evidence and submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show that LCWP had breached any undertaking given to this court in relation to the admissions made by D14 in her affidavits. [77] It is clear from the submissions of the Plaintiff, which I accept, that the scope of the undertaking given by LCWP was limited to not referring to the terms of the Consent Order or the fact that a Consent Order was entered into between the Plaintiff and D14. This undertaking did not extend to a prohibition against referring to the admissions made by D14 in her affidavits, as alleged by the Said Defendants. The Said Defendants appear to have misconstrued the scope of the undertaking given by LCWP. [78] Further, based on the submissions before me, I find that the Plaintiff and LCWP have not breached the undertaking given to this court. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff or LCWP have ever referred to the terms of the Consent Order or the fact that a Consent Order was entered into with D14 to support the Plaintiff's claim against the Defendants. The Said Defendants have not pointed the court to any instance where such a breach has occurred. [79] Accordingly, I find no merit in the Said Defendants' contention that LCWP should be disqualified for purportedly breaching an undertaking to this court. The Said Defendants appear to have misunderstood the scope of the undertaking given. In any event, there is no evidence of any breach of the actual undertaking given by LCWP not to refer to the terms or existence of the Consent Order against the other Defendants. Prayer 3: LCWP disclosure to court the discussions and/or agreements between the Plaintiff and D13 and/or D14 which led to the Consent Order dated 9.2.2013 and/or the Ex Parte Mareva Order dated 22.7.2022 [80] Prayer 3 of Enclosure 516 seeks for an order that LCWP disclose to this court the discussions and/or agreements between the Plaintiff and D13 and/or D14 which led to the Consent Order dated 9.2.2013 and/or the Ex Parte Mareva Order dated 22.7.2022. [81] This prayer appears to be premised on the allegation that there were some undisclosed discussions, negotiations or agreements between the Plaintiff and the D13 and D14 which led to the Consent Order and Order being recorded. However, the Said Defendants did not specifically address this prayer in their Written Submissions nor in their Reply Submissions. [82] As submitted by the Plaintiff, the Consent Order between the Plaintiff and D14 dated 9.2.2023 was validly entered and recorded before this court. Despite having the opportunity to do so, the Said Defendants did not object to the Consent Order when it was recorded in open court on 9.2.2023 in the presence of all parties. Further, there has been no appeal filed against the Consent Order, nor any application to set it aside. Following the legal principles laid down in Lee Heng Moy and Tong Lee Hwa, a consent order remains valid and binding on the parties to the order until it is set aside. The Said Defendants are therefore estopped from seeking disclosure of any discussions that led to the Consent Order, when they did not challenge the Consent Order at the material time and are not parties to the Consent Order. [83] Similarly, in respect of the Consent Judgment between the Plaintiff and D13, this court had on 6.3.2024 considered the Defendants' objections but nevertheless allowed the Consent Judgment to be recorded. In doing so, this court found that there was nothing irregular about the Plaintiff entering into the Consent Judgment and that there was no concealment of the D13’s role as a cooperating witness. [84] I find that the Defendants have failed to show any basis to compel LCWP to disclose any discussions or agreements leading to the Consent Judgments. There is no evidence before me of any impropriety, illegality or undue influence surrounding the Consent Judgments that would warrant disclosure of the discussions between the parties that led to the Consent Judgments. The terms of the Consent Judgments are not in dispute and the Consent Judgments do not bind or prejudice the Said Defendants who are not parties to the orders. Parties to litigation are generally entitled to resolve their disputes on a without prejudice basis and the court should be slow to interfere with negotiations and discussions that led to a consent judgment in the absence of evidence of illegality or impropriety. No such evidence has been shown here. [85] The Said Defendants have also not shown why LCWP should be compelled to disclose any discussions leading to the Mareva Order against D13. I have in any event found that there is no basis to the Said Defendants' allegations of an “undisclosed arrangement” between the Plaintiff and D13 in relation to the Mareva limit. The Defendants have failed to show any irregularity in respect of the Ex-Parte Mareva Order that would justify an order for disclosure against LCWP. [86] Accordingly, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to present any grounds for this court to exercise its discretion to order disclosure of the privileged discussions and negotiations between the Plaintiff and D13 and D14 that led to the Consent Orders or the Ex-Parte Mareva Order. As such, prayer 3 of Enclosure 516 is dismissed with costs. Prayer 4: LCWP cannot utilise the averments by D13 and D14 in Enclosures 138 and 181 regarding the allegation of corruption in favour of the Plaintiff and for parties to accept the NFA letters as undisputed facts that the alleged bribery by the late Dato' Zafer never occurred [87] Prayer 4 of Enclosure 516 seeks, as an alternative to the disqualification of LCWP, for an order that LCWP is not to utilise the averments by D13 and D14in Enclosures 138 and 181 regarding the allegation of corruption in favour of the Plaintiff, and for all parties to accept the NFA letters as undisputed facts that the alleged bribery by the late Dato' Zafer never occurred for the entire purpose and record of this proceeding. [88] While the Said Defendants had included this prayer as part of their application in Enclosure 516, they did not specifically address or submit on this alternative prayer in their Written Submissions or Reply Submissions. The Said Defendants focused their arguments on their primary prayer for the disqualification of LCWP but did not develop their case on why this alternative prayer should be allowed in the event the disqualification application is dismissed. The evidential burden lies on the Said Defendants as the applicants to prove their case for this prayer and to show why such an order should be made to restrict the Plaintiff's use of D13's and D14's affidavits or to compel all parties to accept the NFA letters as undisputed facts. In the absence of any submissions, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to discharge this burden. [89] While the Plaintiff did not specifically respond to this alternative prayer, the Plaintiff had submitted that the application as a whole should be dismissed as it is without merit and is an afterthought by the Defendants. The Plaintiff argued that the NFA letters do not preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing its civil claim against the Defendants, relying on this court's Broad Grounds of Decision dated 19.1.2024 where it was held that the NFA letters do not bar the Plaintiff from pursuing its civil remedies. [90] I am inclined to agree with the Plaintiff. As I have held in my Broad Grounds of Decision, it is trite law that a civil action is distinct from criminal proceedings and the fact that the authorities have decided not to initiate criminal charges does not prevent a litigant from pursuing civil remedies arising from the same subject matter. The standard of proof in civil and criminal proceedings also differ. Therefore, the existence of the NFA letters, even if accepted as undisputed facts, do not operate as a legal bar to the Plaintiff's civil claim against the Defendants for the various causes of action pleaded, such as conspiracy, fraud, knowing receipt and dishonest assistance. [91] Further, the prayer sought by the Said Defendants is essentially to restrict the Plaintiff's conduct of its case by preventing the Plaintiff from relying on certain affidavits and evidence filed in these proceedings. This is a drastic order that would prejudice the Plaintiff in presenting its case at full trial. I find that there is no basis nor exceptional circumstances for the court to make such an order to curtail the Plaintiff's freedom to conduct its case as it deems fit. If the Said Defendants dispute the veracity of the contents of D13's and D14's affidavits, the appropriate recourse would be to challenge those affidavits by way of cross-examination at trial. It is not appropriate, in the present interlocutory application, for the court to restrict the Plaintiff's use of affidavits and evidence without the benefit of a full trial. [92] It would also not be appropriate for this court to compel all parties to this proceeding to accept the NFA letters as undisputed facts that the alleged bribery did not occur, when the material issue of whether there was bribery or otherwise is a serious triable issue that should be determined by the trial court based on the evidence adduced. Such a determination requires an evaluation of the totality of the evidence, including any explanations given for the NFA letters. The court should not at this interlocutory stage curtail the presentation of evidence or make a finding that certain facts must be accepted as undisputed by all parties without the benefit of a full trial. To do so would prejudice the proceedings and impinge on the trial judge's function to evaluate all relevant evidence at trial. [93] Accordingly, I find no merits in the alternative prayer 4 sought by the Said Defendants in Enclosure 516 to restrict the Plaintiff's use of affidavits or to compel acceptance of the NFA letters as undisputed facts. As such, this prayer is dismissed. Whether costs to be awarded on an indemnity basis [94] The Plaintiff has asked for costs to be awarded against the D2 and the Said Defendants on an indemnity basis in respect of Enclosures 515 and 516 to disqualify LCWP. The Plaintiff relied on the High Court case of Low Huei Ying & Anor v Andrew Gregory Sewell (practising in the name and style of Messrs Andrew Sewell) [2023] MLJU 2084 to submit that costs on an indemnity basis should be ordered if the court finds that the disqualification application was frivolously filed with the intention to harass and delay the proceedings. [95] Encik Syamsul Azhar, counsel for the Said Defendants, arguing for his clients and whose submissions are adopted by D2 on this point, objected to costs being awarded on an indemnity basis. He submitted that the defendants had to file this application as the defendants felt aggrieved by the circumstances surrounding the Consent Judgments entered with the D13 and D14, the admissions made by D13 and D14 in their affidavits, and the non-disclosure of the NFA letters issued to some of the Defendants. The defendants contended that they had notified the Plaintiff of their intention to raise these issues and had no choice but to file this application when the Plaintiff did not provide a satisfactory response. [96] I have considered the submissions of the parties on the issue of costs. The general rule is that costs should follow the event and that the unsuccessful party should pay the costs of the successful party. However, the court has discretion to depart from this rule depending on the circumstances of the case. Costs on an indemnity basis may be ordered in cases where the paying party has conducted the litigation improperly or unreasonably, such as where the application was frivolous or vexatious. [97] However, in the present case, while I have found that the applications to disqualify LCWP is without merit and should be dismissed, I am not satisfied that the applications were frivolous or filed with the intention to delay the proceedings, such that it warrants an order for indemnity costs against these defendants. [98] Based on the chronology of events, the issues relating to the Consent Judgments with D13 and D14, their admissions in the affidavits, and the NFA letters were relevant developments that transpired after the defendants had entered appearance in this suit. While I have found that these issues do not justify the disqualification of LCWP, I accept that these issues had caused concern to these defendants, such that they felt compelled to raise it to the court through this application. The defendants had also issued letters to the Plaintiff to notify them of their intention to raise these issues, before filing this application. This shows that the application was not filed frivolously or recklessly by the defendants without first attempting to resolve the matter with the Plaintiff. [99] In the circumstances, I do not find that the defendants had conducted the application unreasonably or improperly to warrant an order for indemnity costs. As the defendants had attempted to ventilate their grievances before the court, albeit unsuccessfully, they should not be penalised with indemnity costs. [100] Accordingly, while I agree that the defendants shall bear the costs of this application as the unsuccessful party, I order that such costs be paid to the Plaintiff on a standard basis rather than on an indemnity basis. Conclusion [101] For all the reasons set out above, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to establish any proper grounds for the disqualification of the Plaintiff's solicitors from continuing to act in these proceedings. The various allegations of professional misconduct, breach of undertakings, failure to report criminal conduct, and conflict of interest remain unsubstantiated by evidence and appear to be largely speculative in nature. The mere fact that consent judgments were entered with certain defendants, or that regulatory authorities issued NFA letters in related investigations, does not in itself create any basis for disqualification of solicitors who continue to act properly within their professional obligations. While the court has inherent jurisdiction to disqualify solicitors where necessary to prevent injustice or abuse of process, such a drastic remedy requires compelling grounds which are wholly absent in this case. Accordingly, this application is dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by the defendants to the Plaintiff on a standard basis, for the reasons explained above regarding the denial of indemnity costs. 16 December 2024 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Dato’ Lim Chee Wee and Nathalie Ker Si Min (Messrs Lim Chee Wee Partnership) For the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 17th, 22nd, 24th and 25th Defendants: Syamsul Azhar Ab Aziz (Messrs Azhar Aziz & Associates)