BANK PEMBANGUNAN MALAYSIA BERHAD v Sidqi Ahmad Said Bin Ahmad (WA-22NCC-264-06/2022)

SIDQI AHMAD SAID BIN AHMAD

SHAILEN A/L POPATLAL

WAN ALIAS BIN WAN NGAH

ROSLINA BINTI IBRAHIM

ABDUL WAHID BIN ABDUL GHANI

MD RADZAIF BIN MOHAMED (NO. K/P: 580328-07-5377) (As administrator of MOHD RADZI BIN MOHAMED

MUHAMMAD SHAZHAKIM BIN SHAZARUL HISHAM (NRIC NO.: 910501-14-6124) S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA

SHAZA ARINA BINTI SHAZARUL HISHAM

MUSTAFA ALI ZAMINALI SAYED

WONG CHEE KEONG

ABD. HADI BIN ABD. MAJID

TUNKU MAZLINA BINTI TUNKU ABD AZIZ

RANJEET SINGH SIDHU

NOORUSA’ADAH BINTI OTHMAN

PANEAGLE HOLDINGS BERHAD

PANEAGLE SDN. BHD.

VCB INVESTMENT BERHAD

OPEN FIBRE SDN. BHD.

PRIMAWIN LIMITED

CHINA FINANCE LIMITED (COMPANY NO.: 38227) S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA

HADRON EQUITIES LIMITED (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ARAB MIRATES CAPITAL LIMITED)

ORIENT TELECOMS SDN. BHD.

SILVER RIDGE HOLDINGS BHD.

BVS TRINITY SDN. BHD.

VCB MALAYSIA BHD.

ZAVARCO PLC

SILVER RIDGE SDN BHD

IZLIN BINTI ISMAIL (NRIC NO.: 720526-02-5030) (as joint administrators of the estate of MOHD ZAFER MOHD

HASHIM (NRIC NO.: 720704-71-5115)) MUHAMMAD RADZI BIN MOHD ZAFER (NRIC NO.: 970814-87-5015) (as joint administrators of the estate of MOHD ZAFER MOHD

HASHIM (NRIC NO.: 720704-71-5115)) ZAKARIA BIN SAAD (NRIC NO.: 570818-07-5565) …DEFENDANTS S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA GROUNDS OF JUDGEMENT INTRODUCTION [1] This judgement concerns an application filed by the 16th Defendant in Enclosure 1044 for a stay of proceedings for this suit, WA-22NCVC-264-06/2025, (Suit 264). The 16th Defendant seeks to stay Suit 264 due to another suit, namely WA-22NCVC-510- 08/2025 (Suit 510) filed on 16.8.2025 which is a direct challenge to the validity the consent judgments entered between the Plaintiffs (BPMB) and the 13th Defendant, Noorusa’adah Binti Othman (Sa'adah) and 14th Defendant, Ranjeet Singh Sidhu (Ranjeet). PRELIMINARY BACKGROUND [2] The Plaintiff claim that the present suit concerns fraud perpetuated by a web of individuals using various corporate vehicles to defraud BPMB, a development financial institution into granting a loan of RM400 million (“Loan”) to Aries Telecoms (M) Berhad (“Aries”). [3] The Loan was originally and solely intended to partly finance the development of the coastal fibre optic network of 1,562km around Peninsular Malaysia (“Project”). Aries defaulted on the Loan and the Project was never completed according to the Plaintiff. S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA [4] This Plaintiff alleges that a fraudulent scheme between numerous Defendants, which also involves the late BPMB’s former President and Group Managing Director, abusing his position and power within BPMB to conspire with the other individuals and their respective corporate channels. [5] This judgement concerns the 16th Defendant, Paneagle Sdn Bhd, a 3% shareholder in 15th Defendant Paneagle Holdings Berhad, the turnkey contractor, whom is also implicated in the said scheme. The 16th Defendant, now seeks to stay the trial of Suit 264, which is about to commence towards the end 2025. [6] The reasoning of Suit 510 is to determine the position of the 13th, Defendant, Ranjeet Singh Sidhu (“Ranjeet”) and 14th Defendant Noorusa’adah Binti Othman (“Adah”), on the basis that they could be reinstated as Defendants. Abbreviations and references of all parties in Suit 264 [7] Before going into the brief chronology, the following references for defendants are set out below in a table to relate names of all the individuals involved in Suit 264. S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA DEFENDANT PARTICULARS OF NAME ABREVIATIONS 1ST Sidqi Ahmad Said bin Ahmad “Sidqi” 2ND Shailen a/l Popatlal “Shailen” 3RD Wan Alias bin Wan Ngah “Wan Alias” 4TH Roslina binti Ibrahim “Roslina” 5TH Abdul Wahid bin Abdul Ghani “Abdul Wahid” 6TH Mohd Radzi bin Mohamed “Mohd Radzi” 7TH Muhammad Shazhakim bin Shazarul Hisham “Shazhakim” 8TH Shasa Arina binti Shasarul Hisham “Shasa” 9TH Mustafa Ali Zaminali Sayed “Mustafa Ali” 10TH Wong Chee Keong “Wong” 11TH Abd. Hadi bin Abd. Majid “Abd. Hadi” 12TH Tunku Mazlina binti Tunku Abd Asis “Tunku Mazlina” 13TH Ranjeet Singh Sidhu “Ranjeet” 14TH Noorusa'adah binti Othman “Adah” 15TH Paneagle Holdings Berhad “Paneagle Holdings” 16TH Paneagle Sdn. Bhd “Paneagle” 17TH VCB Investment Berhad “VCB Investment” 18TH Open Fibre Sdn. Bhd “Open Fibre” 19TH Primawin Limited “Primawin” 20TH China Finance Limited “China Finance” 21ST Hadron Equities Limited “Hadron Equities” 22ND Orient Telecoms Sdn. Bhd “Orient Telecoms” S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA 23RD Silver Ridge Holdings Bhd “Silver Ridge Holdings” 24TH BVS Trinity Sdn. Bhd “BVS Trinity” 25TH VCB Malaysia Bhd “VCB Malaysia” 26TH Zavarco PLC “Zavarco PLC” 27TH Silver Ridge Sdn Bhd “Silver Ridge” 28TH Izlin binti Ismail “Izlin” 29TH Muhammad Radzi bin Mohd Zafer “Radzi Zafer” 30TH Zakari bin Saad “Zakaria” Chronology of Events and Procedural Development since 2022 in Suit 264. Opening remarks observed by this court in Suit 264 [8] After considering the facts and copious procedural development of this case, this court takes the view that there has been delays in Suit 264 in proceeding to trial. It appears, this case not only involves legal considerations but also numerous tactical maneuverings delaying the trial from proceeding. S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA [9] It is the utmost duty of the court to balance fairness and efficiency when dealing with stay applications that might be tactics to delay proceedings. The court must step in and steer the case towards a favorable resolution and ensure that no manipulation or an abuse of the system is present to protect the spirit of justice. [10] I have set out below a table for reference naming some relevant events and parties in suit 264 which this court had to dispense with, namely interlocutory applications before even reaching the trial. NO DATE PARTICULARS RELEVANT TO SUIT 264 & SUIT 510

1.

15.6.2022 The Plaintiff (“BPMB”), filed the present suit. Plaintiff 2.

16.8.2022 “Ranjeet’s” Affidavit admitting and/or disclosing, bribes, fraudulent acts by various parties concerning this suit and how the Loan Sum was unlawfully siphoned to certain defendants. 13th Defendant 3.

16.8.2022 Application to strike out the Plaintiff’s Claim by “Wan Alias” “Abdul Wahid” “Paneagle Holdings” 3rd,5th,15th 16th,17th and 18th Defendants S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA “Paneagle Holdings” “VCB Investment” and “Open Fibre” 4 03.10.2022 “Adah” files a Supplementary Affidavit on the scheme detailing the manipulation of the Loan disbursements. 14th Defendant 5 09.02.2023 Consent Judgment was recorded between BPMB and Adah NO OBJECTIONS RAISED 14th Defendant’s Consent Judgement 6 06.03.2023 Application to strike out the Plaintiff’s Claim dismissed by court. 3rd,5th,15th 16th,17th and 18th Defendants. 7 08.11.2023 After a period of 9 months, the first Disqualification Applications were filed by “Shailen” 2nd Defendant 8 08.11.2023 The second, Disqualification Applications to disqualify LCWP as the solicitors on record. Filed by “Roslina”, “Shazhakim”, “Mustafa Ali”, “VCB Investment”, “Orient 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 17th, 22nd, 24th and 25th Defendants S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA Telecoms” “BVS Trinity” and “VCB Malaysia” 9 19.1.2024 Consent Judgements opposed and the Court directed submissions to be filed giving reasons for opposing the recording of the Consent Judgment. 4th, 7th, 8th 9th, 17th, 22nd, 24th and 25th Defendants 10 6.3.2024 The Court dismissed the objections from relevant Defendants and Consent Judgment was recorded between BPMB and Ranjeet. NO APPEAL FILED 13th Defendant’s Consent Judgement 11 29.03.2024 High Court dismissed the First and Second Disqualification Applications. APPEAL FILED 2nd, 4th, 7th to 9th, 17th, 22nd, 24th and 25th Defendants 12 02.09.2024 The third Disqualification Application filed by the in the present suit, “Wan Alias” and “Abdul Wahid” 3rd and 5th Defendants S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA 13 3.12.2024 High Court dismissed the Third Disqualification on the ground of the unexplained delay of over 5 months. NO APPEAL FILED 3rd and 5th Defendants 14 16.8.2025 Suit 510 filed to contest the validity of the Consent Judgement entered by the 13th and 14th Defendants 16th Defendant 15 8.9.2025 The 16th Defendant filed a stay application to stay the trial pending Suit 510 being heard. 16th Defendant 16 18.9.2025 The counsel for the 16th Defendant orally applied for an ad interim stay pending disposal. Dismissed by JC 16th Defendant 17 6.10.2025 The 16th Defendant filed a stay application pending Suit 510 was dismissed by the JC 16th Defendant 18 9.10.2025 Application filed by the 2nd Defendant for the recusal of the JC handling the trial. 2nd Defendant S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA Filing of suit 510. [11] The principal reason, the 16th Defendant wanting a warrant of stay, for proceedings in Suit 264, was due to the filing of Suit 510. The 16th Defendant specifically requested for a stay in Suit 264, pending the full hearing and disposal of Suit 510, which directly challenges the validity of consent judgments entered by Ranjeet and Adah, alleging illegality, fraud, conspiracy, and bribery. [12] The key dispute in Suit 510 is over the RM75 million that Ranjeet allegedly received from the Aries Loan, yet the consent judgments allowed him to exit for a fraction of the amount. Furthermore, the MACC investigations and asset seizures relates directly to a valid reason for a stay to be granted by this court. [13] Suit 510 also covers issues on BPMB’s solicitors, LCWP, whom are parties named as Defendants in Suit 510 and the issues of conflict of interest arises. The 16th Defendant claim that this creates an untenable position where LCWP cannot properly represent BPMB's interests while defending themselves against serious allegations of professional misconduct. THE RELEVANT ISSUES AND LAW [14] The central issues raised by the both the Plaintiff and the16th Defendant in this suit, concerns “Special Circumstances” for S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA granting stay of proceedings taking into consideration the filing of Suit 510. Plaintiffs Submissions [15] The Plaintiffs argue, in the Federal Court case of Kosma Palm Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257 (“Kosma Palm Oil”), where it was held: “An appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution unless the court so orders. The paramount consideration governing an application for a stay of execution is that the appeal to this court, if successful, should not be rendered nugatory. If upon balancing all the relevant factors, this court comes to the conclusion that an appeal would be rendered nugatory without the grant of a stay or other interim preservation order, then it should normally direct a stay or grant other appropriate relief that has the effect of maintaining status quo”. [16] Kosma Palm Oil further goes on to explain the broad nature of phrase “special circumstances” referring to Ian Chin JC’s (as he then was) decision in Government of Malaysia v Datuk Haji Kadir Mohamad Mastan and another application [1993] 3 MLJ 514, it was held: S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA “An attempt was made to define special circumstances by Raja Azlan Shah (as His Majesty then was) in the case of Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86: - 'Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be special under the circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common.' “The definition only serves to emphasize the fact that there are myriad circumstances that could constitute special circumstances with each case depending on its own facts. I am of the opinion that the list of factors constituting special circumstances is infinite and could grow with time. Any attempt to limit the list or close a category would be to impose a fetter on the exercise of the discretion of the court whether to grant or stay an execution; making the discretion less of a discretion. This is surely not what discretion is all about.” [17] The Court of Appeal decision in International Construction & Civil Engineering Sdn Bhd v Jittra Sdn Bhd & Ors [2018] MLJU 1207 (“International Construction”) states that: - “The threshold to satisfy an application for stay of proceedings in contrast to stay of execution in this time and era is very high as the trial court is required to dispose of the cases within a specific time, expeditiously and fairly. The old English cases before the coming into effect of Lord Woolf’s report may not be helpful. [See Zukerman, A.A.S. (1995)]. The court’s S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA position in England as well as many other countries inclusive of Malaysia is that the ‘overriding objective’ of the court is to ensure that a case is dealt with economically, expeditiously as well as justly… “It is now well established that the court will not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to stay a proceeding unless there are extremely compelling reasons to do so and not merely on the grounds of what is often referred to as ‘interest of justice’, etc. The strict rule in vogue is that once an action is filed, it must proceed expeditiously. The threshold to seek a stay of proceedings is very high in cases before the trial court. Very importantly, if the bona fide of the application is in doubt, a stay application must be dismissed in limine.” Defendants Submissions [18] The Defendants however argue that the fundamental issue before this Court is whether Suit 264 proceedings should continue when the validity of consent judgments that released two key defendants Ranjeet and Adah is being directly challenged in Suit 510 on grounds of illegality, fraud, conspiracy and bribery. [19] As stated in Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia - Civil Procedure, [190.6-078]: S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA "A stay of proceedings arises under an order of the court which puts a stop or 'stay' on the further conduct of the proceedings in that court at the stage which they have reached……. The object of the order is to avoid the trial or hearing of the action taking place, where the court thinks it is just and convenient to make the order, to prevent undue prejudice being occasioned to the opposite party or to prevent the abuse of process." [20] Furthermore, the Defendants argue that test for granting a stay Per Halsbury's Laws of Malaysia [190.6-083]: "The stay of proceedings is a serious, grave and fundamental interruption in the right that a party has to conduct his litigation towards the trial on the basis of the substantive merits of his case, and therefore the court's general practice is that a stay of proceedings should not be imposed unless the proceedings beyond all reasonable doubt ought not to be allowed to continue." [21] The Defendants argue that threshold for staying proceedings must be considered in context. In this application the stay is sought pending determination of a collateral action that directly challenges the validity of consent judgments central to the proceedings and the Court must exercises its discretion to prevent abuse of process and ensure proper administration of justice. The question is not whether proceedings should never continue, but whether they should continue while their foundational validity is under active challenge. S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA The courts view on Special Circumstances and stay threshold [22] The stay threshold is very high and must not be a delaying tactic but a genuine one warranting a stay. In my view, the court treats special circumstances as exceptional, not ordinary, and relies on the Kosma Palm Oil lineage of authorities, which emphasize that stays are extraordinary and should not be granted where there is no exceptional justification. [23] The court also notes that stays must not be used to subvert the primary objective of expeditious, economical, and just disposal of cases, and that appeals or interlocutory matters do not automatically justify a stay. The current Suit 264 was filed in June 2022 should proceed first which is in progress for almost 3 years. [24] In any event Ranjeet and Adah can always be called as witnesses for cross examined as the law provides for such mechanism and is available to the Defendants. The Consent Orders and other inter-connected issues in Suit 510 [25] The 16th Defendant argues that in the Federal Court case of Badiaddin bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 established that consent judgments can be set aside on grounds of:

Fraud; S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA

Illegality;

Misrepresentation; or

Other vitiating factors. “It is settled law that one High Court cannot set aside a final order regularly obtained from another High Court of concurrent jurisdiction. But one special exception to this rule is where the final judgment of the High Court could be proved to be null and void on ground of illegality or lack of jurisdiction so as to bring the aggrieved party within the principle laid down by a number of authorities culminating in the Privy Council case of Isaacs v Robertson [1985] AC 97" [at page 409]. [26] In my opinion, Suit 510, is used to derail the current Suit 264 and as well as to re-litigate the 3 main Disqualification Applications already dealt and determined by this very court. After thoroughly examining the entirety of Suit 510, this court is in the view that arguments addressed in Suit 510, are the same core issues and facts already determined in Suit 264 namely: - I. The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Investigation; II. The challenge of the Consent Orders and Locus Standi; and III. Scandalous and Irrelevant Allegations on the Plaintiffs solicitors S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA The MACC Investigation [27] The Plaintiff contended that its highly inappropriate for the 16th Defendant attempting to characterise BPMB and LCWP’s alleged failure to report to MACC regarding the alleged bribery and fraud issues, is a valid cause of action in Suit 510. It is common sense that any enforcement of such matter lies solely within the powers and duties of MACC. [28] In any event, the fact of a no further action (“NFA”) decision by the MACC is wholly irrelevant to the civil claims in the present suit and Suit 510. This Court has already dealt with this issue and held that the NFA decisions do not preclude BPMB’s pursuit of civil remedies when Attan Mustafa J observed in this case that: “The fact that no prosecution was initiated or that the MACC concluded “no further action” is not a bar to the Plaintiff’s right to pursue civil remedies. This was made clear in Petrotrade Inc and others v Smith and others [2000] All ER (D) 264. Hence, there is no impediment to this Court determining the bribery allegation. Further, the passing of Dato’ Zafer does not prejudice the 2nd Defendant’s right to a fair trial as the Plaintiff would still have to prove its claims against the defendants based on documentary evidence and testimony of other witnesses.” S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA [29] The Defendants are bound by the principles of Res Judicata as the above judgement has been dispensed with on the merits in this suit. It is the duty of the court to prevent any wasting of the court resources on same disputes. Furthermore, it protects parties being harassed by repeated lawsuits. Challenge of the Consent Orders [30] It is my view that the 16th Defendant is now seeking to revive factual issues surrounding the Consent Orders despite then presiding judge, Attan Mustafa J, having stated the following in his judgments: - “First, I agree with the Plaintiff that the Said Defendants are estopped from raising any objection to the Consent Order that was duly recorded before this court on 9.2.2023 and in the presence of the Said Defendants” “Despite having the opportunity to do so, the Said Defendants did not raise any objection to the recording of the Consent Order during the hearing on 9.2.2023. Neither did the Said Defendants file any appeal against the Consent Order, nor take out any application to set aside the Consent Order, even until now.” “It is not an abuse of process for a party to call a witness who was previously a co-Defendant, so long as the other parties are given the opportunity to challenge that witness's evidence at trial.” S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA [31] As mentioned above, Suit 510 is a collateral attempt to re-litigate issues already decided and dismissed in the Suit 264 via interlocutory application filed by some of the Defendants. The court finds that the 16th Defendant’s application for a stay lacks fundamental requirement showing special circumstances. No Locus Standi to Challenge the Consent Order [32] The 16th Defendant’s also asserts in Suit 510 that the position of Ranjeet and Adah, should be reinstated as Defendants in the present suit. However, the question before this court, is whether the 16th Defendants have the locus standi to object to the recording of the consent judgment between BPMB and both Ranjeet and Adah. [33] A consent judgment is essentially a settlement agreement recorded by the court and has the same legal force as a normal judgment and can be enforced against the parties. The Plaintiff argued that the consent judgment is a contract between the parties and a stranger to the consent judgment has no right to set it aside taking into consideration by the decision established by the Court of Appeal in Tiong Nam Trading & Transport (M) Sdn Bhd v Commercial Union Assurance (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 6 MLJ 342 , Abdul Malik Ishak JCA delivering the judgment of the Court stated at p 351: S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA “Being a stranger to the judgment, the plaintiff has no right to set it aside in his personal capacity. Kannappa Chettiar v Vellasamy Pillai [1977] 1 MLJ 255 at p 256 per Mohamed Azmi J.” [34] In the case of Norshuime bin Baharudin (sole administrator for the estate of Baharudin bin Mahmud, deceased) v Leong Yee Heng and another appeal [2019] 5 MLJ 62 the Court of Appeal held at paragraph 26: “[26] Further, we were also of the view that since the plaintiff was not privy or a party to the consent judgment, it follows that he had no right to set it aside (see Tiong Nam Trading and Boustead Naval Shipyard). The most he could do was to ask the court to set aside only clauses which mentioned his name but not the whole consent judgment (see Khaw Poh Chuan).” [35] As discussed above, this court had already made a ruling earlier to this effect by Atan Mustafa J where he mentioned that: - [28]…..The court had already heard full arguments and decided to record the Consent Judgment between the Plaintiff and D13 on 6.3.2024 after due consideration of all re levant factors…. [29]…..Ultimately, the recording of a consent judgment is a matter solely between the parties to that judgment. A non-party to the consent judgment has no locus to object to it save on grounds of fraud, illegality, misrepresentation or other vitiating S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA factors….. The Consent Judgment with D13 was validly entered into between the Plaintiff and D13 and cannot now be impugned by D2 through the guise of this disqualification application. Scandalous and Irrelevant Allegations on the Plaintiffs solicitors [36] There were also allegations in Suit 510 that LCWP as BPMB’s solicitors shielded Ranjeet from criminal liability and concealment from the authorities which can be are scandalous. As mentioned in the above paragraphs, similar assertions were dismissed by Atan Mustafa J as bare conjecture and speculation unsupported by evidence. [37] He expressly held that alleged regulatory or investigative issues do not warrant disqualification or otherwise impede the fair trial of the present suit Specifically, Atan Mustafa J in dismissing the Second Disqualification observed “[62] Having considered the evidence and submissions of the parties, I find that the Said Defendants have failed to show any basis for the disqualification of LCWP as the Plaintiff's solicitors. First, I agree with the Plaintiff that the Said Defendants are estopped from raising any objection to the Consent Order that was duly recorded before this court on 9.2.2023 and in the presence of the Said Defendants. Despite having the opportunity to do so, the Said Defendants did not raise any objection to the recording of the Consent Order during the hearing on 9.2.2023. S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA Neither did the Said Defendants file any appeal against the Consent Order, nor take out any application to set aside the Consent Order, even until now. Following the legal principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in Lee Heng Moy and the Federal Court in Tong Lee Hwa, the Consent Order remains valid and binding on the Plaintiff and D14 as the parties to the Consent Order. The Said Defendants, who are not parties to the Consent Order, have no locus to now challenge the validity of the Consent Order through this application. [63] Second, even if the Said Defendants are entitled to raise objections to the Consent Order, there is no evidence before me which shows that LCWP were involved in any alleged “undisclosed negotiations/arrangements” between the Plaintiff and D14 which led to the Consent Order and to D14 purportedly changing her position in her affidavit in Enclosure 181. The Said Defendants' contention remains a bare allegation that is unsupported by any cogent evidence. The Said Defendants have failed to show how LCWP is a material witness to the alleged “undisclosed negotiations/arrangements”, when the evidence clearly shows that D14's affidavits in Enclosure 37 and 181 were filed by D14's solicitors and not the Plaintiff or LCWP. I find that the circumstances and terms of the Consent Order between the Plaintiff and D14 are not in dispute and have no bearing to the present application. The terms of the Consent Order are clear. LCWP therefore has no testimony to give in relation to the Consent Order that would make them a material witness to any of the facts in issue in the present suit between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. [64] Third, the Said Defendants have not shown how LCWP have breached any etiquette or are in a position of conflict merely S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA because the Plaintiff had entered into the Consent Order with D14. It is trite that parties to a suit are entitled to resolve their dispute and to enter into a consent judgment at any stage of the proceedings. The fact that D14 had affirmed an affidavit after entering into the Consent Order does not in itself suggest any impropriety or conflict of interest on the part of LCWP that would justify LCWP's disqualification. If the Said Defendants believe that D14's affidavit contains false evidence, the appropriate recourse would be for the Said Defendants to challenge D14's evidence at trial, rather than to disqualify the Plaintiff's solicitors. There is no rule of law or etiquette that prohibits LCWP from continuing to act for the Plaintiff merely because the Plaintiff had entered into a consent judgment with one of the Defendants.” Conclusion [38] As mentioned above, this court is in the view that it has the utmost duty of the court to balance fairness, efficiency and tactics to delay proceedings. The judiciary has the utmost responsibility to step in and steer the case towards a favorable resolution and ensure that no manipulation or an abuse of the system is present to protect the underlying principles of fairness, equity, and moral rightness. [39] As a summary this court adopts the approach in the Court of Appeal’s case of Jagdis Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 4 MLJ 213 which states that: - S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA

where an application is an abuse of the court process, then the stay of proceedings will not be granted. A typical example of abuse of court process is where a suit is duplicated or where a party employs improper and perverse procedure to obtain an advantage undeservedly;

it is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore, where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings; it will be refused. Some applicants, on seeing the weakness of their client’s case, would resort to application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not to encourage such unwholesome practice; and

an applicant for stay of proceedings must come with clean hands because what he is asking is an equitable relief. Equity will not assist the unclean. That is why the court has to look into the antecedents of the parties.” [40] This Court had considered factors such as the prevention of abuse of process, the avoidance of injustice, and the efficient and economical disposal of this suit. The stay threshold is high, special circumstances must be shown, and I have to agree with the Plaintiff that there are none here. S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA [41] The Court’s power to grant a stay of proceedings is a discretionary one, to be exercised judiciously. The 16th Defendant lacks the requirement of special circumstances in which this court is prepared to grant a stay therefore application for stay is dismissed with cost. 8 December 2025 SHOBA RAJAH A/P DORAI RAJAH Judicial Commissioner Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Kwan Will Sen & Lee Suan Cui with Pang Huey Lynn (Messrs Lim Chee Wee Partnership) For the 16th Defendants: Sreedhara Naidu (Messrs Naidu Chambers) S/N axwDMeo0qEi5ydMAEVwcuA