Bank Pertanian Malaysia Berhad v Nur Muhammad Kamil Bin Mohd Izhari (RA-29NCC-3-01/2024)

Kes ini melibatkan satu Notis Rayuan kepada Hakim Dalam Kamar yang telah difailkan oleh Penghutang Penghakiman (Penghutang) ke atas keputusan Penolong Kanan Pendaftrar (PKP) pada 3/9/2025 yang telah menolak permohonan Penghutang di K38 dengan kos sebanyak RM2,000.00.

K38 adalah merupakan satu Saman Dalam Kamar oleh Penghutang yang memohon Notis Kebankrapan bertarikh 18/1/2024 (K2) dan Petisyen Pemiutang bertarikh 10/9/2024 (K23) diketepikan dan tiada perbuatan kebankrapan dilakukan. K38 difailkan atas pendirian S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Penghutang bahawa terdapat isu material yang perlu dibicarakan yang boleh menyebabkan tindakan Pemiutang Penghakiman (Pemiutang) boleh dibatalkan. Fakta kes

Tindakan Pemiutang ke atas Penghutang adalah berdasarkan kepada satu Penghakiman Ingkar yang telah direkodkan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen Butterworth melalui kes Saman No PB-A52M- 116-09/2019 atas kegagalan Penghutang menjelaskan tuntutan Pemiutang sebayak RM480,365.25. Satu prosing kebankrapan telah dimulakan oleh Pemiutang berdasarkan Notis Kebankrapan bertarikh 18/1/2024 (NB) yang telah diserahkan kepada Penghutang melalui satu prose penyampaian secara ganti.

Berlanjutan itu satu Petisyen Pemiutang bertarikh 10/9/2024 (PP) telah difailkan dan diserahkan kepada Penghutang melalui serahan ganti. Walaubagaimanapun, Penghutang telah memfailkan SDK di K38 untuk mengenepikan NB dan PP tersebut.

SDK tersebut telah didengar dan diputuskan oleh PKP pada 3/9/2024 yang telah menolak permohonan Penghutang dengan kos sebanyak RM2,000.00. Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan rayuan terhadap keputusan Penolong

Adalah menjadi satu prinsip yang mantap bahawa rayuan terhadap keputusan PKP kepada Hakim Dalam Kamar adalah merupakan satu S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g pendengaran semula sepenuhnya di mana Hakim yang mendengar rayuan akan melaksanakan budi bicara seolah-olah perkara itu didengar buat kali pertama tanpa terikat dengan keputusan terdahulu. Ini sepertimana yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Tuan Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1996] 1 CLJ 241. Analisis dan dapatan mahkamah Sama ada Penghutang tidak bertanggungan sepenuhnya ke atas hutang

Penghutang menegaskan bahawa penghutang hanyalah seorang dari dua orang yang telah memohon kemudahan kredit dari Pemiutang yang boleh dilihat dari Perjanjian Prinsipal Jualan Komoditi bertarikh 3/9/2015 di ekshibit B Afidavit Sokongan (K39). Seorang lagi peminjam adalah Sahadah binti Ahmad.

Ini diperkuatkan lagi menerusi Penghakiman Ingkar yang direkodkan ke atas Penghutang dan Sahadah biti Ahmad sepertimana yang dilampirkan dalam Permintaan Untuk Mengeluarkan Notis Kebankrapan (K1). Sehubungan dengan itu, peguam Penghutang mennghujahkan bahawa Penghutang sepatutnya menanggung separuh liabiliti dari jumlah terhutang.

Dalam kes Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2020] CLJU 226, Mahkamah Rayuan telah merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Sumathy Subramaniam v. Subramaniam Gunasegaran & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 305 dan menyatakan seperti berikut: “[12] Turning to the consent judgment, we can do no better than reiterate the settled law in the words of Mary Lim JCA in Sumathy (supra) at para [12] of the judgment:

It is the argument of both appellants that while the respondent may be entitled to enter judgment for the same single sum, which the respondent did, the liability of each of them is necessarily joint. This is because, the summary judgment that was entered has not specified that both appellants are jointly and severally liable for that single sum. Where the judgment is silent or has not specified that liability is joint and several. The liability is necessarily joint. Where liability is joint, each of the appellants as defendant, shares that liability equally – see In Re Dato Elamaran M Sabapathy; ex p RHB Bank Bhd [2011] 10 CLJ 262. And so, when it comes to enforcing the judgment, the respondent has a right to enforce only half the judgment sum against each appellant. The respondent is not entitled to enforce the full sum against both of them, certainly not at the same time. [13] In this case, the BN and CP were premised on the 2nd defendant's liability in respect of the whole sum under the consent judgment; which premise was founded on the joint and several liability of the 2nd defendant under the consent judgment. [14] Applying the settled law to these facts, it can only be concluded that the foundation underlying the BN and CP was S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g defective as the amount claimed in question is for the whole judgment sum and not for the portion owed by the 2nd defendant pursuant to the consent judgment. Shorn of that foundational basis, the BN and CP cannot stand and were correctly set aside by the SAR and whose decision was correctly affirmed on appeal by the learned judge.”

Bagi mahkamah, isu yang berbangkit kini adalah sama ada Pemiutang dibolehkan untuk menuntut keseluruhan jumlah terhutang hanya ke atas Penghutang semata-mata walaupun tiada penegasan tanggungjawab liabiliti secara bersama-sama atau berasingan dinyatakan dalam Penghakiman Ingkar.

Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa prinsip perundangan yang terpakai dalam bidang kuasa negara ini adalah berdasarkan kepada seksyen 44 Akta Kontrak 1950 [Akta 136] yang menetapkan bahawa dalam perjanjian yang melibatkan beberapa orang pembuat janji bersama, seseorang penerima janji boleh memaksa mana-mana orang atau lebih untuk melaksanakan keseluruhan janji tersebut, kecuali kontrak menyatakan sebaliknya.

Kesannya, Pemiutang tidak wajib menuntut setiap pembuat janji secara berasingan. Mana-mana seorang pembuat janji boleh dituntut untuk melunaskan keseluruhan hutang atau obligasi.

Perkara yang sama telah dibincang dan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 7 CLJ 823 seperti berikut: S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g “[24] In this jurisdiction in any event, the common law is inapplicable, as we are governed by the Contracts Act 1950. Section 44 of the Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136) ("the Contracts Act") is the relevant provision relating to joint liability. It states:

When two or more persons make a joint promise, the promisee may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any one or more of the joint promisors to perform the whole of the promise. (emphasis added) [25] Section 44 of the Contracts Act is in pari materia with s. of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In Re Vallibhai Adamji (supra), BJ Wadia observed that the provision: ... makes the liability on all contracts joint and several, and allows the promisee to sue one or more of the several joint promisors as he chooses, and excludes the right of any one of them to be sued along with his co-promisor or co-promisors. (See also: Union of India v. East Bengal River Steamer Service Limited 1963 Indlaw Cal 177; AIR 1964 Cal 196) [26] In summary therefore, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the contract, all joint contracts effectively impose a full liability for the debt on each of the promisors, by virtue of s. 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: see Pollock & Mulla: Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts - vol. 1, 13th edn., (India: LexisNexis, 2009), at p. 1043-1044. Thus, where the debts are S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g jointly incurred, each promisee is liable for the whole amount: see Dhanki Mahajan v. Rana Chandubha Vakhatsing AIR 1969 SC 69. [27] Accordingly, so long as a judgment debt remains unrealised, the judgment creditor is entitled to proceed against one or any number of judgment debtors to secure the performance of an obligation in its entirety.”

Prinsip yang sama turut ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Mohd Abdul Karim Abdullah & Ors v. Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja [2025] 8 CLJ 185 apabila menafsirkan seksyen 46 Akta Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991 [Akta 452] iaitu sama ada terdapat halangan ke atas KWSP untuk menamakan pengarah sahaja dalam tuntutan mereka. Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “[34] In this Edwin Cassian case, a bankruptcy notice was filed by the respondent against Edwin Cassian alone who was a director of a company for the outstanding unpaid EPF contributions that was recorded in a consent judgment entered into earlier between the respondent and Edwin Cassian and the other director. What is important in this case is that, even in the case where the court judgment did not specifically state the word joint and several liability, such judgment was given effect to the liability on a joint and several basis by virtue of s. 46 of the EPF Act. This court there stated that: S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g [36] The instant appeal concerns a consent judgment entered into between the parties. Of primary importance is s. 46 of the EPF Ac t which imposes joint and several liability on the directors of a company for unpaid contributions. These provisions must be given full effect, as they comprise statutory law. It is not open to the courts to stultify, vary or whittle down the clear provisions promulgated by Parliament in relation to liability for EPF contributions, by construing judgments in manner which is not consonant with the EPF Act. In short, the EPF Act prevails over the terms of the judgment. ... [39] In our considered opinion, the courts below erred in law in invoking the presumption that joint liability means liability for only half the debt and not the full amount. As mentioned earlier, joint and several liability gives rise to one joint obligation and to as many several obligations as there are joint and several promises. The promisee, ie, the Board, is therefore entitled to proceed against one promisor, or the other, or both, in order to procure full performance as is evident from s. 44 of the Act. [35] Of equal importance was the point on the proper party, where this court in Edwin Cassian has held, in a similar vein with Ong Kim Chuan, that in the case of joint and several liability, the creditor is entitled to proceed against one or the other, or both or any number of debtors, as the case may be. Marzida follows Edwin Cassian. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g ……… [39] Consistency in interpretation by the courts, as was shown by the relevant three authorities cited before us means that there is no conflict, as yet, or ambiguity or confusion on the meaning and application of s. 46 of the EPF Act in respect of the proper party and the question of joint and several liability of directors who were/are directors during the period of default to pay the outstanding EPF contributions. Edwin Cassian has shown that even if only one director is sued against, that action is valid and proper in accordance with the said provision where the joint and several liability is given effect and enforceable.” [penekanan ditegaskan]

Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa selagi mana Penghakiman Ingkar tersebut adalah menjadi asas ke atas NB dan menjadi satu penghakiman yang muktamad serta tidak diketepikan atau digantung perlaksanaannya, maka Pemiutang adalah tidak terhalang dari meneruskan tindakannya ke atas seorang Penghutang atau mana-mana penghutang yang dinamakan dalam Penghakiman Ingkar tersebut.

Sehubungan dengan itu, NB yang dikeluarkan ke atas Penghutang adalah teratur dan tidak wujud sebarang salah arah perundangan. Dengan kata yang lain, tiada merit dalam rayuan Penghutang bagi isu ini. Sama ada Pemiutang tidak memenuhi format Petisyen Pemiutang S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g

Asas ke atas bantahan Penghutang seterusnya adalah bersandarkan kepada fakta bahawa sepanjang masa material prosiding kebankrapan ini dijalankan terdapat 1 hartanah yang telah diletakkan sebagai sekuriti cagaran, iaitu hakmilik GM1658, Lot11, Bandar Alor Setar, Daerah Kota Setar, Kedah (hartanah tersebut), dan nilaian hartanah ini juga adalah dinilai pada kadar RM2,650,000.00 setakat tarikh 4/9/2023, dan hal ini tidak dicabar keesahannya oleh Pemiutang.

Penghutang menegaskan bahawa, Pemiutang telah gagal untuk menyenaraikan hartanah bercagar ini, yang menjadikan Penghutang sebagai penghutang bercagar. Sehubungan itu, Pemiutang dihujahkan telah membuat kekhilafan yang nyata, yang menjadikan PP dalam tindakan ini sebagai tidak sah di sisi undang-undang dan sepatutnya dibatalkan.

Perhatian mahkamah ini di bawa kepada seksyen 5 Akta Kebankrapan 1967 [Akta 360] yang menyatakan bahawa jika pemiutang petisyen ialah pemiutang bercagar, beliau wajib menyatakan dalam petisyennya sama ada beliau bersedia menyerahkan sekuriti tersebut untuk faedah pemiutang-pemiutang lain, atau memberikan anggaran nilai sekuriti tersebut jika penghutang diisytiharkan bankrap.

Peguam Pemiutang menghujahkan bahawa kegagalan Pemiutang menyenaraikan hartanah tersebut bukanlah satu yang fatal dan menjadikan PP tersebut sebagai cacat dan perlu dibatalkan. Ini selaras dengan seksyen 131 Akta 360 yang menyatakan bahawa tiada prosiding kebankrapan akan dibatalkan oleh sebarang S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g kecacatan rasmi atau ketidakteraturan, melainkan mahkamah berpendapat bahawa wujud ketidakadilan yang sebenar. Penghakiman kes Per: Dewana Tara Singh lwn ex parte : Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad [2023] MLRHU 1877 adalah menjadi sandaran peguam Pemiutang.

Mahkamah mendapati bahawa fakta yang tidak dipertikaikan oleh kedua-dua pihak adalah Penghutang adalah merupakan seorang penghutang bercagar dan perkara ini tidak pernah dimasukkan dalam PP. Persoalannya adalah sama ada perkara ini adalah fatal ke atas Pemiutang.

Keperluan pematuhan seksyen 5 Akta 360 telah dibincangkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan dalam kes Sri Ram Ms Sarma v United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2023] 2 CLJ 942 melalui penghakiman oleh Hakim See Mee Chun HMR seperti berikut: “Application Of S. 5(2) IA [12] Firstly, we do not think there is any dispute that if s. 5(2) IA is not complied with, this will be fatal to the CP. In M Hashimi Ibrahim v. Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd [2002] 5 CLJ 25; [2001] 4 MLJ 67 it was stated at p. 31 (CLJ); p. 73 (MLJ): ... Being a secured creditor, the respondent creditor should have stated the truck under the hire purchase agreement as a security at para. 3 in the petition, giving its estimated value or stating that it has a security which it is willing to give up as provided for in a s. 5(2) of the Act. In the present case, the respondent creditor failed to state that in its petition. Section 5(2) of the Act is S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g mandatory in its provision; therefore it must be complied with strictly. Thus, the failure to comply with the requirement is fatal to the petition. The appeal is allowed with costs and the orders of the learned SAR are hereby set aside. The petition is dismissed.”

Mahkamah Rayuan menegaskan dengan jelas bahawa kegagalan mematuhi seksyen 5 Akta 360 akan menyebabkan PP boleh diketepikan. Malahan keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan ini adalah berpandukan kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Samuel Pakianathan Jabamanickam [1993] 3 CLJ 349 yang memutuskan seperti berikut: “In our view, what was crucial here was to determine whether under s. 5(2) the appellant bank as a petitioning creditor was a 'secured creditor' not in the loan agreement with the principal borrower, but under the contract of guarantee with Mr Samuel from which had emanated Mr Samuel's liability in the O. judgment and upon which in turn the bankruptcy notice and petition were based. In short, Mr Samuel was the only 'debtor' in the bankruptcy proceeding before the court on account of the judgment, and his alleged act of bankruptcy was governed by s. 3(1)(i ) for non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the word 'debtor' appearing in both ss. 2 and 5(2) must mean and should be limited to the actual 'debtor' involved in the particular bankruptcy proceeding and should not include any other debtors that may exist. Thus, in this particular petition, to clothe the appellant bank S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g as a 'secured creditor' under s. 5(2), it must be shown that the appellant bank was holding a mortgage, charge or lien on the property of Mr Samuel, as a security for the debt of RM11.2m due to the bank from Mr Samuel. It was common ground that Mr Samuel had not given any security and debenture, were admittedly given by the principal borrower and none by Mr Samuel. In fact, the contract of guarantee executed by Mr Samuel was a third form of collateral or security given to the bank in addition to the landed charge and debenture. Thus, in this particular bankruptcy proceeding as far as Mr Samuel was concerned, the appellant bank was not secured creditor within the meaning of a s. 5(2), and as such non-compliance with its requirement could not be fatal to the petition.”

Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa seksyen 131 Akta 360 yang dirujuk oleh peguam Pemiutang adalah berkaitan dengan kecacatan rasmi atau ketidakaturan dalam PP. Ia akan hanya terpakai apabila ianya tidak menyentuh intipati PP dan tidak boleh diremedi oleh mahkamah. Perkara ini telah dibincangkan dalam kes Ismail Daud & Hjh. Qamariah Fateh Mohamed, Re: Ex P; Universal Life & General insurance Sdn. Bhd. seperti berikut: "I agree with Counsel that if the amount specified in the notice is quantified or is quantifiable then even if the amount demanded exceeds the amount actually due such a notice will not per se invalidated unless the debtor within the prescribed 7 days gives notice to the creditor that he disputes the validity of the notice on the ground of the mistake. In the absence of a dispute by the debtor of the quantum it is not for the Court or the Official S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Assignee to question the quantum of the amount claimed in the notice. However, if what is claimed is not clear as opposed to being excessive it is, in my view, the duty of the Court and of the Official Assignee to take note of such lack of clarity and inspect it in the light of s. 131 of the Bankruptcy Act which is as follows: S.131. No proceeding in bankruptcy shall be invalidated by any formal defect or by any irregularity, unless the Court before which an objection is made to the proceeding is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by any order of that Court. The policy of the Act is that the recipient of the bankruptcy notice must not be misled. In Rengasamy Pillai v. Comptroller Of Income Tax [1968] CLJU 127; [1968] 1 LNS 127 the Privy Council in its advice stated at p. 236F: What then is 'a formal defect or irregularity within the meaning of the section? This was discussed in relation to a bankruptcy notice in In re a Debtor Ex Parte The Debtor v. Bowmaker Ltd.in which the earlier authorities were considered. The test there laid down was whether the defect in the notice was of such a kind as could reasonably mislead a debtor upon whom it was served. If it was, the notice was not validated by the section notwithstanding that the particular debtor upon whom it was served was not in fact misled. If on the other hand it would not reasonably mislead the debtor it was a formal defect and validated by the section. Their Lordships are here only S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g concerned with the application of the section to a bankruptcy notice. They are not concerned with whether the same test is appropriate to determine the validity of subsequent steps in bankruptcy proceedings. In their view any failure to comply with the statutory provisions as to the form of a bankruptcy notice of a kind which could not reasonably mislead a debtor upon whom it is served is a " formal defect " and validated by the section." [penekanan ditegaskan]

Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa tujuan seksyen 131 Akta 360 adalah untuk mencegah prosiding kebankrapan dari dibatalkan hanya kerana kesilapan teknikal kecil. Ia merujuk kepada kesilapan prosedur, salah ejaan, atau kecacatan teknikal yang tidak menjejaskan intipati kes dan memberi budi bicara kepada mahkamah untuk membetulkan kecacatan tersebut dan meneruskan prosiding sekiranya ia tidak mengakibatkan ketidakadilan yang nyata.

Namun persoalannya adakah apabila pemiutang gagal memasukkan perihal berkaitan Penghutang sebagai penghutang bercagar adalah merupakan satu kesilapan teknikal yang kecil dan mewajarkan mahkamah ini untuk melaksanakan budi bicaranya memperbetulkan

Dalam pertimbangan mahkamah, kegagalan tersebut adalah tidak terangkum dalam kategori kesilapan teknikal yang kecil. Ini kerana ia memberi kesan ke atas Penghutang secara lansung kerana melibatkan hartanah yang mempunyai nilaian yang jauh melebihi dari tuntutan yang dibuat oleh Pemiutang. Ia tidak menggambarkan S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g sepenuhnya tindakan yang diambil oleh Pemiutang ke atas Penghutang dan ia menjejaskan kepentingan Penghutang.

Mahkamah menegaskan bahawa dalam sesuatu prosiding kebankrapan, mahkamah perlu memberi tafsiran tegas. Ia selaras dengan beberapa nas duluan seperti berikut:

Affin Bank Berhad v. Abu Bakar Ismail [2017] 7 CLJ 282; [2017] 1 LNS 65, mahkamah memutuskan; "Bankruptcy proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and strict compliance to the laws must be adhered"

Low Mun v. Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd. [1987] 2 CLJ 400; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 172, diputuskan bahawa: "As to the principle of the construing bankruptcy notices, we agree with the view that since bankruptcy is entirely a creation of statute law, the rule of strict construction should be applied to the legislative words creating the bankruptcy."

Bagi isu ini, mahkamah bersetuju bahawa ketiadaan pengisytiharan berhubung hartanah yang ditampilkan oleh Pemiutang dalam PP dan dinyatakan pula di parenggan 3 PP bahawa tiada sebarang sekuiriti dalam tindakan tersebut adalah satu khilaf yang material serta melanggar seksyen 5 Akta 360 dan ianya adalah fatal. Ia dengan secara lansung menjadikan NB dan PP adalah cacat dan wajar dibatalkan. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Sama ada Pemiutang dibolehkan untuk melaksanakan dua prosiding perlaksanaan serentak ke atas Penghutang

Isu selanjutnya adalah sangat berkait dengan isu yang kedua iaitu apabila Pemiutang turut melaksanakan prosiding perlaksanaan secara penjualan ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui kes KA-38-330- 12/2023 di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Alor Setar pada 17/4/2024. Ia dijalankan selepas pemfailan Permintaan Untuk Mengeluarkan Notis Kebankrapan dan Notis Kebankrapan di mahkamah ini pada 18/1/2024.

Peguam Penghutang menghujahkan bahawa terdapat 2 tindakan dijalankan ke atas Penghutang sedangkan Pemiutang sepatutnya membuat tindakan mengikut aturan yang bersesuaian. Sekiranya Pemiutang telah mememulakan tindakan untuk perlaksanaan secara lelongan, maka tiada kewajaran untur mengambil tindakan kebankrapan pada waktu yang sama.

Peguam Pemiutang dalam menangani isu ini menghujahkan bahawa ia adalah merupakan hak pemiutang sepertimana yang dipertahankan di bawah Klausa 30 Perjanjian Prinsipal Jualan Komoditi dan Klausa 19 serta Lampiran ke atas Gadaian yang telah ditandatangani oleh Penghutang pada 30/8/2025. Klausa-klausa tersebut jelas memberi hak kepada Pemiutang untuk melaksanakan apa-apa remedi bagi mendapatkan jumlah yang masih terhutang.

Pemiutang merujuk kepada kes Re Tan Sri Amin Shah Omar; ex parte Affin Bank Bhd [2008] 3 MLRH 164 yang telah memutuskan hak pemiutang untuk mengambil tindakan bagi mendapat kembali S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g jumlah terhutang dengan merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1996] 2 MLRA 491 seperti berikut; “Now, it is trite that a chargee/creditor may pursue any or all remedies to recover monies lent by him. He may enforce his statutory charge against the chargor by wav of proceedings in rem under s. 256 of the Code. He may sue the principal debtor (who may or may not be the chargor) upon the personal covenant contained in any loan agreement that was entered into between the parties. He may proceed against the surety who has guaranteed the loan. And he may pursue all of these courses simultaneously, contemporaneously or successively. See, China and South Sea Bank Ltd v. Tan [1989] 3 All ER 839, 842.”

Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa pada setiap masa yang material, Pemiutang sedar Pemiutang mempunyai pilihan dalam menentukan remedi tindakan ke atas Penghutang iaitu sama ada mengambil tindakan kebangkrapan serta boleh melaksanakan tindakan melelong hartanah tersebut. Apatah lagi, hartanah tersebut mempunyai nilaian yang jauh lebih melebihi dari tuntutan oleh Pemiutang.

Oleh itu, sebagai Pemiutang, maka Pemiutang perlu memutuskan remedi sesuai yang perlu diambil secara satu persatu. Pandangan mahkamah ini adalah dengan merujuk kepada keputusan dalam kes Ong Kong Kuan v. Ong Kong Beng & Anor (CIMB Bank Bhd & Ors, Garnishees) [2023] CLJU 2236; [2023] 1 LNS 2236; [2023] S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g AMEJ 2214; [2023] MLJU 2496; [2023] MLRHU 1802 yang memutuskan; "A judgment creditor has to tread with prudence and care as to whether he/she wants to initiate bankruptcy proceeding first before he/she applies for garnishment or writ of execution against the judgment debtor's assets".

Manakala dalam kes Wong Kum Pun v. Ng Lay @ Ng Soo [2024] CLJU 2222, Mahkamah Tinggi telah menjelaskan alasan ke atas peringatan dalam kes Ong Kong Kuan (supra) adalah perlu seperti berikut: “[21] The reason for the above caution is obvious. When a judgment creditor initiates bankruptcy proceedings, by virtue of section 50(1) of the Insolvency Act 1967, a judgment creditor "shall not be entitled to retain the benefit of the execution or attachment against the Director General of Insolvency unless he has completed the execution or attachment before the date of the bankruptcy order and before notice of the presentation of any bankruptcy petition by or against the debtor, or of the commission of any available act of bankruptcy by the debtor' (own emphasis). [22] Since the Respondent/Plaintiff judgment creditor in the present case has not completed the execution of the judgment debt, the presentation (and the pendency) of the bankruptcy petition meant that the Respondent/Plaintiff judgment creditor is barred from enforcing the judgment against the S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Appellant/Defendant judgment debtor (see Industrial Diseases Compensation Ltd v. Marrons [2001] BPIR 600 and Nationwide Building Society v. Wright and another [2010] Ch 318).”

Mahkamah berpandangan Pemiutang sepatutnya membuat tindakan mengikut aturan yang bersesuaian. Memandangkan Pemiutang telah memutuskan untuk mengambil tindakan pelaksanaan secara lelongan hartanah, maka adalah tidak wajar untuk tindakan kebankrapan ini difailkan.

Bagi mahkamah tindakan pelaksanaan perlulah dijalan secara satu persatu, dari melaksanakan kedua-duanya serentak dalam satu masa yang sama. Ini kerana jika ia secara serentak dan tindakan lelongan berjaya, maka ianya akan memprejudiskan pihak Penghutang kerana masih ada tindakan pelaksanaan ke atasnya melalui prosiding kebankrapan.

Atas dasar keadilan, mahkamah bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Penghutang bahawa ianya adalah material dan ia bukan berkenaan berkenaan Penghutang dengan sengaja menghalang tindakan pihak Pemiutang untuk mendapatkan jumlah terhutang. Sebarang tindakan hendaklah dibuat atas pematuhan sebarang peruntukan, serta aturan undang-undang sedia ada, dan sekiranya kekhilafan yang dibuat adalah fatal dan tidak boleh dipulihkan serta memprejudiskan Penghutang, maka ia hendaklah dibatalkan.

Atas isu ini, mahkamah memutuskan wujud merit dalam rayuan Penghutang ke atas keputusan PKP. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Sama ada terdapat persoalan berkaitan kesahihan jumlah terhutang yang dinyatakan dalam NB

Isu seterusnya adalah berkaitan jumlah terhutang yang dinyatakan dalam NB. Ia adalah sangat berkait dengan isu sebelum ini berkaitan hartanah yang dicagarkan. Ini berdasarkan hujahan peguam Penghutang bahawa ianya bertentangan dengan seksyen 3(1)(i) Akta 360 yang menyatakan; “(1) A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of following cases: ……….. i. a creditor has obtained a final judgment or final order against him for any amount and execution thereon not having been stayed has served on him in the Federation, or by leave of the court elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act requiring him to pay the judgment debt or sum ordered to be paid in accordance with the terms of the judgment or order with interest quantified up to the date of issue of the bankruptcy notice, or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor or the court; and he does not within seven days after service of the notice in case the service is effected in Malaysia, and in case the service is effected elsewhere then within the time limited in that behalf by the order given leave to effect the service, either comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the court that he has a counter-claim, set off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g debt or sum ordered to be paid and which he could not set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained or in the proceedings in which the order was obtained ;…..”

Teras hujahan peguam adalah nilai hartanah tersebut melebihi jumlah yang terhutang dan ini bermaksud Penghutang mempunyai tuntutan silang yang melebihi jumlah penghakiman. Perhatian mahkamah telah dibawa kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Westech Sdn Bhd v Thong Weng Lock [2017] 8 CLJ 257 yang memutuskan seperti berikut; “[37] Construing r. 95 of the BR, when an affidavit in support of an application discloses that the deponent has an appropriate counterclaim, set-off or cross demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt (r. 94(1)(b) of the BR ), that affidavit operates as an application to set aside the BN (Datuk Lim Kheng Kim v. Malayan Banking Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 324; [1993] 2 MLJ 298 (SC)). The respondent did just that ie, he disclosed that he had an appropriate counter-claim, set-off or cross-demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt. By his unwitting act, the application was converted into an application under r. 95 of the BR. [38] The affidavit, in short, a written sworn statement of fact made by a deponent under oath or affirmation, administered by a person authorised to do so by law, incidentally is also the evidential basis to decide on the matter. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g [39]Rule 95 of the BR is the statutory exception which defers an act of bankruptcy committed as envisaged by s. 3(1)(i) of the BA. It is couched with stringent requirements and legal effects, in particular the portion of r. 95(2) of the BR which reads, "... no act of bankruptcy shall be deemed to have been committed under the notice until the application has been heard and determined. [40] For purposes of our appeal, it is factually undeniable that the impugned BN application was heard and determined by the Registrar on 13 April 2012 when he judicially dismissed it.”

Mahkamah sebaliknya berpandangan bahawa hujahan peguam Penghutang adalah sama sekali tersalah arah. Apa yang dimaksudkan di bawah seskyen 3(1)(i) Akta 360 dan kes Westech Sdn Bhd (supra) adalah sama sekali berbeza. Mahkamah Persekutuan menekankan bahawa apabila afidavit sokongan permohonan mendedahkan bahawa deponen mempunyai tuntutan balas, penolakan atau permintaan balas teratur yang bersamaan atau melebihi jumlah hutang maka afidavit itu beroperasi sebagai permohonan untuk mengetepikan NB. Responden telah mendedahkan bahawa dia mempunyai tuntutan balas, penolakan atau permohonan balas yang teratur yang bersamaan atau melebihi jumlah hutang penghakiman.

Ia berbeza dengan kes semasa kerana ia melibatkan hartanah yang dicagar. Ia bukannya satu tuntutan balas, penolakan atau permintaan balas teratur kerana hartanah tersebut walaupun telah dinilaikan, masih belum dilelong yang merupakan satu jumlah yang boleh dikira dan mendatangkan jumlah yang berlebihan dari jumlah terhutang. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g

Dalam masa yang sama, peguam Penghutang turut mempertikaikan jumlah yang menjadi tuntutan kerana wujud perbezaan di antara jumlah terhutang semasa Penghakiman Ingkar iaitu pada 21/10/2019 yang berjumlah RM480,365.25 dengan jumlah dalam NB bertarikh 18/1/2024 yang berjumlah RM457,802.95. Penghutang mengakui bahawa di antara tarikh tersebut Penghutang ada membuat bayaran sebayak RM50,000.00. Namun memandangkan jumlah terhutang adalah meliputi ta’widh (denda), kos penghakiman dan kos-kos lain, maka dihujahkan bahawa jumlah yang sepatutnya berbaki adalah sebanyak RM430,365.25.

Peguam Penghutang menghujahkan bahawa penyata akaun yang disediakan oleh Pemiutang sepertimana di ekshibit SBW-A telah wujud jumlah yang ditokok tambah dan tidak dinyatakan secara spesifik tujuan amaun tersebut dikenakan. Ini dikhuatiri menyebabkan wujud caj sebanyak dua kali secara khususnya berkaitan kos penghakiman.

Mahkamah berpandangan bahawa hujahan peguam Penghutang hanyalah merupakan dakwaan tanpa bukti yang kukuh. Perkara yang tidak dapat dinafikan adalah Penghutang sememangnya berhutang degan Pemiutang. Ia berdasarkan 2 dokumen penting iaitu Surat Tawaran bertarikh 22/7/2015 dan Perjanjian Prinsipal Jualan Komoditi bertarikh 9/9/2015.

Dalam kedua-dua dokumen tersebut, terdapat klausa yang jelas menyatakan apa-apa penyata akaun yang dikeluarkan akan menjadi bukti jumlah terhutang kecuali terdapat kesilapan yang nyata. Oleh itu, ekshibit SBW-A yang merupakan penyata akaun akan menjadi S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g bukti teras jumlah terhutang kecuali jika dapat ditunjukkan sebarang kesilapan.

Dalam kes Citibank NA v Ooi Boon Leong & ors [1981] 1 MLJ 282, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan; “We have often said in this court many a time that where the issues are clear and the matter of substance can be decided once and for all without going to trial there is no reason why the Assistant Registrar or the judge in chambers, or, for that matter, this court shall not deal with the whole matter under the R.S.C. Order 14 procedure. In the present case, the guarantee contains a clause which enables the bank by producing a certificate of indebtedness by its officer to dispense with legal proof of the actual indebtedness of the respondents.... It means that, for the purpose of fixing liability of the respondents, the company's indebtedness may be ascertained conclusively by a certificate.”

Keputusan Ooi Boon Leong (supra) telah diterima pakai oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying & anor [2005] 2 MLRA 736 yang telah menyatakan; “The above dictum establishes firmly the conclusive nature and extent of a certificate of indebtedness. A certificate of indebtedness operates in the field of adjectival law. It excuses the plaintiff from adducing proof of debt. Such a certificate shifts the burden onto the defendant to disprove the amount claimed. [7] In the instant case, the relevant cls. 27 and 7.03 of the loan agreement and guarantee agreement respectively are S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g sufficiently clear. A clause of this nature has been described as a conclusive evidence clause. Such a clause has been held to be binding and valid by courts in Australia and England. In Dobbs v. National Bank of Australiasia [1953] 53 CLR 643, the Australian Court made the following observation which we think is instructive:- ... The bank could recover without the production of a certificate if, by ordinary legal evidence, it proved the actual indebtedness of the customer. But the (conclusive evidence) clause, if valid, enables the bank by producing a certificate to dispense with such proof. It means that for the purpose of fixing the liability of a surety, the customer's indebtedness may be ascertained conclusively by a certificate.... But the manifest object of the clause was to provide a ready means of establishing the existence and amount of the guaranteed debt and avoiding an inquiry upon legal evidence into the debits going to make up the indebtedness. The certificate of indebtedness, exh. P3, issued in accordance with cls. 27 and 7.03 aforesaid, is lucid enough. There is nothing to indicate or suggest any manifest error on the face of the said certificate nor is any fraud shown.”

Bagi mahkamah, ekshibit SBW-A adalah bukti konklusif berhubung keberhutangan Penghutang setakat tarikh NB difailkan. Tiada bukti kukuh dikemukakan oleh Penghutang bagi membuktikan wujudnya kesilapan bagi amaun tersebut. Cabaran Penghutang adalah lebih merupakan dakwaan kosong. Undang-undang adalah mantap S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g bahawa dakwaan kosong adalah tidak memadai untuk dijadikan sandaran bagi menyokong cabaran Penghutang. Sama ada alamat penyampaian ke atas NB dan PP adalah defektif

Isu selanjutnya adalah bersangkutan dengan alamat penyampaian, dan ianya berkait rapat dengan maklumat yang dimaklumkan oleh Penghutang, dengan maklumat yang diikrar sumpah oleh pihak Pemiutang di Afidavit Tanpa Serahan (K8) di mana Pemiutang memaklumkan Penghutang telah dimaklumkan berpindah, dan Afidavit Tanpa Serahan (K9) di mana Pemiutang telah memaklumkan premis telah lama dimiliki oleh orang lain, iaitu Heap Huat Trader.

Peguam Penghutang menghujahkan bahawa Penghutang telah memaklumkan perubahan alamat melalui surat Letter of Redemption Cum Letter of Undertaking bertarikh 22/12/2021 yang dialamatkan ke M2-13-17, Kondominium Kristal, Jalan Pualam 7/32, Seksyen 7, 40000 Shah Alam, Selangor (ekshibit A dalam Afidavit Sokongan) dan emel oleh Sahadah Binti Ahmad kepada Pegawai Pemiutang Penghakiman bertarikh 22/4/2022 memaklumkan pertukaran alamat ke No.34, Kampung Sekolah Bongor, 09100 Baling, Kedah.

Persoalannya adalah sama ada kedua-dua yang dirujuk oleh Penghutang boleh dianggap sebagai satu pemakluman kepada Pemiutang. Ini kerana jelas NB dan PP yang dikemukakan oleh Pemiutang kepada Penghutang adalah berdasarkan kepada Surat Tawaran bertarikh 22/7/2015 dan Perjanjian Prinsipal Jualan Komoditi bertarikh 9/9/2015 yang ditandatangani oleh Penghutang. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g

Tiada sebarang permohonan pertukaran alamat dibuat oleh Penghutang kepada Pemiutang. Bagi mahkamah, undang-undang adalah mantap iaitu jika tiada permohonan pertukaran, maka alamat ketika Surat Tawaran dan Perjanjian dikeluarkan merupakan alamat yang sebenar.

Malahan Pemiutang telah membuat carian alamat terkini Penghutang di Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara dan menunjukkan alamat terkini Penghutang setakat 19/4/2024 adalah di No 1, Taman Teratai, Jalan Simpang, 34000 Taiping, Perak.

Dalam kes Per: H Dantti Mohamad: Ex Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2022] MLRHU 1470, mahkamah menyatakan; “[16] It is clear that the JD, from reg 3(1) of the National Registration Regulations 1990 is, unless the contrary has been proven to this Court and which there is no evidence to the contrary given by the JD in the documents before me, bound by the said National Registration Regulations 1990 and is by way of reg 15(1) mandated by the use of the word 'shall' therein to 'report the fact to the nearest registration Office and shall apply for a replacement identity card' which appears not to have been done by the JD. A similar decision was made by the Court in In Re: Yusri Meon; Ex-Parte: PP Chin Hin Sdn Bhd [2016] MLRHU 1748. …….. [18] I therefore hold that the JC had done all that it could have done in the circumstances to make an official check or verification of the S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g JD's address by way of the JPN search it had conducted and that the JC had acted properly and reasonably in doing so. The JD cannot and should not be allowed to rely on its own noncompliance with National Registration Regulations 1990 to evade the Bankruptcy proceedings before this Court. This Court will not come to the aid of nor assist the JD herein when encl 1 was filed exturpi causa as was stated by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson [17751802] ALL ER Rep 98; [1775] 1 Cowper 341, and which have been applied in numerous cases in Malaysia, amongst of which are Thomas Chin Yun Phin v. Macquarie Capital Services (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2014] MLRHU 722, wherein in the former it was stated:"No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action on an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appears to arise exturpi causa, or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the court says that he has no right to be assisted. It is on that ground the court goes; not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides and the defendant was to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it; for where both are equally (at) fault, potior est conditio defendantis." [19] Our own Court of Appeal had also held in Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Petaling v. Swee Lin Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 MLRA 438; [1999] 3 MLJ 489; [1999] 3 CLJ 577 that:".... there is a principle of great antiquity that a litigant ought not to benefit from its own wrong." S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g

Bagi isu ini mahkamah berpandangan bahawa tidak terdapat sebarang kekhilafan dalam alamat penyampaian ke atas NB dan PP. Sehubungan dengan itu, isu ini adalah tidak bermerit.

Berdasarkan analisis ini, mahkamah berpandangan bahawa terdapat kecacatan teknikal dalam pengeluaran NB dan PP ke atas Penghutang.

Sehubungan dengan itu, rayuan ini dibenarkan dan keputusan PKP adalah diketepikan. Dengan secara lansung, permohonan Penghutang melalui SDK di K38 adalah dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM3,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokatur. Bertarikh: 12 hb. Jun, 2026 (DATUK MOHAMAD ABAZAFREE BIN MOHD ABBAS) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Kangar, Perlis. S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Pihak-Pihak: Peguam Pemiutang Penghakiman: Puan Siti ' Adilah Binti Ahmad Tetuan Shariful Azhar & Partners Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara No.38 Tingkat Bawah & Tingkat Atas Jalan Dagangan Bertam Perdana 13200 Kepala Batas Seberang Perai, Pulau Pinang Peguam Penghutang Penghakiman : Encik Ahmad Afiq Bin Md Zain Tetuan Afiq Zain & Co Peguam Bela dan Peguam Cara No.10 Tingkat 2 Susuran Sinaran Kompleks Perniagaan Sinaran 06000 Jitra Kedah Tarikh Keputusan : 13 Februari 2026 S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g Undang-Undang Yang Dirujuk :  Akta Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja 1991  Akta Kebankrapan 1967 Kes-Kes Yang Dirujuk :  Tuan Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1996] 1 CLJ 241  Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2020] CLJU 226  Sumathy Subramaniam v. Subramaniam Gunasegaran & Another Appeal [2018] 2 CLJ 305  Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v. Edwin Cassian Nagappan [2021] 7 CLJ 823  Mohd Abdul Karim Abdullah & Ors v. Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja [2025] 8 CLJ 185  Per: Dewana Tara Singh lwn ex parte : Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad [2023] MLRHU 1877  Sri Ram Ms Sarma v United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2023] 2 CLJ 942  Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Samuel Pakianathan Jabamanickam [1993] 3 CLJ 349  Ismail Daud & Hjh. Qamariah Fateh Mohamed, Re: Ex P; Universal Life & General insurance Sdn. Bhd.  Affin Bank Berhad v. Abu Bakar Ismail [2017] 7 CLJ 282; [2017] 1 LNS 65 S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g  Low Mun v. Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd. [1987] 2 CLJ 400; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 172  Re Tan Sri Amin Shah Omar; ex parte Affin Bank Bhd [2008] 3 MLRH 164  Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd [1996] 2 MLRA 491  Ong Kong Kuan v. Ong Kong Beng & Anor (CIMB Bank Bhd & Ors, Garnishees) [2023] CLJU 2236; [2023] 1 LNS 2236; [2023] AMEJ 2214; [2023] MLJU 2496; [2023] MLRHU 1802  Wong Kum Pun v. Ng Lay @ Ng Soo [2024] CLJU 2222  Westech Sdn Bhd v Thong Weng Lock [2017] 8 CLJ 257  Citibank NA v Ooi Boon Leong & ors [1981] 1 MLJ 282  Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying & anor [2005] 2 MLRA 736  Per: H Dantti Mohamad: Ex Parte: CIMB Bank Berhad [2022] MLRHU 1470 S/N i/BVUKtqzkG7YfOXijmg0g