to establish a Compensation Fund.” [34] From the above, it is very clear that the objectives of the Applicant are different from the LSM. The statutory objectives of the Applicant are wider than LSM, including establishing and maintaining relations with international bar associations and to establish a Compensation Fund. The duty of the Applicant is to protect its members, who have been admitted as members of the Malaysian Bar. The Applicant is the sole authority having control over members of the Malaysian Bar under the LPA 1976. [35] However, the membership of LSM includes those who are legally qualified but have not been admitted to the Bar under the LPA 1976. 19 The LSM has no authority over members of the Malaysian Bar as it is registered only as a society under Act 335. The objectives of LSM includes protecting the welfare of its members and to foster a closer relationship amongst its members. Therefore, I am of the considered opinion and I agree with the ROS that LSM does not appear to mislead or be calculated to mislead members of the public as to the true character or purpose of the society. Added to that, there is no evidence given by the Applicant of any complaints made by members of the public that they have been misled in the first place. [36] As such, I am of the considered opinion that there is no breach of subsection 7(3)(d)(i) of Act 335. Issue (iii) whether the ROS’s decision is unreasonable. [37] The Applicant takes the position that the ROS‟s Decisions to change LSM‟s name in 2014 and maintaining the same in 2017 are extremely unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. Added to that, it is said that the process of ROS in arriving at its Decision is irrational because the ROS did not or failed to carry out a proper investigation. The Applicant submits that the ROS has failed to take into consideration sections 2A and 7(3) of Act 335 in arriving at his Decision. [38] However in his affidavit, the ROS has affirmed that he had done the necessary investigations by looking into the documents given by LSM, including LSM‟s Constitution. Having done the investigations, 20 the ROS was satisfied that the name of LSM does not breach the provisions of Act 335. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Decision of the ROS is irrational. [39] It must be emphasized that subsection 7(3)(d)(i) of Act 335 gives the discretion to the ROS to make a finding if the name of the society „appears‟ to him to misled or calculated to misled the public. In such a situation, it is not for this Court to go behind the opinion of the ROS and make its own finding, as this would be usurping the limited powers of the ROS. The court would then have to substitute the subjective opinion of the ROS. If this is allowed, the Court will be taking over the role of the ROS, and this will be contrary to Act 335. In Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor v. Vikneswary RM Santhivelu [2008] 6 CLJ 573, it was held that: “From the provisions of the general orders it is clear that it is never the intention of the legislators that the courts should step into the shoes of the disciplinary authority in deciding whether it was fair to the respondent to have granted him a right to make oral representations or whether he should be given such right although he did not ask for it.” (emphasis added) [40] In Gasing Meridian Sdn Bhd v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2004] 1 CLJ 219, Abdull Hamid Mohamed then JCA, said that "It is the Commissioner who has to be satisfied. It is not for the court to be satisfied and then force it on the Commissioner". 21 [41] Therefore, where the ROS had directed his mind to the facts and objectives of Act 335 and was satisfied that the name LSM does not appear to mislead the public as the character and purpose of the LSM does not violate Act 335, it is not for this court to substitute the opinion of the ROS. As such, it cannot be said that the Decision of the ROS is irrational. Conclusion [42] Premised on the reasons enumerated above, I am of the considered opinion that there is no merit in this application and the same is dismissed with costs. (AZIZAH BINTI HAJI NAWAWI) JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA (Appelliate and Special Powers Division 2) KUALA LUMPUR Dated: 27 May 2019 22 Counsels/Solicitors for the Appellant Asim Ng [Tetuan Fahri & Co, Petaling Jaya Selangor] Counsels/Solicitors for the Respondents 1st Respondent: Puan Mazlifah Bt Ayob (SFC) [Jabatan Peguam Negara, Putarajaya] 2nd Respondent: Tan Sri Dato‟ Indera Abdul Aziz A Rahman Ashraf Appoo Nurul Azua Abu Yazid [Tetuan Nik Saghir bin Ismail, Kuala Lumpur] REFERENCES: 1) Booi Kim Lee v YB Menteri Sumber Manusia & Another [1999] 3 MLJ 515 2) Council of Civil Service Unions V. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 3) Public Services Commission Malaysia & Anor v. Vikneswary RM Santhivelu [2008] 6 CLJ 573 4) Gasing Meridian Sdn Bhd v. Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2004] 1 CLJ 219