No person shall use or permit to be used any land or building otherwise than in conformity with the local plan. [20] Now, I find the Respondent’s contention to be wholly misplaced. The Appeal Board has made a clear distinction between the use of the New 14 Premises as an exhibition hall (Dewan Pameran) for the mere display of cars, which is prohibited, and the marketing and sale of cars, which is permitted under the Guidelines. Therefore, the condition that the Appeal Board had imposed for the issuance of the planning permission by the Applicant is in full conformity with the Guidelines and the local plan. [21] I find that the Appeal Board’s Order is not only consistent with the Guidelines, but is also consistent with the past practices of the Respondent in giving approval for car showrooms along Jalan Univerisiti, including to the Applicant at the Old Premises. The Applicant intends to use the New Premises to carry out the same commercial activity of marketing and selling cars, as in the Old Premises, which is permitted under the Guidelines, as opposed to a “Dewan Pameran” or exhibition hall which is not permitted. After all the Applicant had with the previous approval of the Respondent been carrying similar trade on the Old Premises at No. 64, which is just 3 lots away from the New Premises at No. 58 Jalan Universiti. This fact has been considered by the Appeals Board in coming to its decision. [22] In this regard, it would be apposite to quote from the judgment of the learned judge in the 1st Judicial Review, where he observed: “... From the factual matrix of the present case ... it clearly shows that the whole of Jalan Universiti is a mixed development of various commercial activities with car 15 show rooms approved for various buildings located on the same road ... For that matter the Old Premises which is just 3 lots away was approved for the same in the year 2005. Within the immediate vicinity of the New Premises, to the left is a building erected on the premises No. 60 and No. 62 ... which I am sure is not a residential building. From the look of the building it appears to be more of an exhibition centre. No. 54 to the right of the New Premises is a furniture exhibition ... In the circumstances, it is quite difficult to imagine how the New Premises could be preserved as “residential” especially when a new flyover was erected right in front of it.” Similar observation was made by the learned judge, my predecessor who heard substantive arguments on the present judicial review and allowed the application. Hence, the Respondent had over the years consistently read the Guidelines to mean that the residential premises along Jalan Universiti were permitted to be used as car showrooms for the marketing and sale of cars. Hence, it is rather perplexing that the Respondent would all of a sudden decide to give a new interpretation to the Guidelines and argue that such commercial activities are prohibited. If that was so then all their past approvals for such commercial activities along Jalan Universiti, including the approval for the use of the Old Premises as a car showroom would have been illegal. That cannot be so. [23] In this regard, it would be helpful to refer to the observation of the Federal Court in Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama- 16 sama Sebaguna Sungai Gelugor dengan Tanggungan [1999] 3 MLJ 1 as regards the provisions of section 22(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976: The question for decision regarding this part of the case, therefore, is: in considering an application for planning permission for development, what is the status and relevance of the Development Plan? It is not difficult to cite an authology of authorities on this question. Our choice is as follows. By s 22(2) of the Act, it is provided that in dealing with an application for planning permission, the local planning authority 'shall take into consideration such matters as are in its opinion expedient or necessary for proper planning and in particular, inter alia, the provisions of the Development Plan'. These statutory provisions are equivalent to s 70(2) of the UK Town and Country Planning Act. In this context, the cases of Kissell v Secretary of State for the Environment (1993) TLR, 22 July at p 32, Etherridge v Secretary of State for the Environment (1991) EGCS 28 Good v Epping Forest DC [1994] 2 All ER 156 and R v Westminister City Council, ex p Monahan [1989] 3 WLR 408 (the Royal Opera House Covent Garden case) are relevant and show that the Structure Plan has legal status and cannot be disregarded, as Counsel for the Society implied by his submission. It is also obvious that the statutory requirement in s 22(2) of the Act, 'to take into consideration' to the provisions of the Development Plan does not mean that the local planning authority must slavishly comply with it. It will suffice if it considers the Development Plan without incurring the obligation to follow it. (See, Lord Guest in Simpson v Edinburgh Corp [1960] SC 313 Enfield London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (1974) 233 EG 53). But, note the two situations — not material to the present case — where the planning authority would be debarred from granting planning permission (s 22(4) of the Act). Hence, the Federal Court has stated very clearly that, whilst section 22(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 mandates the planning authority to 17 have regard to the local plan for the area in deciding on planning permission, they do not have to slavishly adhere to it. This means that, whilst the local plan is important it does not mean that anything that does not conform to the local plan must be automatically rejected. The local authority may, nevertheless, still consider and approve such applications. Section 22(2) merely states that the local authority “shall take into consideration such matters as are in its opinion expedient or necessary for proper planning and in particular the provisions of the development plan” and not that it shall strictly conform to the local development plan at all cost. In this regard, I agree with submissions of counsel for the Applicant that section 18(1) must necessarily be read together with section 22(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976. [24] Thus, I find that the Respondents argument that the Appeal Board’s Order is an illegality by reason of contravention of section 18 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 is without any merit whatsoever. ii. Alleged contravention of the land code [25] Now, I shall move on to the Respondent’s argument as regards the alleged contravention of the land code, and the Respondent’s contention that the Appeal Board’s Order is illegal as it contravenes sections 52 and 122 of the National Land Code 1965 (“NLC”). Section 122 of the NLC provides that the 18 state authority may pursuant to alienation of any state land under section 52 of the NLC impose conditions on the use to which any building on the land is to be put. The Respondent argues that the land title to the New Premises expressly states that the category of use of the land is for residential building and as such any commercial use of the land or the building, without first amending or converting that express category of use in the title, would be illegal as it would contravene section 122 of the NLC . [26] I do not find any merit in this argument. When the policy of allowing residential premises to be used for limited commercial use was formulated by the state and local authorities the use of the express category of use on the land titles to these properties where addressed. The Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor vide his Circular No. 5/2007 dated 29.5.2007 has expressly allowed for residential properties that come within the re-zoned limited commercial use areas to be used for commercial purposes provided that the increased quit rent based on the category of use of “commercial” is paid by the landowner. The Appeal Board has made specific reference to this Circular in the Appeal Board’s Order in the following terms: c. membayar cukai tanah tambahan berasaskan tanah itu bukan lagi tanah untuk kediaman tetapi sebagai tapak komersial (menurut Pekeliling Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor Bil 5/2007 bertarikh 29 Mei 2007); 19 Hence, the Appeal Board has taken into consideration the requirement imposed by the Director of Land and Mines Selangor in his Circular No. 5/2007 for the Applicant to pay the increased quit rent at commercial rates if the New Premises is to be used for ‘commercial’ rather than ‘residential’ purposes. Thus, it is once more perplexing as to why the Respondent is raising this issue of illegality now, when it has been done and dusted on the last occasion. And when the Appeal Board’s Order is perfectly within the bounds of the law. [27] In addition to this, the Court of Appeal in Majlis Perbandaran Subang Jaya v Visamaya Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 5 MLJ 554 held that the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 must be read consistent with the NLC, and if that was not possible, then the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976, as the later legislation would prevail. Therefore, any use of land which is different from the category that which is expressed on title, by reason of re-zoning by the local authority under the Town and Country Planning Act 1976, cannot be rendered illegal merely by the express category of use on the title. The landowner merely has to pay the increased quit rent for the new category of use, if there is any difference in the quit rent payable. This is the mechanism that is provided in the Pekeliling Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor Bil. 5/2007 dated 29.5.2007, and the Respondent is well aware of this. 20 Respondent’s obligation to follow the Appeal Board’s Order [28] Before I conclude, there is another disturbing feature in this judicial review, and the position taken by the Respondent, that needs to be addressed. The Respondent is a local planning authority on whom planning control is vested by virtue of the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976. The Appeal Board is established pursuant to section 36 of the same Act. Section 23 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 provides: