costs; and (6) such further or other relief as the court deems fit. [12] The grounds supporting the application are: (1) the adjudicated sum is disputed due to pending appeals and the existence of an undertaking that could alter or nullify the debt; (2) the statutory demand is premature and amounts to an abuse of process as it is being used to exert undue pressure to settle a sum under judicial scrutiny; (3) any winding-up petition would lack reasonable prospects of success as the Plaintiff is not insolvent and has demonstrated ability to pay by depositing the adjudicated sum; (4) the use of winding-up proceedings as leverage to secure payment of a contested debt is improper; (5) presentation of a winding-up petition would cause irreparable harm including damage to reputation, loss of business confidence, and operational disruption; (6) these consequences cannot be adequately remedied by damages; (7) the balance of convenience favours injunctive relief; and (8) the Plaintiff has secured the disputed sum in a solicitor's client account, demonstrating its ability to pay and confirming it is not insolvent. Summary of Submissions Plaintiff’s Submissions [13] The Plaintiff submits that the primary basis for seeking a Fortuna injunction rests on the fact that the full amount of the Adjudicated Sum (approximately RM1.4 million) has been deposited with the Plaintiff's solicitors' client account. This deposit demonstrates the Plaintiff's solvency and ability to satisfy the judgment, meaning that any winding-up petition would have no chance of success, as the fundamental test for winding-up is a company's inability to pay its debts. [14] According to the Plaintiff's arguments, there exists a bona fide dispute regarding the Adjudicated Sum due to the ongoing Appeals against both the enforcement and dismissal of the setting aside of the Adjudication Decision. With the appeals pending before the Court of Appeal (scheduled for hearing on 18.4.2025), the sum determined by the Adjudicator may ultimately be found incorrect or unjustified, making the current Notice under Section 466 premature. [15] The Plaintiff contends that the deposit of funds is particularly warranted given that the Defendant is a foreign company with Korean shareholders, necessitating safeguards to protect the Plaintiff's interests pending final determination of the appeals. Despite this precautionary measure, the Plaintiff emphasises its willingness to undertake that upon the Court of Appeal deciding in the Defendant's favor, the solicitors will immediately release the deposited sum to the Defendant. [16] Central to the Plaintiff's case is the existence of an "Undertaking" between the parties that may significantly impact the quantum of the alleged debt. This Undertaking, entered into between the parties, essentially stated that the Defendant would provide additional Aluminium Formwork required for the Project without additional charges to the Plaintiff, potentially nullifying the Defendant's claim to the sum reflected in the Section 466 Notice. [17] In addressing potential irreparable harm, the Plaintiff highlights that the presentation of a winding-up petition would cause severe damage to its business and reputation. This damage is particularly acute as the Plaintiff is a subsidiary of a publicly listed company, meaning the petition would affect share prices and market confidence, impacting not just the company but public shareholders as well. [18] The Plaintiff argues that the balance of convenience lies strongly in favor of granting the injunctive relief. By depositing the full sum with solicitors, the Plaintiff has demonstrated both its good faith and its ability to satisfy any valid debt, while simultaneously protecting itself from the irreparable harm that would result from a potentially unjustified winding-up petition. [19] The Plaintiff distinguishes its case from situations where companies simply refuse to pay judgment debts, emphasising that it is not refusing payment but rather taking a prudent approach by securing the funds pending final determination of a genuine dispute. This approach respects both the Defendant's potential right to payment and the Plaintiff's right to have its appeal properly heard before irreversible damage is caused. Defendant’s Submissions [20] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy both necessary limbs required for a Fortuna injunction: first, that the intended petition has no chance of success as a matter of law and fact, and second, that the presentation of such petition might produce irreparable damage to the company. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff has established neither of these conditions. [21] According to the Defendant's arguments, the adjudication decision forming the basis of the debt has been properly enforced through a valid High Court order dated 5.4.2024, which remains legally binding and has not been set aside or stayed. Despite the Plaintiff's appeal against this decision to the Court of Appeal, the Defendant contends that an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution and does not transform a valid judgment debt into a disputed debt. [22] The Defendant maintains that the Plaintiff's unilateral act of depositing the judgment sum into their solicitor's client account was never agreed to by the Defendant and does not prevent enforcement actions. The Defendant argues that even if a company can prove solvency, a continued refusal to pay the judgment creditor directly cannot deny the right of a creditor to file a winding up petition against a debtor. [23] In challenging the existence of a bona fide dispute, the Defendant highlights that a party may proceed to wind up a company based on an adjudication decision under CIPAA 2012, even without first applying to enforce it. The Defendant argues that in this case, since the adjudication decision has already been enforced by the High Court, their position is even stronger. [24] The Defendant asserts that the alleged "Undertaking" between parties that the Plaintiff relies on has already been considered and rejected by both the adjudicator and the High Court. They argue that this issue will be addressed in the pending appeal and does not constitute a valid reason to deny the Defendant its right to enforce the judgment debt through winding-up proceedings in the meantime. [25] Regarding the Plaintiff's concerns about irreparable damage, the Defendant argues that when a debt cannot be disputed, it is irrelevant whether or not enforcement will cause irreparable damage to the company. The Defendant further suggests that the Plaintiff's fear of damage could easily be avoided by simply paying the undisputed debt. [26] The Defendant contends that granting a Fortuna injunction would thwart and frustrate the very purpose of the CIPAA 2012, which aims to provide speedy dispute resolution and timely payment to contractors. The Defendant argues that cashflow is the lifeblood to contractors in the construction industry, and preventing enforcement would undermine this legislative intent. Analysis and findings of the court The effect of the Plaintiff's deposit and undertaking to release funds [27] The Plaintiff contends that its deposit of RM1,393,278.83 into its solicitors' client account demonstrates both solvency and good faith. The Plaintiff further offers to instruct its solicitors to release these funds immediately should the Court of Appeal rule in the Defendant's favour on 18.4.2025, arguing this provides a practical solution balancing both parties' interests during the pendency of the appeals. [28] The Defendant submits that the unilateral deposit and conditional offer to release funds cannot override its immediate rights under the valid High Court order dated 5.4.2024. The Defendant relies on Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v Muniammah Muniandy [2010] MLJU 2217, where the Court of Appeal held that a valid and enforceable judgment, unless set aside or stayed, cannot be considered a disputed debt. [29] I find the Defendant's position to be correct in law. The deposit of funds, while perhaps demonstrating ability to pay, paradoxically reinforces the Plaintiff's continued refusal to honour its legal obligations under a valid court order. The Court of Appeal in Sime Darby Energy Solution Sdn Bhd v RZH Setia Jaya Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 1494 has established that even if insolvency is rebutted, a continued refusal to pay cannot deny a creditor's right to file a winding-up petition. The Court of Appeal stated, citing Karisma Synergy Sdn Bhd v Gates PCM Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 CLJ 122: “[32] We concur with the judgment of the case in Karisma Synergy Sdn Bhd v Gates PCM Construction (M) Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 CLJ 122 where the law on this point was succinctly stated as follows: ‘The solvency or otherwise of the respondent is in this context of little relevance. Once the debt is shown not to be bona fide disputed on substantial grounds, and the presumption of insolvency unrebutted, even if the respondent could show that it was actually solvent, its refusal to pay up would still entitle the petitioner to pursue the winding up of the respondent. A neglect to payment in the first place triggers the statutory presumption under s. 466(1)(a). The question then turns on whether the respondent debtor can show it is not insolvent in order to rebut the presumption. But even if the presumption is rebutted, a continued refusal cannot deny the right of a creditor to file a winding up petition against a debtor.’” (Emphasis added) [30] The Plaintiff's proposal to release funds only after the Court of Appeal hearing effectively seeks to create a de facto stay without following proper legal channels. As held in Nobility Acclaim Sdn Bhd v Dan Green Field Engineering [2024] CLJU 2182, an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution, nor does it amount to a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt. “[36] Be that as it may, the decision of the High Court in allowing the Defendant's application to enforce the Adjudication Decision is pending appeal before the Court of Appeal. Does a pending appeal turn the present Adjudication Decision that has not been set aside nor stayed into a disputed debt? [37] This Court is bound by the authority which states that an appeal does not operate as a stay of execution. In Pacific & Orient Insurance Co Bhd v. Muniammah a/l Muniandy [2011] 1 CLJ 947; [2011] 1 AMR 685; [2010] MLJU 2217; [2010] 3 MLRA 263, the Court of Appeal explained: [22] The status of the judgment on the insurer under s. 96(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 is the same with status of the said judgment on the insured earlier granted in favour of the respondent. Unless set aside or stayed by proper authority, the said judgment remains. Upon the respondent obtaining the judgment against the insured, the debt ceased to be a disputed debt. Thereafter the question whether the debt or amount due was bona fide disputed became non-issue. This is so even though the appellant had filed an appeal against the said judgment because the filing of an appeal does not have the effect of reverting the status of the judgment debt to its original status as a disputed debt before judgment was obtained. The filing of an appeal does not make a valid and enforceable judgment a disputed debt, (see: SBSK Plantations Sdn Bhd v. Dynasty Rangers (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 CLJ 329). Although this decision was in relation to judgment debts, it would apply to adjudication decisions under the CIPAA. [38] The above point is further reinforced by the decision of the Federal Court in Comintel, where it was held that a pending review application of the Federal Court decision does not amount to a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt.” [31] The arrangement proposed by the Plaintiff lacks certainty and enforceability. No formal terms have been agreed regarding the mechanism for release, timing post-judgment, or provisions for accruing interest. This uncertainty underscores why unilateral proposals cannot substitute for compliance with valid court orders. As held in Jaks Sdn Bhd v Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 1825, the proper recourse is for the unsuccessful party to pay the adjudicated sum and pursue its grievances through the arbitration or court proceedings. The court held: “49] In my judgment, the Adjudication Decision is and remains binding as well as enforceable until it is set aside or until the dispute between the parties are finally determined by way of arbitration or court notwithstanding any errors or mis-directions made by the Adjudicator as contended by the Plaintiff, which are all denied by the Defendant. The proper recourse is for the Plaintiff to pay up the adjudicated sum and pursue its grievances in arbitration or court following Subang Sky park Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 10 CLJ 801 and Ceylon Builders Sdn Bhd v Ultimate Pursuit Sdn Bhd & Another Case [2018] 1 LNS 2128.” [32] Furthermore, the Plaintiff's approach would frustrate the purpose of CIPAA 2012, which aims to ensure prompt payment in the construction industry. The court in Jaks Sdn Bhd v Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd found that granting a Fortuna Injunction would thwart the legislative purpose of CIPAA 2012, which is to alleviate cash flow issues in the construction industry through a speedy dispute resolution process. This is what the court said: “[52] That cashflow is the lifeblood to contractors in the construction industry is irrefragable, in Martego Sdn Bhd V Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2019] 8 CLJ 433, the Federal Court said “the primary objective of the CIPAA 2012 is to alleviate cash flow issues by providing an effective and economical mechanism. The courts are consistent on the finding that the CIPAA 2012 is intended to alleviate cash flow issue. Therefore, the mischief that the CIPAA 2012 intends to cure is none other the cash flow in the construction industry through effective and economical mechanism; for deciding otherwise would run counter to the legislative purpose of creating an expedited adjudication process”. [53] It is also my view that granting a Fortuna Injunction readily on the totality of the facts here will thwart and frustrate the very purpose of the CIPAA 2012 which is aimed at providing a speedy dispute resolution and timely payment to contractors such as the Defendant.” [33] The deposit and conditional offer to release funds therefore appear to be tactical manoeuvres designed to delay payment while avoiding the consequences of non-payment. Such an approach cannot override the Defendant's statutory rights or the binding effect of a valid High Court order. The solution lies not in creative arrangements to delay payment, but in compliance with existing legal obligations while pursuing any available appellate remedies. The relevance of the Defendant's foreign status to the granting of a Fortuna injunction [34] The Plaintiff contends that special circumstances exist warranting protection of the deposited funds pending appeal, primarily due to the Defendant being a foreign company with Korean shareholders. The Plaintiff argues this creates legitimate concerns about potential difficulties in recovering the money should the Court of Appeal rule in the Plaintiff's favour on 18.4.2025. [35] The Defendant submits that its status as a foreign company is irrelevant to the exercise of its statutory rights under section 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016. [36] I find the Defendant's position to be correct in law. The Plaintiff's concerns about the Defendant's foreign status are speculative and unsupported by evidence. The affidavit evidence shows that the Defendant is a Malaysian company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, with its registered address at 33-1 Jalan 4/93, Taman Miharja Cheras, 55200 Kuala Lumpur. While its shareholders may be Korean, this does not affect its status as a Malaysian legal entity subject to Malaysian law and jurisdiction. [37] The Court of Appeal in Likas Bay Precinct Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Sdn Bhd [2019] 3 MLJ 244 has established that one may proceed to wind up a company based on an adjudication decision under CIPAA 2012, even without first applying to enforce it under section 28 of CIPAA 2012. It was held: “[21] Also, we were of the view that s 31 of the CIPAA can be invoked by a successful party. There is nothing in the language employed in both ss 28 and 31 of the CIPAA which would liberally suggest that s 31 is subject to s 28 therein. One thing is conspicuous. There is no specific reference made by either of the sections to each other. In fact s 31(2) expressly provides that ‘remedies provided by the CIPAA are without prejudice to other remedies available in the construction contract or any written law ...’. So, it is in addition to s 28, not in derogation thereto.” [38] The Defendant here has gone further by obtaining a High Court order dated 5.4.2024 enforcing the adjudication decision. The nationality of shareholders cannot be a basis to deny enforcement of this valid court order. [39] The Plaintiff's argument, if accepted, would create an unwarranted distinction between Malaysian companies based on their shareholders' nationality. This would undermine the efficacy of CIPAA 2012 as a mechanism for ensuring prompt payment in the construction industry. As observed in Jaks Sdn Bhd, cashflow is the lifeblood of contractors in the construction industry, and the primary objective of CIPAA 2012 is to alleviate cash flow issues through an effective and economical mechanism. [40] Furthermore, the Defendant has already demonstrated its commitment to the Malaysian legal process by obtaining an adjudication decision and pursuing enforcement through proper legal channels. There is no evidence suggesting the Defendant would not similarly comply with any subsequent court orders. The Plaintiff's concerns about potential recovery difficulties are therefore purely speculative and cannot form a proper basis for restraining the Defendant's statutory rights under the Companies Act 2016. The effect of pending appeals on the granting of a Fortuna injunction [41] The Plaintiff contends that its pending appeals before the Court of Appeal, scheduled for hearing on 18.4.2025, constitute a bona fide dispute over the adjudicated debt. These appeals challenge both the High Court's order enforcing the adjudication decision and the dismissal of the setting aside application, which the Plaintiff argues raises substantial questions about the validity of the underlying debt. [42] The Defendant submits that the mere filing of appeals does not operate as a stay of execution or constitute a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt. The Defendant relies on Nobility Acclaim Sdn Bhd v Dan Green Field Engineering, where the High Court held that an appeal does not amount to a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt under a valid and enforceable order. [43] I find the Defendant's position to be correct in law. The High Court's order dated 5.4.2024 enforcing the adjudication decision remains valid and enforceable. As held by the Court of Appeal in Pacific & Orient Insurance, the filing of an appeal does not have the effect of reverting the status of the judgment debt to its original status as a disputed debt before judgment was obtained. The Court of Appeal observed: “[22] The status of the judgment on the insurer under s96(1) of the Road Transport Act 1987 is the same with status of the said judgment on the insured earlier granted in favour of the respondent. Unless set aside or stayed by proper authority, the said judgment remains. Upon the respondent obtaining the judgment against the insured, the debt ceased to be a disputed debt. Thereafter the question whether the debt or amount due was bona fide disputed became non-issue. This is so even though the appellant had filed an appeal against the said judgment because the filing of an appeal does not have the effect of reverting the status of the judgment debt to its original status as a disputed debt before judgment was obtained. The filing of an appeal does not make a valid and enforceable judgment a disputed debt. (see: SBSK Plantations Sdn Bhd v Dynasty Rangers (M) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 CLJ 329).” [44] This principle was reinforced by the Federal Court in Comintel Sdn Bhd v U Television Sdn Bhd [2019] 12 MLJ 667, where it was held that a pending review application does not amount to a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt. The court emphasised that orders and judgments must be treated with respect and require strict obedience until set aside. It was stated as follows: “[37] In other words, the plaintiff is contending that it had a bona fide dispute against the debt demanded by reason that it has filed a motion to review the Federal Court decision and that its collection of equipment from the first defendant being relevant to the judgement debt in question. [38] In my view, an application for a Fortuna injunction cannot be the appropriate forum for a determination of the merits of the plaintiff's motion to review the Federal Court decision. The review application does not amount to a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt, in view of the Federal Court decision which is at present a valid, binding and enforceable order. It is after all trite law that orders and judgments of the court must be treated with respect and require strict obedience, until and unless set aside (see, for example, the Supreme Court decision in Wee Choo Keong v. MBf Holdings Bhd & Anor and another appeal [1993] 2 MLJ 217). [39] Thus, this line of argument of the plaintiff is similarly without merit. As things stood at the hearing, the law considers the decision of the Federal Court allowing the appeal to be valid and binding on the court. This is settled law. At the same time, the court, more so a winding up court, cannot go behind a valid judgment of the court, except in cases of fraud or illegality, which was not the contention of the plaintiff.” [45] The position is particularly clear in the context of CIPAA 2012 adjudication decisions. As held in Jaks Sdn Bhd, an adjudication decision remains binding and enforceable until set aside or until the dispute is finally determined, notwithstanding any errors or misdirections alleged by the unsuccessful party. The proper recourse is for the unsuccessful party to pay the adjudicated sum and pursue its grievances through the appellate process. [46] Furthermore, during oral submissions, the Plaintiff acknowledged the Court of Appeal decision in Bludream City Development Sdn Bhd v Pembinaan Bina Bumi Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 616 which permits enforcement of CIPAA 2012 decisions via winding-up even when appeals are pending. The court stated: “...if the dispute on the debt has been adjudicated which resulted in an adjudication decision obtained in favour of the unpaid party, the debt ceases to be disputable in an ensuing winding-up proceeding. This is because the disputed debt has been independently adjudicated by a neutral third party. More pertinently, it should not be open to the non-paying party to again dispute the debt when the sanctity of the adjudication decision has been preserved by the subsequent court orders refusing to set aside and/or stay as well as allowing enforcement of the adjudication decision as a judgment pursuant to ss. 27, 16 and 28 CIPAA respectively.” [47] While the Plaintiff attempted to distinguish this authority based on its deposit of funds with solicitors, this distinction does not affect the fundamental principle that pending appeals do not constitute a bona fide dispute over an adjudicated debt. [48] As observed in Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd [2021] MLJU 1399, the merits of pending appeals are not matters the court ought to be concerned with when determining if a Fortuna injunction should be granted. “[33] I am of the view that the correctness of the CIPAA decision is a matter which belong to the merits of the appeal pending in the Court of Appeal. The merits of the appeal are not matters this court ought to be concerned with in determining if a Fortuna Injunction should issue. In any event, these issues have already been ventilated in the High Court in the application to set aside the CIPAA decision. [34] A pending appeal or other proceedings is not a reason to allow a Fortuna Injunction. To reiterate, an Enforcement Order has been issued. A stay of execution was refused at two levels. The absence of a stay only serves to affirm the absence of a bona fide disputed debt. Consequently, there is no legal impediment to the Defendant enforcing its statutory rights by issuing the statutory notice.” [49] The Plaintiff's appeals, while raising various grounds including the alleged undertaking between parties, cannot override the binding effect of the High Court's order enforcing the adjudication decision. Irreparable damage arising from the plaintiff's status as a subsidiary of a public listed company [50] The Plaintiff contends that as a subsidiary of a publicly listed company, the presentation of a winding-up petition would cause severe and irreparable damage beyond mere financial loss. The Plaintiff relies on Ecofirst Hartz Sdn Bhd v Poon Mun Cheong & Anor [2018] 1 LNS 947, arguing that the potential impact on share prices, market confidence, and public shareholders' interests constitutes irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated through damages. [51] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's status as a subsidiary of a listed company cannot override a creditor's statutory rights where there is a valid and enforceable judgment debt. The Defendant relies on Pacific & Orient Insurance, where the Court of Appeal held that fears of losing business, customers, suppliers, and goodwill are not special circumstances justifying the denial of a creditor's statutory rights. The court said this: “[41] The appellant fears of irreparable damage if the injunction prayed for is not granted. On this issue, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ming Ann Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd (supra) serves a strong reminder where it was held as follows: On the facts, the grounds relied on by the applicant are nothing more than ‘fear of losing’; fear of losing business, fear of losing customers, fear of losing suppliers, fear of losing goodwill, fear of not being able to collect its dents from third parties, in case the applicant company is wound up. All that the applicant has to do to avoid such ‘fears’ is to settle the judgment debt. These factors are not ‘special circumstances’ or do they show that the appeal, if successful, will be rendered nugatory. They are nothing unusual. Execution is a natural process after obtaining a judgment and winding-up is one of them.” [52] I find the Defendant's position to be correct in law. The Court of Appeal in Lafarge Concrete (M) Sdn Bhd v Gold Trend Builders Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 817, held that a company’s solvency does not prevent winding-up proceedings where there is a continued refusal to pay. The court determined that the solvency of a company is irrelevant if it is not ready, willing, and able to meet the creditor’s demand. The court held: “[20] The winding up order should have been made even if the respondent was solvent (Cornhill Insurance pic v Improvement Services Ltd and ors [1986] 1 WLR 114, where It was held by Harman J that where a creditor’s debt is clearly established, then the creditor has the right to present a winding up petition and obtain relief even though the company was solvent). ‘Where the creditor’s debt is clearly established it seems to me to follow that this court would not, in general, at any rate, interfere though the company would appear to be solvent ...to persist in non-payment ... would itself either suggest inability or that the application was an application that the court should give the debtor relief which it itself could provide, but would not provide, by paying the debt’ (Mann v Goldstein [1968] 1 WLR 1091 per Ungoed-Thomas J). The solvency of a company counts for nothing if it is not ready, willing and able to meet the demand of the creditor. The discretion to refuse winding up could be exercised if the respondent was ready, willing and able to meet the demand of the appellant (see Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Company, Blackpool, The v Hampson, Re (1882) 23 Ch D 1; [1883] 49 LT147, 151, where the company was solvent and the creditor accepted the proposal to pay the debt within one month, the Court of Appeal (Jessel MR, Cotton and Bowen UJ) ordered the debt to be paid within one month, in default of which ‘there will be the usual winding up order’). But it was not that in the instant case. [21] There was no genuine dispute. The respondent was insolvent. The respondent was not ready, willing and able to meet the demand. Winding up should have been the foregone conclusion.” [53] The potential impact on share prices or market confidence, while relevant considerations, cannot override a creditor's statutory rights under section 466(1)(a) of the Companies Act 2016. [54] The case of Ming Ann Holdings Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd cited in Pacific & Orient Insurance is particularly instructive. The Court of Appeal there held that fears of losing business, customers, and goodwill are nothing unusual and do not constitute special circumstances. These consequences are inherent in any winding-up proceeding and can be avoided by settling the undisputed debt. [55] This position is reinforced by Jaks, where the High Court held that a plaintiff's fears and hardship cannot override a defendant's statutory right to enforce an adjudication decision. The court emphasised that allowing such concerns to prevent enforcement would frustrate the purpose of CIPAA 2012, which aims to ensure timely payment in the construction industry. It was said: “[51] With utmost respect, I am of the view that the Plaintiff’s fears and hardship set out in para 15 to 18 of its supporting affidavit cannot override the Defendant’s statutory right to enforce the Adjudication Decision obtained by it.” [56] The Plaintiff's reliance on Ecofirst Hartz is misplaced. While that case discussed irreparable damage in the context of Fortuna injunctions, it did not establish that a company's status as a subsidiary of a listed entity automatically warrants protection from winding-up proceedings. [57] The Plaintiff's concerns about market confidence and shareholder interests, while understandable, represent precisely the type of pressure that the Court of Appeal in Pacific & Orient Insurance held should not prevent creditors from exercising their statutory rights. The solution lies in the Plaintiff's hands - it can avoid all alleged irreparable damage by paying the undisputed judgment debt, which it acknowledges it has the ability to do. The effect of the alleged undertaking on the validity of the adjudicated debt [58] The Plaintiff contends that an undertaking was given at a meeting on 4.11.2019 regarding aluminum formwork quantities, which materially affects the validity of the adjudicated debt. The Plaintiff argues that this undertaking, which forms part of its grounds of appeal, could potentially alter or nullify the entire debt of RM1,393,278.83 once the appeals are heard on 18.4.2025. [59] The Defendant submits that the alleged undertaking was already considered and rejected in the adjudication proceedings, with no party able to produce records or minutes of the alleged meeting. The Defendant relies on Lion Pacific Sdn Bhd v Pestech Technology Sdn Bhd, where the High Court held that the merits of pending appeals are not matters the court ought to be concerned with in determining if a Fortuna injunction should be granted. [60] I find the Defendant's position to be correct in law. The existence and effect of the alleged undertaking were fully ventilated before the adjudicator and subsequently before the High Court in both the enforcement and setting aside applications. As held in Nobility Acclaim Sdn Bhd, an appeal does not amount to a bona fide dispute of the judgment debt under a valid and enforceable order. [61] The Court of Appeal in Likas Bay Precinct has established that one may proceed to wind up a company based on an adjudication decision under CIPAA 2012, even without first applying to enforce it under section 28 of CIPAA 2012. Here, the Defendant has gone further by obtaining a High Court order dated 5.4.2024 enforcing the adjudication decision. [62] The position in Jaks Sdn Bhd v Zeta Letrik Sdn Bhd is particularly relevant, where the High Court held that an adjudication decision remains binding and enforceable until set aside, notwithstanding any errors or misdirections alleged by the unsuccessful party. The proper recourse is for the unsuccessful party to pay the adjudicated sum and pursue its grievances through arbitration and court proceedings. [63] While the Plaintiff relies on witness statements from Wong Poh Seng, Ang Khong Khee and Ku Fei Fen regarding the alleged undertaking, no contemporaneous documentary evidence has been produced to support its existence. The adjudicator, and subsequently the High Court, have already considered and implicitly rejected these assertions in arriving at their respective decisions. [64] The Federal Court in Comintel has emphasised that orders and judgments must be treated with respect and require strict obedience until set aside. A winding-up court cannot go behind a valid judgment except in cases of fraud or illegality, which is not alleged here. The Plaintiff's attempts to relitigate the undertaking issue through this Fortuna injunction application amount to an impermissible collateral attack on the adjudication decision and High Court order. Conclusion [65] For the reasons detailed above, I find that the Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements for a Fortuna injunction. While the deposit of funds with solicitors demonstrates ability to pay, this paradoxically reinforces the continued refusal to honour valid legal obligations. The pending appeals and alleged undertaking do not constitute bona fide disputes capable of preventing winding-up proceedings, as established by binding Court of Appeal authority. The Plaintiff's status as a subsidiary of a listed company, while relevant to potential damage, cannot override a creditor's statutory rights where there is a valid and enforceable judgment debt. The proper course is for the Plaintiff to pay the adjudicated sum and pursue its appellate remedies, rather than seeking to create a de facto stay through tactical maneuvers that would frustrate both the Defendant's rights and the legislative purpose of CIPAA 2012. The Originating Summons in Enclosure 1 is accordingly dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00. 10 March 2024 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: S Raven with Danial Hazizan and Cindy Wong (Messrs TY Teh & Partners) For the Defendant: Khoo Ai Teng with Jessie Teo Khor Ying (Messrs Ng, Zainirul, Seke & Khoo)