Black Swan Petroleum DMCC v Cmb.Tech Nv (WA-27NCC-14-03/2025)

The Defendant D filed a notice of application dated 9.10.2025 in Enclosure 16 to strike out the Plaintiff s P claim. The striking out application is made under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012.

On 9.1.2026, I allowed striking out application in Enclosure 16. Here are my reasons. The law on striking out

The law pertaining to rule 19 of the Rules of Court 2012 is settled. It is only in a plain and obvious case that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule. This summary procedure should only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim is on the face of it obviously unsustainable. It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action. (See the Supreme Court decision in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36).

The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claim is frivolous or vexatious. The court is not concerned at this stage with the merits of the claim. So long as the pleadings disclose some cause of action or raise some questions fit to be decided by the judge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed at the trial is no ground for the pleadings to be struck out.

In Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606 at 611, the Supreme Court remarked that the lower court should have scrutinized the evidence in order to decide whether the action was bound to fail. The Supreme Court said that an action can be summarily disposed if there is an absence of conflict of material evidence or of conflict of affidavits on material points. So that seemingly triable or difficult issues could be readily decided in such a way as to lead to the conclusion that the action was bound to fail.

In a suit involving complex questions of law but where the essential facts are not in dispute, the complexity of the questions of law should not be a reason for refusing relief under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of Court

If satisfied that the questions of law are unarguable, the court is not law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer Khairy Jamaluddin v [2013] 4 MLJ 173 at 182).

In considering Enclosure 16, I had regard to the following :

Under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (a) of the Rules of Court 2012, only the pleadings are to be considered without regard to affidavit evidence.

For the other limbs of striking out in respect of which affidavit evidence is admissible, the approach of Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1 at 1 ought to be adopted. Where the Privy Council held that the court is to submit the available evidence to critical examination in deciding whether the action is bound to fail.

This approach is consistently followed by our courts. From the Supreme Court case of Raja Zainal Abidin (supra), the Court of Appeal case of Pengiran Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff & Anor v Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Lipkland (Sabah) Sdn Bhd) & Ors [1996] 1 CLJ 257; [1996] 1 MLJ 309 at 320 - 321, to the High Court cases of Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v Yeoh Teen Eam & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 at [31], Magnificient Empire Sdn Bhd v MPI Generali Insurans Bhd [2022] MLJU 21 at [17], and Tadmansori Holdings Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v Dancom Telecommunications (M) Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors [2025] CLJU 1479 at [51] and [53]. The grounds for striking out

Euronav Shipping alleged claims that Euronav Shipping and D (as Euronav Shipping s parent company holding 100 % shares in Euronav Shipping) had abused their corporate group structure so as to deprive P of its cargo. As such, their corporate veil should be pierced Euronav Shipping s actions.

P alleges that D had :

caused Euronav Shipping surrender the said cargo to the United States Department of US DOJ

conspired with Euronav Shipping to injure and cause loss to P . Thereby procuring Euronav Shipping s breach of its duties in bailment to redeliver the cargo thus depriving P of the same; and

w Silk Straits storage agreement dated 23.3.2023 entered between Silk Straits and P over the cargo storage agreement .

I find that . Here is my explanation.

First, a plain reading of the statement of claim would show that P has Euronav Shipping to injure P. As will be elaborated later, the allegation in itself is pleaded ambiguously and rendered inherently vague. In sum, the pleadings fail to make out a sustainable cause of action for conspiracy.

Second, despite the exhaustive exchange of affidavits, P has disclosed neither cogent nor credible evidence to show that D had conspired with Euronav Shipping to injure P vis - à - vis the cargo. Conversely, the evidence shows that :

D and Euronav Shipping are separate and distinct legal entities. They cannot be taken to be acting as one merely to attach liability onto D;

D never had any legal relationship or any relationship for that matter with P or Silk Straits. D had never entered into any agreements with them vis - à - vis the cargo and had no dealings with either of them. As such, D owed no contractual obligations to either of them;

In addition, the vessel Oceania on which the cargo was stored was at all material times owned and operated by Euronav Shipping. In other words, it was Euronav Shipping that had possession of the cargo, not D.

Third, there is no justification for the corporate veil of D and Euronav Shipping to be disregarded.

There is no cause for the corporate veil to be disregarded because as a matter of public record, D is indeed a 100 % shareholder of Euronav Shipping. This has always been an overt fact and not a hidden one. It is not as if the shareholder relationship is concealed from the public which can only be revealed through the disregarding of the corporate veil.

s purported involvement with the cargo are all formed upon pure suppositions and mere suspicions. In this regard, P has strung a series of tenuous but unsubstantiated assumptions to allege dealing with the cargo.

In effect, this action is not brought because there is a sustainable cause of action which has arisen against D. Rather, it is brought to explore whether there is any remedy to be had against D in

Fourth, based on the foregoing, this action is an abuse of the process of the court fides.

As can be seen from the statement of c is predicated upon Euronav Shipping s purported conversion or non - redelivery of the cargo.

Prior to commencing this suit on 12.3.2025, P had brought an action in rem on 14.9.2023 against Euronav Shipping via Admiralty in Rem Suit No. : WA - 27 NCC - 46 - 09 / ES suit

It is significant to note that in the ES suit :

No mention whatsoever, much less any allegations, were made of D herein;

(ii) In the same vein, no allegations were made of any conspiracy to injure or any inducement of breach of contract against Euronav Shipping. The ES suit is purely a case on conversion and breach of duties in bailment.

A year and six months later, this suit was suddenly instituted against D. It alleges that D conspired together with Euronav Shipping to injure P and for inducement of breach of the storage agreement. In this regard :

Our courts do not condone delay in the introduction of an allegation of conspiracy. In this case, the action for conspiracy could have been brought in the year 2023 had it been genuine. This will be elaborated below.

(ii) This is underlined by the fact that the remedies as prayed in both suits are substantially similar if not identical.

(iii) Although serious allegations are made against Euronav Shipping in this action, P left out Euronav Shipping as a party in this suit.

This brings to fore a breach of natural justice.

Euronav Shipping cannot answer the new allegations of conspiracy to injure and inducement to breach the contract as pleaded against it in this action, as it is not named as a party herein;

(ii) D cannot answer on behalf of Euronav Shipping, the allegations made against Euronav Shipping herein, as they are separate and distinct legal entities.

(iii) Against this backdrop, D is put to defend this action on the purported acts of Euronav Shipping which are attributed to D by P without more.

I consider described above is to gain a tactical advantage over D and Euronav Shipping. It is therefore unsurprising that P remains silent as to why it chose not to bring Euronav Shipping into this suit. No explanation was proffered.

In fact, such an abuse of process as highlighted above is still its statement of claim in the ES suit to add the causes of action of conspiracy to injure and inducement of breach of contract against Euronav Shipping has been disallowed on those parts by the court on 3.12.2025. Such abuse of process and breach of natural justice will remain unless this action is struck out.

The fifth point concerns ilk Straits to breach the storage agreement between P and Silk Straits. To date, there is neither finding nor order of any court or tribunal that Silk Straits had breached the storage agreement between P and Silk Straits.

There is no evidence of P having made a claim against Silk Straits for breach of the storage agreement. In the circumstances, the cause of action of inducement to breach the storage agreement is premature. In the same vein, it is frivolous and vexatious as against D. Findings and analysis

The following may be gleaned from the statement of claim.

As can be seen from paragraph 2 of the statement of claim, this action is brought against D as the sole shareholder of Euronav Shipping.

The statement of claim goes on from paragraphs 3 to 14 identifying and setting out :

Euronav Shipping as the owner of the vessel Oceania;

(ii) The storage agreement entered between P and Silk Straits to receive and store the cargo on board the vessel Oceania;

(iii) The transfer of the cargo onto the vessel Oceania;

(iv) ilk Straits, as the charterer of the vessel Oceania, to discharge and transfer back the cargo from the vessel Oceania;

Euronav Shipping s purported refusal of Silk Straits to discharge the cargo;

(vi) The correspondence from Euronav Shipping s solicitors to P stating that Euronav Shipping had no contractual relationship with P;

(vii) Silk Straits communication with P informing that they have received information that Euronav Shipping had purportedly transferred the cargo on the vessel Oceania to a vessel purportedly helmed by the US DOJ.

I would point out that although D is the sole shareholder of Euronav

D and Euronav Shipping are separate and distinct legal entities, as evidenced by the registration records of the said companies;

The vessel Oceania was at all material times owned and registered under Euronav Shipping, as evidenced by the certificate of registry of the vessel Oceania;

In this regard and as is consistent with the statement of claim suit, the vessel Oceania was operated by Euronav Shipping. Euronav Shipping entered into a contract with Silk Straits and took on the cargo. At all times, communications were between Silk Straits and Euronav Shipping on the cargo. It is also P Euronav Shipping had purportedly transferred the cargo onto a vessel helmed by the US DOJ; and

In the same connection, D was not involved with any of the above. D also did not enter into any contract and had no relationship or communication with P or Silk Straits. As otherwise, the statement of claim herein or in the ES suit would have said so.

Against this backdrop, P contends at paragraph 15 of the statement of claim that the US DOJ had served a seizure warrant on D. P pleads that it was not served on Euronav Shipping.

From there, P sets out at paragraphs 16 and 17 of the statement of claim the purported conversion and breach of the duties of bailment on the part of Euronav Shipping.

P extrapolates at paragraph 18 of the statement of claim [D herein] had, in turn, caused ES [Euronav Shipping] to wrongfully retain the cargo and / or surrender the c However, this is a bare allegation without more. Especially when the unchallenged evidence of D is that it had merely informed Euronav Shipping of the seizure warrant. No justification for disregarding the corporate veil

The basic company law doctrine arising from Salomon v Salomon that each company is a separate and distinct legal personality requires no elaboration.

In relation to paragraph 22 of the statement of claim (averments regarding lifting of the corporate veil), I consider that the corporate veil of companies cannot be pierced unless there is fraud or equitable fraud pleaded, which are missing in this action.

In Law Kam Loy & Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355 at 362, the Court of Appeal held : In my judgment, in the light of the more recent authorities such as Adams v Cape Industries Plc, it is not open to the courts to disregard the corporate veil purely on the ground that it is in the interests of justice to do so. It is also my respectful view that the special circumstances to which Lord Keith referred include cases where there is actual fraud at common law or some inequitable or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity. The former, that is to say, actual fraud, was expressly recognised to be an exception to the doctrine of corporate personality by Lord Halsbury in his speech in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, the seminal case on the subject.

Law Kam Loy (supra) was approved by the Federal Court in Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel - Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 785 at [46].

In the present case, P has not pleaded fraud or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity. Furthermore, although abuse of corporate group structure is mentioned, the statement of claim is bereft of particulars of such abuse.

The lifting of the corporate veil is pleaded at paragraph 22 of the statement of claim, which reads : D) Lifting of the corporate veil 22) BSP [i.e. P] avers that given EN [i.e. D] and ES [i.e. Euronav Shipping] had conducted themselves inequitably / unconscionably by abusing their corporate group structure to deprive BSP of its Cargo, the corporate veil should be pierced / disregarded so that EN is made liable for the loss and damage suffered by BSP as a result of ES' actions. Particulars a) EN, as the sole shareholder of ES, controlled ES. b) The Seizure Warrant were served on EN rather than ES. EN, and not ES, was the party liaising with the US authorities, including the DOJ, on the Cargo and its seizure by the US DOJ, as though it was the owner of the Vessel. Paragraph 15 above is repeated. c) EN had caused ES to wrongfully retain the Cargo and / or to surrender the Cargo to the US DOJ. d) EN is liable for ES failure, refusal and / or neglect to comply with SS / BSP s demands for the re - delivery of the Cargo resulting in ES s liability to BSP for conversion and / or breach of duties in bailment to redeliver the Cargo, take reasonable care of the Cargo and / or not to convert the Cargo.

Paragraphs 22 (a) to (d) of the statement of claim, which are the particulars for the corporate veil to be pierced, do not bear scrutiny.

Nothing turns on paragraph 22 (a). Just because D is the sole shareholder of Euronav Shipping, it cannot be equated without more that D was involved in the purported retention or surrendering of the cargo by Euronav Shipping.

(ii) Similarly for paragraph 22 (b). The observation made by P that the service of the seizure warrant by the US DOJ was upon D rather than on Euronav Shipping is neither here nor there.

(iii) The fact remains that Euronav Shipping was the owner and operator of the vessel Oceania, not D. Furthermore, D has no control over which company the US DOJ chooses to serve the seizure warrant. In this connection, as the subject matter of the seizure warrant pertained to the cargo on the vessel Oceania but was served on D, D accordingly informed Euronav Shipping of the same as its parent company when it received the seizure warrant. There is nothing sinister about this.

(iv) As for paragraph 22 (c), the statement of claim has not provided any particulars as to how D caused Euronav Shipping to wrongfully retain the cargo and to surrender the cargo the US DOJ.

In this regard, the liability sought to be attributed on D in paragraph 22 (d) for the actions of Euronav Shipping is without basis.

Apart from the foregoing, there is no necessity to disregard the corporate veil in this case. In this regard, the Court of Appeal decision in Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 MLJ 752 is instructive. The Court of Appeal said (at page 772) : [48] action was against TNBT - a subsidiary, but the respondents are now seeking to impose liability on the appellant (TNB) - the holding company, and this is untenable in the circumstances of the case. [49] You cannot simply raise the veil of incorporation just because you feel that it is in the interest of justice. But if there is fraud, then the veil of incorporation may be lifted. But here, there was no fraud at all. [50] record at Jilid 1 states that the appellant (TNB) is the directing mind of the TNBT. With respect, that averment is insufficient to trigger the lifting of the veil of incorporation. And right from the very beginning the respondents said that the appellant (TNB) played a prominent role. This cannot be right because the five agreements were contracts between the respondents and TNBT. There was thus no veil to be lifted. Everything was there to be seen and appreciated. Nothing was hidden. Everything was transparent.

Moreover, P itself is unsure as to what it wishes to do with the corporate veil in this case. In the statement of claim, paragraph 22 is preceded by the sub - heading Lifting of the corporate veil paragraph 22 however, P seeks for the corporate veil to be pierced / disregarded , with nothing said of lifting as stated in the sub - heading.

I think there is a distinction in law between lifting, piercing and disregarding the corporate veil. Taking all of them interchangeably as one is embarrassing for want of clarity in the pleadings. I refer to the decision of the Federal Court in Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 4 CLJ 821 at 840 - 842, which held : [45] At para. 27 of the judgment in Prest, Lord Sumption expressed his view that the court may be justified in piercing the corporate veil if a company s separate legal personality is being abused for the purpose of some relevant wrongdoing. In the seminal paragraph of his judgment which is most often quoted, para. 28, he states : The difficulty is to identify what is a relevant wrongdoing. References to a façade or sham beg too many questions to provide a satisfactory answer. It seems to me that two distinct principles lie behind these protean terms, and that much confusion has been caused by failing to distinguish between them. They can conveniently be called the concealment principle and the evasion principle. The concealment principle is legally banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil at all. It is the interposition of a company or perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identity of the real actors will not deter the courts from identifying them, assuming that their identity is legally relevant. In these cases the court is not disregarding the façade but only looking behind it to discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing. The evasion principle is different. It is that the court may disregard the corporate veil if there is a legal right against the person in control of it which exists independently of the company's involvement, and a company is interposed so that the separate legal personality of the company will defeat the right or frustrate its enforcement. Many cases will fall into both categories but in some circumstances the difference between them may be critical ... [50] The consequences of applying the concealment and evasion principles in relation to the wrongdoing in issue also gives rise, theoretically at least, to different consequences in law. When the concealment principle is applicable to a particular wrongdoing, it follows that the court may disregard the corporate shell or personality to enable it to look behind the façade and determine the true facts that were being concealed by the use of the corporate personality. The latter does not preclude the court from determining the truth of the matter in issue. However, no piercing of the corporate veil is involved when applying the concealment principle to enable the court to look behind the façade of the corporate personality. The façade is disregarded in order to enable the court to look at the real facts behind the corporate structure. Or which have been hidden behind the corporate structure. Neither does it follow that liability is necessarily visited upon the corporate personality or the controller of the company. [51] The evasion principle however, is only applicable if there is a legal right available against the controller of the company, independently of the company s involvement. The company is interposed to frustrate the enforcement of the right or to defeat the legal right. [52] When applicable to a particular wrongdoing, it enables the court to pierce the veil and impose liability against the controller, the company, or both. Imposition of liability follows from the application of the evasion principle. It is therefore apparent that liability can devolve upon more than just the actor who is the alter-ego of the company or series of companies. Liability can devolve on other related parties too.

The analysis above demonstrates that there is no justification for the corporate veil of D and Euronav Shipping to be disregarded. Underlining such lack of justification is the unsustainable plea of conspiracy to injure, which will be dealt with next. Conspiracy claim flawed

As alluded to earlier, P has failed to provide sufficient particulars for its claim of conspiracy to injure.

In Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and other appeals [2010] 5 MLJ 394 at 406, the Court of Appeal held that a claim is liable to be struck out if there are insufficient particulars as to a plea of conspiracy to injure. It was held that a plaintiff must condescend to particulars as to :- (a) an agreement between two or more persons; (b) an agreement for the purpose of injuring; (c) that acts done in execution of that agreement resulted in damage; and (d) damages suffered.

Further, it was held that :- (a) the agreement to injure must come first (in other words the agreement should have crystallised), before the alleged unlawful acts are done in execution or pursuant to the agreement; and (b) the overt acts of the defendants must also be pleaded.

These principles have been consistently applied by our courts. (See [2021] MLJU 2422 at [16] to [23] ; Datuk Hj Ishak bin Ismail v Kenanga Investment Bank Bhd & Ors [2012] 7 MLJ 840 at [97], [98] and [101] to [103] ; Deepak Jaikishan Razak & Ors [2020] MLJU 1282 at [32] to [38] ; Ho Hup Construction Company Bhd v Zen Courts Sdn Bhd & Ors [2018] MLJU 325 at [111] to [122] ; Teguh Kemajuan Sdn Bhd v Ngau Boon Keat & Ors [2020] MLJU 1977 at [18] to [24] and [27] ; Thai Odyssey Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chuah Seong Keat & Ors [2022] MLJU 1550 at [35] to [40] ; Yee Teck Fah v Lee Chee Meng & Anor [2021] MLJU 186 at [39] to [52]).

Conspiracy is pleaded at paragraphs 22 to 25 of the statement of claim, which reads : E) Lawful or unlawful means conspiracy 23) EN and ES also wrongfully and with the intent to injure BSP and / or cause loss to BSP by unlawful means conspired and combined together to convert the Cargo and / the Cargo, take reasonable care of the Cargo and / or not to convert the Cargo. Particulars a) EN caused and procured ES not to deliver the Cargo to BSP, the lawful owner of the Cargo, when: (i) BSP had requested of SS, and SS had in turn requested of ES re - delivery of the Cargo to the MT ABYSS on 30 March 2023, (ii) BSP had demanded of SS, and SS had in turn demanded of ES for the same on 5 April 2023 and several occasions thereafter; and (iii) subsequently when BSP itself made a direct demand for delivery of the Cargo to ES on 26 May 2023. b) Even though the US did not have any jurisdiction over ES or EN, in Malaysian territorial waters and / or in the present transaction, EN and ES caused and procured the transfer of possession of the Cargo to the US DOJ in or around July 2023. c) EN and ES intended to injure BSP by depriving BSP of the Cargo to protect and / or promote their own interests. 24) Alternatively, ES and EN conspired and combined together wrongfully and with the sole or predominant intention of injuring BSP and / or of causing wholly unreasonable and unjustified. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the conspiracy, ES retained the Cargo and surrendered the Cargo to the DOJ

(a)] to [23 (b)] above are repeated. 25) above, BSP has suffered loss and damage, being the market value of the Cargo as of 12 June 2023 and the Hedging Losses of USD 13,616,800.

P at paragraphs 23 to 24 of the statement of claim has failed to provide material particulars regarding the alleged conspiracy.

First, P has failed to plead with particulars the purported agreement between D and Euronav Shipping which came to injure P;

(ii) Second, while generally asserting that D controlled Euronav Shipping by virtue of its shareholding, P has failed to condescend to particulars as to how and what is the control exerted by D over Euronav Shipping with specific regard to the cargo in this case;

(iii) Third, P has failed to plead with particulars the overt acts as to how D procured Euronav Shipping to retain the cargo and not to re - deliver the same as requested by P and Silk Straits;

(iv) Fourth, P has failed to plead with particulars the overt acts as to how D procured Euronav Shipping to surrender and transfer the cargo to the US DOJ;

Fifth, P has failed to plead with particulars the overt acts as to how D acted in accordance with the seizure warrant;

(vi) Sixth, P has failed to plead with particulars the interests of D and Euronav Shipping which they are alleged to have protected and promoted in injuring P;

(vii) Seventh, other than D receiving the seizure warrant, P has failed to plead with particulars any dealings of D with the US DOJ which give rise to the allegation of conspiracy to injure.

In the premises, it is my finding that P has not disclosed a reasonable cause of action for conspiracy to injure. obviously unsustainable. Attempt to supplement particulars by way of affidavit

Insufficient particulars aside, P has attempted to supplement its statement of claim and reply by way of its affidavit in reply dated 20.11.2025 in Enclosure 21 as follows.

At paragraphs 16, 45 (a) and 57 (a) on the unpleaded event of the information sent by the United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) to D and another company within the Euronav group alleging that the cargo originated from Iran and that it was subject to sanctions; and

At paragraphs 17 to 19, 45 (b), 65 (a) and (b) on the unpleaded events of one Brian Gallagher giving comments to the press concerning the cargo, ostensibly for and on behalf of D as its alleged representative.

It is trite that affidavits cannot be used to supplement or to improve on pleadings, what more in a claim for conspiracy where sufficient particulars are stringently required in law.

In United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd v Palm & Vegetable Oils (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 206, the Federal Court found unpleaded material facts in the affidavit in support of a summary judgment application. The Federal Court said (at page 207) : any defect or omission in the statement of claim cannot be made good by affidavit .

Further, as held by the High Court in United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Datin Theresah Bt Abdullah & Anor [1994] MLJU 273 : parties are bound by their own pleadings. The further affidavit cannot be used as an improved version of the statement of defence

In Mohd Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak & Ors [2020] MLJU 1282, the High Court held : It is trite that parties are bound by the four corners of their pleadings. A defect in a pleading cannot be rectified by affidavit evidence or submission. In Adib bin Mokhtar & Ors v Jason Chan Chee Khong & Anor [1999] 2 MLJ 473 at 479, the High Court held that the matters stated in the affidavit of the plaintiff in reply to a striking out application cannot be relied upon to make good the omissions in the statement of claim so as to clothe the plaintiffs with a cause of

Even if the aforesaid averments in affidavit are not disregarded, they are devoid of merit.

inconsequential. The fact is that the said letter ought to have been sent to Euronav Shipping and not D, as D did not take on the cargo and has no relationship with Silk Straits or P. The vessel Oceania was at all material times a vessel owned by Euronav Shipping, and not D. The operations and the business of the vessel were subject to Euronav Shipping, and not D. Having received the letter, D informed Euronav Shipping of the same.

Nothing turns on the spokesperson giving press statements for D and Euronav Shipping. It remains a fact that both D and Euronav Shipping are separate and distinct entities. The latter, not the former, owned and operated the vessel Oceania. Nothing turns on this as it lends no weight to the allegation of conspiracy between D and Euronav Shipping.

suppositio the sole shareholder of Euronav Shipping and that the seizure warrant was served on D. This cannot in any reasonable consideration be said to be a sustainable claim for conspiracy on the part of D. Especially when the issues within the communications from the US DOJ pertain to Euronav Shipping as the owner and operator of the vessel Oceania, and not D. Likewise, the subject matter of the seizure warrant being the cargo in Euronav Shipping s hold, not D. Inducement of breach contract not made out

Paragraph 26 of the statement of claim avers that D had wrongfully induced and procured Silk Straits to breach the storage agreement with

At the outset, there is no evidence or finding by any court or tribunal that Silk Straits had breached the storage agreement in the first place.

Further, there is no evidence of any legal proceedings taken by P against Silk Straits for breach of the storage agreement. Neither is there evidence of Silk Straits admitting to such a breach.

As such, the allegation that D had induced such a breach is misplaced.

Further, it is plain that P has not particularised how D would have known of the storage agreement. D is not a party to any agreement with Silk Straits and has no relationship with Silk Straits.

In addition, there are no particulars as to how P had caused Euronav Shipping to purportedly fail to re - deliver the cargo upon the request of Silk Straits. There is also no evidence as to the same.

In the premises, the allegation of inducement of breach of contract is frivolous and vexatious. Abuse of the process of the court

the process of the court. Such abuse stems from the tactical manner in which P has deployed this action to gain an advantage over D and Euronav Shipping.

P could have brought this action in the year 2023 for the same allegations made out in the claim herein.

Instead, P waited it out only to bring this action in the year 2025 alleging conspiracy to injure between D and Euronav Shipping. In so doing, P :

deliberately chose not to name Euronav Shipping as a party herein;

(ii) but attributes all the purported acts of Euronav Shipping on D, by alleging that D and Euronav Shipping are co - conspirators.

In this instance, the delay in bringing such allegations is compounded by the prejudice visited upon D and Euronav Shipping. Any finding of conspiracy would invariably involve adverse findings against Euronav Shipping. However, Euronav Shipping is not a party hereto and cannot defend itself. This action is thus a breach of natural justice.

Further, given that D cannot answer on behalf of Euronav Shipping as they are separate and distinct legal entities, P would in effect be proving its allegations against Euronav Shipping by default and attributing such findings on D by virtue of the manner in which this claim is brought. Such abuse of the process of the court ought not to be countenanced.

As captured in the High Court decision of KCSB Konsortium Sdn Bhd & Anor v Malaysia Building Society Bhd & Anor [2021] MLJU 521 : In the event if the allegation of the purported fraud and conspiracy by the Ayobs Brother and YS are true, the Defendants should have brought them as parties to this suit which in this present case is absen[t]. Moreover, YS is the it is not judicious for me to make a finding of facts on person or co - conspirator who are not a party

The action herein is not maintainable without naming Euronav Shipping as a party. As held by the Court of Appeal in SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Liew Siew Pang & Anor [2011] 4 MLJ 393, there must be a co - existence of an agreement with an overt act causing damage to the observed that although the plaintiffs alleged that other co - conspirators had conspired with the defendants to defraud the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had not named these alleged co - conspirators as co - defendants in the action.

In Abu Bakar bin Mohd Kassim & Ors v Mohd Yusoff bin Mohd Kassim [2016] MLJU 1732; [2016] 1 LNS 247, the Court of Appeal said : [12] It is our view that parties to a conspiracy are jointly and severally liable for all loss flowing from the conspiracy and should be named as parties, unless the names of the conspirators are not known Since Rashdan had not been made a party and the alleged agreement to conspire is between him and the 1st defendant, how could it be said that there was an agreement between Rashdan and the 1st defendant to defraud the plaintiff .

Similarly in bin Ahmad & Ors v Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd [2001] MLJU 638, the High Court held : cannot see how a charge of collusion in a suit can stand when one of the two persons who are parties to the alleged understanding or conspiracy is no longer a party

I am cognizant of the case of Deepak Jaikishan a/l Jaikishhan Rewachand & Anor v Intrared Sdn Bhd (previously known as Reetaj City Centre Sdn Bhd and formerly known as KFH Reetaj Sdn Bhd) & Anor [2013] 7 MLJ 437 (Deepak). Where the High Court opined that it is not necessary that every co - conspirator be made a party failing which the claimant cannot succeed. (See paragraph [173] of the judgment).

I think the reasons for so holding in Deepak are not applicable to the facts of our case.

First, there were reasons and explanation given by the plaintiffs in Deepak as to why KFH was not made a party. (See paragraph [169] of the judgment). However, no reasons are given in our case as to why Euronav Shipping is not named as a party. Or why no in personam claim was properly instituted against Euronav Shipping here.

Second, the explanation given in Deepak was that KFH had settled the matter which resulted in the suit against KFH being withdrawn, leaving Intrared as the remaining party. The High Court thus distinguished the Court of Appeal case of SCK Group due to the different facts. (See paragraph [170] of the judgment). In our case, the allegations against Euronav Shipping remain very much alive even though Euronav Shipping has not been made a party here.

Third, the issue to be determined in Deepak was whether the plaintiffs having withdrawn the suit against KFH can continue with their conspiracy claim against Intrared. (See paragraph [171] of the judgment). In our case, those facts do not apply. Euronav Shipping was never a party in this action. But substantial allegations have been made against Euronav Shipping, whose perceived wrongdoing are attributed to D. As P here never added Euronav Shipping as a party in this action, this is not a case where settlement or withdrawal against Euronav Shipping has been achieved and that the suit carries on without Euronav Shipping.

Apart from the foregoing, the futility of this action is underlined by way to D dated 24.9.2025. Where P describes the issues in the ES s w and fact arising in both the ES Suit and , and proposes that there be a joint trial of this suit and the ES suit.

By virtue of the order of court dated 3.12.2025, the claim for conspiracy to injure and inducement of breach of contract now only appears in this action, where Euronav Shipping is not a party. It goes without saying that Euronav Shipping cannot even file a defence against such allegations pleaded here.

Recall that inducement to breach contract against Euronav Shipping and D by way of an amendment to its ES suit statement of claim has already been disallowed on 3.12.2025 by the court.

The same allegations which have been disallowed are mirrored in this claim here, if maintained, would be incongruous with the order of court dated 3.12.2025.

For the reasons above, I allowed striking out application in Enclosure 16. I awarded costs of RM 20,000 to D. Dated 16 February 2026 Quay Chew Soon Judge High Court of Kuala Lumpur (Commercial Division NCC 2 & Admiralty 9) Counsels Arun Krishnalingam, Lionel Navin Noel, Tan Hui Ling and Eugene Yeap Zhe Jian (Messrs. T S Oon & Partners) for the Plaintiff James Khong (Messrs. James Khong) for the Defendant Case reference 1. Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 1969; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 3 MLJ 36 2. Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & 3 Ors v British - American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 CLJ 606 3. [2013] 4 MLJ 173 4. Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1 5. Pengiran Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff & Anor v Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd (formerly known as Lipkland (Sabah) Sdn Bhd) & Ors [1996] 1 CLJ 257; [1996] 1 MLJ 309 6. Bukit Baru Villas Sdn Bhd v Yeoh Teen Eam & Ors [2017] MLJU 2058 7. Magnificient Empire Sdn Bhd v MPI Generali Insurans Bhd [2022] MLJU 21 8. Tadmansori Holdings Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v Dancom Telecommunications (M) Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors [2025] CLJU 1479 9. Law Kam Loy & Anor v Boltex Sdn Bhd & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 355

Solid Investments Ltd v Alcatel - Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (previously known as

Alcatel Network Systems (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 785

Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [2011] 1 MLJ 752 Ong Leong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 4 CLJ 821

Renault SA v Inokom Corp Sdn Bhd & Anor and other appeals [2010] 5 MLJ 394 14. [2021] MLJU 2422

Datuk Hj Ishak bin Ismail v Kenanga Investment Bank Bhd & Ors [2012] 7 MLJ 840

Ho Hup Construction Company Bhd v Zen Courts Sdn Bhd & Ors [2018] MLJU 325

Teguh Kemajuan Sdn Bhd v Ngau Boon Keat & Ors [2020] MLJU 1977

Thai Odyssey Sdn Bhd & Ors v Chuah Seong Keat & Ors [2022] MLJU 1550

Yee Teck Fah v Lee Chee Meng & Anor [2021] MLJU 186

United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd v Palm & Vegetable Oils (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 206

United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Datin Theresah Bt Abdullah & Anor [1994]

Tun Abdul Razak & Ors [2020] MLJU 1282 KCSB Konsortium Sdn Bhd & Anor v Malaysia Building Society Bhd & Anor [2021] MLJU 521

SCK Group Bhd & Anor v Sunny Liew Siew Pang & Anor [2011] 4 MLJ 393

Abu Bakar bin Mohd Kassim & Ors v Mohd Yusoff bin Mohd Kassim [2016] MLJU 1732; [2016] 1 LNS 247 26. [2001] MLJU 638

Deepak Jaikishan a/l Jaikishhan Rewachand & Anor v Intrared Sdn Bhd (previously known as Reetaj City Centre Sdn Bhd and formerly known as KFH Reetaj Sdn Bhd) & Anor [2013] 7 MLJ 437 Legislation reference 1. Order 18 rule 19 (1) (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012